IV. Does a generalized Heisenberg principle operate in the social sciences?

It is argued that a generalization of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy is possible in the social sciences. The empirical grounds for this contention lie with interference phenomena induced by transference distortions that may occur when human beings investigate the behaviour of one another.     

Pluralism, Indeterminacy and the Social Sciences: Reply to Ingram and Meehan

This article defends methodological and theoretical pluralism in the social sciences. While pluralistic, such a philosophy of social science is both pragmatic and normative. Only by facing the problems of such pluralism, including how to resolve the potential conflicts between various methods and theories, is it possible to discover appropriate criteria of adequacy for social scientific explanations and interpretations. So conceived, the social sciences do not give us fixed and universal features of the social world, but rather contribute to the task of improving upon our practical knowledge of on-going social life. After arguing for such a thorough-going pluralism based on the indeterminacy of social action, I defend it from the post-modern and hermeneutic objections by suggesting the possibility of an epistemology of interpretive social science as a form of practical knowledge.     

Uncertainty as a Fundamental Scientific Value

The author argues that, though social scientists generally value tolerance for ambiguity, and some even assert a fundamental indeterminacy in human systems, there is still a discipline-wide discomfort with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is argued that this distaste for uncertainty derives from a distorted view of the classical physical sciences, a view that ignores the essentially critical and radical foundations of scientific practice. The drive for certainty, it is argued, is essentially unscientific, in that certain, or adequate, forms of knowledge can only recapitulate the already known and in their dogmatic and institutionalized forms prevent the development of genuinely new knowledge. In contrast, uncertainty is defended as a positive condition, generative of new knowledge because it is open to discovery and to the mystery of the other. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that the social sciences can only progress if uncertainty, or mystery, is protected and cultivated through a scientific discourse constituted in local and concrete terms (rather than in general and universal ones) and through a self-reflective and self-critical research praxis.     

Can relativism be reconciled with realism and causalism?

This paper deals with two fundamental assumptions of the Strong programme in the sociology of knowledge and the theoretical (im) possibility of their co‐existence with the general relativist tendency of this programme. The first assumption is the realist thesis introduced into the Strong programme through the materialist presupposition that sense experience is reliable and humans are able to learn about the regularities of the non‐social world in order to survive. The second assumption is the causal principle. Arguments developed in this paper lead to the conclusion that neither realism nor causalism can be reconciled with relativism. In both cases inconsistency is brought about by a tension between scientific perspective and relativism, between an external approach aiming at objective, universal, and causal explanation of what is studied, on the one hand, and the internal, relativist and reflexive, hermeneutical understanding of the human, on the other hand. The belief that the sociology of knowledge can be at the same time scientific, like the natural sciences, and relativist, like certain philosophies but not the natural sciences, is not sufficiently justified in the Strong programme.     

Autistic Heterogeneity: Linking Uncertainties and Indeterminacies

Autism is a highly uncertain entity and little is said about it with any degree of certainty. Scientists must, and do, work through these uncertainties in the course of their work. Scientists explain uncertainty in autism research through discussion of epistemological uncertainties which suggest that diverse methods and techniques make results hard to reconcile, ontological uncertainties which suggest doubt over taxonomic coherence, but also through reference to autism’s indeterminacy which suggests that the condition is inherently heterogeneous. Indeed, indeterminacy takes two forms—an inter-personal form which suggests that there are fundamental differences between individuals with autism and an intra-personal form which suggests that no one factor is able to explain all features of autism within a given individual. What is apparent in the case of autism is that scientists put uncertainty and indeterminacy into discussion with one another and, rather than a well-policed epistemic-ontic boundary, there is a movement between, and an entwinement of, the two. Understanding scientists’ dialogue concerning uncertainty and indeterminacy is of importance for understanding autism and autistic heterogeneity but also for understanding uncertainty and ‘uncertainty work’ within science more generally.     

Poppers Methodologischer Individualismus und die Sozialwissenschaften

Popper's methodological individualism and the social sciences. Popper's philosophy of social sciences poses a dilemma that arises out of the two theses of methodological individualism and situational logic. In order to find a way out of this dilemma, one must raise the question concerning the epistemological and methodological status of the `laws' of the human sciences. There are indeed `rules' from which human actions depart mostly to a negligible extent, but they remain valid or stay in effect without exception only as far as they are not re-evoked or re-emerge in the consciousness of the agents. The element of truth of methodological individualism lies in the person's capacity to revoke, in principle, the validity of the rules concerning oneself. Situational logic and methodological individualism can thus be reconciled. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Factor Indeterminacy as Metrological Uncertainty: Implications for Advancing Psychological Measurement

Researchers have long been aware of the mathematics of factor indeterminacy. Yet, while occasionally discussed, the phenomenon is mostly ignored. In metrology, the measurement discipline of the physical sciences, uncertainty – distinct from both random error (but encompassing it) and systematic error – is a crucial characteristic of any measurement. This research argues that factor indeterminacy is uncertainty. Factor indeterminacy fundamentally threatens the validity of psychometric measurement, because it blurs the linkage between a common factor and the conceptual variable that the factor represents. Acknowledging and quantifying factor indeterminacy is important for progress in reducing this component of uncertainty in measurement, and thus improving psychological measurement over time. Based on our elaborations, we offer a range of recommendations toward achieving this goal.     

What Is an Immature Science?

Cognitive and social sciences such as psychology and sociology are often described as immature sciences. But what is immaturity? According to the received view, immaturity is disunity, where disunity can usefully be cashed out in terms of having a plurality of disunified frameworks in play, where these frameworks consist of concepts, theories, goals, practices, methods, criteria for what counts as a good explanation, etc. However, there are some reasons to think that the cognitive and social sciences should be disunified in this sense. If that is right, either these sciences should remain immature, or we need a new account of immaturity. The former option is unappealing. I therefore provide an alternative account of immaturity, based on Dudley Shapere’s work on the internal/external distinction. I then go on to use this account to argue against the imposition of unification on the cognitive and social sciences. Acceptance of disunity may be the route to maturity, rather than a sign of immaturity.     

Indeterminacy,empirical evidence,and methodological pluralism

Roth (1987) effectively distinguishes Quinean indeterminacy of translation from the more general underdetermination of theories by showing how indeterminacy follows directly from holism and the role of a shared environment in language learning. However, Roth is mistaken in three further consequences he draws from his interpretation of indeterminacy. Contra Roth, natural science and social science are not differentiated as offering theories about the shared environment and theories about meanings respectively; the role of the environment in language learning does not justify an empiricist sense of objective evidence; and his advocacy of methodological pluralism does not appropriately sustain the project of social scientific methodology in response to holism and indeterminacy.This paper has benefited from comments by Paul Roth and Terry Winant on an earlier draft, and by the two anonymous referees for Synthese.     

Synonymy and the epistemology of linguistics

In Word and Object, Quine argues from the observation that ‘there is no justification for collating linguistic meanings, unless in terms of men's dispositions to respond overtly to socially observable stimulations’ to the conclusion that ‘the enterprise of translation is found to be involved in a certain systematic indeterminacy’. In this paper, I propose to show (1) that Quine's thesis, when properly understood, reveals in the situation of translation no peculiar indeterminacy but merely the ordinary indeterminacy present in any case of empirical investigation; (2) that it is plausible that, because the subject of inquiry is language, we are in a better position with respect to such empirical indeterminacies than we are in other areas of investigation; (3) that, in any case, Quine's arguments are impotent, for they are either contradictory or incoherent; and (4) that Quine is led to his radical conclusions because he confuses a trivial and unexciting indeterminacy, which does obtain, with the striking indeterminacy for which he argues, which does not obtain.     

Humanities,Social Sciences and Islamic Studies

Three avenues in Islamic studies are distinguished. The humanities study the languages, texts and history of Islam as a civilisation and religion. The main difficulty confronting them is to understand properly the texts studied. Anthropology, sociology and political science constitute the main contribution of the social sciences. Here the main difficulty lies in explaining religious data correctly within their context. In religious studies, the third avenue, the main problem is to interpret correctly the way in which Muslim communities and persons have understood their cultural tradition and the religious elements which belong to it. Focusing on the people's intentions which make Islam a religion rather than a social system or ideology enables Islam to be understood from the perspective of religious studies.     

Technology of Counseling and the Science of Behavior: A Rapprochement

Analysis reveals that as the profession of counseling has increasingly been defined by the solitary practice of counseling, it has narrowed its vision and mission. Misdirected specialization has resulted in a highly skilled technology with a primary emphasis on the method(s) of counseling. In turn, this specialization has restricted the focus of counseling to areas amenable to that technology. Part of the diminution of counseling perspective is the result of a distancing of the counseling profession from the social and behavioral sciences, the humanities, and philosophy. The article presents examples from the social and behavioral sciences to demonstrate how their contributions could strengthen the profession and practice of counseling.     

Sartre’s Dialectical Methodology

Sartre’s intention in the Critique of Dialectical Reason is to establish the heuristic value of the dialectical method when applied to the social sciences. Toward this end, he furnishes an account of how, on the basis of natural needs, rational choices, burgeoning social ensembles, natural and social contingencies and unintended consequences, human beings make their history. I shall argue that his dialectical method, especially when modified, opens up interesting possibilities for clarifying the two most important and enduring meta-issues in the philosophy of social science: (1) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of the beliefs, desires and actions of individuals or the rules and practices of social institutions (“Methodological Individualism” or “Methodological Holism”) and (2) whether social phenomena should be explained in terms of causes, as in the natural sciences, or in terms of what they mean in their social contexts, as in hermeneutics and other interpretive approaches (“Explanation” or “Understanding”).     

EXTENDING THE GLOBAL ACADEMIC TABLE: AN INTRODUCTION

Before commenting on the papers from a recent interdisciplinary gathering of scholars from China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, a case is made for regional academia conversations today, because international conferences, especially in the humanities and social sciences, are still dominated by “Western” traditions, discourse, and protocols. After touching on the relative stability or variability of phenomena and procedures in the natural sciences, humanities, and social sciences, political and cultural questions are considered along with some of the ongoing consequences of the East Asian adoption of the European model of the modern research university.     

The Political Socialization of Commerce and Social Science Students: Epistemic Authority and Attitude Change1

A 3-year longitudinal study assessed the effects of studying in the social sciences versus commerce on sociopolitical orientation. Results reveal field-specific changes in attitudes. Commerce students (n= 34) became, over time, more favorable toward “capitalists,” less favorable toward “unions,” and less likely to attribute poverty and unemployment to systemic factors. In contrast, social science students (n= 57) maintained liberal attitudes and became less likely to attribute poverty and unemployment to internal dispositions. Beliefs about internal and external causes of poverty and unemployment, while unrelated in 1st year, become negatively related in 3rd year but only among social science students. Measures taken in 3rd year to assess the influence of peers, professors, and courses suggest that peers have a generally conservative effect, even in the social sciences, while professors and courses have a liberal effect only in the social sciences.     

The indeterminacy of color vision

A critical survey of recent work on the ontological status of colors supports the conclusion that, while some accounts of color can plausibly be dismissed, no single account can yet be endorsed. Among the remaining options are certain forms of color realism according which familiar colors are instantiated by objects in our extra-cranial visual environment. Also still an option is color anti-realism, the view that familiar colors are, at best, biologically adaptive fictions, instantiated nowhere.I argue that there is simply no fact of the matter as to which of these remaining options is correct. I blame this indeterminacy on the fact that color vision exhibits several of the hallmarks of a modular input system, as described by Jerry Fodor in The Modularity of Mind.Finally, I speculate that the range of live options falling within the scope of the indeterminacy may be even broader than initially indicated.     

On the Sociology and Social Organization of Stigma: Some Ethnomethodological Insights

Although “stigma“ has evolved as a remarkably widespread concept in the social sciences, the concept has almost never, as such, been subject to inquiry or overt definition, with the notable exception of Goffman’s insights concerning it. In this paper I topicalize stigma in its use by social scientists and consider its utility in concrete social situations as organized by interactants. My central claim is that “stigma“ has become under-defined and over-used. In making these points I examine two interrelated but distinct issues. The first of these concerns the “meaning“ of stigma as exposed (almost always implicitly) in literature in sociology and other behavioural sciences. My goal here is to ascertain the discursive construction of stigma as a phenomenon that is amenable to study and especially to use as an interpretive and explanatory resource in social and behavioural sciences. As a second topic I consider by way of empirical demonstration the lived experience of persons who have what might be termed a “stigmatizing“ condition–specifically, survivors of stroke–to address the paltriness of “stigma“ as an omniscient summary of their circumstances.     

DONNA HARAWAY'S METATHEORY OF SCIENCE AND RELIGION: CYBORGS, TRICKSTER, AND HERMES

Abstract. This article is a close reading of two essays by Donna Haraway on feminist philosophy, the biophysical sciences, and critical social theory. Haraway's strong social constructionist approach to science is criticized by colleague Sandra Harding, resulting in an epistemological reconceptualization of objectivity by Haraway. Haraway's notion of “situated knowledges” provides a workable epistemology for all social and biophysical sciences, while inviting the reintegration of religions as critical conversation partners in an emancipatory hermeneutics of nature, culture, and technology.     

Indeterminacy and the analytic/synthetic distinctions: a survey

It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine’s criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’ and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction.