Foreknowledge,accidental necessity,and uncausability

Foreknowledge arguments attempt to show that infallible and exhaustive foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. One particularly powerful foreknowledge argument employs the concept of accidental necessity. But an opponent of this argument might challenge it precisely because it employs the concept of accidental necessity. Indeed, Merricks (Philos Rev 118:29–57, 2009, Philos Rev 120:567–586, 2011a) and Zagzebski (Faith Philos 19(4):503–519, 2002, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2011) have each written favorably of such a response. In this paper, I aim to show that responding to the accidental necessity version of the foreknowledge argument by disputing the concept of accidental necessity, including doing so in the ways these authors do, does not constitute a successful response to the foreknowledge argument. This is because there is an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of the foreknowledge argument which employs the notion of uncausability rather than accidental necessity; and this argument is not threatened by objections to the concept of accidental necessity, including those objections offered by Zagzebski and Merricks. As recent literature on the foreknowledge argument has emphasized, when a response to a foreknowledge argument fails to threaten an only slightly modified but still well-motivated version of that argument, the response in question is not successful. So the responses to the accidental necessity version of the foreknowledge argument I have mentioned are not successful. Moreover, those working on foreknowledge arguments more generally should take seriously the uncausability version of the foreknowledge argument articulated here, as it may well be that still more responses to the foreknowledge argument will not threaten it, either.     

Combinations of tense and deontic modality: On the approach to temporal logic with historical necessity and conditional obligation

We consider three infinite hierarchies of what I call “two-dimensional temporal logics with explicit realization operators”, viz. (i) one without historical or deontic modalities, (ii) one with historical but without deontic modalities, and (iii) one with historical and with dyadic deontic modalities for conditional obligation and permission. Sound and complete axiomatizations are obtained for all three hierarchies relative to a simplified version of the finite co-ordinate-system semantics given for so-called T × W logic of historical necessity in [L. Åqvist, The logic of historical necessity as founded on two-dimensional modal tense logic, J. Philos. Logic 28 (1999) 329–369].     

A unified approach to the perception of motion,stereo, and static-flow patterns

This paper presents a unified approach for studying the perception of motion, stereopsis, and static-flow (Glass) patterns. The objective is to address the same issues across these “modalities.” To this end, a new class of stimuli and procedures were developed, the key feature of which is the incorporation of a forced-choice competition paradigm into the random-dot stimuli paradigm that has traditionally been used in these modalities. The two competing percepts that are pitted against each other are opposite directions for motion, near/far depth planes for stereopsis, and orthogonal global patterns for Glass patterns. The differences in qualitative predictions for competing hypotheses are generally well pronounced, and the results provide clear evidence for deciding between alternative hypotheses. This approach has been used to confirm that covariance is the preferred metric for eliciting global correlations in all the modalities and to investigate the nature of front-end processes in each modality. It has the potential for neurophysiological studies for both single-cell and neuronal ensemble recording.     

Crisis counseling: A right and a necessity for members of the underclass

Crisis counseling, short-term, directive psychotherapeutic intervention, is an appropriate form of therapy for the low socioeconomics status (SES) individuals. Poverty, racism, and cultural alienation contribute to making crises a prominent feature of life among poor people. Members of the underclass frequently do not have the time or cultural affinity for many forms of long-term therapy. Oriented toward the solution of practical problems and toward quickly re-establishing emotional equilibrium, crisis counseling does not require the client's long-standing commitment to personal growth. Because it is relatively free of the social biases of most treatment modalities, crisis counseling is a way of introducing many low SES individuals to psychotherapy. For many underclass individuals, crisis counseling can lead them in the direction of overcoming other situations that keep them at a disadvantage.     

Possibility,chance and necessity

Those who deny the usefulness of the concept of “motive” for psychology commonly bring two arguments in support of theirview. The first is that the whole notion of “motive” is “animistic” and “folklorish”, since a motive cannot be directly observed. The second is that “motives” cannot be accurately observed, and therefore are beyond the scope of scientific study, because (a) they are “the secret of the agent”, and (b) the agenthimself has no indubitable knowledge of his “motives”.

In a recent article, Professor MacIver defends the view that the imputation of “motives” is necessary to a complete explanation of behaviour. To the first of the above criticisms, he replies that such a view neglects a part of reality and that since “motives” exist they should be studied by psychology. This reply does nothing to demonstrate the necessity of imputing motives in order to obtain a complete explanation of behaviour. To the second criticism he replies (a) “motives” are not the secret of the agent, and (b) we can only assert that the agent has mistaken his “motive” if we can gain indepen-dent knowledge of it. We can do this, Professor MacIver asserts, by observing typical behaviour in typical circum-stances, and making inferences from the coherence of total situations.

Professor MacIver's replies to the second of the above criticisms are valid only if “motive” is defined as equivalent to “need”, so that we can say “under such-and-such conditions, such-and-such behaviour occurs”. A statement of this type says nothing about the agent's awareness of his goal. When the term “consciousness” is carefully defined along the lines suggested by Boring, the methods of imputation described by Professor MacIver can be seen to lead us only to the agent's “drives”, or “needs”, defined without reference to the agent's awareness of his goal. Professor MacIver uses “motives” to mean “awareness of the goal”, but gives us no clue as to how they may be imputed, and adduces no proof that their imputation is necessary.

A possible criterion of the presence of a “motive” is the degree of direction observable in the organism's varied reac-tions in response to frustration, though the more precise definition of such a criterion must await further experiment.

In view of the ambiguity of the term “motive” and its penumbra of false suggestion, it is desirable that the term be dropped from psychology.     

Nonspatial attentional shifts between audition and vision

This study investigated nonspatial shifts of attention between visual and auditory modalities. The authors provide evidence that the modality of a stimulus (S1) affected the processing of a subsequent stimulus (S2) depending on whether they shared the same modality. For both vision and audition, the onset of S1 summoned attention exogenously to its modality, causing a delay in processing S2 in a different modality. That undermines the notion that auditory stimuli have a stronger and more automatic alerting effect than visual stimuli (M. I. Posner, M. J. Nissen, & R. M. Klein, 1976). The results are consistent with other recent studies showing cross-modal attentional limitation. The authors suggest that such cross-modal limitation can be produced by simply presenting S1 and S2 in different modalities and that central processing mechanisms are also, at least partially, modality dependent.     

Grounding,physicalism and necessity

Recent work on metaphysical grounding has suggested that physicalism can be characterised in terms of the mental facts being grounded in physical facts. It is often assumed that the full grounds of a fact metaphysically necessitate that fact. Therefore, it seems that if the physical grounds the mental, then the physical facts metaphysically necessitate the mental facts. Stefan Leuenberger argues that such a version of physicalism would be vulnerable to counterexamples. I shall outline a characterisation of grounding which appeals to a relation between grounding and the essences of properties instantiated in the grounded facts or in their grounds. If a grounded fact is such that its constituent property is essentially related to the properties instantiated in its grounds, or vice versa, then the grounded fact will be metaphysically necessitated by its full grounds. This characterisation of grounding not only avoids Leuenberger’s counterexamples, but has broader implications for characterising physicalism in terms of grounding.     

Visual and auditory processing of common pattern class structure

Visual and auditory classification of equivalent class structured patterns were examined. Underlying patterns from two classes were translated into auditory tone sequences and visual polygons. All Ss classified 50 visual patterns and their direct auditory analogs. Visual classification accuracy exceeded auditory accuracy (p < .01); however, auditory accuracy improved when auditory classification was preceded by the visual task (p < .01). Based on group data, classification strategies appeared similar across modalities, with accuracy of classification of individual patterns predicted to the same degree by common measures of physical class structure across modalities. Ss’ drawings of the prototypes also suggested a common strategy across modalities. While group data suggest some consistency of classification strategy across modalities, individual Ss were not at all consistent in their visual and auditory classifications.     

似然性、必然性和恒等:一种相对似然性逻辑

We construct a Hilbert style system RPL for the notion of plausibility measure introduced by Halpern J, and we prove the soundness and completeness with respect to a neighborhood style semantics. Using the language of RPL, we demonstrate that it can define well-studied notions of necessity, conditionals and propositional identity. The paper is partially supported by a project (No. 05JJD720. 40001) granted by the Key Research Institutes for Humanities and Social Sciences of Chinese Ministry of Education.     

Temporal necessity and the conditional

In [12] Richmond Thomason and Anil Gupta investigate a semantics for conditional logic that combines the ideas of [8] and [9] with a branching time model of tense logic. The resulting branching time semantics for the conditional is intended to capture the logical relationship between temporal necessity and the conditional. The central principle of this logical relationship is Past Predominance, according to which past similarities and differences take priority over future similarities and differences in determining the comparative similarity of alternative possible histories with respect to a given present moment.In this paper I will use ordinary possible worlds semantics (i.e. Kripke frames) to solve the completeness problem for a system of logic that combines conditional logic with temporal necessity in the context of Past Predominance. Branching time models turn out not to be necessary for the articulation of Past Predominance, and this means that one can axiomatize Past Predominance without first having to solve a much more difficult problem: the completeness problem for the logic of temporal necessity in the context of branching time.Thomason and Gupta argue in [12] that in addition to Past Predominance, temporal necessity and the conditional are logically related, by what have become known as the Edelberg Inferences, whose apparent validity motivates the very complicated theory presented at the end of [12]. I will conclude this paper by examining how the Edelberg inferences would be incorporated into the possible worlds based system presented in the earlier sections of this paper.This article is based on the second chapter of my doctoral dissertation Studies in the Semantics of Modality, University of Pittsburgh, 1985. I thank my adviser Richmond Thomason for his patient help throughout the course of that project.     

A Modal Logic for Discretely Descending Chains of Sets

We present a modal logic for the class of subset spaces based on discretely descending chains of sets. Apart from the usual modalities for knowledge and effort the standard temporal connectives are included in the underlying language. Our main objective is to prove completeness of a corresponding axiomatization. Furthermore, we show that the system satisfies a certain finite model property and is decidable thus.     

Essence,necessity, and definition

Philosophical Studies - What is it for something to be essential to an item? For some time, it was standard to think that the concept of necessity alone can provide an answer: for something to be...     

Semantic access processing in a supra-modal deficit: a single case study

The case is presented of a semantic dementia patient, who shows a deficit selective for (i) conceptual class (living things), (ii) attribute processing (visual features) and affecting (iii) input-output modalities at the same processing stage (matching stored representation to attributes). The first experimental part aims at exploring the specific stage/process at which semantic knowledge breaks down through multi-modality tasks, devised to tap different levels within the semantic elaboration flow. The second focuses on the differences between category vs. attribute knowledge across various modalities. The core nature of the patient's deficit is investigated through a close comparison of her damage to a specific processing stage across modalities in the light of her class and attribute-specific impairment. The complex pattern of findings is discussed according to current theoretical accounts of semantic memory organization. Finally, the relevance of the adoption of a broad perspective when dealing with semantic memory impairments is highlighted.     

Cross-modal information integration in category learning

An influential theoretical perspective describes an implicit category-learning system that associates regions of perceptual space with response outputs by integrating information preattentionally and predecisionally across multiple stimulus dimensions. In this study, we tested whether this kind of implicit, information-integration category learning is possible across stimulus dimensions lying in different sensory modalities. Humans learned categories composed of conjoint visual–auditory category exemplars comprising a visual component (rectangles varying in the density of contained lit pixels) and an auditory component (in Exp. 1, auditory sequences varying in duration; in Exp. 2, pure tones varying in pitch). The categories had either a one-dimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans could solve the information-integration category tasks by integrating information across two stimulus modalities. The results demonstrated an important cross-modal form of sensory integration in the service of category learning, and they advance the field’s knowledge about the sensory organization of systems for categorization.     

Human Psychophysical Functions,an Update: Methods for Identifying their form; Estimating their Parameters; and Evaluating the Effects of Important Predictors

Stevens’ power law for the judgments of sensation has a long history in psychology and is used in many psychophysical investigations of the effects of predictors such as group or condition. Stevens’ formulation \(\varPsi = {aP}^{n}\), where \(\varPsi \) is the psychological judgment, P is the physical intensity, and \(n\) is the power law exponent, is usually tested by plotting log \((\varPsi )\) against log (P). In some, but by no means all, studies, effects on the scale parameter, \(a\), are also investigated. This two-parameter model is simple but known to be flawed, for at least some modalities. Specifically, three-parameter functions that include a threshold parameter produce a better fit for many data sets. In addition, direct non-linear computation of power laws often fit better than regressions of log-transformed variables. However, such potentially flawed methods continue to be used because of assumptions that the approximations are “close enough” as to not to make any difference to the conclusions drawn (or possibly through ignorance the errors in these assumptions). We investigate two modalities in detail: duration and roughness. We show that a three-parameter power law is the best fitting of several plausible models. Comparison between this model and the prevalent two parameter version of Stevens’ power law shows significant differences for the parameter estimates with at least medium effect sizes for duration.     

Identity Coping in the First Years of University: Identity Diffusion,Adjustment and Identity Distress

In today’s advanced post-capitalist societies, consolidating identity with a view to acquiring adult roles is more complex than in the past. In Italy, the changes in the educational system are also associated with changes in the labor market characterized by lack of opportunity and instability. Therefore, young people on the threshold of university are discouraged from making long-term decisions and developing a coherent identity. The aim of the study was to explore what modalities Italian students adopt in order to cope with developmental tasks and how they proceed to negotiate and resolve identity-related concerns. The participants were 332 Italian students, balanced by gender, attending the first 2 years of university and aged 18–25. We used six self-report measures: Dimensions of Identity Development Scale; Identity Stage Resolution Index; Identity Distress Scale; Locus of Control Scale; Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; and Depressive Symptom Subscale and Anxiety Symptom Subscale. Participation was voluntary, and anonymity was guaranteed. Findings indicate that identity processes, identity distress and sense of adulthood are related dimensions. We find five different modalities of identity coping (clusters) that identify different subjects. These retained clusters have also an effect on psychosocial correlates. Results advance the literature linking identity, sense of adulthood and coping with developmental tasks in emerging adulthood. Findings also support previous literature suggesting that coping with identity during first years of university is an important target of prevention efforts aimed at improving academic performance and identification of developmental path, particularly for individuals who exhibit identity diffusion and distress.     

Neuronal assemblies: necessity, signature and detectability

The ease with which highly developed brains can generate representations of a virtually unlimited diversity of perceptual objects indicates that they have developed very efficient mechanisms to analyse and represent relations among incoming signals. Here, we propose that two complementary strategies are applied to cope with these combinatorial problems. First, elementary relations are represented by the tuned responses of individual neurons that acquire their specific response properties (feature selectivity) through appropriate convergence of input connections in hierarchically structured feed-forward architectures. Second, complex relations that cannot be represented economically by the responses of individual neurons are represented by assemblies of cells that are generated by dynamic association of individual, featureselective cells. The signature identifying the responses of an assembly as components of a coherent code is thought to be the synchronicity of the respective discharges. The compatibility of this hypothesis is examined in the context of recent data on the dynamics of synchronization phenomena, the dependence of synchronization on central states and the relations between the synchronization behaviour of neurons and perception.     

A Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification: Implications for the Legitimation of Authority,Hierarchy, and Government

In an attempt to explain the stability of hierarchy, we focus on the perspective of the powerless and how a subjective sense of dependence leads them to imbue the system and its authorities with legitimacy. In Study 1, we found in a nationally representative sample of U.S. employees that financial dependence on one's job was positively associated with the perceived legitimacy of one's supervisor. In Study 2, we observed that a general sense of powerlessness was positively correlated with the perceived legitimacy of the economic system. In Studies 3 and 4, priming experimental participants with feelings of powerlessness increased their justification of the social system, even when they were presented with system‐challenging explanations for race, class, and gender disparities. In Study 5, we demonstrated that the experience of powerlessness increased legitimation of governmental authorities (relative to baseline conditions). The processes we identify are likely to perpetuate inequality insofar as the powerless justify rather than strive to change the hierarchical structures that disadvantage them.     

The Logic of “Most” and “Mostly”

The paper suggests a modal predicate logic that deals with classical quantification and modalities as well as intermediate operators, like “most” and “mostly”. Following up the theory of generalized quantifiers, we will understand them as two-placed operators and call them determiners. Quantifiers as well as modal operators will be constructed from them. Besides the classical deduction, we discuss a weaker probabilistic inference “therefore, probably” defined by symmetrical probability measures in Carnap’s style. The given probabilistic inference relates intermediate quantification to singular statements: “Most S are P” does not logically entail that a particular individual S is also P, but it follows that this is probably the case, where the probability is not ascribed to the propositions but to the inference. We show how this system deals with single case expectations while predictions of statistical statements remain generally problematic.