Utopia and history. Some remarks about Nikolai Berdjaev’s struggle with history

The article deals with the philosophy of Nikolai Berdjaev (1874–1948), which he formulated between The Philosophy of Inequality (written in 1918, but published in 1923) and The New Middle-Ages (1924). Berdjaev’s philosophy is analyzed in the context of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and its aftermath. The other point of reference is the crisis of culture and civilisation, which affected the West in the inter-war period. Berdjaev’s position has been interpreted in view of the archetypal myth of the struggle of the two principles, the principle of order (cosmos) and the forces of destruction (chaos). This myth is tied to the millenialist world view. Berdjaev took an anti-utopian stance. He juxtaposed the utopian-revolutionary principle with the hierarchical-creative one. From this position he criticized among others democracy, liberalism and socialism. In the midst of the crisis of the 1920s he remarked the possibility of spiritual rejuvenation putting forward the concept of the New Middle-Ages. One can say that at that time Berdjaev’s philosophy evolved within the conservative-creative framework, from the utopia of conservatism to the utopia of ‘free creativity’.     

Johannes Kepler’s computer simulation of the universe: Some remarks about theory in psychology

Computer simulation may be an overly seductive way of formulating theory in the social sciences. The capability of constructing complex computer simulation models may remove some of the incentive for finding simple laws. This point is illustrated via a fantasy in which the sixteenth century astronomical theorist, Johannes Kepler, uses Ms computer instead of his mind to account for extant data on stellar and planetary motion. Similarities between sixteenth century cosmology and twentieth century psychology are discussed.     

Some remarks on “ambiguity” and “perceptual processes”

A paper by Bever, Garrett, and Hurtig on the perception of ambiguous sentences is analyzed in terms of (1) the explanation offered for the experimental findings, (2) the linguistic theory underlying the experiment, and (3) the characteristics of the stimuli utilized. It is concluded that Bever, Garrett, and Hurtig's findings are open to serious question, particularly because of multiple deficiencies in the design of the experiment.     

Some thoughts on self‐disclosure and the danger‐safety balance in the therapeutic relationship

This paper examines the assumptions and recommendations of Irwin Hoffman on self‐disclosure and Jay Greenberg on the danger—safety balance in the therapeutic relationship. On the basis of this examination, alternatives to the ideas of Hoffman and Greenberg are offered for consideration.     

Between cultural relativism and liberal ethnocentrism: What does Saudi Arabia tell us about cultural variation in moral identity and prejudice?

Cultural conceptions of morality are grounded in diverse moral foundations, but moral identity research often assumes that individualizing concerns are the universal basis for morality. Moral identity scales grounded only in individualizing foundations risk liberal ethnocentrism, to the extent that binding foundations emphasized in collectivist cultures are overlooked. Three hundred and ninety-five Saudi Arabian and UK participants completed prejudice and moral identity measures, which either narrowly measured only individualizing foundations or broadly measured both binding and individualizing foundations. The broader measure had greater power to predict prejudice scores in both countries, particularly in Saudi Arabia. Generally, moral identities grounded in individualizing foundations predicted less prejudice, while moral identities grounded in binding foundations predicted higher prejudice in both countries. Individualizing measures of moral identity may assess ethnocentric concepts, but recognizing morality grounded in binding considerations may taint the category of moral identity with self-concepts that are associated with greater—not less—ethnocentrism.     

Why teach ethics in science and engineering?

The following views were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) Seminar “Teaching Ethics in Science and Engineering”, 10–11 February 1993 organized by Stephanie J. Bird (M.I.T.), Penny J. Gilmer (Florida State University) and Terrell W. Bynum (Southern Connecticut State University). Opragen Publications thanks the AAAS, seminar organizers and authors for permission to publish extracts from the conference. The opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the opinions of AAAS or its Board of Directors.     

Merleau‐Ponty and Nagarjuna: relational social ontology and the ground of ethics

Through a comparative analysis of the key ontological notions in Merleau‐Ponty and Nagarjuna, I develop a relational social ontology that is grounded in their respective implicit and explicit ethics. Both thinkers take heed of our being‐in‐the‐world; this is evident in their views on intersubjective sociality and language. Recognizing the limitations in these views points us toward a greater understanding of the meaningfulness of our situated existences. In this vein, I propose a number of ideas to guide the work of comparative philosophy.     

Contextualism,relativism and ordinary speakers’ judgments

Some authors have recently claimed that relativism about knowledge sentences accommodates the context sensitivity of our use of such sentences as well as contextualism, while avoiding the counterintuitive consequences of contextualism regarding our inter-contextual judgments, that is, our judgments about knowledge claims made in other contexts. I argue that relativism, like contextualism, involves an error theory regarding a certain class of inter-contextual judgments.

Can relativism be reconciled with realism and causalism?

This paper deals with two fundamental assumptions of the Strong programme in the sociology of knowledge and the theoretical (im) possibility of their co‐existence with the general relativist tendency of this programme. The first assumption is the realist thesis introduced into the Strong programme through the materialist presupposition that sense experience is reliable and humans are able to learn about the regularities of the non‐social world in order to survive. The second assumption is the causal principle. Arguments developed in this paper lead to the conclusion that neither realism nor causalism can be reconciled with relativism. In both cases inconsistency is brought about by a tension between scientific perspective and relativism, between an external approach aiming at objective, universal, and causal explanation of what is studied, on the one hand, and the internal, relativist and reflexive, hermeneutical understanding of the human, on the other hand. The belief that the sociology of knowledge can be at the same time scientific, like the natural sciences, and relativist, like certain philosophies but not the natural sciences, is not sufficiently justified in the Strong programme.     

Some myths about ‘mental illness’

Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called ‘mentally ill’ are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever thought differently was (C) because of unsophisticated category mistakes or (D) because of an adherence to the epistemology of a sick society; and (E) that the phrase ‘mental illness’ is used to mask value judgments about others’ behavior in pseudo‐scientific respectability. Reasons are given for rejecting each of these versions of the argument that mental illness is a myth.     

What’s philosophically interesting about engineering ethics?

What makes a subject philosophically interesting is hard-to-resolve confusion about fundamental concepts. Engineering ethics suffers from at least three such fundamental confusions. First, there is confusion about what the “ethics” in engineering ethics is (ordinary morality, philosophical ethics, special standards, or something else?) Second, there is confusion about what the profession of engineering is (a function, discipline, occupation, kind of organization, or something else?) Third, there is confusion about what the discipline of engineering is. These fundamental confusions in engineering ethics connect with philosophically interesting work in moral theory, political philosophy, and philosophy of science. Work in these areas may help with the philosophical problems of engineering ethics. But, equally important, work in engineering ethics may help with the philosophical problems in these others fields.     

Toward law–gospel harmony in Lutheran theology and ethics

Lutheran antipathy toward the law is harmful to Christian ethics. This antipathy arises from the false notion that law and gospel are opposed. However, the Lutheran Confessions show that law–gospel distinction does not necessarily imply law–gospel opposition. When law and gospel are properly defined, they interrelate harmoniously within a multiperspectival model of Christian ethics. Moreover, the third use of the law then emerges as the basic and primary use.     

Thinking about non‐being∗

There are genuine references to non‐existent objects, as can be seen through elucidating reference in common language and applying the criteria enumerated to expressions used in writing and speaking about fiction. The concept of a fictitious entity is simply accepted in the adoption of the ‘language‐game’ of fiction and has no undesirable ontological consequences. To think otherwise is to fail to attend to the conceptual status of such talk. Accounts of fictional discourse by Russell, Ryle, and Chisholm are found objectionable. The concept of existence is touched on, and consequences concerning reference to abstract and other objects and also concerning method in ontology mentioned.     

Fill‐in and infill errors in order memory

Many current models of memory are specified with enough detail to make predictions about patterns of errors in memory tasks. However, there are often not enough empirical data available to test these predictions. We report two experiments that examine the relative frequency of fill‐in and infill errors. In immediate serial recall tasks, subjects sometimes incorrectly recall item N too soon, placing it in position N?1. The error of interest is which item is recalled after this initial mistake. A fill‐in error is the tendency to recall item N?1 next, whereas an infill error is the tendency to recall item N+1 next. Both experiments reveal more fill‐in than infill errors, not only overall but at each possible error location throughout the list. The overall ratio is approximately 2:1. We conclude that none of the currently existing models adequately accounts for fill‐in and infill errors.     

Four observations about “six domains of research ethics”

Stimulated by Kenneth Pimple's "Six Domains of Research Ethic", this paper examines four aspects of the responsible conduct of research and scientists' social responsibilities. I argue that scholars and decision-makers concerned with the responsible conduct of research should take notice of the rapidly growing body of scholarship on the social organization of science and the behavior of scientists, integrating that work with ethical principles. Of particular concern are the increasing heterogeneity and interdisciplinary of research, the ambivalences in the practice of peer review, the social tensions of research life, and the heightened concern for social and economic returns from federal research investments. In all, the paper echoes and develops Pimple's call for integrative thinking about the responsible conduct of research.