Contextualizing counterintuitiveness: how context affects comprehension and memorability of counterintuitive concepts

A number of anthropologists have argued that religious concepts are minimally counterintuitive and that this gives them mnemic advantages. This paper addresses the question of why people have the memory architecture that results in such concepts being more memorable than other types of concepts by pointing out the benefits of a memory structure that leads to better recall for minimally counterintuitive concepts and by showing how such benefits emerge in the real-time processing of comprehending narratives such as folk tales. This model suggests that memorability is not an inherent property of a concept; rather it is a property of the concept, the context in which the concept is presented, and the background knowledge that the comprehendor possesses about the concept. The model predicts how memorability of a concept should change if the context containing the concept were changed. The paper also presents the results of experiments carried out to test these predictions.     

Safety is more than the antonym of risk

abstract   Even though much research has been devoted to studies of safety, the concept of safety is in itself under-theorised, especially concerning its relation to epistemic uncertainty. In this paper we propose a conceptual analysis of safety. The paper explores the distinc-tion between absolute and relative safety, as well as that between objective and subjective safety. Four potential dimensions of safety are discussed, viz. harm, probability, epistemic uncertainty, and control. The first three of these are used in the proposed definition of safety, whereas it is argued that control should not be included in a reasonable definition of safety. It is shown that strictly speaking, an objective safety concept is not attainable. Instead, an intersubjective concept is proposed that brings us as close as possible to an objective concept.     

Dreams in Child Psychoanalysis

More than six decades after Freud's death, psychoanalysts are certainly not more unified in their view of the concept of the unconscious—its structure and its way of working—than in ‘the good old days’. Challenges are facing psychoanalysis from many perspectives, urging psychoanalysts to continuously reconsider their theoretical grounds. This paper pursues three lines of argumentation concerning the Unconscious. The first line concerns the relation to neuroscience and this paper suggests the concept of background feelings (Damasio) as a contribution to another understanding of deficits in the psychoanalytic relationship. The second line concerns the relation to cognitive semiotics, and here, the paper stresses the concept of basic image sehemata as a possible link between the subject's pre-reflective awareness of the other and the internal world of phantasy. The third line pursues a concept of the analytic interpretation which is close to the Freudian idea that psychoanalysis is the communication between two Unconscious, and, consequently, that the psycho-analytic interpretation is not per se a conscious act.     

The revisionist's rubric: conceptual engineering and the discontinuity objection

This paper is about conceptual engineering (CE). Specifically, it discusses a common objection to CE, which I call the Discontinuity Objection. According to the Discontinuity Objection, CE leads to problematic discontinuities in subject and/or inquiry – making it philosophically uninteresting or irrelevant. I argue that a conceptual engineer can dismiss the Discontinuity Objection by showing that the pre-engineering concept persists through the proposed changes. In other words, the Discontinuity Objection does not apply if the proposal involves identity-preserving changes. Two existing views on identity-preserving changes are considered and rejected. I then argue that an identity-preserving conceptual change is one that allows the concept to continue to perform its function. A concept’s function is its job, its point and purpose, its role in a conceptual repertoire. In a slogan: Preserve a concept’s function, and you preserve the concept itself; preserve the concept, and you preserve the subject. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of this view.     

THE PERCEPTUAL THEORY OF PAIN: ANOTHER LOOK

The essential logical deficiency of the perceptual theory of pain, as I tried to show in my paper,¹ is that feeling pain cannot be perceiving anything. The conceptual framework that would make it possible for us to understand "feel" in this use to be a perception concept does not exist. The concept of a glimpse, which George Pitcher relies upon to supply this framework,²cannot begin to do so because it is a secondary perception concept entirely dependent upon that of seeing. This primary concept of visual perception is tied up with actions and supporting concepts like looking, glancing, gazing, glimpsing, watching, and the like. These are different ways in which one's visual perceiving may be characterized. Without the primary concept and the actions connected with it, there would be nothing to characterize. The word "feel" in contexts involving pain is not a perception concept and efforts to make it one are doomed to fail. The supporting actions and concepts do not exist.     

An examination of concept lattices,types, and functions inRoget’s International Thesaurus

The notions of objects and attributes are essential to knowledge representation. Rudolf Wille’s concept lattices group objects and attributes into concepts, with concepts organized in a lattice, so that some concepts are subconcepts of others. This paper applies certain aspects of type theory to concept lattices in order better to facilitate the representation of knowledge inRoget’s International Thesaurus. Of particular interest is a formal analysis of functions providing concept lattices with a way of representing procedures and actions that currently are not present in the thesaurus.     

Property instantiation in conceptual combination

In four experiments, I examined how a property in one concept is transferred to a second concept during conceptual combination. The results suggest that people instantiate properties: that is, they use a specific representation of a property in the modifier concept to construct a new version of that property that is specific to the combination. If people are instantiating properties, then the modifier property should match its counterpart in the combination to the extent that the modifier and head noun are similar. This observation leads to a variety of predictions (supported by the experiments) about interpretations of similar and dissimilar combinations and about plausibility, preference, and similarity judgments associated with such interpretations. The results argue against an alternative view of transfer that posits that, in general, abstract representations of properties are copied from one concept to another. In this paper, I describe various processing accounts of instantiation and discuss the implications of the instantiation view for theories of metaphor, conceptual combination, and induction.     

The Concept of Inductive Probability

The word ‘probability’ in ordinary language has two different senses, here called inductive and physical probability. This paper examines the concept of inductive probability. Attempts to express this concept in other words are shown to be either incorrect or else trivial. In particular, inductive probability is not the same as degree of belief. It is argued that inductive probabilities exist; subjectivist arguments to the contrary are rebutted. Finally, it is argued that inductive probability is an important concept and that it is a mistake to try to replace it with the concept of degree of belief, as is usual today.     

On the factivity of implicit intersubjective knowledge

The concept of knowledge can be modelled in epistemic modal logic and, if modelled by using a standard modal operator, it is subject to the problem of logical omniscience. The classical solution to this problem is to distinguish between implicit and explicit knowledge and to construe the knowledge operator as capturing the concept of implicit knowledge. In addition, since a proposition is said to be implicitly known just in case it is derivable from the set of propositions that are explicitly known by using a certain set of logical rules, the concept of implicit knowledge is definable on the basis of the concept of explicit knowledge. In any case, both implicit and explicit knowledge are typically characterized as factive, i.e. such that it is always the case that what is known is also true. The aim of the present paper is twofold: first, we will develop a dynamic system of explicit intersubjective knowledge that allows us to introduce the operator of implicit knowledge by definition; secondly, we will show that it is not possible to hold together the following two theses: (1) the concept of implicit knowledge is definable along the lines indicated above and (2) the concept of implicit knowledge is factive.     

On structures

Some of the metapsychology involving the concept of structure is briefly reviewed, together with some difficulties presented by it. The concept of structure is defined, for purposes of the paper, and various kinds of structures are delineated. The author confines herself to the "microstructures," such as memories, cognitive structures, affect structures, defenses, identifications. Possible factors related to the development and maintenance of structures are discussed. In addition, the concept of structural change is taken up. It is suggested that an essential in such change is conscious review, however brief. The author proposes that structure formation and change is a fruitful area for mutual work by psychoanalysts and basic scientists.     

Children's concept of word

The development of the concept of word as a unit of speech is a metalinguistic insight that usually corresponds to the acquisition of literacy skills. Further, as a fundamental aspect of language structure, it converges as well with skills involved in bilingualism. A framework that describes the structure of metalinguistic awareness is applied to this task in order to relate the development of word concept to literacy and bilingualism. Children between 4 and 6 years old who are prereaders or early readers, and bilingual or monolingual, are given three tests of word concept. The results show that concept of word emerges gradually and is evident to some extent even in the 4-year-olds. Further, literacy and bilingualism are shown to promote specific aspects of its developmentThe research reported in this paper was unded by grant No. A2559 from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada. I am indebted to Sandra Owston, who assisted in conducting the study.     

EVIDENCE FOR RELATIONAL-CODING IN CONCEPT FORMATION,AND A NOTE ON THE EFFECTS OF FEEDBACK*

The purpose of the present paper was to determine whether people encode relations among component features in experience, or whether they simply encode the occurrence of features separately as independent cues. This has become a major issue in theories of concept-formation at the present time. It is suggested in this paper that two problems have particularly obstructed a clear resolution of the issue. The first is a consistent failure to check to what extent training materials actually contain relations among features, before results are declared in favour of a particular model. The second is the use, hitherto, of only informal methods of analysing such relations, where they exist, and of predicting from them the structure of the concept. This paper describes an expression for measuring the overall relations among feature-variables in concept training materials. It also introduces a methodology, using log-linear models, for predicting concept structures on the basis of those relations. An experiment combined these methods to assess whether subjects abstracted relations among features, or whether they abstracted independent cues. A subsidiary aim was to assess how feedback, based on independent-cue information, during learning, affected the construction of the concept. The results came out strongly in favour of relational-coding and there was some evidence that feedback based on independent-cues retarded concept formation.     

The Concept of Abnormality in Medical Genetics

This paper explores usage of the concept ofabnormality in medical genetics and proposesdirectives for more careful usage of this concept.The conceptual difficulties are first explored, thena model is developed to assess actual usage, followedby analysis of a sample of genetic textbooks andgenetics literature. It appears that fact andvaluation are often intermingled, that referencestandards used to define 'genetic abnormalities' areoften not clear and that the concept of abnormality isoften used independent of the degree of certainty withwhich the altered genetype develops into a (seriously)harmful phenotype. On the basis of these findings itis argued that more restraint and more careful use ofthe concept of genetic abnormality of medical geneticsis appropriate as well as more agreement on the use ofreference standards.     

ON EXPLICATING THE CONCEPT THE POWER OF AN ARITHMETICAL THEORY

In this paper I discuss possible ways of measuring the power of arithmetical theories, and the possiblity of making an explication in Carnap’s sense of this concept. Chaitin formulates several suggestions how to construct measures, and these suggestions are reviewed together with some new and old critical arguments. I also briefly review a measure I have designed together with some shortcomings of this measure. The conclusion of the paper is that it is not possible to formulate an explication of the concept.     

Between Realism and Relativism: Moral Certainty as a Third Option

This paper is an attempt to lay out a meta-ethical position that is inspired by the framework of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To achieve this goal, this paper is divided into two parts. First, I explore recent attempts to tie Wittgenstein's epistemology in On Certainty to moral epistemology. I argue that there can be a meaningful parallel drawn between the epistemic certainties discussed in On Certainty and what I consider to be moral certainties. These moral certainties are unjustified fundamental moral attitudes that underlie our moral practices. Then, I show how the debate over moral certainty has branched into two directions. One direction presents the concept of moral certainty as a naturalistic concept. On this reading, moral certainties transcend time and place since they are rooted in our natural tendencies to act or not act in certain ways. The other direction presents moral certainty as a distinctly relativistic concept. On this reading, we have our moral certainties because we belong to communities that agree on these certainties. In the second section, I argue that we have both natural, universal certainties and localized, relative certainties. I also argue that our localized certainties are constrained by non-moral facts about ourselves and about the world. To make this argument, I rely on Wittgenstein's concept of “general facts of nature.” The result of the paper is a meta-ethical position that can be located in between moral relativism and moral realism.     

Applying the least restrictive alternative principle to treatment decisions: A legal and behavioral analysis

The least restrictive alternative concept is widely used in mental health law. This paper addresses how the concept has been applied to treatment decisions. The paper offers both a legal and a behavioral analysis to some problems that have emerged in recent years concerning the selection of behavioral procedures used to change client behavior. The paper also offers ways of improving the application of the concept, which involve developing a more behaviorally functional perspective toward restrictiveness.     

The notion of a recognitional concept and other confusions

The notion of a recognitional concept (RC) is stated precisely and shown to be unrelated to the proper notion of a perceptually based concept, defining of concept empiricism. More fundamentally, it is argued that the notion of an RC does not reflect a potentially sensible candidate theory of concepts at all and therefore ought to be abandoned from concept-theoretical discourse. In the later parts of the paper, it is shown independently of these points that Fodor’s attacks on RCs are in all central respects based on fallacies and confusions. Thus, even if the notion of an RC were one worth defending, it could not be threatened by Fodor’s attacks on it. Throughout the paper, I aim at clarification regarding the logical relations between various concept-theoretical options.     

Principle of organization: a dynamic-systems view of the archetype-as-such

The personality is a dynamic system. Like all other dynamic systems, it must be self-organized. In this paper I focus upon the archetype-as-such, that is, upon the essential core around which both an archetypical image and a complex are organized. I argue that an archetype-as-such is a pre-existing principle of organization. Within the personality that principle manifests itself as a psychological vortex (a complex) into which we are drawn. The vortex is impersonal. We mediate it through myths and rituals or through consciousness. In this paper I show that Jung's intuition about the archetype-as-such is supported by recent science. I evaluate other concepts of the archetype. My concept is different from that proposed recently by Saunders and Skar. My concept allows each archetype-as-such to be defined precisely in mathematical terms. It suggests a new interpretation of mythology. It also addresses our spiritual experience of an archetype. Because the archetypes-as-such are fundamental to the personality, the better we understand them the better we understand our patients. The paper is grounded with clinical examples.     

The Axioms of Set Theory

In this paper I argue for the view that the axioms of ZF are analytic truths of a particular concept of set. By this I mean that these axioms are true by virtue only of the meaning attached to this concept, and, moreover, can be derived from it. Although I assume that the object of ZF is a concept of set, I refrain from asserting either its independent existence, or its dependence on subjectivity. All I presuppose is that this concept is given to us with a certain sense as the objective focus of a ”phenomenologically reduced“ intentional experience. The concept of set that ZF describes, I claim, is that of a multiplicity of coexisting elements that can, as a consequence, be a member of another multiplicity. A set is conceived as a quantitatively determined collection of objects that is, by necessity, ontologically dependent on its elements, which, on the other hand, must exist independently of it. A close scrutiny of the essential characters of this conception seems to be sufficient to ground the set-theoretic hierarchy and the axioms of ZF. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.