Rethinking the paradigm of enterprise: A global and evolutionary perspective

The most elementary law of nature, the principle that best explains how the world works, is that actions have consequences. The consequences of enterprise (or business) will be as profitable or detrimental as the actions behind them. The rapidly approaching new millennium forces society to assess where we are (the consequences) and how we got here (the actions). The standard of living in the western world is a direct consequence of past and present enterprise, but the actions taken to get to this plateau and their associated costs may far over‐shadow the gains. A major issue facing those who study the development and evolution of enterprise is whether past merits and mistakes can be used to develop a new paradigm that is more reflective of what is currently experienced and most likely to occur in the future.

This paper discusses some of the shortcomings in current economic thinking, how current developments in economic thinking need to become the norm and the future of socio‐ecologically behavior and patterns of growth for enterprise.     

Predicting knowledge acquisition in two clinician groups: Rethinking the standard paradigm

The focus of this study was an innovative antibiotic preventive regimen recommended by experts and regularly updated. Data about knowledge of this regimen and potential predictors of knowledge levels were obtained from representative samples of New York State urban and rural general dental practitioners. Using multivariate analyses, four research objectives were achieved: measurement of clinicians' level, of knowledge in both groups; identification of personal and professional work and communication factors influencing clinicians' knowledge level; assessment of the effect of each of these factors on knowledge; and differentiation between sets of predictors for each group. Explanatory factors in this study appeared to be specific, situational, and/or ecologic. The role of distinct configurations of communication networks in the knowledge acquisition process is noted. Donald Sadowsky is professor, Department of Dentistry, Albert Einstein College of Medicine. Research interests include the latter stages of professional socialization, measurement of clinician knowledge and knowledge-related behavior, and planned interventions to change that behavior. Carol Kunzel is assistant professor of dentistry at Albert Einstein College of Medicine. Her academic degree is in sociology. She is currently studying clinician knowledge and its role in the prevention of bacterial endocarditis in a national sample of general practice dentists.     

Rethinking Emancipation,Rethinking Education

In this paper I discuss the possibility of the idea of emancipation within an educational philosophy that does not accept schooling as its first premise. The first part of the paper will take Sweden as an example of an educational state defined through educational policies such as life long learning, accountability and evidence-based research, and argue that these words are only meaningful within the myth of schooling and not in a language of education/emancipation. The second part of the paper discusses different but related conceptions of emancipation by exploring its ambiguous nature. In the third part of the paper I specify the role and place of emancipation within a philosophy of education that seeks to articulate its social value.     

Rethinking Bivalence

Classical logic rests on the assumption that there are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive truth values. This assumption has always been surrounded by philosophical controversy. Doubts have been raised about its legitimacy, and hence about the legitimacy of classical logic. Usually, the assumption is stated in the form of a general principle, namely the principle that every proposition is either true or false. Then, the philosophical controversy is often framed in terms of the question whether every proposition is either true or false. The main purpose of the paper is to show that there is something wrong in this way of putting things. The point is that the common way of understanding the controversial assumption is misconceived, as it rests on a wrong picture of propositions. In the first part of the paper I outline this picture and I argue against it. In the second part I sketch a different picture of propositions and I suggest how this leads to conceive the issue of classical logic in different terms.     

Rethinking creativity

John S. Dacey. Fundamentals of Creative Thinking. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, Division of D.C. Heath, 1989, 314 pp., $39.00 hardcover, ISBN 0–669–16140–30.     

Rethinking Power

This paper argues that feminists have yet to develop a satisfactory account of power. Existing feminist accounts of power tend to have a one-sided emphasis either on power as domination or on power as empowerment. This conceptual one-sided’ ness must be overcome if feminists are to develop an account complex enough to illuminate women's diverse experiences with power. Such an account is sketched here.     

Rethinking Revision

We sketch a broadening of the Gupta-Belnap notion of a circular or revision theoretic definition into that of a more generalized form incorporating ideas of Kleene’s generalized or higher type recursion. This thereby connects the philosophically motivated, and derived, notion of a circular definition with an older form of definition by recursion using functionals, that is functions of functions, as oracles. We note that Gupta and Belnap’s notion of ‘categorical in L’ can be formulated in at least one of these schemes.

     

Rethinking Prophecy

Abstract

This essay demonstrates that Argula von Grumbach’s understanding of prophecy and interpretation of Old Testament prophecy show direct alignment with Martin Luther’s views as they appear in his early 1520s German works. We recall that it is too restrictive to view ‘prophecy’ in the sixteenth century in merely apocalyptic terms. Rather, the author points to the wider view of prophecy of a contemporary male Protestant in which ‘prophecy’ is specifically aligned with the call to interpret and apply Scripture. The author sets illustrated several ways in which this new definition of prophecy played out in the writings, self-conception, and ministry of the aristocrat, Argula von Grumbach. She and Luther both emphasized the call of Christians to interpret Scripture, speak out against unbiblical teaching, distinguish between true and false prophets, and read contemporary situations in the light of Old Testament prophecy. Argula is, therefore, a prime example of one kind of early Luther reception in informed, lay circles.     

Rethinking Philosophy

Can philosophy still be fruitful, and what kind of philosophy can be such? In particular, what kind of philosophy can be legitimized in the face of sciences? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions, listing the characteristics philosophy should have to be fruitful and legitimized in the face of sciences. Since the characteristics in question demand that philosophy search for new knowledge and new rules of discovery, a philosophy with such characteristics may be called the ‘heuristic view’. According to the heuristic view, philosophy is an inquiry into the world which is continuous with the sciences. It differs from them only because it deals with questions which are beyond the present sciences, and in order to deal with them must try unexplored routes. By so doing, when successful, it may even give birth to new sciences. In listing the characteristics that philosophy should have, the paper systematically compares them with classical analytic philosophy, because the latter has been the dominant philosophical tradition in the last century.     

再评费尔巴哈

<唯一者及其所有>出版后,受到施蒂纳猛烈批评的费尔巴哈在1845年<维干德季刊>第2期撰文反驳,施蒂纳随即在该杂志第3期作了对费尔巴哈及其他批评者的再反驳.他对费尔巴哈再批判的核心是:费尔巴哈只要坚持人的本质的观念,就仍然是虔信者和唯心主义者,就无法在唯物主义的层面上理解具体的、特殊的、现实的个人.——译注     

Rethinking the presumption of atheism

Is there—or rather, ought there to be—a presumption of atheism, as Antony Flew (1923–2010) so famously argued nearly half a century ago? It is time to revisit this issue. After clarifying the concept of a presumption of atheism (which includes clarifying the concept of a presumption), I take up the evaluative question of whether there ought to be a presumption of atheism, focusing on Flew’s arguments for an affirmative answer. I conclude that Flew’s arguments, one of which rests on an analogy with the (legal) presumption of innocence, fail.     

Confidentiality in the military

This article presents and analyzes options military physicians face regarding whether or not to respect gay servicepersons' confidentiality. This situation is considered to be generic to others that involve similar conflicts. Dilemmas arising before and after the emergence of HIV-related diseases are discussed. Recommendations regarding psychiatrists' ethical obligations when conducting forensic exams are compared with military physicians' obligations to respect servicepersons' confidentiality. It is suggested that military psychiatrists should violate servicepersons' confidentiality under some circumstances, but generally should warn them in advance that they will do so. Possible exceptions exist when warning servicepersons would increase the likelihood that justice would be violated or substantial harm would occur.     

Rethinking the focusing effect in decision-making

According to Legrenzi et al. [Cognition 49 (1993) 37], in making a choice people consider only the alternatives explicitly represented in their mental model of the decision situation. Their idea has found empirical support in the "focusing effect": Individuals focus on the alternatives explicitly stated in the problem context, and do not take into account other possibilities. In their original study, Legrenzi and colleagues considered only one factor to account for the explicit representation of an alternative--i.e., its explicit verbal formulation in the decision problem. Recent theories of relevance and information gain can help articulate their original idea, suggesting that individuals explicitly represent relevant alternatives, whether or not they are explicitly formulated in the decision problem. In three experiments we first replicated Legrenzi et al.'s original experiment, and then showed that the explicit verbal mention of an alternative is neither sufficient nor necessary to focus on it. The results suggest that individuals are able to consider relevant alternatives, even when they are not made explicit in the verbal formulation of a decision problem.