Proving the non‐existence of God

Using Rawls's theory as illustration, I argue that any conception of justice which includes a commitment to equality of opportunity eventually must collide with a commitment to the family. I then contend that the link between justice and equality of opportunity cannot be severed by showing that one powerful attempt to do so founders. Borrowing from Martin Buber, I try to show that the perspective required by justice is different from and opposed to that required for intimate relations. Moreover, I argue that the institution of the family provides the soil without which human intimacy withers. Finally, I try to suggest that the need for human. I‐You encounters is a response to aspects of the human condition quite different from those which give rise to institutions of justice and the state.     

Conceiving existence: on Hume’s argument against the distinctness of the idea of existence

There are two questions concerning Hume’s doctrine of existence which have not yet found any persuasive answer: (a) What is his argument in favour of the thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence? (b) What are the semantic and metaphysical consequences of this thesis within his philosophical framework? This paper mainly aims to answer question (a). In order to do that, I will first explain why some reconstructions suggested by interpreters such as Cummins and Bricke are problematic. One of them relies on exegetically dubious presumptions; the other departs too much from Hume’s text. Then, I will offer my own reconstruction that makes maximal use of some principles which are very familiar to Hume’s readers, including the principle stating the similarity between perceptions and their images. After that, I will discuss a potential objection to my reconstruction and make a brief remark on question (b), arguing that, as opposed to numerous interpreters’ concerns, Hume’s thesis that there is no distinct idea of existence does not by itself prevent him from being able to conceive negative existential propositions.     

Comments on ‘A model of diffusion-induced grain boundary migration’ by T. K. Chaki

Abstract

Chaki (1988) has recently proposed a model for diffusion-induced grain boundary migration (DIGM). In his Letter he concluded that the interface energy of a grain boundary and the free energy of mixing are responsible for DIGM and, from the equations he derived, it was claimed that they can explain many DIGM experimental results. However, on examining his model closely there appear to be some fundamental difficulties. The following are comments on his Letter:

(1) In Chaki's calculation of ΔG_s he assumed that, after interface 1 had moved a distance δx, the radius of curvature of this interface increased from R to R + δx, which gives a surface energy drop of 2γV_m δx/R². However from many DIGM observations (for example Balluffi and Cahn (1981)) the curvature of a migrating boundary is increased rather then decreased, that is, the surface free- energy term actually prevents a grain boundary from migrating rather than helping it!

(2) Chaki considered ΔG_cryst during the migration of interface 2. It is also necessary to consider AGcrys, during the migration of interface 1, since within the migration distance δx the structure is changed from a crystalline structure to a grain boundary core structure. ΔG_m should also be considered during the migration of interface 2 since the concentration of the area swept by interface 2 will not be the same as that of a grain boundary core.     

The ‘face’ of the il y a: Levinas and Blanchot on impersonal existence

This essay argues for a reading of Levinas’ work which prioritizes the significance of the il y a over the personal Other. I buttress this reading by using the well-documented intersections between Levinas’ work and that of Maurice Blanchot. Said otherwise, I argue that Levinas’ relationship with Blanchot (a relationship that is very much across the notion of the il y a) calls scholars of the Levinasian corpus to place the conception of impersonal existence to the forefront. To do so is to take seriously the complex relationship between Levinas’ explicitly ethical account of the face, and his phenomenological account of impersonal existence. To approach Levinas in this way (by way of his relationship with Blanchot) is to not only recognize that the ethical import of the face lies in its being without determination or nomenclature, but it is to also fully acknowledge the underlying horror of a Levinasian rendition of the ethical encounter.     

On the aims of medicine: Comments on ‘philosophy of medicine as the source for medical ethics’

Health defined as the psychophysiological capacity to act or respond appropriately in a wide variety of situations, is enhanced by many means other than preventing and treating disease and injury. Therefore no choice of a particular medical intervention is likely to maximize health for all people with (or at risk for) a given disease. As a result, if medical practitioners are to be fully competent in the sense of knowing not only how to perform procedures but when and when not to do so, they must be able to support patients (and those who know and care about them) in weighing all of the many factors which bear upon the decision as to which, if any, medical interventions are likely to improve the person's health.     

Yemeni debates on the status of non‐Muslims in Islamic law

This essay examines Yemeni legal debates, in the period between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, regarding the status of and relations with non‐Muslims inside and outside the Islamic state. The legal works considered in this paper are written by Zaydi scholars, but they are informed by all other Muslim legal traditions. Studies of the Islamic law of nations and of the dhimma system have traditionally fluctuated between either wholesale condemnation or unqualified apologetic defence. And yet, as the works examined in this essay illustrate, the Islamic legal position on each of the controversial aspects of the laws of non‐Muslims is diverse, and it does not lend itself to essentialist classifications. Moreover, this diversity demonstrates the internal flexibility of the law and its inherent potential for reforming itself.     

Editorial ‘Political Normativity. Critical Essays on the Autonomy of the Political’

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice -