A RECONSIDERATION OF KIERKEGAARD'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE HUMAN OTHER: The Hidden Ethics of Soteriology

In this article, I embark on an analysis of Søren Kierkegaard's view of human otherness in strict correlation to his Christian philosophy. More specifically, my aim is to show that Kierkegaard's thought is essentially informed by a decisive appropriation of the soteriological category of sin which has momentous implications for Kierkegaard's views of selfhood and intersubjectivity. The main argument is that both Kierkegaard's negative evaluation of human otherness and his acerbic indictments of any collectivist interference in salvific matters cohere with his appropriation of the doctrine of the Fall. At the same time, I show in what sense Kierkegaard deems human alterity to be indispensable to one's spiritual self‐becoming expressed through the Christian imperative of loving the other as neighbor. Seen thus, agape, while supplementing Kierkegaard's creationistic psychology, actually becomes the necessary restorative opposite of sinfulness in the self's encounters with the distinct uniqueness of the human other.     

The Life of Spirit: The Self and Sanctification in Søren Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death

Danish theologian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is often overlooked as an author in the Christian spiritual tradition. This paper answers Christopher Barnett's call to investigate themes of Christian spirituality in Kierkegaard's writing. In this paper, I argue that we can construct of vision of sanctification from Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death. While Kierkegaard does not directly deal with themes of sanctification in The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti-Climacus does demonstrate the ‘spiritless’ life of despair. The ‘spiritless’ life, as Anti-Climacus defines it, is a life that is not truly a ‘self’. Anti-Climacus systematically demonstrates four categories of despair, and all people not living in faith, whether they realise it or not, fit into one of these categories of ‘spiritless’ existence. I argue that by constructing the opposites of Kierkegaard's categories of despair I demonstrate that a ‘spirit-filled’ life exemplifies a vibrant Christian life of sanctification.     

Immediacy ‐ subjectivity ‐ revelation

Kierkegaard's fundamental view of life was negative and Gnostic. It was through his interpretation of life that his vision of the nothingness of existence became positive. What formed the material of Kierkegaard's interpretation was the common experience of existence, what ‘all’ men know. His concept of existence has a threefold content : immediacy, subjectivity, and the Christian Revelation. Immediate reality that is not made content of subjectivity becomes empty changeableness, and subjectivity that does not appropriate immediacy deprives itself of the concrete (as with the mystic). Immediacy's ‘text’ first acquires a qualitative transcendent content through the ‘repetition’ of subjective choice. Kierkegaard takes this appropriation of the immediate to be also the self‐development of subjectivity. Consciousness of guilt is an expression of a God‐relationship. Implicated with this consciousness is the consciousness of the nothingness of everything — echoed in man as dread. Yet even when subjectivity is conscious of guilt the truth remains immanent in subjectivity. In the Christian Revelation truth is outside man: subjectivity is untruth (sin).     

Kierkegaard's anti-ecclesiology: the attack on ‘Christendom’, 1854–1855

Abstract

This article examines Kierkegaard's attack on the Danish state church in 1854–1855, beginning with Kierkegaard's rejection of Martensen's application of the term ‘witness to the truth’ to the recently deceased primate of the Danish church, J. P. Mynster. For Kierkegaard a witness to the truth is the person who emulates Christ's life of suffering and lives in poverty and abasement. It is an insult to the memory of the ‘glorious ones’ of the past to apply this term to the worldly, self-serving Mynster. The article goes on to consider Kierkegaard's conception of the heterogeneity of Christianity with the world, before considering Kierkegaard's rejection of the state church as a confusion of church and state which eliminates the Imitatio Christi essential for genuine Christian existence. The failure of the state church and its clergy to live according to the New Testament means that they are an abomination, and public worship is a blasphemous insult to God. The paper concludes by considering what lessons can be learned from Kierkegaard's radical anti-ecclesiology.     

Works of Love in a World of Violence: Kierkegaard,Feminism, and the Limits of Self‐Sacrifice

Feminist scholars adopt wide‐ranging views of self‐sacrifice: their critiques claim that women are inordinately affected by Christianity's valorization of self‐sacrifice and that this traditional Christian value is inherently misogynistic and necrophilic. Although Søren Kierkegaard's Works of Love deems Christian love essentially sacrificial, love, in his view, sets significant limits on the role of self‐sacrifice in human life. Through his proposed response to one who requests forgiveness, “Do you now truly love me?” Kierkegaard offers a model of forgiveness that subverts traditional ideals of the self‐sacrificing and submissive woman while keeping love central. The question asserts self‐love, involves redoubling and double danger, and expresses a refusal to imitate Christ's suffering. I propose a reading in keeping with Grace Jantzen's vision for a feminist philosophy of religion, which reads against the grain and “seeks to break through to new ways of thinking that may open up divine horizons.” My reading is further supported by Kierkegaard's contention that everything essentially Christian bears a double meaning. In light of the subversive potential found in the discrepancy between apparent love and actual love, as well as the duty to name the sin of one who has behaved in an unloving manner, I argue that Kierkegaard's philosophy of love resists simplistic understandings of self‐sacrificing love.     

Redeeming the penultimate: discipleship and Church in the thought of Søren Kierkegaard and Dietrich Bonhoeffer

There are striking parallels between the theologies of discipleship advanced by the Danish thinker Søren Kierkegaard and the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer's notion of ‘costly grace’ closely resembles Kierkegaard's critique of the misuse of the Pauline-Lutheran doctrine of justification by grace through faith alone. After the publication of Cost of Discipleship, however, Bonhoeffer's view of discipleship moves in a different direction from that of Kierkegaard. Whereas Kierkegaard takes discipleship to mean that the Christian must be in irrevocable conflict with the world, Bonhoeffer sees discipleship as living in the world and cultivating a ‘worldly holiness’. This article tracks the reasons why their initially similar theologies of discipleship result in Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer developing different understandings of Christian discipleship and church. The discussion is organised around the distinction Bonhoeffer makes in his Ethics between the ‘ultimate’ and the ‘penultimate’. Kierkegaard emphasises the ultimate to such an extent that the penultimate is virtually eliminated and the Christian disciple is called upon to live in a state of constant eschatological opposition to the world. For Bonhoeffer on the other hand the penultimate is not to be condemned but to be transformed in the light of the ultimate. The article argues that the differing notions of discipleship advanced by Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer arise from the different political contexts in which they were living and writing. Whereas Kierkegaard's historical situation prompted him to affirm the ultimate by confronting his contemporaries with New Testament Christianity's radical opposition to the world, Bonhoeffer's resistance to the Nazi régime prompted him to reflect on how the ultimate can be integrated into the penultimate and how the Christian disciple can engage with the world without being of the world.     

In Search of the Self's Grounding Power: Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death as Dogmatics for Unbelievers

Kierkegaard's The Sickness unto Death can be read as an attempt to present the Christian message in a way that makes sense for unbelievers without violating the integrity of the Christian faith. This is done by exploring the psychological implications of the lack of faith in a way that is supposed to make sense even for those who take offence at the Christian message and do not accept the anthropological implications of the story of the incarnation as their basic point of orientation. It is argued that this attempt is successful, and that this can be demonstrated both by the consistency of the argument and the breadth of its Wirkungsgeschichte.     

Are Christian politics possible? A Kierkegaardian perspective

This paper provides a rereading of Søren Kierkegaard's attack upon Christendom in light of his theory of spheres of existence to examine whether Christian politics are possible after Kierkegaard. Talking of Christian politics makes sense only in the esthetic and the religious spheres of existence. However, Kierkegaard argues that politics worthy of the title Christian are impossible. Either such politics are simply Christendom far removed from New Testament Christianity, or Christian politics are faced with the paradox of existing before God and cannot proceed.     

Kierkegaard on the Problems of Pure Irony

Søren Kierkegaard's thesis, The Concept of Irony, contains an interesting critique of pure irony. Kierkegaard's critique turns on two main claims: (a) pure irony is an incoherent and thus, unrealizable stance; (b) the pursuit of pure irony is morally enervating, psychologically destructive, and culminates in bondage to moods. In this essay, first I attempt to clarify Kierkegaard's understanding of pure irony as “infinite absolute negativity.” Then I set forth his multilayered critique of pure irony. Finally, I consider briefly a distinctly theological component in Kierkegaard's critique. I argue that this feature of Kierkegaard's account can and should be distinguished from the broadly ethical critique of pure irony that I sketch in the second section, even if these components of Kierkegaard's position are found together as a unified whole in The Concept of Irony. My overall goal in this essay is to reveal the subtlety and plausibility of Kierkegaard's critique of pure irony. I also attempt to disclose the richness of the Hegelian account of ethical life to which Kierkegaard recurs in his thesis.     

Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth: Reflections on a Relation and a Proposal for Future Investigation

Karl Barth's relationship to Kierkegaard is one that is complex but often solely understood by means of Barth's own explicit reflections on Kierkegaard near the end of his life. This article revisits this history not only to cast light on the reasons for Barth's explicit distancing of himself from Kierkegaard's work, but also to provide evidence that Kierkegaard's influence upon Barth's thinking may have ranged further and in more subtle ways than is often acknowledged. This is particularly seen when Kierkegaard's understanding of Christology and the objectivity, rather than subjectivity, of faith is taken into account. Such an examination may provide warrant for a reappraisal of the relation between these two figures.     

II. Hamlet without the prince of Denmark revisited: Pörn on Kierkegaard and the self

Ingmar Pörn (Inquiry 27 [1984], nos. 2–3) claims that certain ideas of Kierkegaard's can illuminate a notion of the self articulated in action‐theoretical terms. Through a reconstruction of Kierkegaard's concept of despair, couched in these terms, Pörn aims to show how these ideas can contribute to the study of the self. Because he misconstrues an important distinction in Kierkegaard's account of selfhood, Pörn fails to show this. It remains uncertain what use the study of the self would have for Kierkegaard's notion of selfhood, and whether an action‐theoretical analysis is capable of bringing out whatever may be of interest in it.     

Do You Have the Heart to Come to Faith? A Look at Anti‐Climacus' Reading of Matthew 11.6

In Practice in Christianity, Søren Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Anti‐Climacus enters into an extended engagement with Matthew 11.6, ‘Blessed is he who takes no offense at me’. In so doing, he comes to an understanding that ‘the possibility of offense’ characterises the ‘crossroad’ at which one either comes to faith in Christ's revelation or rejects it. Such a choice, as he is well aware, cannot be made from a neutral standpoint, and so he is led to propose that it is ‘the thoughts of the heart’ (i.e. a person's disposition) that constitute the pivotal factor in determining whether or not God will reconcile a person into the Christian faith. In this paper, I discuss Anti‐Climacus' interpretation of Mt. 11.6 and consider his reasons for interpreting a person's predisposition as being so decisive for faith.     

EUDAIMONIA AND AGAPE IN MACINTYRE AND KIERKEGAARD'S WORKS OF LOVE

This essay explores connections and divergences between Alasdair MacIntyre's eudaimonistic ethic and Søren Kierkegaard's agapeistic ethic—perhaps the greatest proponents of these ethical paradigms from the past two centuries. The purpose of the work is threefold. First, to demonstrate an impressive amount of convergence and complementarity in their approaches to the transcendent grounds of an ethic of flourishing, the rigors necessary for a proper self‐love, and the other‐directed nature of proper social relations. Second, given the inapplicability of common dichotomies, to pinpoint more precisely where Kierkegaard departs from eudaimonism, and where MacIntyre departs from agapeism. Finally, to show that both Kierkegaard's and MacIntyre's grounds for departure are inadequate, and thus that the most central insights of eudaimonist and agapeist ethics can be harmonized to a greater extent than either Kierkegaard's or MacIntyre's framework can allow.     

THE LIGHTNING AND THE EARTHQUAKE: KIERKEGAARD ON THE ANFECHTUNG OF LUTHER

By focusing discussion through Søren Kierkegaard's view of Martin Luther's initiation into the monastery (the lightning strike), it is suggested that an analogy can be discerned for Kierkegaard's own sense of divine vocation (the portentous ‘earthquake’ which he makes enigmatic reference to) and the ensuing self‐mortification of melancholy and religious scrupulosity which commentators have suspected in both figures. Kierkegaard's often ambivalent critique of Luther's Anfechtung is thus read as bearing ironic significance for his own struggles with ‘spiritual trial’ [Anfægtelse]. In this reading, Luther's Anfechtung is taken to signify for Kierkegaard both the anguish inherent to the authentic God‐relationship and also the dangerous possibility of the individual imagination's [Phantasi] capitulation into the precariously embellished realm of ‘the fantastic’ [Phantastiske]. It is here that Kierkegaard's emphasis upon individual responsibility – contrasted with Luther's concentration upon the role of the devil – demonstrates the fundamental differentiation between Kierkegaard's anatomy of Anfægtelse and Luther's Anfechtung.     

Kierkegaard's Critique of Eudaimonism: A Reassessment

Interpreters are less univocal than one might think in assessing Søren Kierkegaard's attitude toward eudaimonism. Through an analysis of several key texts from across Kierkegaard's authorship, I argue that existing interpretations do not convincingly address the relationship between Kierkegaard's critique of eudaimonism and his mid‐nineteenth‐century context, which was dominated by post‐Kantian idealists. While I am sympathetic to aspects of deontological and aretaic interpretations, a contextual reading shows that his critique centers on what he diagnoses as the enclosure of the modern self. This puts his critique of eudaimonism in the purview of his moral psychology and in continuity with his critique of romanticism.     

Thinking Outside the Circle: The Place of Kierkegaard in Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation

Abstract

In Understanding Moral Obligation, Robert Stern presents an interesting account of the history of ethics from Kant through Hegel and Kierkegaard. I argue that Stern in this account misinterprets Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Works of Love by reading them as presenting a Divine Command Theory of moral obligation, as a philosophical account meant to compete with those of Kant and Hegel. It mistakes, indeed subverts, Kierkegaard's purposes to read him as engaging in a philosophical dialectic in these texts. I argue that Stern's reading renders Kierkegaard's contribution internal to a philosophical dialectic that Kierkegaard means to speak against, from a position expressly and resolutely external to it.     

THINKING THROUGH KIERKEGAARD'S ANTI-CLIMACUS: ART, IMAGINATION, AND IMITATION

What place do imagination and art have in Christian existence? This paper examines this question through the writings of Kierkegaard's pseudonym Anti‐Climacus: The Sickness Unto Death and Practice in Christianity. I focus on the latter work in particular because it best illustrates the importance of imagination in following after (Efterfølgelse) Christ in imitation, which Anti‐Climacus presents as the proper task of faithful Christian existence. After outlining both his critique and his affirmation of the imagination, I then consider what role the notion of ‘Christian art’ might play in his account of the imitation of Christ. Anti‐Climacus gives a severe critique of Christian art, insofar as it disposes the viewer to detached observation and admiration – rather than imitation – of Christ. However, an earlier passage in the same text gives a provocative yet cryptic indication of the sort of art that would not succumb to this danger. Taking a cue from the phenomenology of Jean‐Luc Marion, I draw out this suggestion and argue for the important role that visual art can play in imitating Christ. The final section illustrates this point briefly with three paintings: Matthias Grünewald's Crucifixion, Hans Holbein's The Body of the Dead Christ in the Tomb, and Albrecht Dürer's Self‐Portrait (1500).     

You can't get something for nothing: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on how not to overcome Nihilism 1

This paper analyzes Kierkegaard's Religiousness A sphere of existence, presented in his edifying works, and Heidegger's concept of authenticity, proposed in Being and Time, as responses to modern nihilism. While Kierkegaard argues that Religiousness A is an unsuccessful response to modern nihilism, Heidegger claims that authenticity, a secularized version of Religiousness A, is a successful response. We argue that Heidegger's secularization of Religiousness A is incomplete and unsuccessful, that Heidegger's later work offers a reconsideration of the problem of modern nihilism, and that later Heidegger suggests a way out of nihilism which is compatible with Kierkegaard's Religiousness B sphere of existence.