Compatibilism,determinism, and the identity theory

Two issues are raised with regard to Ted Honderich's A Theory of Determinism. First, regarding the relation between a token identity theory of mental and physical events and Honderich's ‘psychoneural union theory’, it is suggested that a token identity theory would serve Honderich's purposes while securing a simpler ontology. Second, it is argued that there is a substantive philosophical issue dividing compatibilists and incompatibilists on the question of whether persons possess free will, contrary to Honderich's contention that the compatibilist and incompatibilist differ only in responsive attitude.     

Honderich,Davidson, and the question of mental holism

Honderich's defence of aspects of his correlationist theory against many objections actually or likely to be raised today, in particular from the point of view of Davidson's anomalous monism and psychological holism, is accepted as largely successful. But it is suggested that, even if Davidson's theory is wrong‐headed, another kind of holism, more deeply ontological and less linguistic, regarding the mental seems to be true, and presents difficulties for Honderich's correlationism. Finally, it is contended that a panpsychist kind of identity theory escapes his strictures on identity theories and is probably true; however, the identity is, in virtue of certain synthetic necessities about the course of a stream of consciousness, either only between particular mental and physical events (and thus anomalously monist in Davidson's sense), or if it holds also between types of mental and of brain event then certain quite striking consequences follow as to the character of the fullest possible explanation of what goes on in the brain.     

Multiple realization,reduction and mental properties

This paper tries to remove some obstacles standing in the way of considering mental properties as both genuine natural kinds and causally efficacious rather than epiphenomena. As the case of temperature shows, it is not justified to conclude from a property being multiply realizable to it being irreducible. Yet Kim's argument to the effect that if a property is multiply realizable with a heterogeneous reduction base then it cannot be a natural kind and possesses only derivative “epiphenomenal” causal efficacy is not conclusive either. The fact that temperature is, but jade is not, a natural kind cannot be established by comparing the heterogeneity of their respective reduction bases, but rather by the fact that the former is and the latter is not embedded in laws of nature.     

Shoemaker's Analysis of Realization: A Review

Sydney Shoemaker has been arguing for more than a decade for an account of the mind–body problem in which the notion of realization takes centre stage. His aim is to provide a notion of realization that is consistent with the multiple realizability of mental properties or events, and which explains: (i) how the physical grounds the mental; and (ii) why the causal work of mental events is not screened off by that of physical events. Shoemaker's proposal consists of individuating properties in terms of causal powers, and defining realization as a relation of inclusion between sets of causal powers. Thus, as the causal powers that define a mental property are a subset of the causal powers that characterize a physical property, it can be said that physical properties realize mental properties. In this paper we examine the physicalist credentials of Shoemaker's mind–body theory in relation to three important issues: the direction of the relation of dependence that the theory is committed to; the possibility of mental properties existing without being anchored by physical properties; and the compatibility of the theory with the causal closure of the physical world. We argue that Shoemaker's theory is problematic in all three respects. After that we consider whether the theory should count as a mind–body theory at all, given that it seems to be committed to a distorted view of mental properties.     

Contrastive mental causation

Any theory of mind needs to explain mental causation. Kim’s (upward) exclusion argument concludes that non-reductive physicalism cannot meet this challenge. One classic reply is that mental properties capture the causally relevant level of generality, because they are insensitive to physical realization. However, this reply suggests downward exclusion (if mental properties are causally efficacious, their physical realizers are causally impotent), contrary to physicalism’s assumption of closure. This paper shows how non-reductive physicalists can solve this problem by introducing a contrastive account of causation with non-exhaustive contrasts. That view has independent justification, because it is also needed to solve other puzzles. On this theory, both a mental property and its physical realizer can cause the same physical effect without lapsing into any problematic overdetermination when they cause that effect in contrast with distinct foils. This contrastive solution has advantages over previous accounts of mental causation and is defended against objections.

     

Spinoza and the philosophy of immanence: Reflections on Yovel's The Adventures of Immanence

Much of this paper is concerned with several issues of considerable importance in assessing the adequacy of Honderich's account of our nature and the persuasiveness of his case for his theory of determinism. First, there are a number of respects in which his treatment of the mental does not do justice to it, chiefly owing to the mental's being abstracted from its larger context in human life, and to neglect of its intimate relation to socially engendered and maintained systems of significant forms. Second, and relatedly, there is his contention that the untenability of the notion of an Originator is fatal to any attempt to offer a philosophically respectable alternative to the sort of deterministic theory he espouses. An attempt is made to show how one might mount a response that would counter this argument by making sense of the idea of a humanly attainable substitute for the kind of Originator he with good reason rejects. The conclusion is not that indeterminism may thereby be saved, but rather that we might do better to abandon the dispute between determinism and indeterminism in favor of other more promising questions.     

LE POINT DE VUE DE PIAGET

Summarizing a summary is impossible if we want to avoid unacceptable schematizing. So let us merely state the theses very briefly developped in this article. (I) Knowledge deals with the transformations from a state into another one, each one being, at the same time, the point of arrival and the starting point of actual transformations. (II) Therefore knowledge is contínously being built up, and this progress does not come down to recordings of external informations, but includes an internal mechanism that (III) can be reduced or compared to self-regulations in the biological meaning. (IV) So the fundamental mode of relation could not correspond to the classical notion of association : it consists in processes of “ assimilation ” of the object to the subject's structures or schemes, with “ accommodation ” of these structures to the properties of the object. (V) The mental development includes stages that occur in a necessary sequential order, but without any fixed chronological date; on an other hand, the possible hastenings or delays of these stages include an optimum speed. (VI) Even learning depends on these laws of development. (VII) Experience has a bipolar role with abstraction from objects in physical experience and from the subject's actions on the object in logico-mathematical experience. (VIII) The general actions of the subject are internalized into operations that are not derived from language, but determine the stages of its acquisition. (IX) Therefore, in addition to the classical factors of development, it is necessary to add a factor of equilibration based on self-regulation, the importance of which in explanation is due to systems of sequential probabilities and to the fact that self-regulation, at first semi-reversible, tends to result in complete reversibility. (X) At last, the elements of this construction are taken from structures of inferior level by a process of “ reflecting abstraction ” in the double meaning of a quasi-physical reflection on a new plane of organization and of a mental reflection that enriches the structure with new operations carried out on the previous operations or actions.     

A Scoring Scheme for the TAT and other Verbal Projective Techniques

Summaiy: Three groups of subjects rated each item in Rotter's I-E Scale for its social desirability value. Social desirability scale values (SDSV) of paired items were compared with one another. Results indicated that paired items are not sufficiently similar in their SDSVs, thus enabling subjects to respond on the basis of social desirability. All three groups rated internal items as being significantly more socially desirable than external items. The correlations between the SDSV ratings of the three groups were highly significant. The results indicate that the scale, as it is currently used, is seriously deficient.     

Spinoza's Formal Mechanism

I defend a new reading of Spinoza's account of causation that reconciles the strengths of the mechanist and formal cause interpretations by locating instances of nature's fixed and unchanging laws inside individual natures; natures are efficacious because that's where the laws are. God's necessity, for instance, follows from certain logical principles contained within God's nature. Causes between finite particulars likewise stem entirely from finite natures. They do so, I argue, because finite instances of nature's fixed and unchanging laws are inscribed within those natures. In each of these instances, effects follow from natures on account of laws contained within them.     

Diagrams: Socrates and Meno's slave

Abstract

When do two mental items belong to the same life? We could be content with the answer ‐just when they have certain volitional qualities in common. An affinity is noted between that theory and Berkeley's early doctrine of the self. Some rivals of the volitional theory invoke a spiritual or physical owner of mental items. They run a risk either of empty formality or of causal superstition. Other rivals postulate a non‐transitive and symmetrical relation in the set of mental items. They must allow in consequence either for joint ownership of one and the same mental item, or for incompatible simultaneous decisions by one and the same person, or for new forms of death. This makes them disquieting. Another rival invokes a transitive and symmetrical relation defined in terms of co‐consciousness. Even that allows for incongruous simultaneities. The volitional theory is free from such disadvantages.     

I See Not Only a Madonna,but Also a Hole,in the Picture

According to an intuitive claim, in saying that one sees a picture's subject, i.e., what a picture presents, in the picture's vehicle, i.e., the picture's physical basis, by ‘in’ one does not mean the spatial relation of being in, as holding between such items in the real space. For the picture's subject is knowingly not in the real space where one veridically sees the picture's vehicle. Some theories of pictorial experience have actually agreed with this intuition by claiming that the picture's subject lies in a pictorial space of its own, disconnected from the real space that includes the picture's vehicle. Yet, not only linguistic evidence suggests that when used as above, ‘in’ means precisely that very relation, but an appropriate theory of pictorial experience can justify the above claim.     

Self-Concept and Moral Reasoning among Batswana Adolescents

Abstract

On the basis of Herzberg, Mausner, and Snyderman's (1959) motivatorhygiene theory, it was hypothesized that intrinsic but not extrinsic work values would be inversely related to stress. Also investigated was the question of which work values provide the most relief from stress. Elementary school teachers and administrators (N = 607) from nine school boards in southern Ontario completed a survey that included Pines, Aronson, and Kafry's (1981) stress scale and Elizur's (1984) work values scale. Almost all of the 12 intrinsic work values investigated were negatively correlated with stress, but the 4 extrinsic work values studied were not consistently related to stress. Five work values explained 11% of the variance in physical stress, 9 work values explained 22% of the variance in emotional stress, and 6 work values explained 26% of the variance in mental stress. Four work values emerged as meaningful predictors of all three types of stress: being esteemed by others, achieving through work, doing meaningful work, and being able to use one's knowledge and abilities.     

Consciousness is not a property of states: A reply to Wilberg

According to Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness, one is in a conscious mental state if and only if one is aware of oneself as being in that state via a suitable HOT. Several critics have argued that the possibility of so-called targetless HOTs—that is, HOTs that represent one as being in a state that does not exist—undermines the theory. Recently, Wilberg (2010) has argued that HOT theory can offer a straightforward account of such cases: since consciousness is a property of mental state tokens, and since there are no states to exhibit consciousness, one is not in conscious states in virtue of targetless HOTs. In this paper, I argue that Wilberg's account is problematic and that Rosenthal's version of HOT theory, according to which a suitable HOT is both necessary and sufficient for consciousness, is to be preferred to Wilberg's account. I then argue that Rosenthal's account can comfortably accommodate targetless HOTs because consciousness is best understood as a property of individuals, not a property of states.     

Using Toys and Models in Interviews with Young Children

The present study examined the conditions under which toys and model items facilitate children's accounts of personally experienced events. In three experiments, 109 five- to six-year-old children were interviewed about an event in which they had participated. Experiment 1 varied the similarity of the props to the items from the event while Experiments 2 and 3 varied the number of model items and the method of their presentation. Results showed that increasing the physical similarity of the props to items from the event, adding spatial layout cues, or increasing the number of props provided enhanced the facilitative effects of props on children's accounts. The implications of these results for interviewing children in clinical and legal contexts are discussed. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Attachment and preschool children's understanding of maternal versus non‐maternal psychological states

There is growing evidence that insecurely attached children are less advanced in their social understanding than their secure counterparts. However, attachment may also predict how individual children use their social understanding across different relationships. For instance, the insecure child's social‐cognitive difficulties may be more pronounced when the psychological states of an attachment figure are being considered. In the current study, forty‐eight 4‐ to 5‐year‐old children were asked about their mothers' emotions and false beliefs, as well as those of non‐attachment figures. The Separation Anxiety Test (SAT) was administered to assess children's attachment representations. Children's SAT scores predicted their overall performance on the false belief and causes of emotion tasks, even after controlling for age and verbal ability. More interestingly, however, children with high scores on the Avoidance dimension of the SAT experienced greater difficulty understanding maternal false beliefs relative to those of an unfamiliar adult female. Thus, although attachment insecurity may hinder social‐cognitive development in general, the findings suggest that there are more specific effects as well. Attachment representations that are characterized by high levels of avoidance appear to interfere with children's ability to fully engage their social‐cognitive skills when reasoning about maternal mental states.     

The psycho‐physical laws of intentionality

Intentional mental states have causes and effects. Davidson has shown that this fact alone does not entail the existence of psycho‐physical laws, but his anomalism makes the connection between the content and causation of intentional states utterly mysterious. By defining intentional states in terms of their causes and effects, functionalism promises to explain this connection. If intentional states have their causes and effects in virtue of their contents, then there must be intrinsic states (of the people who have them) which are ‘local causal surrogates’ for the propositions believed, desired, or whatever. We can define these intrinsic states in terms of the laws that govern them, but these laws alone are not sufficient to account for intentional content. To do that we need to invoke laws which link these intrinsic states with their contents. Such a ‘wide’ functional account is sketched; it combines a suggestion of Ramsey's about truth conditions with a ‘feedback’ account of the content of desires.     

QUANTUM AND CONSCIOUSNESS: IN SEARCH OF A NEW PARADIGM

Abstract. Two fundamental issues raised by Lothar Schäfer are considered: (1) the question of a suitable paradigm within which the findings of quantum physics can be optimally interpreted and (2) the question of the assessment of the presence and importance of mind and consciousness in the universe. In regard to the former, I contend that the ideal of science is to interpret its findings in an optimally consistent and minimally speculative framework. In this context Schäfer's assertion that certain findings in quantum physics (those that relate to virtual states) indicate the presence of mind at the quantum level implies a dualistic and hence unnecessarily speculative assumption. In regard to the assessment of mind and consciousness, a consistent and parsimonious paradigm suggests that mind and consciousness are not part of a chain of events consisting of an admixture of physical and mental events but that physical events form a single, coherent set of events, and mental events another set, with the two sets related, as Teilhard (and a number of other philosophers, including White head) affirmed, as the “within” and the “without” (or the “mental pole” and the “physical pole”) of one and the same fundamental reality. This panpsychist as contrasted with Schäfer's dualist paradigm provides a single self‐consistent framework for the interpretation of quantum (and all natural) events while recognizing the presence of mind in the universe as the least speculative realist implication of our immediate experience of consciousness.     

Happy but unhealthy: The relationship between social ties and health in an emerging network

Social connections are essential to health and well‐being. However, when pursing social acceptance, people may sometimes engage in behavior that is detrimental to their health. Using a multi‐time‐point design, we examined whether the structure of an emerging network of students in an academic summer school program correlated with their physical health and mental well‐being. Participants who were more central in the network typically experienced greater symptoms of illness (e.g., cold/flu symptoms), engaged in riskier health behaviors (e.g., binge drinking), and had higher physiological reactivity to a stressor. At the same time, they were happier, felt more efficacious, and perceived less stress in response to a strenuous math task. These outcomes suggest that social ties in an emerging network are associated with better mental well‐being, but also with poorer physical health and health behaviors. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

通勤时间对心理健康的影响：基于美好生活的视角

为探讨通勤时间对民众心理健康的影响，以及美好生活体验的中介作用与美好生活需要的调节作用，对4199名居民进行问卷调查，结果显示：（1）通勤时间、心理健康、美好生活体验、美好生活需要等两两显著相关；（2）美好生活体验在通勤时间与心理健康间起中介作用；（3）美好生活需要对通勤时间与美好生活体验的关系以及美好生活体验与心理健康的关系均起调节作用，具体来说，高美好生活需要不仅可以降低通勤时间对美好生活体验的负向影响，还可以增强美好生活体验对心理健康的正向影响。     

A puzzle about natural laws and the existence of God

The existence of natural laws, whether deterministic or indeterministic, and whether exceptionless or ceteris paribus, seems puzzling because it implies that mindless bits of matter behave in a consistent and co-ordinated way. I explain this puzzle by showing that a number of attempted solutions fail. The puzzle could be resolved if it were assumed that natural laws are a manifestation of God’s activity. This argument from natural law to God’s existence differs from its traditional counterparts in that, whereas the latter seek to explain the fact of natural laws, the former seeks to explain their possibility. The customary objections to the traditional arguments cannot be successfully adapted to counter this new argument, with one exception which has only limited effect. I rebut four claims that the theistic solution to the puzzle about natural laws is paradoxical, though I concede that one of these claims has merit. I consider four objections to the new argument but find three of them more or less unsatisfactory. The fourth, if successful, would undermine our claims to know the truth about the world.