No‐self,real self,ignorance and self‐deception: Does self‐deception require a self?

In this paper I dispute Eliot Deutsch's claim [See Deutsch, Eliot (1996) Self‐deception: a comparative study, in: Roger T. Ames and Wimal Dissanayake (Eds) Self and Deception: a cross‐cultural enquiry (Albany, State University of New York Press), pp. 315–326] that examining self‐deception from the perspective of non‐Western traditions (i.e. how it is understood in those cultures) can help us to better understand the nature of the phenomenon in one's own culture. Although the claim appears to be uncontrover‐sial and perhaps even self‐evident, I shall argue that it is fundamentally mistaken. What is important about both the claim and my critical assessment of it is not what it tells us about self‐deception. I shall show that it tells us little about self‐deception; that Deutsch confuses ignorance with self‐deception; and that he straightforwardly equivocates on the concept. Instead, what is interesting is what Deutsch's treatment of self‐deception in comparative perspective can tell us about comparative philosophy. The significance of what follows in this paper is less about self‐deception than it is about comparative philosophy.     

SELF‐DECEPTION ABOUT EMOTION

In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self‐deception—instances in which one is self‐deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self‐deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self‐deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self‐deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two variants of self‐deception about emotion: cognitively motivated self‐deception and phenomenologically motivated self‐deception. After providing an account of each variant, I discuss the importance of the role that perception plays in cases of self‐deception about emotion. I conclude with a comment on the relevance of this discussion for contemporary debates in moral theory.     

Addiction and Self‐Deception: A Method for Self‐Control?

Neil Levy argues that while addicts who believe they are not addicts are self‐deceived, addicts who believe they are addicts are just as self‐deceived. Such persons accept a false belief that their addictive behaviour involves a loss of control. This paper examines two implications of Levy's discussion: that accurate self‐knowledge may be particularly difficult for addicts; and that an addict's self‐deceived belief that they cannot control themselves may aid their attempts at self‐control. I argue that the self‐deceived beliefs of addicts in denial and of self‐described addicts differ in kind. Unlike the self‐deception of an addict in denial, that of the self‐described addict allows them to acknowledge their behaviour. As such, it may aid an addict to develop more self‐control. A paradoxical implication is that this self‐deception may allow an addict more self‐knowledge.     

Kant's Criticism of Common Moral Rational Cognition

There is a consensus that Kant's aim in the Groundwork is to clarify, systematize and vindicate the common conception of morality. Philosophical theory hence serves a restorative function. It can strengthen agents' motivation, protect against self‐deception and correct misunderstandings produced by uncritical moral theory. In this paper, I argue that Kant also corrects the common perspective and that Kant's Groundwork shows in which senses the common perspective, even considered apart from its propensity to self‐deception and without being influenced by misleading theory, is deficient. Critical practical philosophy needs to set right agents about the stringency of some of their duties, and agents need to be made aware that they have certain other duties. I discuss how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of the stringency of the duty to not make false promises and how Kant corrects the common agent's notion of duties to self. I finally discuss how his critical practical philosophy can become popular and achieve the correction of the common perspective. I stress the role of education informed by philosophical theory for this and contrast it with so called ‘popular philosophy’.     

Secondary self‐deception

According to doxastic accounts of self‐deception, self‐deception that P yields belief that P. For doxastic accounts, the self‐deceiver really believes what he, in self‐deception, professes to believe. I argue that doxastic accounts are contradicted by a phenomenon that often accompanies self‐deception. This phenomenon – which I term ‘secondary deception’ – consists in the self‐deceiver's defending his professed (deceit‐induced) belief to an audience by lying to that audience. I proceed to sketch an alternative, non‐doxastic account of how we should understand self‐deception in terms of the self‐deceiver's misrepresentation of himself as believing that P.     

DO THE SELF‐DECEIVED GET WHAT THEY WANT?

Abstract: Two of the most basic questions regarding self‐deception remain unsettled: What do self‐deceivers want? What do self‐deceivers get? I argue that self‐deceivers are motivated by a desire to believe. However, in significant contrast with Alfred Mele's account of self‐deception, I argue that self‐deceivers do not satisfy this desire. Instead, the end‐state of self‐deception is a false higher‐order belief. This shows all self‐deception to be a failure of self‐knowledge.     

Self‐Interests and Beliefs: Predictors of Mothers’ Views of Child Care1

Mothers (N= 270) completed questions related to child care for their children who were between 2 and 6 years of age. They completed a 9‐page questionnaire that included scales used to assess their attachment to their careers, financial need to work, and gender‐role beliefs as predictors of their ratings of the effects of child care on 4 criterion measures. Findings supported the hypothesized model that a mother's needs and her self‐interests and beliefs would influence her ratings of the benefits and costs of child care, her anxiety in leaving her child in child care, and her views of the effects of child care on her child. It is suggested that future research should avoid biases that might arise from participant or observer self‐interest and seek more objective approaches to the examination of the impact of child care on children.     

Ibsen's Nora and the Confucian Critique of the “Unencumbered Self”

Criticisms of the liberal‐individualist idea of the “unencumbered self” are not just a staple of communitarian thought. Some modern Confucian thinkers are now seeking to develop an ethically particular understanding of social roles in the family that is sensitive to gender‐justice issues, and that provides an alternative to liberal‐individualist conceptions of the “unencumbered self” in relation to family roles. The character of Nora in Henrik Ibsen's A Doll's House seemingly exemplifies such conceptions of the unencumbered self in her rejection of her housewife role for a more authentic selfhood. Drawing upon the capabilities approach to justice, and positive early Japanese bluestockings’ responses to Ibsen's play, I argue that Nora's character is better understood as exemplifying an ethically compelling disencumbered self in potentially cross‐cultural circumstances: a self criticizing and rejecting social roles that are found to be unjust according to universal, as opposed to particularist, “Confucian” ethical standards.     

A stronger latent‐variable methodology to actual–ideal discrepancy

We introduce a latent actual–ideal discrepancy (LAID) approach based on structural equation models (SEMs) with multiple indicators and empirically weighted variables. In Study 1, we demonstrate with simulated data, the superiority of a weighted approach to discrepancy in comparison to a classic unweighted one. In Study 2, we evaluate the effects of actual and ideal appearance on physical self‐concept and self‐esteem. Actual appearance contributes positively to physical self‐concept and self‐esteem, whereas ideal appearance contributes negatively. In support of multidimensional perspective, actual‐ and ideal‐appearance effects on self‐esteem are substantially—but not completely—mediated by physical self‐concept. Whereas this pattern of results generalises across gender and age, multiple‐group invariance tests show that the effect of actual appearance on physical self‐concept is larger for women than for men. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Police officers' beliefs about,and use of,cues to deception

Meta‐analytic findings indicate that people, including police officers, are generally poor at detecting low‐stakes deception. Related to this, investigations of behaviours that people reportedly use to make truth or lie judgements tend to conclude that people rely on incorrect stereotypes. However, consistent findings suggest that police officers are able to detect high‐stakes deception; this implies that, at least in some contexts, police officers utilise reliable cues to deception. The research presented here was an investigation of cues to deception used by police officers (N  = 69), when making veracity decisions about real world, high‐stakes communications. Data were collected on both free report cues, and also prescribed cues that were known (from previous research), to discriminate between liars and truth‐tellers in the communications that the police officers observed. Officers free reported using cues related to verbal content, emotion, body language, eyes, vocal cues, and external cues. Most prescribed cues were self‐reportedly used correctly by large majorities of the officers, suggesting that they may not rely on inaccurate stereotypes. Self‐report use of categories of free report cues, and prescribed cues, was not related to accuracy in detecting deception. As people may not always be aware of the behaviours on which their judgements are based, the relationships between some of the behaviours actually displayed in the communications, and group accuracy in detecting deception in those communications, were also investigated. Group accuracy was related to the presence of subjective, emotion‐related cues in the communications.     

Self-Deception and Responsibility for Addiction

ABSTRACT We frequently accuse heavy drinkers and drug users of self‐deception if they refuse to admit that they are addicted. However, given the ways in which we usually conceptualize it, acknowledging addiction merely involves swapping one form of self‐deception for another. We ask addicts to see themselves as in the grip of an irresistible desire, and to accept that addiction is an essentially physiological process. To the extent this is so, we, as much as the addicts, suffer from self‐deception, and the responsibility for their state is in part ours. Conversely, since addicts are compelled to accept a self‐deceptive image of themselves, they are at least partially excused from blame for their self‐deception.     

Linking self and ingroup: Self‐anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification

The present paper investigates how cognitive projection processes instigate social identification. We complement the classical self‐stereotyping approach (i.e., conforming to prototypical group norms) by investigating self‐anchoring (i.e., projection from self to group) as a distinct cognitive route to social identification. Self‐anchoring has mainly been investigated as predictor of intergroup differentiation. Surprisingly, no reliable link has been provided yet between self‐anchoring and social identification. In Study 1, we provide first evidence for this positive link. In Study 2, we add self‐stereotyping to our model and show that self‐anchoring is still positively related to social identification when controlling for self‐stereotyping. Additionally, we show that self‐anchoring is positively related to affective components of identification, while self‐stereotyping is positively related to cognitive components. Moreover, we examined the impact of self‐concept stability on self‐anchoring. Self‐concept stability was positively related to self‐anchoring, and hence to social identification (Study 1), independently from self‐stereotyping (Study 2). In the discussion, we argue that disentangling self‐anchoring from self‐stereotyping is important as it increases our insight in how people identify, and how this may vary depending on self‐concept and group context. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

SELF‐DECEPTION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF FICTION

Sartre's commentary on bad faith is the starting‐point for an exploration of self‐deception: what it is not, what it is, and whether it's always wrong. The proffered analysis of self‐deception parallels a certain theory of our experience of fiction. In essence, it is argued that the self‐deceiver creates a kind of fiction in which he is a character, a fiction that he nonetheless believes to be real.     

Gegenstände and other matters

In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action‐guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre‐consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self‐transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self‐deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self‐deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self‐deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self‐deception.     

Facing a breakup: Electromyographic responses moderate self‐concept recovery following a romantic separation

Romantic breakups arouse fundamental questions about the self: Who am I without my partner? This study examined self‐concept reorganization and psychological well‐being over an 8‐week period in the months following a breakup. Multilevel analyses revealed that poorer self‐concept recovery preceded poorer well‐being and was associated with love for an ex‐partner, suggesting that failure to redefine the self contributes to post‐breakup distress. Psychophysiological data revealed that greater activity in the corrugator supercilia facial muscle while thinking about an ex‐partner predicted poorer self‐concept recovery and strengthened the negative association between love for an ex‐partner and self‐concept recovery. Thus, the interaction between self‐report and psychophysiological data provided information about the importance of self‐concept recovery to post‐breakup adjustment not tapped by either method alone.     

Walking the yellow brick road

This article uses the story of The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (L. F. Baum, 1900) as a metaphor for exploring career counseling issues related to self‐deception, loss, and the search for the “all‐knowing” expert. The dynamics of the story can be applied to both counseling practice and counselor training. Cross‐cultural issues are also considered.     

BEYOND FIELDS,NETWORKS, AND FAME: LAWRENCE KRADER AS AN “OUTSIDER” INTELLECTUAL

This paper investigates the intellectual biography of the American philosopher and anthropologist Lawrence Krader (1919–1998) as a contribution to the sociology of intellectuals and history of ideas. We trace Krader's career trajectory to his intellectual self‐concept, his scholarly and political worldviews, and his financial independence. Krader entertained a self‐concept of a lone pioneer that led him to reject the competition for attention as highlighted in the current literature, dominated as it is by an emphasis on field, habitus, the accumulation and reproduction of power, and symbolic capital. His self‐concept and his happier financial circumstance kept him relatively aloof from key intellectual networks and narrow institutional constraints. Our paper seeks to combine the new sociology of ideas with its focus on institutions and networks with traditional Wissenssoziologie that emphasized the role of class, status, and worldviews to explain the rise and fall of theories and thinkers.     

Self-Deception and Moral Responsibility

The self‐deceived are usually held to be moral responsible for their state. I argue that this attribution of responsibility makes sense only against the background of the traditional conception of self‐deception, a conception that is now widely rejected. In its place, a new conception of self‐deception has been articulated, which requires neither intentional action by self‐deceived agents, nor that they posses contradictory beliefs. This new conception has neither need nor place for attributions of moral responsibility to the self‐deceived in paradigmatic cases. Accordingly, we should take the final step toward abandoning the traditional conception, and drop the automatic attribution of responsibility. Self‐deception is simply a kind of mistake, and has no more necessary connection to culpability than have other intellectual errors.     

Looking Philosophical: Stuff,Stereotypes, and Self‐Presentation

Self‐presentation is a complex phenomenon through which individuals present themselves in performance of social roles. The success of such performances rests not just on how well a performer fulfills expectations regarding the role she would play, but on whether observers find her convincing. I focus on how self‐presentation entails making use of material environment and objects: One may “dress for the part” and employ props that suit a desired role. However, regardless of dress or props, one can nonetheless fail to “look the part” owing to expectations informed by biases patterned along commonplace social stereotypes. Using the social role of philosopher as my example, I analyze how the stereotype attached to this role carries implications for how demographically under‐represented philosophers may self‐present, specifically with regard to dress and decoration. I look, in particular, to the alienation from one's material environment that may follow on the frustration of self‐presentation through bias. One pernicious effect of bias, I argue, is the power it has to deform and distort its target's relation to her physical setting and objects. Where comfort and ease in one's material environment can be a significant ethico‐aesthetic good, bias can inhibit access to, and enjoyment of, this good.