On misunderstanding science

Abstract

The paper examines the differences between Kuhn's account, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, of the sciences as necessarily communal activities with internally set standards of procedure and achievement, and that view of the sciences which calls itself ‘Scientific Realism’ and regards them as striving toward, and perhaps asymptotically approaching, some external and objective reality that bestows truth or falsity on scientific theories.

The main argument turns on Poincaré's demonstration that Newton's Second Law (f = ma) is not a testable, provable proposition with a truth value, but something that is simply adopted. It is adopted in the light of experience, certainly, but there is no logical necessity in the adoption. My suggestion is that it is a ‘way of looking’ and ‘a method of analysis’ and that the necessity of its adoption by any individual lies in its being a necessary condition of entry into the scientific community. That community itself adopts ways of looking or methods of analysis for their fruitfulness in dealing with old problems and defining new ones.

Incoherences in the ‘approach’ account of scientific progress are looked at, and the individualistic assumptions that motivate it. These require the sciences to be presented as the source and basis of agreement and community amongst separated individuals. This picture and its requirement inverts reality as well as Kuhn's account, which makes community and agreement the starting point. The notion of reality as a transcendental convergence point becomes redundant.

The old problem of the incommensurability of paradigms is discussed by relating them to the notions of ways of looking and methods of analysis. These may be incompatible in that one cannot look at things in two different ways at once, but at the same time they cannot be measured on any common scale.     

IV. Understanding Peter Winch

Peter Winch's The Idea of a Social Science has been the subject of repeated misunderstanding. This discussion takes one recent example and shows how Winch's argument is gravely distorted. What is at issue is not, as is usually supposed, whether we can accept or endorse another society's explanations of its activities, but whether we have to look for an explanatory connection between concepts and action. Winch's argument is that before we can try to explain actions, we have to identify them correctly. This can only be done by seeing how they, and the concepts they are associated with, fit within a way of life. Grasping its rule‐following character is understanding action. Once the difficulties in making such identifications are appreciated, we will be less inclined to accept facile explanations why people in other societies do the things they do.     

道家的"两行"和禅宗的"一行"--论冯友兰先生对"两行"的错误理解

本文从冯友兰先生对"两行"的理解谈起,对"两行"的出处、思想根源和修养方法进行了分析,并据此将道家与禅宗的最高境界进行对照,得出了冯友兰先生的理解是错误的结论.     

简论孙中山的宗教观

本文沿着孙中山一生的足迹,探索宗教文化对其思想发展的影响。青少年时代．他受洗入教,成为虔诚的基督教徒。在革命生涯的开创时期．基督教精神成为推动其革命的动力之一。迈向不惑之年的孙中山,自愿礼拜民间宗教偶像,发誓遵守洪门帮规,其主旨在于发展革命势力。民国初创时期,孙中山作为民主共和制度的缔造者．努力谋求各种宗教势力的支持,表现出近代民主政治家的风鉴。在其晚年思想的飞跃中,孙中山的宗教观也日臻成熟达观。其一．科学比宗教优越。其二．政治的主义比宗教的主义切实。其三,宗教之仁在于,以心感化民众,为灵魂谋幸福,健全国民人格,培养国家之基。晚年的孙中山力图将基督教文化与中国传统文化融合。他呼吁：“本基督救世之苦心．行孔子自立立人、自达达人之美意。”     

杨向奎先生易学研究述略

在杨向奎先生博大精深的学术体系中,易学研究是一个重要内容。关于《周易》的来源和性质,关于《周易》和易学在中国思想文化史上的地位、影响,关于中国易学的发展等问题,杨先生都有所探究、有所创获。杨先生的易学研究是多视角、全方位的,既有对《周易》和易学文本及其相关材料的具体而微的开掘、考证和阐释,又有对易学史及其相关问题的宏观认识和总体把握。杨先生没有拘泥于传统的象数与义理之分。而是将二者熔为一炉,融会贯通,综合超越,始终注意将易学问题置于宏大的思想文化背景和流变中来系统考察,将易学研究建立在文化史、社会史研究的基础上,从而更好地展示了易学演变的脉络和规律。     

Fundamentally misunderstanding visual perception. Adults' belief in visual emissions

The authors reviewed research about a profound misconception that is present among college students, namely, the belief that the process of vision includes emanations from the eyes, an idea that is consistent with the extramission theory of perception, which was originally professed by early Greek philosophers and which persisted in scholarly circles for centuries. The authors document the strength and breadth of this phenomenon and the object failure of traditional educational techniques to overcome this belief, and they reveal that students are leaving psychology courses with a flawed understanding of one of the most studied processes in the history of psychology--visual perception. Some suggestions are offered for overcoming this misconception in traditional college classroom settings.     

Peter Winch and Political Authority

This article explores a neglected aspect of Peter Winch's work: his writings on political authority. It seeks to show that this neglect is undeserved. Three themes are interweaved in the discussion. First, the major developments in Winch's thinking between his first published article on political authority (in a symposium with Richard Peters) and his later writings on the subject are identified and assessed. Criticism is focused mainly on his tendency to be insufficiently attentive to the distinction between being in authority and being an authority, and the implications this has for the distinctiveness of political authority. Secondly, particular attention is given to some of the key strands in Winch's analysis. These include his distinction between the nature and the grounds of political authority, how the role of consent is to be understood in the light of this distinction, how an adequate understanding political authority does not undermine our ideas of autonomy, and what it might mean to reject the whole idea of political authority. Finally, the article concludes by briefly defending the value of Winch's approach to political philosophy. Earlier it is shown that Winch's analysis does not foreclose on a range of political responses to authority, and this point is generalised to argue for a philosophical approach (like Winch’s) that aims at understanding, rather than at advancing any particular set of moral or political principles.     

论中--兼评程、朱对"中"的严重曲解

中道即指天道。之所以称“中”,是因为天道运行具有精准守信、不过不忒的品性。人能精准如实地、恰如其分地把握和实行天道,就是合于“中”,就是奉行中道。这两层意思都可以用“无过无不及”之“中”来表述。所谓“调和、折中、平衡”,都不是“中”的本义。程、朱用“不偏不倚”释“中”,是对中庸之德的极大歪曲。     

Enactment as understanding and as misunderstanding

The author considers the concept of enactment as a ubiquitous event that is best seen as part of a sequence in the process of understanding a patient. As such, enactments are not unusual or special save as they are often subject to disavowal or to being singled out by the analyst as especially subject to scrutiny. Once recognized, enactments need to be interpreted: not so much in terms of their unconscious origins, but more with regard to the need to include them in the analytic dialogue.