Psychopaths and Filthy Desks

Philosophical and empirical moral psychologists claim that emotions are both necessary and sufficient for moral judgment. The aim of this paper is to assess the evidence in favor of both claims and to show how a moderate rationalist position about moral judgment can be defended nonetheless. The experimental evidence for both the necessity- and the sufficiency-thesis concerning the connection between emotional reactions and moral judgment is presented. I argue that a rationalist about moral judgment can be happy to accept the necessity-thesis. My argument draws on the idea that emotions play the same role for moral judgment that perceptions play for ordinary judgments about the external world. I develop a rationalist interpretation of the sufficiency-thesis and show that it can successfully account for the available empirical evidence. The general idea is that the rationalist can accept the claim that emotional reactions are sufficient for moral judgment just in case a subject’s emotional reaction towards an action in question causes the judgment in a way that can be reflectively endorsed under conditions of full information and rationality. This idea is spelled out in some detail and it is argued that a moral agent is entitled to her endorsement if the way she arrives at her judgment reliably leads to correct moral beliefs, and that this reliability can be established if the subject’s emotional reaction picks up on the morally relevant aspects of the situation.     

The Kindness of Psychopaths

Psychopathy attracts considerable interdisciplinary interest. The idea of a group of people with abnormal morality and interpersonal relations raises important philosophical, legal and clinical issues. However, before engaging these issues, we ought to examine whether this category is scientifically grounded. We frame the issue in terms of the question whether ‘psychopathy’ designates a natural kind according to the cluster approaches. We argue that currently there is no sufficient evidence for an affirmative answer to this question. Furthermore, we examine three ways of dealing with the category of psychopathy. We could eliminate the category, revise it, or subscribe to a more encompassing account of kinds, which could capture psychopathy as it is currently conceptualised. We argue that while a revision of the category of psychopathy is to be expected with empirical and theoretical advancements, we also emphasise its role in clinical and forensic research, which makes it an important pragmatic kind.     

国外精神病态罪犯的脑机制研究述评

精神病态是一种个体表现在人际关系、情感、生活方式和反社会特质等方面的人格障碍, 与非精神病态者相比, 精神病态者更容易违反社会规则和法律, 表现出更加残忍和极端的侵犯模式, 犯罪的起始年龄更早, 犯罪活动更为广泛和多样, 累犯率非常高。国外关于精神病态罪犯脑机制的ERP研究表明精神病态罪犯注意朝向、语义和情感加工以及对错误加工的后期阶段存在缺陷。MRI和fMRI的研究表明, 大脑结构异常以及额叶-边缘系统回路活动异常与精神病态行为有关。     

Psychopaths and Symmetry: A Reply to Nelkin

Philosophia - An agent is morally competent if she can respond to moral considerations. There is a debate about whether agents are open to moral blame only if they are morally competent, and Dana...     

Acoustic Distinctions in the Speech of Male Psychopaths

A key feature of psychopathy is the ability to deceive, manipulate, and con the unwary, while seeming to be perfectly sincere. Is this impression of sincerity achieved solely through body gestures and facial expression, or is there also something different about the voice quality of psychopaths? We analyzed the acoustic characteristics of speech in 20 male offenders (10 psychopaths and 10 nonpsychopaths), assessed with the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised (Hare, 1991). We used a computer program developed by Alpert, Merewether, Homel, Martz, and Lomask (1986) to measure variations in amplitude and prosody. Results indicated that psychopaths spoke more quietly than controls and did not differentiate, in voice emphasis, between neutral and affective words. These findings are consistent with the developing view that psychopaths are insensitive to the emotional connotations of language. In addition, their vocal characteristics may be part of a self-presentation mode designed to manipulate and control interpersonal interactions.     

Psychopaths and blame: The argument from content

The recent debate over the moral responsibility of psychopaths has centered on whether, or in what sense, they understand moral requirements. In this paper, I argue that even if they do understand what morality requires, the content of their actions is not of the right kind to justify full-blown blame. I advance two independent justifications of this claim. First, I argue that if the psychopath comes to know what morality requires via a route that does not involve a proper appreciation of what it means to cause another harm or distress, the content of violations of rules against harm will be of a lower grade than the content of similar actions by normal individuals. Second, I argue that in order to intend a harm to a person—that is, to intend the distinctive kind of harm that can only befall a person—it is necessary to understand what personhood is and what makes it valuable. The psychopath's deficits with regard to mental time travel ensure that s/he cannot intend this kind of harm.     

On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible

A number of philosophers have recently argued that we should interpret the debate over moral responsibility as a debate over the conditions under which it would be “fair” to blame a person for her attitudes or conduct. What is distinctive about these accounts is that they begin with the stance of the moral judge, rather than that of the agent who is judged, and make attributions of responsibility dependent upon whether it would be fair or appropriate for a moral judge to react to the agent in various (negative) ways. This is problematic, I argue, because our intuitions about whether and when it would be fair to react negatively to another are sensitive to a host of considerations that appear to have little or nothing to do with an agent’s responsibility or culpability for her attitudes or behavior. If this is correct, then theories which make attributions of responsibility dependent upon the appropriateness of our reactions as moral judges will turn out to be fundamentally misguided. I am grateful to Barbara Herman, T. M. Scanlon, and two anonymous reviewers for The Journal of Ethics for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I am also grateful to Pamela Hieronymi and the members of her Fall 2201 graduate seminar on moral responsibility at UCLA, and to the audience members at Simon Fraser University, for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this material. My biggest debt of gratitude goes to Jean Roberts, for stimulating discussion and insightful commentary on multiple drafts of this paper.     

Personality Differences between Responsible and Less Responsible Children

Social maladjustment has been related to an external locus of control orientation. It was hypothesized, therefore, that delinquent females would be more external than a control sample. Further, since alienation from others is also associated with maladjustment, it was expected that the delinquents would also prefer greater distance from others. These hypotheses were confirmed with discussion being in terms of implication for rehabilitation of delinquents.     

Marijuana Revisited

This review examines recent research on the psychological effects of marijuana. The article contains material on potency, research problems, use patterns in the United States, and expectancy, as well as a review of research on acute effects, including psychosis, toxic delerium, acute anxiety, and brain damage. Nonacute effects are also examined, with material on studies of amotivational syndrome, intellectual functioning, memory, sexual activity, and driving. Research on marijuana's relationship to other drugs and to criminal behavior is also evaluated. Implications for counselors are discussed. Counselors are urged to help provide accurate information to users and to encourage an informed-decision approach. The significance of marijuana use to value and life-style choice and the counselor's role in considering marijuana law changes are evaluated.     

Quotation Revisited

Philosophical Studies -     

Porn Revisited

In this paper I will revisit the debate over pornography by doing three things: (a) I will suggest a more sophisticated, two-dimensional set of distinctions between positons in the debate; (b) I will then go on to attack both libertarians and the group I call "repressive feminists"; and (c) I will conclude by suggesting that by means of Hume's theory of sympathy we could support a limited form of censorship to bring women more fully into our moral and political community. I turn first to the labors of definition.     

We-Intentions Revisited

This paper gives an up-to-date account of we-intentions and responds to some critics of the author’s earlier work on the topic in question. While the main lines of the new account are basically the same as before, the present account considerably adds to the earlier work. For one thing, it shows how we-intentions and joint intentions can arise in terms of the so-called Bulletin Board View of joint intention acquisition, which relies heavily on some underlying mutually accepted conceptual and situational presuppositions but does not require agreement making or joint intention to form a joint intention. The model yields categorical, unconditional intentions to participate in the content of the we-intention and joint intention (viz. shared we-intention upon analysis). The content of a we-intention can be, but need not be a joint action. Thus a participant alone cannot settle and control the content of the intention. Instead the participants jointly settle the content and control the satisfaction of the intention. These and some other features distinguish we-intentions from “action intentions”, viz. intentions that an agent can alone settle and satisfy. The paper discusses weintentions (and other “aim-intentions”) from this perspective and it also defends the author’s earlier account against a charge of vicious circularity that has been directed against it.     

Confidentiality Revisited

This article challenges the importance and necessity of confidentiality, which are often taken for granted, and questions whether the default promise of confidentiality to all participants, particularly in educational research, could in fact be an unnecessary concern. This article begins by reviewing the difference in the way confidentiality is handled in different fields and the applicability of some underlying assumptions. This is followed by an explanation of why confidentiality is investigated in the sense of anonymity in this article. Then the article draws on an empirical study where original researchers and their original participants were interviewed about their views on anonymity. Lastly, the contradiction between the promises of confidentiality and the recognition of a participant’s contribution is highlighted. The article concludes with a call for more empirical observation and investigation into the importance of confidentiality.

Jihad Revisited

This article offers an overview of the various formulations of jihad during the first six Islamic centuries (7th–13th CE), showing them to be embedded in particular socio‐historical contexts. If the essential significance of jihad as righteous cause (i.e., action for the sake of a moral order) is shown to have been variously altered according to the needs and conditions of the Muslim community, significant possibilities arise for a contemporary understanding of jihad that is relevant to the needs and circumstances of the Muslim community today. Some features of the jihad tradition, although specific to a particular period and with little relevance today, continue to inform the current discussion on jihad. Discussion of the jihad tradition, then, should take care to distinguish the historically incidental features of the tradition from those with an enduring relevancy. By doing so, the jihad tradition will be able to contribute to discussions on the relation of religion to the public order and political organization, even those not limited to Islam.     

Royaumont Revisited

Michael Dummett has claimed that the only way to establish communication between the analytic and Continental schools of philosophy is to go back to their point of divergence in Frege and the early Husserl. In this paper, I try to show that Dummett's claim is false. I examine in detail the discussions at the infamous 1958 Royaumont Colloquium on analytic philosophy. Many – including Dummett – believe that these discussions underscore the futility of attempting to bridge the gap between Continental and analytical philosophies in anything like their current shapes. I argue, however, that a close study of the Royaumont proceedings rather reveals how close some of the analytical speakers were to some of their Continental listeners.