Are We All Little Eichmanns?

Philosophia - In this review essay, I review in detail Abram de Swann's fine new book, The Killing Compartments. The book is a theoretical analysis of the varieties and causes of genocides and...     

‘We Are All One,We Are All Gods’: Negotiating Spirituality in the Conscious Partying Movement

Research literature has been growing over the past five years which explores the religious significance of electronic dance music cultures. This article adds to this work by offering an analysis of spiritual discourses used within a particular underground dance scene in the UK, the ‘conscious partying’ movement. An ethnographic account is given of a typical dance night within this scene, which demonstrates how these spiritual discourses are embedded within a range of musical, artistic, therapeutic, and political networks and practices. The use and salience of spiritual discourses of oneness, energy, and immediatism within this scene are then analysed. It is argued that the conscious partying scene in the UK reflects spiritual ideas and practices within the wider global psy-trance music scene and that this study demonstrates the importance of ethnographic research for examining the complex ways in which such broader spiritual discourses may be negotiated within specific groups. The article concludes by identifying possible future research that explores in more depth the relationships between spiritual discourses, the aural properties of electronic dance music, and embodied practices of dance.     

Are My Temporal Parts Agents?

When we think about ethics, we normally focus on a particular sort of agent: the individual person. Some philosophers have argued that we should rethink the limits of what counts as an ethically relevant unit of agency by expanding outward, and claiming that groups of people can have normative reasons for action. In this paper, I explore whether we can go in the other direction. Are there sub-personal beings who count as agents with their own reasons for action? In particular, might the temporal parts of persons, beings like “me-in-my-twenties,” be thought of as normative agents? This idea, I argue, has deep attractions, and deep, but surmountable, challenges. And if we do accept this idea, I argue, this can indirectly help to support the case for thinking that groups can have reasons for action.     

Are All Preferences Nosy?

The significance which any human action carries for normative reasoning is held to include its causal preconditions as well as its causal consequences. That claim is defended against a series of natural objections. The point is then extended from actions to preferences via discussion of Barry and Dworkin. The grounds for excluding nosy preferences from aggregation must involve appeal not just to rights and intention but also to the consequences of acting on them. But then some of the features in virtue of which nosy preferences are held to be objectionable will also be present in any other preference. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

‘We Are All the Same,We All Are Mestizos’: Imagined Populations and Nations in Genetics Research in Colombia

In Colombia, as in other Latin American countries, current population genetics research is based on the understanding that Colombians constitute a mestizo nation, given the admixture process that took place between Africans, Amerindians, and Europeans during colonial times. The mestizo is a pervasive category used by geneticists to conduct, organise, and publish research studies that deal with the continent's peopling process and the genetic makeup of its contemporary population(s). It is also the dominant imaginary for the Colombian population and a key nation-building ideology. By tracing how this category moves and is used across four Colombian genetics laboratories, it is possible to discern that despite its apparently clear-cut boundaries, the mestizo is contingent, contested, and flexible, allowing for multiple understandings and usages. This flexibility and multiplicity are visible in the quantification of genetic ancestry, the divisions of geographical location, and the understanding of gender. Such understandings allow one to think about a homogeneous nation (inclusive) that is simultaneously heterogeneous (exclusive); they provide multiple but not necessarily contradictory possibilities of being mestizo, allowing the coexistence of images of the nation that could otherwise seem contradictory; and they permit navigation around contested terms such as race, while simultaneously thinking of mixed races or racialised individuals. Finally, these flexible and multiple constructions of the mestizo (re)produce various subjects as ‘other’, whether they are women, the Indigenous, the black/dark, or the poor.     

Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?

Incompatibilists believe free will is impossible if determinism is true, and they often claim that this view is supported by ordinary intuitions. We challenge the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive to most laypersons and discuss the significance of this challenge to the free will debate. After explaining why incompatibilists should want their view to accord with pretheoretical intuitions, we suggest that determining whether incompatibilism is in fact intuitive calls for empirical testing. We then present the results of our studies, which put significant pressure on the claim that incompatibilism is intuitive. Finally, we consider and respond to several potential objections to our approach.     

Are We Essentially Animals?

Animalism is the view that we human individuals are animals. And standard animalists claim that if we are animals, we are animals essentially. This is because they believe that if we are animals, we are essentially members of the human kind (e.g., human animal, Homo sapiens), and as a result, we have the criterion of identity by virtue of that kind. The goal of this paper is to reject the claim that our being animals implies our essentially being animals. I begin by reformulating the standard animalist's argument for the claim that we are essentially biological entities of some sort. I then argue that the very same argumentative strategy can be applied against standard animalism. Specifically, the standard animalist's reasoning for the claim that we are contingently psychological beings faces a dilemma that undermines the claim that we are animals essentially. In the remainder of the paper, I reply to various objections to my argument and consider a strategy that animalists can pursue in attempting to block the dilemma.     

Are All Primitives Created Equal?

Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling ( 2013 ), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky ( 2013 ), between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be metatheoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives.     

Why Are We Certain that We Exist?

Descartes was certain that he was thinking and he was accordingly certain that he existed. Like Descartes, we seem to be more certain of our thoughts and our existence than of anything else. What is less clear is the reason why we are thus certain. Philosophers throughout history have provided different interpretations of the cogito, disagreeing both on the kind of thoughts it characterizes and on the reasons for its cogency. According to what we may call the empiricist interpretation of the cogito, I can only claim to be certain of having experiences, and this certainty, as well as that of my own existence, stems from their phenomenal and subjective character. According to rationalist interpretations, on the other hand, I am certain of having some self‐reflexive propositional attitudes, and this certainty derives from their rational features. Psychiatric patients suffering from acute forms of depersonalization or of the Cotard syndrome often doubt that they think and exist, and might even believe that they don't. I argue that their study allows us to favor the empiricist interpretation of the cogito.     

Are We All Overconfident in the Long Run? Evidence from One Million Marathon Participants

In this project, we measured overconfidence in a large, heterogeneous sample making familiar, repeated choices in a natural environment that provided direct feedback. Specifically, in study 1, we elicited predictions of own finishing time among participants of the 2012 Warsaw Marathon. The participants' prediction errors were highly correlated with the change in pace over the course of the run: overly optimistic forecasters slowed down more in the second half. In study 2, we consequently took this slowdown as a proxy for overconfidence and used existing field data of one million participants in several large marathons for which split times are available (but own predictions are not). Both studies indicate that men as well as the youngest and oldest participants tend to be more confident. In study 2, we were able to investigate national and cultural dimensions. We found confirmation of previously reported findings of relative overconfidence in Asians. Additionally, we show some largely novel results, in particular that relatively conservative societies tend to be relatively overconfident. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.