共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
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Benjamin De Mesel 《The Journal of Ethics》2017,21(3):309-333
According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility. Secondly, Zimmerman questions the significance of the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility, according to the Strawsonian view. Thirdly, he argues that that view may be taken to suggest the wrong kind of priority relation between ‘P is morally responsible’ and ‘it is appropriate to adopt some reactive attitude toward P’. I discuss each of these problems in turn and conclude that Strawsonians can respond to all three problems raised by Zimmerman. The Strawsonian view supports a significant interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. 相似文献
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Michael J. Zimmerman 《The Journal of Ethics》2017,21(3):251-262
In a recent article in this journal, I argued against the popular twofold Strawsonian claim that there can be no moral responsibility without a moral community and that, as a result, moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. Benjamin De Mesel has offered a number of objections to my argument, including in particular the objection that I mischaracterized Strawson’s view. In this article, I respond to De Mesel’s criticisms. 相似文献
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Eric Christian Barnes 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2017,98(4):533-554
Some compatibilists have responded to the manipulation argument for incompatibilism by proposing an historical theory of moral responsibility which, according to one version, requires that agents be morally responsible for having their pro‐attitudes if they are to be morally responsible for acting on them. This proposal, however, leads obviously to an infinite regress problem. I consider a proposal by Haji and Cuypers that addresses this problem and argue that it is unsatisfactory. I then go on to propose a new solution inspired by the libertarian theory of Robert Kane. 相似文献
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Michael Weber 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(2):209-226
Larry Temkin has shown that Derek Parfit’s well-known Mere Addition Paradox suggests a powerful argument for the intransitivity
of the relation “better than.” The crux of the argument is the view that equality is essentially comparative, according to
which the same inequality can be evaluated differently depending on what it is being compared to. The comparative view of
equality should be rejected, I argue, and hence so too this argument for intransitivity.
相似文献
Michael WeberEmail: |
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A random sample of 1033 adults in an Australian community survey completed a form containing the abbreviated Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire together with an index of community involvement in a range of secular groups and church attendance. The data indicate that different personality characteristics are associated with church attendance on the one hand and with secular areas of community involvement on the other hand. 相似文献
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Significant public efforts have been mounted to stop the perceived epidemic of texting and driving, especially among younger drivers. However, despite the taken-for-granted nature of these fears, cell phones are reported as a contributing factor in only about 1% of all crashes. This study examines 11 years of crash data from Kentucky to demonstrate that despite the exponential growth of cell phones in American culture, cell phone-related crashes have remained stable over time, and they represent far less of a public health risk than most people are led to believe. The conclusions are presented in the context of moral panic theory. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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Moral Responsibility and the Irrelevance of Physics: Fischer’s Semi-compatibilism vs. Anti-fundamentalism 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Helen Steward 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):129-145
The paper argues that it is possible for an incompatibilist to accept John Martin Fischer’s plausible insistence that the
question whether we are morally responsible agents ought not to depend on whether the laws of physics turn out to be deterministic
or merely probabilistic. The incompatibilist should do so by rejecting the fundamentalism which entails that the question
whether determinism is true is a question merely about the nature of the basic physical laws. It is argued that this is a
better option for ensuring the irrelevance of physics than the embrace of semi-compatibilism, since there are reasons for
supposing that alternate possibilities are necessary for moral responsibility, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary. There
are two distinct reasons for supposing that alternate possibilities might be necessary for moral responsibility—one of which
is to do with fairness, the other to do with agency itself. It is suggested that if one focuses on the second of these reasons,
Fischer’s arguments for supposing that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for moral responsibility can be met by the
incompatibilist. Some possible reasons for denying that alternate possibilities are necessary for the existence of agency
are then raised and rejected.
相似文献
Helen StewardEmail: |
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Whitley Kaufman 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(4):629-632
This book is the fourth volume of a series on moral psychology edited by philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Each of these volumes is organized in debate format, with ten or so main essays each followed by responses from two critics, with an opportunity for the author of the main essay to make a final reply.The present volume takes on the question of free will and moral responsibility, and addresses the question of what implications recent discoveries in neuroscience and social psychology have for our traditional notions of moral and legal responsibility, as well as for popular and philosophical notions of free will. Given the constant barrage of media coverage of scientists declaring that science has now proven that free will is an illusion, and even that morality itself is an illusion, this volume covers a topic that is timely, relevant, and important. 相似文献
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Katharina Nieswandt 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2019,97(1):15-28
A powerful objection against moral conventionalism says that it gives the wrong reasons for individual rights and duties. The reason why I must not break my promise to you, for example, should lie in the damage to you—rather than to the practice of promising or to all other participants in that practice. Common targets of this objection include the theories of Hobbes, Gauthier, Hooker, Binmore, and Rawls. I argue that (1) the conventionalism of these theories is superficial; (2) genuinely conventionalist theories are not vulnerable to the objection; and (3) genuine moral conventionalism is independently plausible. 相似文献
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William L. Rowe 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(3):295-313
Thomas Reid developed an important theory of freedom and moral responsibility resting on the concept of agent-causation, by
which he meant the power of a rational agent to cause or not cause a volition resulting in an action. He held that this power
is limited in that occasions occur when one's emotions or other forces may preclude its exercise. John Martin Fischer has
raised an objection – the not enough ‘Oomph’ objection – against any incompatibilist account of freedom and moral responsibility.
In this essay I argue that Fischer's not enough ‘Oomph’ objection fails to provide any reasons for rejecting Reid's incompatibilist,
agent-causation account of freedom and moral responsibility. 相似文献
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ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject-based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically. 相似文献
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《Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management》2013,33(3):339-356
This research examines a model focused on two acute workplace stressors—interpersonal conflict and work overload—and their interrelationships with role stress, emotional exhaustion, job attitude, working smart, job performance, and turnover intentions. The moderating role of working smart on the relationship between work overload and interpersonal conflict is also investigated. A model is tested using responses of sales employees working for four large financial institutions in South America. Findings indicate that work overload and interpersonal conflict mediate the impact of role stress on emotional exhaustion, job attitudes, and behaviors. Our findings also show that work overload plays a significant role in the stressor-strain process. Results are discussed with reference to previous findings and future research. 相似文献
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Does Everyone Think the Ability to do Otherwise is Necessary for Free Will and Moral Responsibility?
Philosophia - Christopher Franklin argues that, despite appearances, everyone thinks that the ability to do otherwise is required for free will and moral responsibility. Moreover, he says that the... 相似文献