Toward a Post-Representational Politics?: Participation in the 21St Century

Representational democracy has been the main form of government in the West since the English, American, and French revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries. However, there are indications that its ability to frame the relationship between citizen and state has begun to weaken. This weakening can be traced to many factors. One of these is the emergence of new collective actors, such as social movements, and the (re)recognition of the arena of “civil society” just as the articulating power of political parties began to erode. Although these emerged initially under the umbrella of the nation state, toward the end of the 20th century a qualitatively new dynamic of networked social activism illustrated that the nation-state was no longer the only location for political action and the exercise of citizenship. These trends point to a new participatory dynamic, which could not yet be said to offer a serious challenge to representative forms of politics, but that arguably marks the beginning of the decline of that form. However, we are far from understanding how a participatory democracy might replace representational government. This article argues that we should begin now to discuss the uncomfortable gaps in our understanding of what “qualifies” participation, in order to develop a new theory of new practice and strengthen the content and potential of this new political imaginary.     

Can the Innate Right to Freedom Alone Ground a System of Public and Private Rights?

The state regulates the way in which social power is exercised. It sometimes permits, enables, constrains, forbids how we may touch others, make offers, draw up contracts, use, alter, possess and destroy things that matter to people, manipulate, induce weakness of the will, coerce, engage in physical force, persuade, selectively divulge information, lie, enchant, coax, convince, … In each of these cases, we (sometimes unintentionally) get others to act in ways that serve our interests. Which such exercises of power should the state forbid? Which should it permit? An intuitively appealing way to answer this question is, with Ripstein and Kant, to point to the role of freedom: exercises of social power can be legitimately prohibited when (and only when) they restrict people's freedom. But this raises a further question: How do we identify when such exercises of power make people unfree in the relevant sense? Ripstein, in defending Kant, draws a crucial distinction between actions that subject others’ wills to our choices (and which it would therefore be presumptively legitimate for the state to forbid) and actions that merely affect the contexts in which others act (and which it would therefore be presumptively illegitimate for the state to forbid). I query that distinction, and argue that the idea of independence cannot bear, on its own, the weight it is expected to bear within the Kantian framework.     

National Security,Self-rule,and Democratic Action

Most discussions of the relationship between liberty and security focus on the idea that enhancing citizens’ security may require imposing constraints on their civil liberties (e.g., freedom of association, of movement, of communication, and so on). This paper explores the question of how measures to enhance security stand vis à vis the idea of political liberty, i.e. the idea of citizens’ collectively directing the power of their state. It distinguishes two models whereby citizens might enact that ideal of self-rule and argues that with respect to issues of national security, the less direct model, which entrusts political agents to make decisions beyond direct democratic input, will often be more appropriate. It argues as well that various practices often seen as fundamentally at odds with the ideal of rule by the people (e.g., government deception, lack of transparency, covert action) are in fact consistent with a reasonable construal of that ideal. It concludes by outlining various criteria that would have to be met for such practices to be morally permissible in democratic states.

     

What Is Terrorism?

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is not to try to formulate the meaning the word ‘terrorism’has in ordinary use; the word is used in so many different, even incompatible ways, that such an enterprise would quickly prove futile. My aim is rather to try for a definition that captures the trait, or traits, of terrorism which cause most of us to view it with moral repugnance. I discuss the following questions: Is the historical connection of terrorism with terror to be preserved on the conceptual level, or relegated to the psychology and sociology of terrorism? Does mere infliction of terror qualify as terrorism, so that we can speak of non-violent terrorism? If terrorism is a type of violence, does it have to be against persons, or should violence against property also count? In what sense can terrorism be described as indiscriminate violence? Should we use the word only in a political context? In such a context, can we speak of ‘state terrorism’, or should the word be restricted to actions not sanctioned by law? Is the terrorist necessarily oblivious to moral considerations, as those who define terrorism in terms of antinomianism imply? My answers to these questions lead up to the following definition: terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating them, or other people, into a course of action they otherwise would not take.     

Political Legitimacy,the Egalitarian Challenge,and Democracy

This article argues against the claim that democracy is a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Instead, I propose a weaker set of conditions. First, I explain the case for the necessity of democracy. This is that only democracy can address the ‘egalitarian challenge’, i.e. ‘if we are all equal, why should only some of us wield political power?’. I show that if democracy really is a necessary condition of political legitimacy, then (what I label) the problems of domestic justice and of international legitimacy become intractable. I then argue that the egalitarian challenge is addressed where the requirements of (1) horizontal equality, (2) acceptable vertical inequality, and (3) publicity, are met and where (4) citizens have some institutionalized opportunity for a voice in decisions. I show that these conditions can be realized in non‐democratic form and conclude by explaining how the four conditions can be employed to make the problems of domestic justice and of international legitimacy more tractable. Overall, my ambitions are limited. I do not offer an all‐things‐considered case against democracy but I do show that (some) forms of non‐democratic government are permissible.     

Muslim Women and the Politics of Religious Identity in a (Post) Secular Society

Women’s bodies, states Benhabib (Dignity in adversity: human rights in troubled times, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011: 168), have become the site of symbolic confrontations between a re-essentialized understanding of religious and cultural differences and the forces of state power, whether in their civic-republican, liberal-democratic or multicultural form. One of the main reasons for the emergence of these confrontations or public debates, says Benhabib (2011: 169), is because of the actual location of ‘political theology’. She asserts that within the context of globalization, the concept of ‘political theology’ is complicated by its unstable location between religion and the public square; between the private and official; and between individual rights to freedom of religion versus state security and public well-being. Ultimately, therefore, the nature of the tension between religion as a political theology and the forces of state power can at best be described as a clash between identities of a collective nature (as envisaged by the nation-state) and identities of an individual nature (as manifested in different religions and cultures). Ongoing attempts to counter the ascendancy of religion, and as will be discussed in this article, specifically the ascendancy and visibility of Islamic identity as practiced by Muslim women, has brought into serious debate the notion of a (post) secular society and its implications for religious rights. What emerges from the state’s insistence that individuals not be allowed to enter the public discourse as religious beings, are, on the one hand, the constraints imposed on Muslim women by liberal democracies, and on the other hand, that Islam, as represented by Muslim women, is not constitutive of democratic citizenship. Will the inclusion and recognition of Muslim women, therefore, necessarily augment a democratic citizenship agenda, and will it lead to an alleviation of the conflict? Then, in exploring a re-articulation of an inclusive citizenship—one which is held accountable by its minimization of social inequality—what ought to be the parameters of inclusion and how should it unfold differently to what is already happening in liberal democracies?     

Technology and the civil epistemology of democracy

In analogy with Rousseau's concept of ‘civil religion’ as a system of ‘positive dogmas’, ‘without which’, as he observed, ‘a man cannot be a good citizen’, this paper advances the concept of ‘civil epistemology’ as the positive dogmas without which the agents of government actions cannot be held accountable by democratic citizens. The civil epistemology of democracy shapes the citizen's views on the nature of political reality, on how the facts of political reality can be known and by whom. Modern liberal democratic politics assumes that the exercise of political power can be manifest in a visible domain of publicly accessible facts. It rests on the Enlightenment faith in the powers of light and visibility to demystify political power, render political actors more exposed and therefore more honestly accountable and enlist the sense of sight as a vehicle of universal political participation. It is, in this context, that technology has come to play such an important symbolic role in the construction of the particular democratic genre of public action as a political spectacle. Democratic civil epistemology, and technology ‐ in the widest sense of the word ‐ as the prototype of action which can be observed in the field of visual perception, uphold the democratic conception of politics as a view. Together they define political actors as visible performers, journalists as observers (who translate actual seeing into virtual seeing) and the citizens as witnesses.     

Will Capitalists Live Happily Ever After? – Political Myth: On the Use and Abuse of Biblical Themes – By Roland Boer

What would our world be like if all oppositions to capitalism were to be removed? The author describes a doomsday scenario instead of everlasting plenitude if capitalists have their ways. This conclusion comes from the author's masterful discussion of political myth and analysis of the narrative of Genesis to Joshua as a political myth. The narrative of the Hexateuch constructs and at the same time punishes all sorts of rebels who oppose the theocratic state it wishes to establish. But myth is uncanny in that the rebellion hides what it fears the most, the impossibility of such a state to come true, and needs what it desires to annihilate in order to persist as an unfulfilled fantasy that powers a political movement. The author argues that some politicians in Australia and the USA are abusing the logic of the political myth of the Hexateuch in order to support their capitalistic agendas and, therefore, the Left must tell the ending of the capitalist fantasy of endless production and expansion in order to reveal its contradictions.     

Terminator or Super Mario: Human/Computer Hybrids, Actual and Virtual

Abstract: Is a human/computer hybrid feasible: If so, in what ways would such hybridization affect our concept of what it means to be human? There are two forms of such hybridization, the actual and the virtual. Actual hybridization involves the implantation of mechanical devices in the human body. In actual hybridization the computer comes to us and to our body to enhance our functioning in our world. In virtual hybridization we go to the computer, projecting our minds into the world of cyberspace and being formed there. Perhaps the most common form of virtual hybridization is the immersion our children experience in the world of video games. Both forms of hybridization encourage us to think of ourselves only in terms of function, just when most of our theologians find that humans reflect the image of God through our relationships. This emphasis on function best serves the military, but leaves us in the theological community with a dissatisfying concept of what it means to be human.     

People,State and Civic Responses to Immigration,Xenophobia and Racism in the New South Africa

As a result of its political transformation, South Africa has become a victim of its own success, in that the shift in political power brought about a range of new discriminatory practices and victims. South Africa became a magnet for nationals from African countries who came to ‘the rainbow nation’ to share in the fruits of more stable governance and enjoy the benefits of a larger more dynamic economy, instead find themselves faced with xenophobia and racism. The aim of this paper is to analyse the development of immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa in terms of the vulnerabilities and protections it has afforded migrants, as well as ways in which it has informed the behaviour of state officials from 1994 to 2008. It highlights trends and tensions surrounding immigration reform in the new South Africa and argues that legislation has made significant strides in informing the behaviour of high- and low-ranking officials in government and state departments but still has a long way to go.     

Revolution Against Non-violent Oppression

Oppressive governments that use violence against citizens, e.g. murder and torture, are usually thought of as liable to armed revolutionary attack by the oppressed population. But oppression may be non-violent. A government may greatly restrict political rights and personal autonomy by using surveillance, propaganda, manipulation, strategic detention and similar techniques without ever resorting to overt violence. Can such regimes be liable to revolutionary attack? A widespread view is that the answer is ‘no’. On this view, unless a government is or is likely to turn violent, revolution against it is disproportional. After all, revolution would involve launching potentially lethal attacks against oppressors who do not threaten the lives and bodily integrity of their subjects but pose only lesser threats. I argue that this claim of disproportionality is false. Armed revolution against Stably Non-violent Oppressive Regimes (which are neither violent, nor are likely to become violent) can be proportional under some circumstances, thus they may be liable to revolutionary attack. My argument relies on the Responsibility-Sensitive Account of Proportionality. This account holds that responsibility for posing threats renders agents liable to greater defensive harms than the harms with which they threaten. Even if non-violent oppressive regimes do not threaten citizens with murder, serious physical injury, or enslavement, their responsibility for creating an environment in which citizens’ political rights and personal autonomy are extremely restricted may loosen the proportionality requirement of inflicting defensive harm and render them liable to revolutionary attack.

     

What are randomised controlled trials good for?

Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are widely taken as the gold standard for establishing causal conclusions. Ideally conducted they ensure that the treatment ‘causes’ the outcome—in the experiment. But where else? This is the venerable question of external validity. I point out that the question comes in two importantly different forms: Is the specific causal conclusion warranted by the experiment true in a target situation? What will be the result of implementing the treatment there? This paper explains how the probabilistic theory of causality implies that RCTs can establish causal conclusions and thereby provides an account of what exactly that causal conclusion is. Clarifying the exact form of the conclusion shows just what is necessary for it to hold in a new setting and also how much more is needed to see what the actual outcome would be there were the treatment implemented.     

Recent Consideration of World Government in the IR Literature: A Critical Appraisal

Because recent contributions on world government in the international relations (IR) literature have focused on relatively nebulous issues, they are of limited usefulness for illuminating whether or not an actual world government would advance the human prospect. This question cannot be sensibly addressed unless in the light of a specific institutional proposal. Along the authority-effectiveness continuum separating the relatively ineffectual existent United Nations on the one hand, and the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state on the other, there are intermediate possibilities not subject to the respective disadvantages of the extreme endpoints of this continuum.     

Do Muslims in Germany Really Fail to Integrate? Muslim Integration and Trust in Public Institutions

Multivariate analysis of 2008 data from the German Social Survey (ALLBUS) provides firm evidence on the basis of one important dimension of political integration??individuals?? trust in the political system??that Muslims are integrating well into German society. The results are significant despite controls for multiple indicators of respondents?? social capital, socioeconomic status, post-material views, ideological position, partisan support for parties in power, assessment of government performance, interest in politics, and amount of television viewing. Furthermore, Muslims?? level of religiosity does not influence their level of political trust. The findings raise new questions about integration in that the significantly lower levels of political trust found among non-Muslims may negatively affect their views of government and its efforts to respond to Germany??s Muslim population. Skepticism and distrust of government by non-Muslim ethnic Germans may undermine important programs designed to bridge the actual value and cultural differences which remain the source of the ignorance that fuels prejudice and discrimination.     

Can We Use Social Policy to Enhance Compliance with Moral Obligations to Animals?

Those who wish to abolish or restrict the use of non-human animals in so-called factory farming and/or experimentation often argue that these animal use practices are incommensurate with animals’ moral status. If sound, these arguments would establish that, as a matter of ethics or justice, we should voluntarily abstain from the immoral animal use practices in question. But these arguments can’t and shouldn’t be taken to establish a related conclusion: that the moral status of animals justifies political intervention to disallow or significantly diminish factory farming and animal experimentation. In this paper, we set out to do two things: First, we argue that while the arguments mentioned above may establish the moral impermissibility or injustice of the practices they condemn, they are not sufficient to justify political interventions or social policies to abolish or restrict such practices. It is one thing to argue that some moral imperative or imperative of justice exists, and quite another thing to call for the use of political power to induce compliance with that imperative. Our second task is to assess the prospects for developing an argument that is sufficient to justify political interventions to restrict or abolish the use of non-human animals in factory farming or experimentation. Beyond establishing the immorality or injustice of animal consumption or experimentation, one must show that the interventions in question constitute legitimate use of political power. Would prohibiting or discouraging animal use be legitimate? We attempt to answer this question within the context of fundamental liberal constraints on the legitimate use of coercive political power.     

Contextualising the Quebec Charter of Values: how the Muslim ‘Other’ is conceptualised in Quebec

At varying points in Quebec’s recent history, political parties have gained prominence through employing identity politics, framing Muslims as a threatening ‘Other’. This occurred during the Reasonable Accommodation debates from 2006 to 2008 and more recently in discussions over Bill 60, a proposed law that would have prohibited government employees or employees of state-funded institutions from wearing conspicuous forms of religious attire. This article attempts to contextualise the anti-Muslim fallout which resulted from Bill 60, arguing that it was symptomatic of pre-existing fears of a threatening ‘Other’. Through examining how Quebec identity was transformed in the 1960s, this article will demonstrate how the values proceeding from this era influenced state policies to preserve the white francophone majoritarian culture. In the post-9/11 context, this has resulted in Islamophobic rhetoric and anti-Muslim bias permeating political and media discourses in Quebec on the grounds of asserting gender equality and secularist ideals.     

The Tyranny of the Enfranchised Majority? The Accountability of States to their Non-Citizen Population

The debate between legal constitutionalists and critics of constitutional rights and judicial review is an old and lively one. While the protection of minorities is a pivotal aspect of this debate, the protection of disenfranchised minorities has received little attention. Policy-focused discussion—of the merits of the Human Rights Act in Britain for example—often cites protection of non-citizen migrants, but the philosophical debate does not. Non-citizen residents or ‘denizens’ therefore provide an interesting test case for the theory of rights as trumps on ordinary representative politics. Are they the ultimate success story of the human rights framework? Or was Michael Walzer correct to describe government of denizens by citizens as a modern form of ‘tyranny’? This paper argues that neither liberal rights theorists nor democratic republicans provide a coherent response to the existence of denizens. Liberal rights theorists overstate the extent to which a politically powerless status can secure individual rights, while democratic republicans idealise the political process and wrongly assume that all those affected by laws are eligible for political participation. The paper outlines an alternative model for assessing the accountability of states to their non-citizen population, informed by the republican ideal of non-domination. It identifies gaps in state accountability to denizens–such as where there is inadequate diplomatic protection—and argues that these gaps are particularly troubling if their exit costs of leaving the state are high.     

You Ought to Know Better: the Morality of Political Engagement

I argue that, from the liberal perspective, citizens have a pro tanto moral duty to cultivate and maintain a readiness to participate in politics when such an action is called for from the moral perspective—I will call it “the pro tanto duty of political engagement.” It requires a citizen to (i) monitor what the government is doing (or not doing), (ii) evaluate its actions, and (iii) learn what she can do to intervene politically. In Section 1, I will discuss some doubts on the pro tanto duty of political engagement. In Section 2, I will describe Alexander Guerrero’s account of culpable ignorance and argue from his account that the pro tanto duty of political engagement is derived from a general moral duty to properly manage one’s morally relevant beliefs. In Section 3, I will argue that to properly assess the moral significance of any government policy or policy proposal, one must learn about the lives and personal values of those who would be affected by the policy.     

The ‘fruit of enlightenment': Education,politics and Muslim-Christian relations in contemporary Tanzania(1)

Raising the standard of education in the country is a priority task for the Tanzanian government. However, it seems that completion of this task may cause political problems insofar as, since the colonial period, Christians have generally been more educated than Muslims and obtained better access to high administrative positions. If Muslims become as educated as Christians, will it not lead to a severe struggle for power between the two communities? Our analysis based on field research reveals that this is not very likely to be the case: neither the present-day situation nor the tendencies we trace point to a high probability that this negative scenario will materialize. A rise in the standard of education level of both Christians and Muslims will rather contribute to an increase in tolerance in Christian-Muslim relations in the country.     

The linguistic organization of public controversy: A note on the pragmatics of political discourse

Conclusion This paper does not mean to imply that it is only public controversy that can meaningfully affect political outcomes, or even that it is the most important factor. Rather, we have attempted to indicate that public controversy constitutes a forum on which political actorsact; on which they attempt to implicate each other and the public in terms of some preferred view of the controversy at hand. It is certainly the case that the formal structure of the government and power relationships provides important constraints in terms of which controversy may take place. Yet within these constraints, actors can meaningfully construct various views of the structure of the controversy which differently construe the rights and obligations of participants. In this sense, the course of public controversy may in part be understood as a function of the language employed by these actors, both to the extent that particular expressions stand as documentary evidence of underlying discrepancies about the shape of the controversy and to the extent that the logic of certain speech-acts constrains the forms subsequent statements may take.