Wittgenstein on Metaphysical/Everyday Use

Wittgenstein remarked 'What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use' ( PI §116). On this basis, his 'later philosophy' is generally regarded as a version of 'ordinary language philosophy'. He is taken to criticize philosophers for making ('metaphysical') statements which deviate in different ways from the everyday use of some of their component expressions. I marshal textual evidence for another reading of this remark, and show that he used 'metaphysical' in a traditional way, namely, to describe philosophical attempts to delineate the essence of things by establishing necessities and impossibilities. On his conception, 'everyday' simply means 'non-metaphysical' (in this precise sense). Comparisons of philosophical utterances with non-philosophical uses of words are meant to call attention to this crucial distinction.     

Winch and Wittgenstein on moral harm and absolute safety

This paper examines Wittgenstein’s conception of absolute safety in the light of two potential problems exposed by Winch. These are that, firstly: even if someone’s life has been virtuous so far, the contingency of its remaining so until death vitiates the claim that the virtuous person cannot be harmed; and secondly: when voiced from a first-person standpoint, the claim to be absolutely safe due to one’s virtuousness appears hubristic and self-undermining. I argue that Wittgenstein’s mystical conception of safety, unlike some others, requires no claim about one’s own virtue and hence can be construed as avoiding these problems.     

Winch on Understanding Other People

This paper aims to identify the main points that Peter Winch makes, or reminders that he offers, about understanding ourselves and others. It would no doubt be possible to construct a theory out of these ideas, but I try to avoid giving the impression that Winch does so. Instead, the most Wittgensteinian approach to the subject is, as Winch does, to describe, remind and thereby clarify, without putting forward any kind of questionable hypothesis. Winch's work brings out the fact that understanding people is importantly connected to both wisdom and practical being in tune with others, but identical with neither.     

Wittgenstein on Understanding as a Mental State

In trying to make clear whether understanding is a mental state Wittgenstein asks a series of questions about the timing and duration of understanding. These questions are awkward, and they have posed a great challenge for commentators. In this paper I review the interpretations by Mole and by Baker and Hacker, and point out their problems. I then offer a new interpretation which shows (1) that a “mental state” in this context means a state of consciousness, (2) that Wittgenstein's questions are intended to elicit the grammars of the words “understand” and a “state of consciousness”, (3) that, in this way, he clearly shows that understanding is not a state of consciousness and (4) that he also provides a therapy to dissolve the problem.     

Technology Games: Using Wittgenstein for Understanding and Evaluating Technology

In the philosophy of technology after the empirical turn, little attention has been paid to language and its relation to technology. In this programmatic and explorative paper, it is proposed to use the later Wittgenstein, not only to pay more attention to language use in philosophy of technology, but also to rethink technology itself—at least technology in its aspect of tool, technology-in-use. This is done by outlining a working account of Wittgenstein’s view of language (as articulated mainly in the Investigations) and by then applying that account to technology—turning around Wittgenstein’s metaphor of the toolbox. Using Wittgenstein’s concepts of language games and form of life and coining the term ‘technology games’, the paper proposes and argues for a use-oriented, holistic, transcendental, social, and historical approach to technology which is empirically but also normatively sensitive, and which takes into account implicit knowledge and know-how. It gives examples of interaction with social robots to support the relevance of this project for understanding and evaluating today’s technologies, makes comparisons with authors in philosophy of technology such as Winner and Ihde, and sketches the contours of a phenomenology and hermeneutics of technology use that may help us to understand but also to gain a more critical relation to specific uses of concrete technologies in everyday contexts. Ultimately, given the holism argued for, it also promises a more critical relation to the games and forms of life technologies are embedded in—to the ways we do things.     

The Physical: Empirical, not Metaphysical

Intuitively, physicalism is the thesis that there’s nothing ‘over and above’ the physical. Going beyond this intuitive formulation requires an account of what it is for a property, kind, relation, or object to be a physical one. Here I defend an unfamiliar implementation of the familiar strategy of defining physical properties, etc. as those posited by the complete and ideal physical theory. That implementation ties being a physical theory to being a theory with the hallmarks of scientific theories and then identifies physical theories among the scientific ones by their characteristic subject matter, roughly, the world’s relatively fundamental elements. I then argue that, fully fleshed out, such an account is able to satisfy an array of constraints on any account of the physical, as well as avoid a number of prima facie objections, without imposing Wilson’s No Fundamental Mentality Constraint.     

Illusions of Sense in the Tractatus: Wittgenstein and Imaginative Understanding

Certain expositors of the Tractatus have tried to make sense of Wittegnstein's curious revocation of its propositions by suggesting that although they lack content, they nonetheless express ("show," but do not say) some ineffable truths about reality. Such a view Cora Dimaond labels "chickening out." I attempt to diagnose the lingering attraction of the 'chicken' (in this case an attraction to an illusion of sense) by condsidering a (false) parallel with the case of perceptual illusion. To this end, I make a brief excursion into the work of Gareth Evans in order to draw out what the parallel would look like and more specifically how the chicken might be tempted to think that there is indeed such a parallel. In this way, I hope to better 'understand' the chicken and her seduction, and in the process make a plea for not "chickening out." I then turn to a positive consideration of how we should in fact read this work. In particular, I consider Diamond's idea that the Tractatus requires an "imaginative understanding" of its reader, an ability to 'think' oneself into certain philosophical illusions of sense in order to dismantle them from within. I explore exactly what such an imagination involves. In particular, I suggest that it presupposes a kind of 'metaphysical' thesis of its own about the nature of human beings and their innermost tendencies, a position, I argue, that Wittegnstein held.     

How Not to Read Philosophical Investigations: McDowell and Goldfarb on Wittgenstein on Understanding

In a recent article, John McDowell has criticised Warren Goldfarb for attributing an anti‐realist conception of linguistic understanding to Wittgenstein. 1 I argue that McDowell is right to reject Goldfarb's anti‐ realism, but does so for the wrong reasons. I show that both Goldfarb's and McDowell's interpretations are vitiated by the fact that they do not pay attention to Wittgenstein's positive claims about understanding, in particular his claim that understanding is a kind of ability. The cause of this oversight lies in their endorsement of an excessively anti‐systematic or “therapeutic” reading of Wittgenstein.     

Understanding: not know-how

There is considerable agreement among epistemologists that certain abilities are constitutive of understanding-why. These abilities include: constructing explanations, drawing conclusions, and answering questions. This agreement has led epistemologists to conclude that understanding is a kind of know-how. However, in this paper, I argue that the abilities constitutive of understanding are the same kind of cognitive abilities that we find in ordinary cases of knowledge-that and not the kind of practical abilities associated with know-how. I argue for this by disambiguating between different senses of abilities that are too often lumped together. As a consequence, non-reductionists about understanding—those that claim that understanding-why is not reducible to knowledge-that—need to find another way to motivate the view. In the end, the fact that abilities are constitutive of understanding-why does not give us reason to conclude that understanding is a kind of know-how.     

Wittgenstein on Understanding and Interpretation (Comments on the work of Thomas Morawetz)

Wittgenstein's distinction between understanding and interpretation is fundamental to the account of meaning in Philosophical Investigations. In his discussion of rule‐following, Wittgenstein explicitly rejects the idea that understanding or grasping a rule is a matter of interpretation. Wittgenstein explains meaning and rule‐following in terms of action, rejecting both realist and Cartesian accounts of the mental. I argue that in his effort to employ Wittgenstein's views on meaning and rule‐following, Professor Morawetz embraces the position Wittgenstein rejects. In the course of making his case for law as a “deliberative practice,” Professor Morawetz embraces interpretation as a fundamental element of human practices, thereby taking up precisely the view Wittgenstein rejects     

Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement

Books reviewed:
Michael Luntley, Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement , Blackwell Publishers, 2003, ix + 187, price £16.99 p.b. Reviewed by Daniel Whiting, University of Reading Department of Philosophy University of Reading Whiteknights, Reading RG6 6AA danieljwhiting@hotmail.com     

Wittgenstein and Scepticism Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Books reviewed:
Wittgenstein and Scepticism , Denis McManus (ed.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xi, 305 pp. $50 hb. Wittgenstein at Work: Method in the PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS , Erich Ammereller and Eugen Fischer (eds.). London & New York: Routledge, 2004. xxix, 263 pp. $50 hb. Reviewed by William H. Brenner, Old Dominion University Philosophy Department Old Dominion University Norfolk, VA 23529-0083, USA wbrenner@odu.edu