Professional responsibility: Focusing on the exemplary

The literature on ethics in science and engineering tends to dwell on the negative, emphasizing disasters, scandals, and problems of wrongdoing in everyday practice. This paper shifts to the positive, focusing on the exemplary. After outlining different possible conceptions of responsibility (ranging from a minimalist view of “staying out of trouble” to “going above and beyond the call of duty”), the paper discusses the importance of certain virtues for scientists and engineers. Finally, a broad range of examples of exemplary practice is offered. An earlier version of this paper was presented by the author at a mini-conference, Practicing and Teaching Ethics in Engineering and Computing, held during the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Washington, D.C., March 8–9, 1997. This paper is one of a series edited by Michael C. Loui. See Volume 3, No. 4, 1997 for other papers in this series. Work on this paper was supported by National Science Foundation Grant #SBR-930257.     

Insanity and responsibility

This paper attempts to set forth, in the context of Anglo‐U.S. criminal law, the meaning of the concept of insanity, its necessary relation to absence of responsibility, and its bearing on some relevant psychiatric concepts and legal controversies. Irrationality is a distinctive and necessary (but not sufficient) condition for insanity. Irrationality consists in failure even to grasp the relevance of what is ‘essentially’ relevant. To that extent there obviously can be no responsibility. A mental makeup which renders one (who would not normally be so) substantially incapable of rational conduct constitutes insanity, and in that respect renders the person non‐responsible. Much more broadly and roughly speaking, the mind that is ill is the mind that is irrational (and hence in that respect non‐responsible).     

Health care responsibility

The general and deep dissatisfaction with the present-day status of health care is of such intensity that one speaks of a health care crisis. What is most disturbing to the physicians is that society directs its accusation mainly at the health care professional for being responsible for this crisis. If we want to abolish the crisis we must try to get a renewed look at its source, i.e., to answer the questions “where did health care go wrong primarily?” and “with whom lies the ultimate responsibility for health care?”. In the following discourse these questions are discussed. Based on the assumption that every human being is a free rational agent the ultimate health care responsibility is assigned to the citizen. Of course, whether such an approach will in fact solve the problems inherent in present-day health systems cannot be predicted.     

Assigning vicarious responsibility

An experiment tested three hypotheses about the conditions under which someone can be held vicariously responsible for the actions of another. Two of the hypotheses received empirical support: that the vicariously responsible person is in a superior relationship to the person who caused the damage and is able to control that person's causing of the damage. A third hypotheis, that a person is held vicariously responsible because of a relatively greater ability to pay compensation to the victim, was not supported.     

Beliefs and responsibility

I am grateful to R.S. Downie and Elizabeth Telfer for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Informatics and professional responsibility

Many problems in software development can be traced to a narrow understanding of professional responsibility. The author examines ways in which software developers have tried to avoid accepting responsibility for their work. After cataloguing various types of responsibility avoidance, the author introduces an expanded concept of positive responsibility. It is argued that the adoption of this sense of positive responsibility will reduce many problems in software development. An earlier version of this paper was written for inclusion in S. Rogerson and T. W. Bynum, eds., Computer Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Blackwell, (in press). Prepublished here with permission from the author and the editors.