Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge

Abstract: In his recent Knowledge and its Limits, Timothy Williamson argues that no non‐trivial mental state is such that being in that state suffices for one to be in a position to know that one is in it. In short, there are no “luminous” mental states. His argument depends on a “safety” requirement on knowledge, that one's confident belief could not easily have been wrong if it is to count as knowledge. We argue that the safety requirement is ambiguous; on one interpretation it is obviously true but useless to his argument, and on the other interpretation it is false.     

The Problem of Prejudice: some notes on philosophical hermeneutics for broad-visioned Buddhologists

This paper examines how and why conventional truth is, in Tsong khapa's view, false and deceptive yet indeed truth that stands shoulder to shoulder with ultimate truth. The first part of the paper establishes the complementary nature of the two truths by responding to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “truth” at all?’ The discussion in the second part examines the uses of conventional discourse within the Mādhyamika philosophical framework—partly by discussing Tsong khapa's response to the question ‘Why is conventional truth “false” and “deceptive”?’, and partly by considering his views on the application of the worldly convention within the Prāsangika Mādhyamika system.     

Executive function and children's understanding of false belief: how specific is the relation?

The present study examined developmental relations among understanding false belief, understanding “false” photographs, performance on the Dimensional Change Card Sort (DCCS), and performance on a picture–sentence verification task in 69 3–5-year-old children. Results showed that performance on the DCCS predicted performance on false belief questions even after controlling for children's age and verbal ability. However, neither performance on the picture–sentence verification task, nor performance on the “false” photograph task predicted false belief understanding. Implications of these findings are discussed in the context of suggestions that understanding false belief reflects a general understanding of representation, propositional negation, and the ability to use higher order rules.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

How Not to Prove the Existence of ‘Atomless Gunk’

In his ‘Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts?: An Argument for “Atomless Gunk’’, Dean Zimmerman defends the claim that no physical object has a complete decomposition into simples but instead has among its parts a piece of ‘atomless gunk’ His argument for this claim rests in part upon a theory of the impenetrability of physical objects. In that theory, Zimmerman distinguishes ‘[t]he sort of impenetrability that is a part of the concept of’ a physical object from ‘a power to resist the pressure of other objects’. He says that impenetrability is but ‘an essential inability’ of two physical objects to occupy one and the same region of space, an essential inability that is not a power of one physical object to exert repulsive forces on others in its vicinity. I argue that this theory of impenetrability is false and that Zimmerman's argument for the existence of ‘atomless gunk’ fails.     

The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief

Many philosophers claim that interesting forms of epistemic evaluation are insensitive to truth in a very specific way. Suppose that two possible agents believe the same proposition based on the same evidence. Either both are justified or neither is; either both have good evidence for holding the belief or neither does. This does not change if, on this particular occasion, it turns out that only one of the two agents has a true belief. Epitomizing this line of thought are thought experiments about radically deceived “brains in vats.” It is widely and uncritically assumed that such a brain is equally justified as its normally embodied human “twin.” This “parity” intuition is the heart of truth‐insensitive theories of core epistemological properties such as justification and rationality. Rejecting the parity intuition is considered radical and revisionist. In this paper, I show that exactly the opposite is true. The parity intuition is idiosyncratic and widely rejected. A brain in a vat is not justified and has worse evidence than its normally embodied counterpart. On nearly every ordinary way of evaluating beliefs, a false belief is significantly inferior to a true belief. Of all the evaluations studied here, only blamelessness is truth‐insensitive.     

False belief understanding goes to school: On the social-emotional consequences of coming early or late to a first theory of mind

Abstract

This research report describes a search for possible relations between children's developing theories of mind and aspects of their social-emotional maturity conducted by comparing the performance of 3-year-olds on measures of false belief understanding with teacher ratings of certain of their social-emotional skills and behaviours. The intuitions guiding this exploratory effort were, not only that a working grasp of the possibility of false belief would prove broadly predictive of social-emotional maturity, but also that such associations would be missing in the specific case of those preschool behaviours largely governed by a simple mastery of social conventions. As a step toward evaluating these possibilities a group of 40 preschoolers were given a battery of six measures of false belief understanding. The preschool teachers of these same children then completed a 40-item questionnaire covering a wide variety of markers of social-emotional maturity. Half of these items (termed “Intentional”) featured behaviours and skills thought to require some measure of insight into the mental lives of others, whereas the remainder (termed “Conventional”) were meant to sample a less heady domain of abilities open to those with no more than a simple grasp of social conventions, or the exercise of self-control. Consistent with the view that individual differences in children's early false belief understanding would express themselves primarily in those areas least governed by heavily routinised social conventions, our own summary measure of false belief understanding correlated positively only with those behavioural items classified as “Intentional”.     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

Systematic innovation and social philosophy

Corbett's “Europe and the Social Order”; makes two claims: that industrial societies are marked by “systematic innovation”; and that, as a consequence, our inherited social doctrines are obsolete and must be replaced. The first claim is true, but the second is false: it is not the case that social doctrines are “consistent”; only with certain kinds of social order: we cannot therefore say that innovating societies either preclude or compel any particular social doctrines. They do not invalidate a priori doctrine, though they undermine belief in it. It is therefore less important to attack such doctrine than to study innovation empirically.     

Implication and reasoning in mental state attribution: Comments on Jane Heal's theory of co-cognition

Simulation theory explains third-person mental state attribution in terms of an attributor's ability to imaginatively mimic other people's mental processes. Jane Heal's version of simulation theory, which she calls a theory of “co-cognition,” maintains that one can know and can predict others’ beliefs primarily by thinking about what their antecedent beliefs imply. I argue that Heal's account of belief attribution elides crucial differences between reasoning and merely discovering relations among propositions.     

Is Isaac without Ishmael complete? A nineteenth‐century debate re‐visited

Biblical passages which Christians have traditionally applied to Islam, predicting the rise of false prophets and of false Christs, inform negative judgements. The theory of one nineteenth‐century writer, Charles Forster (1787–1871) is examined as possibly offering a sympathetic Biblical‐key in its interpretation of God's promise to Abraham that he would bless Ishmael and make him father of a great nation. Islam, Forster argued, fulfilled this promise: permitted to exist by God, Islam's eventual “bringing in” to the Kingdom would be by divine not human action. This raises questions about the propriety of proselytizing Muslims and suggests that theological disputation might yield to mutual striving to “do good works” or to obey God's will (Q.5:48; Matt 7:21).     

WHAT IS “MYTHIC REALITY”?

Abstract. The topic of the March 2011 symposium in Zygon is “The Mythic Reality of the Autonomous Individual.” Yet few of the contributors even discuss “mythic reality.” Of the ones who do, most cavalierly use “myth” dismissively, as simply a false belief. Rather than reconciling myth with reality, they oppose myth to reality. Their view of myth is by no means unfamiliar or unwarranted, but they need to recognize other views of myth and to defend their own. Above all, they need to appreciate the grip that any belief aptly labelled myth has—a grip that holds at least as much for a false belief as for a true one.     

Compelling Fictions: Spinoza and George Eliot on Imagination and Belief

Spinoza took it to be an important psychological fact that belief cannot be compelled. At the same time, he was well aware of the compelling power that religious and political fictions can have on the formation of our beliefs. I argue that Spinoza allows that there are ‘good’ and ‘bad’ fictions. His complex account of the imagination and fiction, and their disabling or enabling roles in gaining knowledge of Nature, is a site of disagreement among commentators. The novels of George Eliot (who translated Spinoza's works) represent a significant development for those who aim to resolve such disagreement in favour of the epistemic value of the imagination and fiction. Although Eliot agreed with Spinoza that belief cannot be compelled, she nevertheless affirmed the potential of certain kinds of fiction to be not only compelling but also edifying. The parallel reading of Eliot and Spinoza offered here raises the question of whether his philosophy can accommodate a theory of art in which the artist is seen to be capable of attaining and imparting dependable knowledge.     

Symbols and Similarity: You Can Get Too Much of a Good Thing

A method for eliciting extended explanations was used to evaluate predictions from the “theory-theory” account of developing psychological reasoning. Children were repeatedly asked to explain the actions or emotions of story characters with false beliefs. Questioning elicited false belief attributions in half of 3-year-olds (Study 1, N = 16, age M = 3;6) and most 4-year-olds who failed belief prediction tasks (Study 2, N = 30, M = 4;5). In Study 3, 30 prediction failers (M = 5;1) gave significantly more false belief explanations for emotions than for actions. Across the studies, desire and emotion explanations emerged early and often, reflecting the primacy of these constructs in the children's understanding of psychological causality. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for developmental mechanism.     

Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default

It has been generally assumed in the Theory of Mind literature of the past 30 years that young children fail standard false‐belief tasks because they attribute their own knowledge to the protagonist (what Leslie and colleagues called a “true‐belief default”). Contrary to the traditional view, we have recently proposed that the children's bias is task induced. This alternative view was supported by studies showing that 3 year olds are able to pass a false‐belief task that allows them to focus on the protagonist, without drawing their attention to the target object in the test phase. For a more accurate comparison of these two accounts, the present study tested the true‐belief default with adults. Four experiments measuring eye movements and response inhibition revealed that (a) adults do not have an automatic tendency to respond to the false‐belief question according to their own knowledge and (b) the true‐belief response need not be inhibited in order to correctly predict the protagonist's actions. The positive results observed in the control conditions confirm the accuracy of the various measures used. I conclude that the results of this study undermine the true‐belief default view and those models that posit mechanisms of response inhibition in false‐belief reasoning. Alternatively, the present study with adults and recent studies with children suggest that participants' focus of attention in false‐belief tasks may be key to their performance.     

Comprehension of "absence" by an African Grey parrot: Learning with respect to questions of same/different

An African Grey parrot, Alex, learned to report on the absence or presence of similarity and difference between two objects. Alex was shown pairs of objects that were (a) totally dissimilar, (b) identical, or (c) similar or different with respect to one of three attributes (color, shape, or material). In the first two cases, he responded to the respective queries of “What's same?” or “What's different?” with the vocalization “none,” and in the third case he responded with the appropriate category label (“color,” “shape,” or “mah-mah” [matter]). His accuracy was 80.9% to 83.9% for pairs of familiar objects not used in training and 72.5% to 78.4% for pairs whose colors, shapes, and materials were unfamiliar. The data provide evidence that this parrot's abilities are comparable to those of mammals that have been trained to report on the presence or absence of objects or features of objects.     

MALEBRANCHE'S DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM / CONSENT AND THE INCOMPLETENESS OF GOD'S VOLITIONS

‘God needs no instruments to act’, Malebranche writes in Search 6.2.3; ‘it suffices that He wills in order that a thing be, because it is a contradiction that He should will and that what He wills should not happen. Therefore, His power is His will’ (450). After nearly identical language in Treatise 1.12, Malebranche writes that ‘[God's] wills are necessarily efficacious... [H]is power differs not at all from [H]is will’ (116). God's causal power, here, clearly traces only to His volitions - not merely to the fact that He wills, but specifically to the content of His volitions (‘“what” He wills’). Yet despite the obviously key role the ordinary notion of volitional content plays for Malebranche, recent writers have paid surprisingly little attention either to it or its exegetical implications. I hope to rectify this situation here. The plan of this paper is this: first, to borrow current work in the philosophy of mind to sketch the notion of an incomplete volition, i.e. one whose content is ‘incomplete’ in a sense to be explained; second, to show that Malebranche clearly allows and uses something like this notion; third, to apply the notion to Malebranche's doctrine of human freedom. In so doing, I believe, we can understand this doctrine in a new way, and one which: (i) is clearly consistent with his texts, and (ii) unlike other interpretations makes coherent sense out of the conflicting streams in his heroic attempt to reconcile his occasionalism - the doctrine that no finite substances have genuine causal powers - with our freedom; fourth, Contrast my interpretation with those of two recent writers: Sleigh et al. (1998) and Schmaltz (1996); and Fifth, Summarize the major results.     

Psychoanalytic action explanation

Psychoanalysis is concerned with neurotic behaviour that counts as an action if one takes into account “repressed” mental states. Freud's paradigmatic examples are a challenge for philosophical theories of action explanation. The main problem is that such symptomatic behaviour is, in a characteristic way, irrational. In line with standard interpretations, I will recap that psychoanalytic action explanation is not in accordance with Davidson's classical reason-explanation model, and I will recall that Freud's unconsciousness is not a second mind with its own rationality but that it is non-propositional in character. However, I then will argue that this characterization is not discriminating enough to explain the dynamical unconscious and overlooks the crucial role of “counter-cathexis”. With counter-cathexis the relevant desire turns out to be a complex with two inseparable aspects (“double-aspect view”), so that the causing belief–desire pair is still part of the space of reasons, although it cannot rationalize the behaviour. Psychoanalytic action explanation is hence still Davidsonian, albeit in a modified way.     

THE DEEP CONDITIONS OF SECULARITY

In modern societies and cultures today, religion is widely perceived as basically even if not merely trivially “optional.” This is a contention strongly advocated by Charles Taylor, most notably in his monumental A Secular Age. Throughout his career, Taylor has made the question of religion in modernity the core of his interests. In his most recent work, A Secular Age, Taylor addresses challenging issues of what he calls the “contemporary spiritual experience” and speaks to “the spiritual hungers and tensions of secular modernity.” I critically consider three aspects of this immensely suggestive if not uncontroversial work: (1) I examine whether there is in fact a possible reversibility or revisability to the so‐called ‘optional’ nature of belief that Taylor thinks is characteristic of the secular age; (2) I scrutinize Taylor's notion of “immediacy” of belief in the same milieu; (3) I interrogate his use of the term “fullness” in delineating the temper of the secular age.