On Becoming What We Might Have Been: Counterfactual Thinking and Self-efficacy

Three experiments examined the hypothesis that, in the aftermath of a performance event, upward counterfactuals reinforce feelings of self-efficacy toward similar future events, whereas downward counterfactuals decrease feelings of self-efficacy. Using a scenario methodology, the first two experiments confirmed this hypothesis: upward counterfactual thinking enhanced feelings of self-efficacy relative to downward counterfactual thinking. In a third experiment, conducted in a more real-world context, upward counterfactuals again led to greater feelings of self-efficacy than downward counterfactuals. However, there were important limiting conditions: the effect of counterfactual thinking on self-efficacy was more or less pronounced depending on both situational and dispositional factors. Whereas the pattern of results provided little support for a self-protection explanation for these limiting conditions, the results were consistent with a depth of processing explanation.     

论医学哲学是什么和不是什么

弄清医学哲学是什么和不是什么,是医学哲学学科建设的基本问题.医学哲学理论构架的逻辑起点是生命健康,基本结构是医学哲学的本体论、认识论、方法论、价值论和发展观以及一系列医学范畴.哲学理论+医学实例不是医学哲学.医学哲学具备超验的思维方式、反思的学术精神、创新的学术风格、开放的学术视野,而临床经验总结、紧跟时局的宣传、时髦热闹的效果,从者众多的场面不是医学哲学.     

论医学哲学是什么和不是什么

弄清医学哲学是什么和不是什么,是医学哲学学科建设的基本问题。医学哲学理论构架的逻辑起点是生命健康,基本结构是医学哲学的本体论、认识论、方法论、价值论和发展观以及一系列医学范畴。“哲学理论 医学实例”不是医学哲学。医学哲学具备超验的思维方式、反思的学术精神、创新的学术风格、开放的学术视野,而临床经验总结、紧跟时局的宣传、时髦热闹的效果,从者众多的场面不是医学哲学。     

Why Propositions Might be Sets of Truth-supporting Circumstances

Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.     

Speculations About Problems in Conducting Research with Public Offenders

Problems in conducting research with public offenders are legion. These problems include the lack of a systematic body of knowledge, the lack of avenues of dissemination of information, the lack of a data base describing the situation as it is now, and the lack of communication and/or rapport between researchers and many criminal justice staff members. In addition, ethical concerns about human research are becoming more evident and need to be dealt with. While a few ways of coping with these problems are mentioned, solutions often depend almost entirely on the quality of the setting and the individuals involved in it.     

Philosophy of Science: What One Needs to Know

This introduction to the philosophy of science offers an overview of the major concepts and developments in contemporary theories of science. Strengths and weaknesses of deductive, inductive, and falsificationist models of science are considered. The "Received View" in the theory of science is contrasted with Kuhn's paradigms and Feyerabend's "anything goes," leading to an examination of the merits of a research program–based approach. After touching on the sociology of science, postmodernism, and the feminist critique, the article concludes with a summary, in six theses, of the implications for religion/science.     

Unemployment: What Counselors Can Do About It

The psychological impact of unemployment on many people is just short of devastating. This article attempts to outline some of the relevant considerations in trying to assist the unemployed. It also endeavors to set out some ways in which counselors have sought to respond to the needs of those without work.     

What God might be

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - As Plato suggested, the cosmos may exist because this is ethically necessary. It then might well consist of infinitely many minds, each itself...     

What the Philosophy Of Medicine Is

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics -     

维特根斯坦的哲学观

该文介绍了后期维特根斯坦对哲学的看法。其要点是:哲学的核心工作是概念考察;所考察的是自然概念,用以考察的也是自然概念;因此,哲学工作和实证科学是在两个层面上展开的;哲学的目标不是建构理论;哲学的任务是治疗由误解哲学语法所造成的智性扭曲。文章最后粗略讨论了观念和概念的关系。     

What Moore's Paradox Is About

On the basis of arguments showing that none of the most influential analyses of Moore's paradox yields a successful resolution of the problem, a new analysis of it is offered. It is argued that, in attempting to render verdicts of either inconsistency or self-contradiction or self-refutation, those analyses have all failed to satisfactorily explain why a Moore-paradoxical proposition is such that it cannot be rationally believed. According to the proposed solution put forward here, a Moore-paradoxical proposition is one for which the believer can have no non-overridden evidence. the arguments for this claim make use of some of Peter Klein's views on epistemic defeasibility. It is further suggested that this proposal may have important meta-epistemological implications.