The sociology of sociobiology

This paper turns the tables on the criticisms of sociobiology that stem from a sociological perspective; many of those criticisms lack cogency and coherence in such measure as to demand, in their turn, a psycho‐sociological explanation rather than a rational justification. This thesis, after a brief exposition of the main ideas of sociobiology, is argued in terms of four of the most prominent complaints made against it. Far from embodying tired prejudices about the psychological and sociological implications of biology, sociobiology actually reverses a number of naive assumptions about the consequences of natural selection. I surmise that what really provokes the critics of sociobiology is a certain philosophical relevance of sociobiology both in the broad sense (the application of natural selection principles to behaviour) and in the narrow sense (the insistence on the centrality of certain mechanisms, such as gene selection). In both cases, taking biology seriously affects our philosophical vision of the nature of human beings. At the deepest level, however, the distinction between the level at which rational criteria apply and those where we must have recourse to psycho‐social explanations probably breaks down.     

The sociology of knowledge and its enemies

My objective in the following study is to present and analyze the objections to the ‘classical argument’ in the sociology of knowledge raised by Leo Strauss and Karl Popper. Building on this expository account, I will attempt to demonstrate (1) that the opposition of Strauss and Popper is more apparent and polemical than real, (2) that the position taken by Strauss and Popper on the viability of a sociology of knowledge is essentially no different from that taken by the discipline's founders: Max Scheler, Karl Mannheim, and Georg Lukács, (3) that whatever the merits of Strauss and Popper's contentions, they become relevant only in the context of a radicalized version of the sociology of knowledge which developed subsequent to their formulation, and (4) that the sociology of knowledge has needlessly and deplorably become the battleground for meta‐theoretical disputes that are irrelevant to its practice.     

The influences of evolutionary theory on Pareto's sociology

This paper argues that the influence of evolutionary theory on the sociology of Vilfredo Pareto has been generally misunderstood or overlooked, largely on account of Pareto's own contemptuous rejection of “finalist” Darwinian evolution. But the sources of Pareto's evolutionary ideas were French, not English. Neo-Lamarckian notions of inheritance and the related concept of degeneration helped support Pareto's explanation of social evolution, especially as it is developed in his early sociological works. Understanding these influences helps explain Pareto's peculiarly pessimistic account of the mechanism of social change in modern society.     

The definition of sociology and the sociology of definition: Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method and high school philosophy in France

Despite his attempts to break with philosophy and found a science of society, Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) was involved with philosophy throughout his career. Academic philosophy in France was a highly centralized institution that produced professors capable of teaching a standard curriculum. These professors made up a significant portion of the audience whose support Durkheim hoped to win for his sociological project. The concepts of Pierre Bourdieu and the literature on the rhetoric of the human sciences can help reconstruct the field of academic philosophy, Durkheim's relationship with it, and the ways in which he drew upon it to formulate his method and to persuade his philosophical colleagues. Durkheim's definition of the social fact in The Rules of Sociological Method can only be understood in the context of French academic philosophy. © 1996 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

A happy medium: The sociology of Charles Horton Cooley

The career, teaching, and writing of Charles Horton Cooley (1864–1929), sociologist at the University of Michigan, show that a middle ground between broadly integrative, general knowledge and specialized knowledge prevailed well into the early twentieth century, both at the level of professional social science and within the modern university curriculum. Cooley's social science rested upon introspection and the study of art and literature, and he eschewed the drift of social science toward behaviorism and quantification. As a university professor, he conceived of specialized knowledge within the context of general culture, not in opposition to it.