The Evaluative Consequences of Hedges,Hesitations, and Intensifies Powerful and Powerless Speech Styles

This article examines the separate and combined impact of hedges, hesitations, and intensifiers on perceptions of authoritativeness, sociability, character, and similarity, and the extent to which messages containing one or more of these language variables differs from a “prototypically” powerless message in evaluative consequences. A “prototypically” powerless message is one that contains not only hedges, hesitations, and intensifiers, but also contains polite forms and meaningless particles, such as “oh, well” and “you know.” Two studies indicated that hedges and hesitations individually affected perceptions of authoritativeness and sociability, but interactions among the variables were not found in the studies. Furthermore, only high intensifiers/low hedges/low hesitations and low intensifiers/low hedges/low hesitations messages differed significantly from the “prototypically” powerless message. The second study revealed that speaker status interacted to affect evaluative consequences. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for the power of speech style construct.     

Helen and Heidegger: Disabled Dasein,Language and Others

Abstract

Both Heidegger’s Being and Time and Helen Keller’s The Story of my Life address the problem of what it means for humans to be optimally human. In reading these texts together, I hope to show that Helen’s life-story confirms Heidegger’s existential analyses to some extent, but also, importantly, poses a challenge to them with respect to the interrelated issues of disability, language and others. Heidegger’s hermeneutic explication of what it means to be human is intended to uncover supposedly basic human existential structures. As a fore-structure for this explication, Heidegger projects an already able-bodied, self-sufficient adult, resolutely engaged in daily activity. I shall argue, however, that it is due to this starting-point in adult-Dasein that Heidegger’s existential analyses miss important insights concerning the meaning of being human to be gained from Helen’s experience. Starting from the essentially disabled child-Dasein, Helen describes her struggle to achieve the very condition that Heidegger assumes from the start, first through rescue by the other as teacher, who offered the gift of language and community, and thereafter in her grasp of language as a “pharmakon.” I hope to show in the end that Helen’s experience of a struggle for humanity offers the model for an alternative projection, that of an essentially disabled and needy Dasein, which, I believe, provides a more viable fore-structure than Heidegger’s for a hermeneutics of humanity.     

Does the Bible Tell Me So? Weighing the Influence of Content versus Bias on Bible Interpretation Using Survey Experiments

Discussions of biblical interpretation often proceed under one of two assumptions. Readers’ interpretations are primarily formed (1) inductively, according to the Bible's objective content, or (2) through the lens of preformed ideologies and biases. We assessed the influence of these two factors using two survey experiments with undergraduates. In study 1 (N = 214), participants were randomly assigned one of two nearly identical translations of Ephesians 5:22-28 (a famous passage describing gendered marital submission), with the only difference being that one translation included verse 21 in which Christians are told to “submit to one another.” Participants did not perceive a different message about gendered submission between translations, nor were they more likely to interpret either as misogynistic. However, gender ideology and religious importance did predict interpretation. Study 2 (N = 217) essentially replicated study 1 (using different translations of Ephesians 5:21-28), but one version replaced all “subjection” language with “commitment” language. Participants were significantly more likely to perceive a complementarian message from the translation that referenced “subjection” and they were also more likely to perceive it as misogynistic. Again, gender ideology and religious characteristics predicted interpretation. Findings suggest bias shapes interpretation, but more extreme content modifications (e.g., removing/changing key terms) can also influence interpretation.     

Evangelism in Evangelii Gaudium,The Cape Town Commitment,and Together towards Life

The term “evangelization” has a very broad meaning in Evangelii Gaudium, encompassing everything that is subsumed under “mission” in The Cape Town Commitment and Together towards Life. For those two documents, “evangelism” is just one aspect of mission, namely the verbal communication of the gospel message. In their underlying theological propositions, the three documents are very similar. There is one fundamental difference, though: Evangelii Gaudium focuses on affective transformation, while the other two stress ethical renewal.     

Message Design Logic and Message Goal Structure Effects on Perceptions of Message Quality in Regulative Communication Situations

O'Keefe has suggested that variations in the goal sets individuals choose to pursue and the form of reasoning they employ are sources of variation in message designs. She offered an analysis of the specific consequences of differences in goals (“message goal structure”) and in forms of reasoning (“message design logics”), and shouted how this analysis could be used to describe systematically functional variations in regulative messages. The study reported in this article explored the consequences of differences in message design logic and goal structures for success in regulative communication situations; Messages that differed in these properties were presented to subjects for evaluation on a number of functionally significant dimensions. Level of message design logic was straightforwardly associated with every type of effectiveness that was assessed. Differences in message goal structures had more selective effects on message evaluations, often involving interactions with the level of construct differentiation of the message evaluator.     

Vindication of the Humpty Dumpty attitude towards language

Effective objective (sachlich) verbal communication is dependent upon the use of linguistic locutions which are: a) suitable for some special purposes, b) clear (i.e., having a satsifactorily high degree of subsumability), and c) in accordance with some ordinary (i.e., frequently occurring) language usages. Only in so far as point c is concerned is a study of actual language usage of (indirect) value to philosophers. And this holds true regardless of whether one's underlying assumption tends towards the view: 1) that ordinary language is perfect (Oxford), or: 2) that ordinary language is a mess (Oslo). In any case, one needs to know about the most ordinary usages to prevent unnecessarily drastic deviations from them. Drastic deviations may mislead the sender, as well as the receiver, create communicational disturbances, misunderstandings, and confusion (vide: Strawson's use of “presupposition"). However, considerations of a) suitability for special purposes, and b) clarity (subsumability) will most often, if not always, prevent a communicator from flatly adopting any one of the existing language usages of a given important linguistic locution. He would feel the need for: “explications,”; “rational reconstructions”; or conceptual alterations of one kind or another. In fact, there are instances where the sender finds it most advantageous to disregard completely ordinary language (vide: Einstein's use of “simultaneity"): He “makes words mean what he wants them to mean.”; This is the Humpty Dumpty sender attitude towards language. The corresponding receiver attitude manifests itself as awareness of and tolerance for language ambiguities.     

Empirical Adequacy and Virtue Ethics

Situationists contend that virtue ethics is empirically inadequate. However, it is my contention that there is much confusion over what “empirical adequacy” or “empirical inadequacy” actually means in this context. My aim in this paper is to clarify the meanings of empirical adequacy in order to see to what extent virtue ethics might fail to meet this standard. I argue that the situationists frequently misconstrue the empirical commitments of virtue ethics. More importantly, depending on what we mean by empirical adequacy, either virtue ethics has no need to be empirically adequate or where it does have such a need, the psychological evidence fails to show that it is empirically inadequate. An additional contribution the paper intends to make is to provide a more detailed discussion of the explanatory nature of virtue ethics.     

GENERALIZING ABOUT MESSAGES: SUGGESTIONS FOR DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS

Current research practices in communication create problems for both internal and external validity. One serious design flaw, which involves use of a single message to represent a category of messages, occurs in nearly all of the experimental research on communication effects. The problem with such a design is that an observed difference between categories may reflect only differences between individual, idiosyncratic cases. A related error, the “language-as-fixed-effect fallacy,” involves use of several replications of each category, but analysis of the cases as fixed effects. The consequence is that findings cannot be generalized beyond the sample used. Future research should use multiple cases within each message category studied and treat cases as nested random effects. Since the cases cannot be true random samples from message populations, care must be taken to avoid known sources of bias or other barriers to generalization.     

Does Conversation Need Shared Language? Davidson and Gadamer on Communicative Understanding

In a rare discussion of Gadamer's work, Davidson takes issue with Gadamer's claim that successful communication requires that interlocutors share a common language. While he is right to see a difference between his own views and Gadamer's on this point, Davidson appears to have misunderstood what motivates Gadamer's position, conflating it with that of his more familiar conventionalist interlocutors. This paper articulates Gadamer's view of the role of language in communicative understanding as an alternative to both Davidson's and that of the conventionalist writers Davidson critiques. It is argued, first, that Gadamer employs a conception of what individuates a language, and thus of what it means for two speakers to “share” a language, that Davidson never considers. By emphasizing the role of “application” in the historical development of languages, Gadamer develops a view in which languages are distinguished not by their particular semantic or syntactic rules, but by subtle differences between the concepts they express. Second, it is argued that the instances of “asymmetrical” communication—communication between interlocutors who have different sets of concepts at their disposal—that motivate Gadamer's position pose a challenge to Davidson's account of interpretative charity.     

Embodied Simulations Are Modulated by Sentential Perspective

There is considerable evidence that language comprehenders derive lexical‐semantic meaning by mentally simulating perceptual and motor attributes of described events. However, the nature of these simulations—including the level of detail that is incorporated and contexts under which simulations occur—is not well understood. Here, we examine the effects of first‐ versus third‐person perspective on mental simulations during sentence comprehension. First‐person sentences describing physical transfer towards or away from the body (e.g., “You threw the microphone,” “You caught the microphone”) modulated response latencies when responses were made along a front‐back axis, consistent with the action‐sentence compatibility effect (ACE). This effect was not observed for third‐person sentences (“He threw the microphone,” “He caught the microphone”). The ACE was observed when making responses along a left‐right axis for third‐person, but not first‐person sentences. Abstract sentences (e.g., “He heard the message”) did not show an ACE along either axis. These results show that perspective is a detail that is simulated during action sentence comprehension, and that motoric activations are flexible and affected by the pronominal perspective used in the sentence.     

THE IMAGO DEI AS THE MIND OF JESUS CHRIST

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement.     

D. Z. Phillips and Wittgenstein's On Certainty

I start from Phillips' discussion of Rhees's dissatisfaction with the idea of a language‐game. Then, from a rereading of Moore, I go on to exemplify interconnected uses of the expressions “language‐game,”“recurrent procedure,”“world‐picture,”“formal procedure,”“agreement in judgment,”“genre picture” and “form of life.” The discussion is related to sense perception, our knowledge of time and space, and the picture‐theory. These topics connect with Wittgenstein's earlier treatment of the will – which changed markedly later. The subtext (in footnotes) confronts (i) the sceptical methods of Descartes and Hume with the grammatical methods of Leibniz, Kant and Wittgenstein, and (ii) the realism of Leibniz and the Tractatus with the transcendental idealism of Kant. My conclusion is that, although the method of Wittgenstein's later work remains in a sense grammatical, (i) in its new form it can free us from the conviction that the intellect can and must resolve one way or the other the conflicts that arise in the course of the latter confrontation, and that (ii), although release from such a conviction is to be seen as the aim of philosophical discourse in general, it allows philosophy to retain its overriding significance. A positive element in that lies in the respect the method demands for that in a human life which is transcendental to the activity of scientific theorising: respect, therefore, for the unique perspective of the individual historical agent.     

On the significance of Hannah Arendt's the human condition for sociology

Arendt's book is an analysis of the vita activa, which comprises the three human activities of labor, work, and action. Her presentation involves a critique of modern and current conceptions of them and of many other social phenomena, and an emphasis on distinctions customarily neglected. The interpretation of her book, disregarding the many factual statements it contains, proceeds in a theoretical vein, analyzing her major conceptions, and then turns practical, asking what we as social scientists who listen to her must do (focusing on “behavior” and “action”, “values”, the means‐end scheme, and man's historicity and dualism). The paper concludes with a brief explication of areas of research seen to emerge out of Arendt's work.     

THE HEADING OF A PROBLEM

Efforts to understand the division between analytic and continental philosophy in strictly philosophical terms seem slated to disappointment. Nevertheless, the worldwide dominance of these two models and their numerous subvarieties is the most salient feature of the passage of philosophy through the twentieth century. This paper explores this dominance and offers an assessment of developments that point toward a change from the model of two models. Specific attention is paid to Jacques Derrida's work on philosophical nationalism, which suggests that this change reflects the growing extension of the English language across the world and, hence, belongs to a profoundly ambiguous development. According to Derrida, on the one hand, this development holds out the chance for something radically nonparochial: “the universal penetration of the philosophical and of philosophical communication,” while on the other hand, it raises the threat that certain forms of “dogmatism and authority” that are linked to particularities of nation and history will impose “an axiomatic of philosophical discourse without any possible discussion.” 1 The future of continental philosophy is assessed in light of this ambiguous development.     

Talking With Chameleons: The Role of Language-Games and Setting: Commentary on Paper by Dana Amir

In this paper I take up Dana Amir's concept of the “chameleon language” of perversion considering Wittgenstein's idea of the language-game and the necessity of taking up the context of communication. The setting of psychoanalysis represents a new context for the language of perversion, one that at first implicitly and later explicitly recognizes the bid for tenderness beneath the stealth. I suggest it is the analyst's willingness to risk vulnerability in this game, as much as the interpretation of perverse pacts, that fosters clinical change.     

The Proofs Of The Grundgedanke In Wittgenstein's Tractatus

The Tractatus contains twodifferent proofs of the Grundgedanke, or thenonreferentiality of logical constants. In thispaper, I explicate the first proof in TLP 5.4s andreconstruct the less explicitly stated second proof. My explication of the first proof shows it to beelegant but based on an invalid inference. In myreconstruction of the second proof, the main argumentis that the sign of a logical constant does not denotebecause it possesses the punctuation-mark-nature. Andit possesses the punctuation-mark-nature because,given the analyticity thesis in TLP 5, one canestablish for everyday language an adequate symbolismwith N as the sole fundamental operation such that itssign is a bar indicating merely the order and scope ofits application.     

Movement and Meaning

Movement analysis receives a new and useful examination in this paper. The fact (hat all of us always “read” each other's movement behavior as a matter of course is taken for granted. Our verbal language is rife with allusions to bodily behavior, suggesting that there really is such a thing as a language of the body. But one and the same movement can represent many differing aspects of behavior and is heavily dependent on its context. What we experience nonverbally vis-à-vis another person is the executive function of body language like, for instance, “wringing one's hands” or having “shaky knees.” Usually, people will convey nonverbally how they feel about the situation they find themselves in while the other—the recipient of the message—will convey understanding equally nonverbally. Thus, it is always (he representation of something that we experience—an embodiment of intent, not language itself. It therefore becomes necessary to distinguish between the implementation and movement itself. These abstractions become helpful in the understanding of many phenomena during treatment situations as demonstrated here.     

Explication Defended

How can formal methods be applied to philosophical problems that involve informal concepts of ordinary language? Carnap answered this question by describing a methodology that he called “explication." Strawson objected that explication changes the subject and does not address the original philosophical problem; this paper shows that Carnap’s response to that objection was inadequate and offers a better response. More recent criticisms of explication by Boniolo and Eagle are shown to rest on misunderstandings of the nature of explication. It is concluded that explication is an appropriate methodology for formal philosophy.     

ANALYSIS OF RELATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN DYADS: NEW MEASUREMENT PROCEDURES

Relational communication refers to the control or dominance aspects of message exchange in dyads, as distinct from an emphasis on the report or referential aspects of communication. In relational communication analysis, the focus is on messages as transactions, and the major theoretic concepts which emerge in this analysis are symmetry, transitory, and complementarity of control. This paper contains a brief review and critique of existing interaction analysis techniques, followed by a detailed discussion of new measurement procedures that capture both the control and processual (time-varying) nature of dyadic interaction. The first step in these procedures yields a code (by speaker) based on the grammatical format of each sequential utterance. The second step yields a translation of each message format and response made into a control code, based on the relationship between the message and its immediate predecessor. These codes are next translated into transactional codes, which can then be analyzed in terms of the three major theoretic concepts. These measurement procedures require minimal subjective judgment, particularly at the initial coding level. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ways we are attempting to operationalize major “themes” or patterns of control in lengthy, ongoing dyadic exchanges.