“I Believe in Cusk”: The Effect of Explicit Belief Statements on Children’s Reality Status Judgments and Beliefs about Consensus

Children learn about the world through others’ testimony, and much of this knowledge likely comes from parents. Furthermore, parents may sometimes want children to share their beliefs about topics on which there is no universal consensus. In discussing such topics, parents may use explicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution is real”) or implicit belief statements (e.g., “Evolution happened over millions of years”). But little research has investigated how such statements affect children’s beliefs. In the current study, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 102) were shown videos of their parent providing either Explicit (“Cusk is real”) or Implicit (“I know about cusk”) belief testimony about novel entities. Then, children heard another speaker provide either Denial (“Cusk isn’t real”) or Neutral (“I’ve heard of cusk”) testimony. Children made reality status judgments and consensus judgments (i.e., whether people agree about the entity’s existence). Results showed that explicit and implicit belief statements differentially influenced children’s beliefs about societal consensus when followed by a denial: explicit belief statements prevented children from drawing the conclusion that there is societal consensus that the entity does not exist. This effect was not related to age, indicating that children as young as 4 use these cues to inform consensus judgments. On the reality status task, there was an interaction with age, showing that only 4-year-olds were more likely to believe in an entity after hearing explicit belief statements. These findings suggest that explicit belief statements may serve as important sources of both children’s beliefs about novel entities and societal consensus.     

I Talked to a Genius and All I Got was Knowledge

Bryan Frances’s recent argument is for the epistemic position called Live Skepticism. The Live Skepticism Argument (LSA) attempts to establish a restricted set of skeptical conclusions. The LSA’s “skeptical hypotheses” are scientific and philosophical positions that are “live actual possibilities” in an intellectual community. In order to “rule out” live hypotheses, an expert must know them to be false. However, since these are live hypotheses in this expert’s intellectual community—endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding—this expert is unable to rule them out. Consistent with the LSA is the outcome that people not exposed to these live hypotheses can know what these experts cannot. However, in this paper, I defeat the LSA by developing and defending a counterexample that focuses on the phenomenon of genius testimony. Everyone, including the LSA’s proponent, can and should allow that expertise comes in degrees. While in many cases a person’s intelligence, understanding, and knowledge are parallel to others in the field, there are some who are extraordinary in their intelligence, understanding, and knowledge (geniuses). If an expert meets with a genius, it is possible that the genius provides this individual with beliefs that can rule out a skeptical hypothesis. Therefore, an expert can have knowledge, even if the skeptical hypothesis is live and endorsed by others who have parallel levels of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. After providing this counterexample, I present three potential objections, and show how people can know global warming exists and that smoking does not give someone cancer. I conclude by defending this counterexample from a likely reply by proponents of the LSA involving luck and knowledge.     

Skepticism,Contextualism, and Discrimination*

The skeptic says that “knowledge” is an absolute term, whereas the contextualist says that ‘knowledge” is a relationally absolute term. Which is the better hypothesis about “knowledge”? And what implications do these hypotheses about “knowledge” have for knowledge? I argue that the skeptic has the better hypothesis about “knowledge”, but that both hypotheses about “knowledge” have deeply anti‐skeptical implications for knowledge, since both presuppose our capacity for epistemically salient discrimination.     

More Dyke Methods

In response to a commentary by Jacquelyn N. Zita on the essay “Dyke Methods,” the three principles of that work—” I speak only for myself,”“I do not try to get other wimmm to accept my beliefs in place of their own,” and “There is no given,” are further clarified and developed.     

Searching for Cognitive Processes in the Cultivation Effect Adult and Adolescent Samples in the United States and Australia

Research on the cultivation hypothesis has focused on whether relationships between television viewing and social reality beliefs truly exist or are artifacts. There is very little evidence about what cognitive processes allow viewers to construct television-biased beliefs. The present study tests two possible processes: First, that perceptions of the television world serve as an intermediate step between fragmented incidental learning from television and beliefs about the real world and second, that beliefs closely linked to television content are an intermediate step in implying more general values and beliefs. These two hypotheses were tested in one adult and three adolescent samples, two in the United States and two in Australia. Across a range of cultivation questions, the basic cultivation result generally replicated that heavy viewers had beliefs about the world that appeared influenced by television. However, neither process hypothesis was supported. Although the null findings on the first hypothesis do not rule out construction from learned fragments, findings on the second hypothesis contradict cultivation's second-order effect. “Close” beliefs and their implied counterparts were unrelated, and cultivation relationships for these implied variables occurred only for those with real-world biased “dose” beliefs. Exploration of this result demonstrated that cultivation of both kinds of beliefs occurred more of ten for adolescents with high academic skills, suggesting that if cultivation occurs, it is a more active and intellectually demanding process than previously proposed.     

Where there are internal defeaters,there are “confirmers”

There is widespread consensus that there are undercutting and rebutting defeaters that diminish or destroy the warrant of a belief B. I argue that there are counterparts of defeaters: the counterparts of undercutting defeaters are “requirement fulfillment beliefs”, the counterparts of rebutting defeaters are “consistency beliefs”. These beliefs confirm the warrant of B, I therefore call them “confirmers”.     

WHAT LIARS CAN TELL US ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING

If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010 ) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge‐lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge‐lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge‐lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all.     

Meaning and Conversational Impropriety in Sceptical Contexts

According to “disjunctivist neo‐Mooreanism”—a position Duncan Pritchard develops in a recent book—it is possible to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, even though it is conversationally inappropriate to claim such knowledge. In a recent paper, on the other hand, Pritchard expounds an “überhinge” strategy, according to which one cannot know the denials of sceptical hypotheses, as “hinge propositions” are necessarily groundless. The present article argues that neither strategy is entirely successful. For if a proposition can be known, it can also be claimed to be known. If the latter is not possible, this is not because certain propositions are either “intrinsically” conversationally inappropriate (as Pritchard claims in his book) or else “rationally groundless” (as Pritchard claims in his paper), but rather that we are dealing with something that merely presents us with the appearance of being an epistemic claim.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Belief is Contingently Involuntary

The debate between “Normativists” and “Teleologists” about the normativity of belief has been taken to hinge on the question of which of the two views best explains why it is that we cannot (non‐contingently) believe at will. Of course, this presupposes that there is an explanation to be had. Here, I argue that this supposition is unwarranted, that Doxastic Involuntarism is merely contingently true. I argue that this is made apparent when we consider that suspended judgement must be involuntary if belief is, that suspended judgment is not a belief (or set of beliefs), and that the aim or norm of suspended judgement cannot be constitutive if suspended judgement is not a belief (or set of beliefs).     

Knowledge and knowledge gaps in semantic memory of technical artifacts

Two hypotheses have been considered regarding the relation between knowledge and semantic knowledge gaps: a “knowledge clash” hypothesis predicting more awareness of knowledge gaps with increasing knowledge, and a “knowledge deficit” hypothesis whereby the relation is the opposite. In order to examine these hypotheses, graduate and undergraduate students were asked to state what they knew and what they did not know about a sample of familiar and unfamiliar artifacts. None of the above hypotheses accounted for the results. Instead, knowledge was found to be differently related to various types of unknown features: increasing knowledge was related to less unknown features of the artifacts' function and to more unknown features about contingency relations. Unknown features of the artifacts’ behaviors were frequently reported in the two knowledge conditions. The results suggest new strands of research on the metacognition of “not knowing.”     

Effects of Undergoing Arbitrary Discrimination Upon Subsequent Attitudes Toward a Minority Group1

The purpose of the experiment was to test the hypothesis that having been both the object of prejudice and discrimination and the discriminator, a child will be less likely to hold prejudiced beliefs and exhibit discriminatory behavior toward a minority group. A 3rd-grade class was randomly divided into Orange and Green people. On Day I, Orange children were “superior” and Green children were “inferior”. On Day II, statuses were rcvcrsed. On Day III and again 2 weeks later, the experimental class was significantly more likely to desire a picnic with a group of Black children and held less-prejudiced beliefs when compared to the Control. The manipulation did not affect performance on Days I and II.     

Self-knowledge,belief, ability (and agency?)

Matthew Boyle [(2011). “Transparent Self-Knowledge.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1): 223–241. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2011.00204.x] has defended an account of doxastic self-knowledge which he calls “Reflectivism”. I distinguish two claims within Reflectivism: (A) that believing that p and knowing oneself to believe that p are not two distinct cognitive states, but two aspects of the same cognitive state, and (B) that this is because we are in some sense agents in relation to our beliefs. I find claim (A) compelling, but argue that its tenability depends on how we view the metaphysics of knowledge, something Boyle does not consider. I argue that in the context of the standard account of knowledge as a kind of true belief – what I call the Belief Account of knowledge – the claim faces serious problems, and that these simply disappear if we instead adopt an Ability Account of knowledge, along the lines of that defended by John Hyman [(1999). “How knowledge Works.” The Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197): 433–451; John Hyman (2015). Action, Knowledge, and the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press]. I find claim (B) less compelling, and a secondary aim of the paper is to suggest that once we reject the Belief Account of knowledge, and move over to an Ability Account, there is no explanatory role for (B) left to play.     

Attitude towards Christianity and New Age beliefs among undergraduate students in Slovenia: a study in implicit religion

This study examines two conflicting hypotheses regarding the association between traditional religiosity and new age belief: the “worldview hypothesis” suggesting a positive association between these two sets of beliefs; and the “functional alternative hypothesis” suggesting a negative association between these two sets of beliefs. A sample of 1209 undergraduate students attending the University of Maribor, Slovenia, completed the Francis Scale of Attitude towards Christianity as a measure of traditional religiosity and the Lavri? Scale of New Age Belief, alongside a measure of frequency of church attendance. The data demonstrated a positive correlation between attitude towards Christianity and new age belief, even after taking into account different levels of church attendance. These findings support the worldview hypotheses in favour of the functional alternative hypothesis.     

WITTGENSTEIN AND DEFINING CRITERIA

Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question “How do you know that so-and-so is the case?”, we sometimes answer by giving ‘criteria’ and sometimes by giving ‘symptoms. If medical science calls angina an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case “Why do you say this man has got angina?” then the answer “I have found the bacillus so-and-so in his blood” gives us the criterion, or what we may call the defining criterion of angina. If on the other hand the answer was, “His throat is inflamed”, this might give us a symptom of angina, I call “sympton” a phenomenon of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomenon which is our defining criterion, Then to say “A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him” is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating the definition of “angina”. But to say, “A man has angina whenever he has an inflamed throat” is to make a hypothesis. (BB, pp. 24–25)¹     

THE EPISTEMIC APPROACH IN COGNITIVE THERAPY

A theory of epistemic behavior is applied to the problem of cognitive therapy. The theory addresses the process whereby all knowledge is acquired and modified. The task of cognitive therapy is to modify some types of knowledge, those with aversive consequences to the individual. Any knowledge is assumed to be inevitably biased, selective and tentative. It is assumed to be affected by three epistemically relevant motivations: the need of structure, the fear of invalidity and the need of conclusional contents. Such motivations can be appropriately enlisted in the aid of uprooting the patient's dysfunctional beliefs or “frustrative hypotheses” concerning his/her failures to attain important goals. Unlike major alternative approaches, the present one: (1) disputes the dysfunctional misconception hypothesis whereby neurotic inferences are distorted or biased as compared to normal inferences, (2) questions the value of constructing a priori lists, or taxonomies of dysfunctional beliefs, and (3) qualifies the suggestion that own behavior or personal experience is a superior vehicle of belief-induction. Instead, the persuasive value of behavior or experience is assumed to be restricted to cases in which the individual trusts his own ability to interpret the events at hand.     

Knowledge Grounded on Pure Reasoning

In this paper, I deal with epistemological issues that stem from the hypothesis that reasoning is not only a means of transmitting knowledge from premise‐beliefs to conclusion‐beliefs but also a primary source of knowledge in its own right. The idea is that one can gain new knowledge on the basis of suppositional reasoning. After making some preliminary distinctions, I argue that there are no good reasons to think that purported examples of knowledge grounded on pure reasoning are just examples of premise‐based inferences in disguise. Next, I establish what kinds of true propositions can to a first approximation be known on the basis of pure reasoning. Finally, I argue that beliefs that are competently formed on the basis of suppositional reasoning satisfy both externalist and internalist criteria of justification.     

Skepticism and elegance: problems for the abductivist reply to Cartesian skepticism

Some philosophers argue that we are justified in rejecting skepticism because it is explanatorily inferior to more commonsense hypotheses about the world. Focusing on the work of Jonathan Vogel, I show that this “abductivist” or “inference to the best explanation” response rests on an impoverished explanatory framework which ignores the explanatory gap between an object's having certain properties and its appearing to have those properties. Once this gap is appreciated, I argue, the abductivist strategy is defeated.     

An Exploratory Evaluation of the Cognitive-Active Gender Role Identification Continuum

Individual beliefs and expectations regarding gender roles influence interpersonal behavior. If family therapists ignore or avoid discussions regarding gender roles, change may ultimately be inhibited. The Cognitive-Active Gender Role Identification Continuum (CAGRIC) is a framework that may facilitate a therapist's discussion of gender roles and the ways in which gender role expectations impact their clients’ relationships. Using data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program module on “Family and Changing Gender Roles,” this study examines the gender role classifications proposed by the CAGRIC model and the influence of gender role beliefs and behaviors on relationship satisfaction. Data from Australia, Brazil, Israel, Japan, Russia, Spain, and the United States are used to test the clustering and congruence hypotheses of the CAGRIC model. Results suggest support for the clustering hypothesis of the model, especially in Western countries.