Clarity about concessive knowledge attributions: reply to Dodd

Recently, Dylan Dodd (this Journal) has tried to clear up what he takes to be some of the many confusions surrounding concessive knowledge attributions (CKAs)??i.e., utterances of the form ??S knows that p, but it??s possible that q?? (where q entails not-p) (Rysiew, Noûs 35(4): 477?C514, 2001). Here, we respond to the criticisms Dodd offers of the account of the semantics and the sometime-infelicity of CKAs we have given (Dougherty and Rysiew, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78(1): 121?C132, 2009), showing both how Dodd misunderstands certain central features of that view and how the latter can, pace Dodd, be naturally extended to explain the oddity of those ??For all I know?? statements to which Dodd draws attention.     

Procedural knowledge versus fact retrieval in mental arithmetic: A reply to Baroody

Based on a review of reaction time studies, a model of mental arithmetic performance which emphasizes the process of fact retrieval from organized memory representations was proposed (M. H. Ashcraft, Developmental Review, 1982, 2, 213–236). In contrast to this view A. J. Baroody (Developmental Review, 1983, 3, 225–230) proposes that most mental arithmetic performance depends on procedural knowledge such as rules, heuristics, and principles. While Baroody's idea is both intriguing and potentially important, its exposition is quite vague and speculative. Without concrete suggestions as to the nature of the proposed rules and heuristics, especially for routine problems like 4 + 3 and 8 × 5, Baroody's proposal appears to be pertinent only to special cases like N + 0 and N + 1. Lacking this sort of elaboration, the alternative does not provide a useful or compelling explanation of the existing Chronometric results, and seems, at best, to be premature.     

Sleeping Beauty, evidential support and indexical knowledge: reply to Horgan

Terence Horgan defends the thirder position on the Sleeping Beauty problem, claiming that Beauty can, upon awakening during the experiment, engage in “synchronic Bayesian updating” on her knowledge that she is awake now in order to justify a 1/3 credence in heads. In a previous paper, I objected that epistemic probabilities are equivalent to rational degrees of belief given a possible epistemic situation and so the probability of Beauty’s indexical knowledge that she is awake now is necessarily 1, precluding such updating. In response, Horgan maintains that the probability claims in his argument are to be taken, not as claims about possible rational degrees of belief, but rather as claims about “quantitative degrees of evidential support.” This paper argues that the most plausible account of quantitative degree of support, when conjoined with any of the three major accounts of indexical thought in such a way as to plausibly constrain rational credence, contradicts essential elements of Horgan’s argument.     

Contents,logic and motivation in the process of knowledge acquisition: A reply to Effier

Effler's recent criticisms of the lay-epistemic model are considered. It is argued that various attributional models indeed address various attributional goals but this is because of (and not instead of) their concern with different attributional problems. Furthermore, while some attributional models deal with causal dimensions rather than with specific causes, and/or attend to the influences of important human needs this does not satisfactorily establish the non-arbitrary character of goals featured in those models. Finally, while noncommon deducibility constitutes a principle applicable only to a multi-propositional problem rather than universally, logic, motivation and cognitive contents enter conjunctively into the process of human inference. This view is juxtaposed to the suggestion that they represent disjunctive strategies of inference on which the knower may draw in various circumstances.     

Accreditation: A reply to mathers

Accreditation in counselling is meant not for the benefit of the counsellor but for the protection of the public. It is concerned more with guaranteeing certain standards of ethics than with the acclamation of status. Whatever method is used, it must avoid the pitfalls of conservatism and academicism which in other professions have been jointly responsible for the attack on accreditation itself as a process. Those involved in counselling and psychotherapy should not wait passively until Parliament acts, but need to be critically involved in bringing into being a system of accreditation which is both flexible and creative.     

Vagueness and incoherence: A reply to Burns

I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant.     

Omniscience and physicalism: A reply to Beyer

In a recent issue ofSophia, Jason A. Beyer introduced objections to the antitheist arguments that purport to show the inconsistencies between God’s attributes. In this short response I argue that Beyer’s objections are untenable.     

Anselm and Rowe: A reply to Davis

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -