论马克思对康德自由概念的感性证明

自由是贯穿整个西方文化的价值目标,是主体之为主体的根据,它发展到德国古典哲学时期已经取得了巨大成果,康德和马克思的自由观就宛如德国近代自由思想的两个点:康德自由概念的核心是自由意志,并且它是纯粹理性的唯一事实,但对它的证明始终是个问题;马克思对康德的"自由"进行了感性证明。     

Aesthetic Licence: Foucault's Modernism and Kant's Post-modernism

Recently criticism and theory have maintained that Kant's aesthetic theory is central to modernism, and have used Foucault's archaeology to interrogate that modernism. This paper suggests that archaeology ultimately cannot escape Kant's hold because it depends on Kantian theses. The first section will consider how a recent exponent of an 'archaeological' viewpoint characterizes Kant's theory and will set out the critical role Kant ascribes to art. The second section compares Kant and Foucault to argue that despite appearances their projects turn out to be substantially coterminal. My interest in comparing these critics is not only to be provocative but also to show that post-modernist thinking, at least in the guise of Foucault, needs and uses standards that Kant proposes.     

On A Semantic Interpretation Of Kant's Concept Of Number

What is central to the progression of a sequence is the idea of succession, which is fundamentally a temporal notion. In Kant's ontology numbers are not objects but rules (schemata) for representing the magnitude of a quantum. The magnitude of a discrete quantum 11...11 is determined by a counting procedure, an operation which can be understood as a mapping from the ordinals to the cardinals. All empirical models for numbers isomorphic to 11...11 must conform to the transcendental determination of time-order. Kant's transcendental model for number entails a procedural semantics in which the semantic value of the number-concept is defined in terms of temporal procedures. A number is constructible if and only if it can be schematized in a procedural form. This representability condition explains how an arbitrarily large number is representable and why Kant thinks that arithmetical statements are synthetic and not analytic.     

观念的关系,或先天的形式——论胡塞尔对休谟与康德"先天"概念的反省

一方面,在休谟的主要著作中,先天(apriori)这一概念很少出现,但胡塞尔却认为休谟的"观念的关系"是惟一真正的认识论上重要的先天概念。另一方面,"先天"是康德哲学原则性的主题之一,"先天的形式"可谓康德对先天的基本理解,但胡塞尔却宣称,康德缺乏真正的先天概念。胡塞尔正是通过对休谟和康德"先天"概念的反省而发现他本人所谓的"本质-先天"概念,并在思想发展史上产生了重大效应。     

论数据的本质及其与信息的关系

大数据技术的进步,给传统科学哲学带来了诸多挑战。科学哲学家们需要重新思考数据的本质,进而深入思考数据的特性以及与信息的内在关联。对数据本质的理解主要有两种:一是关系论,二是表征论。以大数据技术的发展为依据,可知关系论更加合理,同时可将信息解释为数据加意义。数据和现象的区分,可以进一步为我们提供理解数据之本质的途径。从大数据的发展看数据和现象的区分,可以得知在不同语境中对数据的定义是不同的,因此数据的两种定义其实并没有冲突。通过对香农的信息定义的解读,可知信息和数据之间有着内在的关联,二者是关系实体的不同表述方式。解决问题的关键在于该定义所使用的语境,以及是否赋予意义在此关系之上,因此数据就是信息,万物皆可信息化或数据化。     

Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's Kant's Ethical Thought

Karl Ameriks has recently devoted an entire volume to defending what he calls "orthodox" Kantianism against what he judges to be the "errors" of such post-Kantian idealists as K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte and to exposing what he claims is the frequently unnoticed but always deleterious influence of post-Kantianism upon certain prominent strands of contemporary philosophy. In response, this paper challenges Ameriks' interpretation of Kantianism itself and of the "post-Kantian project", as well as his construal of transcendental idealism. This is followed by some remarks concerning Reinhold's and Fichte's actual "arguments" for transcendental idealism and a rejection of Ameriks' characterizations of the same. Ameriks' interpretation of "the primacy of the practical" within Fichte's philosophy is also analyzed and criticized, as are his unsubstantiated claims concerning the powerful "indirect" influence of the writings of Reinhold and Fichte upon contemporary philosophy.     

基督教的教义性、伦理性与社会和谐

基督教既是教义性的信仰,也是伦理性的宗教。教义是其内涵,伦理是其外延,二者的有机结合才构成真正的基督教。基督教的教义性表现是,以信经宣告信仰,以圣经确立并检验教义,以教会活动践行教义。基督教的伦理性在于相信一位伦理的上帝,这位上帝必然要求基督徒重伦理、讲道德,尤其注重爱、圣洁和公义。教义性和伦理性相结合,一定能对构建和谐社会产生积极的作用。     

康德之人格性概念的形而上维度

对康德哲学中"Person"和"Pers?nlichkeit"概念加以清晰区分是必要的。以康德文本为基础对这两个概念加以界定和阐述,目的是从关于人格性之实在性问题的探讨出发来展现它是如何为伦理学中的"义务""道德"和"归责"这些核心概念提供一种形而上的奠基的。     

康德启蒙自然观的文化批判

康德的启蒙理性自然观包含三个维度。第一个维度是不可知自然,它体现了人类在有限存在状态中对终极关怀的渴望。第二个维度是人的天性自然,它凸显出人类对自身自然性的合理肯定,表达了人类主体性的展开。第三个维度是合目的性自然,它显现了人类的理性自觉。康德的启蒙理性自然观最终促成了人的理性主体性在近代的全面建立,引发了自然向人生成的理论建设,但同时也成为了主体性是否应该回归自然的现代性争论以及自然被置于边缘地位的生态学困惑的思想源点。     

On Brentano's objections to Kant's theory of knowledge

The main purpose of this essay is to examine Brentano's rejection of Kant's theory of a priori concepts and synthetic a priori judgments. The essay begins by recalling the views of Descartes and Locke about the acquisition of knowledge, since Brentano regards them as on the whole correct or, at least, as pointing in the right direction and since he regards Kant's epistemology as obscurantist and reactionary (Section 1). There follows a brief characterization of Brentano's conception of knowledge as based on self-evident inner perception and analytic propositions, i.e. propositions which are true ex terminis (Section 2). Next some aspects of Kant's epistemology are compared with corresponding features of Brentano's doctrine (Section 3). In the light of this comparison the validity of Brentano's criticisms is examined (Section 4). In conclusion an independent view of the function of concepts and of their relation to perception is briefly outlined and contrasted with the views of Kant and Brentano (Section 5).     

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy: Nature and Relation to Non-Cognitive Behavioral Therapy

Since the introduction of Beck’s cognitive theory of emotional disorders, and their treatment with psychotherapy, cognitive-behavioral approaches have become the most extensively researched psychological treatment for a wide variety of disorders. Despite this, the relative contribution of cognitive to behavioral approaches to treatment are poorly understood and the mechanistic role of cognitive change in therapy is widely debated. We critically review this literature, focusing on the mechanistic role of cognitive change across cognitive and behavioral therapies for depressive and anxiety disorders.     

Nature,corruption, and freedom: Stoic ethics in Kant's Religion

Kant's account of “the radical evil in human nature” in the 1793 Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone is typically interpreted as a reworking of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin. But Kant does not talk about Augustine explicitly there, and if he is rehabilitating the doctrine of original sin, the result is not obviously Augustinian. Instead, Kant talks about Stoic ethics in a pair of passages on either end of his account of radical evil and leaves other clues that his argument is a reworking of an old Stoic problem. “Radical evil” refers to the idea that our moral condition is—by default and yet by our own deed—bad or corrupt; and that this corruption is the root (radix) of human badness in all its variety, ubiquity, and sheer ordinariness. Kant takes as his premise a version of the Stoic idea that nature gives us “uncorrupted starting points” (Diogenes Laertius 7.89). What sense can be made of the origin of human badness, given such a premise? Kant's account of radical evil is an answer to this old Stoic problem, which requires a conception of freedom that is not available in his Stoic sources.     

恶、自由与康德的善人概念

本文将借鉴康德哲学的资源来重新思考自由与恶的问题.之所以以康德为中心,主要是因为康德与自由主义(Liberalism)之间存在着微妙的关系.一方面,两者有很多共同的价值诉求,如在凯克斯看来,"自由主义归属给个人的核心重要性通过康德所表达的自主观念得到极大的提高";而在另一方面,康德与自由主义在诸如自主这样的基本概念层面并不完全相同,而康德哲学的复杂性与深刻性也许能为容纳这些基本价值提供另一种可能的空间.