Thinking about non‐being∗

There are genuine references to non‐existent objects, as can be seen through elucidating reference in common language and applying the criteria enumerated to expressions used in writing and speaking about fiction. The concept of a fictitious entity is simply accepted in the adoption of the ‘language‐game’ of fiction and has no undesirable ontological consequences. To think otherwise is to fail to attend to the conceptual status of such talk. Accounts of fictional discourse by Russell, Ryle, and Chisholm are found objectionable. The concept of existence is touched on, and consequences concerning reference to abstract and other objects and also concerning method in ontology mentioned.     

Ethics,metaphysics, and psychoanalysis∗

An attempt is made to point out some of the moral presuppositions and implications of psychotherapy in theory and in practice. In the various forms of dynamically oriented psychotherapy, the setting of goals and decisions concerning maturation and health have value components. Even in psychoanalysis in its strict sense, decisions made in accepting or rejecting contracts and determination of the terminating point of analysis are value laden.

Finally, in the theorizing of Freud and others about psychotherapy moral positions are assumed.     

Tact: Sense,sensitivity, and virtue∗

The concept of tact has so far received only little theoretical attention. The present article suggests three levels on which the idea of tact may be approached: (1) The epistemological problem: the etymology of the term ‘tact’ is taken seriously, namely its relation to the sense of touch and tactility. An analysis of the position of touch in the ranking of the five senses according to various parameters is shown to be highly relevant to the understanding of the idea of tact. (2) The logical problem: tact is described as a skill which cannot be exhausted in the knowledge of principles or general rules. Like ‘judgment’ it is concerned with the particular, with sensitivity (analogical to that of the sense of touch) to the uniqueness of a human situation. (3) The ethical problem: tact is shown to lie between ethics and etiquette, that is to say it is more than just a rule of politeness or good manners, but it is ‘less’ than a fully fledged moral duty or principle. Its position between the obligatory and the merely conventional opens the way to characterize it as supererogatory.     

Estrangement,Nature and ‘the Flesh’

In this paper I address the question of what it is to be alienated from nature. The focus is alienation in the sense of estrangement, a ‘being cut off from’ a wider world. That we are so estranged is a claim associated with ecological critique of contemporary society. But what is it to be estranged from nature given that everything we are, do and produce, always remains within a wider nature? I explore the possibility that this might be understood with reference to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘flesh’. I set the scene for this with some discussion of Honneth’s recent account of reification as a ‘distorted praxis’ and then, drawing upon Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and especially his later ontology of flesh, develop the idea of estrangement from the natural world as an inadequate participation in a ‘primordial’ perceptual relation. This idea of estrangement brings together various elements of ecological critique. However, I argue that although this idea of estrangement might inform and help to articulate such a critique, it cannot be the sole concern of an environmental political philosophy: other kinds of alienation within the humanised environmental context need to be considered too.     

“Loving Nature” Nature’s Way: Exploring Radical Participation With Nature Through the Metaphor of Complex,Dynamic Self-Systems

The Western metaphor of self-as-identity—as a static, inherently exclusive entity—has been instrumental, historically, to our radical separation from nature, and still hampers a reviving of genuine participation with nature. Suggesting an alternative to this metaphor (informed by literacy as technology), I explore the more nature-informed metaphor of dynamic, complex self-systems, involving both natural and human subsystems. Through this latter metaphor, I re-vision radical participation with nature: in the process of perception, in epistemology/ontology, and in the ways of indigenous, oral cultures. This systems metaphor also sheds contrasting light on literacy-informed, Western ways.     

Thinking about Morality and Moral Thinking: Is There a Distinction?

ABSTRACT A recent exchange with Shaffer (this issue) reveals several points of agreement underscoring the utility of our subject-based approach to understanding moral thought. Shaffer's latest reply raises the interesting question of whether thinking about morality, the focus of our study, constitutes moral thinking. Our response underscores how Shaffer's approach to studying moral thought differs from our own. More important, we emphasize how disagreements over what constitutes moral thinking can and should be settled empirically.     

Hakuin,Scepticism, and Seeing into One’s Own Nature

One of the most significant figures in the history of Japanese philosophy is the Zen master Hakuin. Yet, in the West, little attempt has been made to present and evaluate his thought in a way that would make it accessible to Western philosophers. This article attempts to redress this neglect. Here, it is shown how Hakuin uses kōan meditation to create ‘the great doubt’ or scepticism concerning the self. Hakuin’s method shares elements in common with both ancient Greek scepticism and Descartes. Kōan-induced scepticism leads to ‘the great death’ or a rejection of the self as a delusion. Hume’s similar rejection of the self helps to explain the basis of this delusion. The rejection of this delusion carries with it the realization that one is not separate from the rest of reality. This is the instant of seeing into one’s own nature and, for Hakuin, is the experience of nirvana.     

Respecting Nature?

This paper considers whether respect is a concept that can be applied fruitfully and cogently to nature and the environment. Through an examination of the idea of nature, respect and an analysis of Paul Taylor’s book Respect for Nature, it argues that, despite the attractiveness of the idea, the concept of respect cannot be coherently and systematically applied to the natural world and that, if a reasoned justification for a non-instrumental view of nature is to be sought, it must be sought elsewhere, perhaps in the notion of care rather than respect per se.     

A note on ‘knowledge,certainty, and probability'∗

In ‘Knowledge, Certainty and Probability’, Dr. Heidelberger claims to have shown ‘that it is a mistake to assimilate probability and rational belief to knowledge’. The conclusion may be true but his argument is faulty.     

Kari Weil,Thinking Animals: Why Animal Studies Now?

"Animal Studies" is the name given to an area of study that in the last several decades has proliferated across the disciplines.In contrast to much of the history of philosophy,which sought to define the human as other than animal,animal studies generally problematizes neat categories and distinctions separating humans and other animals.And while there is often an ethical dimension to work in animal studies,it is quite different in tone from the projects of Peter Singer,Tom Regan,and some other philosophers,whose primary task,when addressing animals,is to argue that nonhuman animals have moral standing or ought to be the bearers of significant rights,such as the right not to be harmed.Instead,animal studies,or,sometimes "human-animal studies," poses questions about the meaning and representation of animals in art and literature,politics,history,sociology,anthropology,agriculture,medicine,and science.Engaging work in the natural sciences,social sciences,humanities,and the arts,animal studies seeks to understand the meaning and pervasive role of animals in our lives.     

Second Nature,Critical Theory and Hegel’s Phenomenology

ABSTRACT

While Hegel’s concept of second nature has now received substantial attention from commentators, relatively little has been said about the place of this concept in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This neglect is understandable, since Hegel does not explicitly use the phrase ‘second nature’ in this text. Nonetheless, several closely related phrases reveal the centrality of this concept to the Phenomenology’s structure. In this paper, I develop new interpretations of the figures ‘natural consciousness’, ‘natural notion’, and ‘inorganic nature’, in order to elucidate the distinctive concept of second nature at work in the Phenomenology. I will argue that this concept of second nature supplements the ‘official’ version, developed in the Encyclopedia, with an ‘unofficial’ version that prefigures its use in critical theory. At the same time, this reconstruction will allow us to see how the Phenomenology essentially documents spirit’s acquisition of a ‘second nature’.