Two Kinds of Definition in Spinoza's Ethics

Spinoza scholars have claimed that we are faced with a dilemma: either Spinoza's definitions in his Ethics are real, in spite of indications to the contrary, or the definitions are nominal and the propositions derived from them are false. I argue that Spinoza did not recognize the distinction between real and nominal definitions. Rather, Spinoza classified definitions according to whether they require a priori or a posteriori justification, which is a classification distinct from either the real/nominal or the intensional/extensional classification. I argue that Spinoza uses both a priori and a posteriori definitions in the Ethics and that recognizing both types of definitions allows us to understand Spinoza's geometric method in a new way. We can now understand the geometric method as two methods, one resulting in propositions that Spinoza considers to be absolutely certain and another resulting in propositions that Spinoza does not consider certain. The latter method makes use of a posteriori definitions and postulates, whereas the former method uses only a priori definitions and axioms.     

Language and knowledge in Spinoza

This paper argues against the thesis of Professor Savan, that Spinoza's views about words and about the imagination are such that he could not consistently say, and indeed did not think, that philosophical truths can be expressed adequately in language. The evidence for this thesis is examined in detail, and it is argued that Spinoza should have distinguished between two types of imagination, corresponding roughly to Kant's transcendental and empirical imagination. Finally, it is suggested that the bulk of the argument of the Ethics is conducted on the level of the ‘second kind of knowledge’, reason, but that it also contains examples of the use of the first and third kinds of knowledge.     

Knowing the Essence of the State in Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico‐Politicus

This paper argues that Spinoza's main political writings are concerned, in part, with knowledge of essences as detailed in the Ethics. It is further argued that knowledge of the essences of states, and essential properties that belong to states, may be an example of the elusive scientia intuitiva or third kind of knowledge. The paper concludes by considering Spinoza's goals in his political writings and the importance of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge more broadly for early modern political philosophers.     

“Sherry’s Secret”

The case and commentaries below were developed as part of a project, Graduate Research Ethics Education, undertaken by the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics with funding from the National Science Foundation (NSF Grant No. SBR 9421897 and NSF Grant No. 9817880). The project aims at training graduate students in research ethics and building a community of scientists and engineers who are interested in and capable of teaching research ethics. As part of the project, each graduate student participant develops a case for use in teaching and writes a commentary to go with the case, and then a staff member is asked to write additional commentary on the case. The case below was written in the second year of the project and was published in Research Ethics: Cases and Commentaries edited by B. Schrag, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, Bloomington, Indiana, Vol. II (1998). Publication of these cases and commentaries will be a recurring feature of Science and Engineering Ethics.     

ZYGON 'S DUAL MISSION

The first mission of Zygon has been the exploration of the relation between Religion and Science. The second, I suggest, has been consideration of the relation between Ethics and Technology. Some articles have given attention to the relation of Religion to Ethics, or that of Science to Technology. The interaction of Ethics and Science, and that of Religion and Technology, are also significant. I give examples of articles or symposia in each of these categories and close with great hope for Zygon's future.     

Concretizing an Ethics of Emptiness: The Succeeding Volumes of Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics

Watsuji Tetsurô’s Ethics is one of the most important works in Japanese ethical thought. But scholarly research in English has largely focused on the first of three volumes of Ethics, leaving the latter two oft-neglected. In order to balance out the views of Watsuji’s ethics, this paper focuses on the contributions of the second and third volumes of Ethics. These volumes are essential for any concrete understanding of Watsuji’s ‘ethics of emptiness’. The second volume develops the ideas of the first, particularly how the dual-structure (individuality and communality) is concretely realized through the various stages of ethical organization (family, local community, economy, nation, and state). The third volume develops the notions of space and time from the first volume into a theory of climate (fûdo) and history. By analyzing these, we can understand Watsuji’s system as a whole and clarify Watsuji’s unique contribution to ethical theory.     

Beauvoir,the Scandal of Science,and Skepticism as Method

In The Ethics of Ambiguity (herein the Ethics), Simone de Beauvoir declares that science condemns itself to failure if it takes as its task the total disclosure of being (Beauvoir 1948/1976, 130). I suggest that the Ethics actually parallels the spirit of some scientific programs, specifically those that utilize positive skepticism as method. I draw out connections among the Ethics, Maurice Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (Merleau‐Ponty 1945/1962) to which Beauvoir's works show much likeness, and Francis Bacon's The New Organon (Bacon 1620/2000), the latter being at once a scientific and a positive skeptical program. Underscoring the ways in which Beauvoir's method of interrogating the being of beings and reality is compatible with some scientific pictures is important. It complicates the usual thought that existentialism is antiscience, problematizes Beauvoir's overly simplistic depiction of science, and nuances her analysis of the existent's experience of itself.     

Virtues and Vices of Relativism

comment ? Subject: “Judging Others: History, Ethics, and the Purposes of Comparison” Aaron Stalnaker Journal of Religious Ethics 36.3 (September 2008) ? From: Jonathan Wyn Schofer Harvard Divinity School 45 Francis Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138     

Spinoza's PSR as a Principle of Clear and Distinct Representation

It is argued first, that Spinoza's Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) is best seen as an auxiliary premise and not as an axiom of the Ethics; second, that Spinoza held the PSR to be a self‐evident truth that indicates a necessary condition for clearly and distinctly representing the existence or non‐existence of a thing; and third, that this interpretation of Spinoza's PSR explains the near absence of the PSR within the demonstrations of the Ethics as well as the importance of the principle in Spinoza's thought.     

New Mandates and Imperatives in the Revised ACA Code of Ethics

The first major revision of the ACA Code of Ethics in a decade occurred in late 2005, with the updated edition containing important new mandates and imperatives. This article provides interviews with members of the Ethics Revision Task Force that flesh out seminal changes in the revised ACA Code of Ethics in the areas of confidentiality, romantic and sexual interactions, dual relationships, end‐of‐life care for terminally ill clients, cultural sensitivity, diagnosis, interventions, practice termination, technology, and deceased clients.     

The ontology of intentionality I: the dependence ontological account of order: mediate and immediate moments and pieces of dependent and independent objects

This is the first of three essays which use Edmund Husserl's dependence ontology to formulate a non-Diodorean and non-Kantian temporal semantics for two-valued, first-order predicate modal languages suitable for expressing ontologies of experience (like physics and cognitive science). This essay's primary desideratum is to formulate an adequate dependence-ontological account of order. To do so it uses primitive (proper) part and (weak) foundation relations to formulate seven axioms and 28 definitions as a basis for Husserl's dependence ontological theory of relating moments. The essay distinguishes between dependence v. independence, pieces v. moments, mediate v. immediate pieces and moments, maximal v. non-maximal pieces, founded v. unfounded qualities, integrative v. disintegrative dependence, and defines the concepts of the completion of an object, the adumbrational equivalence relation of objects, moments of unity which unify objects, and relating moments which relate objects. The eight theorems [CUT90]-[CUT97] show that relating moments of unity provide an adequate account of order in terms of primitive (proper) part and (weak) foundation relations.     

Promoting a Contextual Perspective in the Application of the ACA Code of Ethics: The Ethics into Action Map

Because community counselors work within an increasingly broad array of practice settings, it is imperative for them to understand how to apply the ACA Code of Ethics (American Counseling Association, 2005) to specific practice settings. The author examines ethics applied to unique practice settings and proposes the Ethics into Action Map as a method to promote an increased understanding of the application of ethical standards to specific contexts. Case examples are provided to illustrate the use of the Ethics into Action Map.     

DIETRICH BONHOEFFER—AN ETHICS OF GOD'S APOCALYPSE?

Bonhoeffer's theology generally and his Ethics in particular have not commonly been thought to be ‘apocalyptic’. Indeed, many have adjudged him to be “almost immunized” against such eschatology. Yet, a close reading of Bonhoeffer's Ethics shows unmistakable resonances between the themes, tasks and argumentative forms of his theological ethics and the contours of pauline apocalyptic as set forth recently in the work of J. Louis Martyn and others. In this text, Bonhoeffer confronts the question ‘What has paraenesis to do with apocalypsis?’ and experiments with answers which acknowledge that ‘the incursion of a new world’ in Christ ‘renders ancient good uncouth.’ Seeing this illumines several aspects of Bonhoeffer's theological ethics, clarifies the importance of the doctrine of justification therein, and emphasises its dynamic, dialectical and pauline character.     

Singularity in Beauvoir's The Ethics of Ambiguity

Though it has gone unnoticed so far in Beauvoir Studies, the term “singularity” is a technical one for Simone de Beauvoir. In the first half of the essay I discuss two reasons why this term has been obscured. First, as is well known Beauvoir has not been read in the context of the history of philosophy until recently. Second, in The Ethics of Ambiguity at least, singularité is translated both inconsistently and quite misleadingly. In the second half of the essay I attempt to demonstrate the importance of this term in The Ethics. The will to disclose being is the will to disclose the singularity of the other, whether human, land, sky or painting. Ambiguity, which Beauvoir distinguishes from absurdity in Camus, is an image suggesting this necessarily mutual disclosure of singularity.     

The professional ethics course

A professional ethics program was recently developed and implemented as a comparative values course at the University of Puget Sound. This article is a report ontheprogram, “Professional Ethics fora Technological Era.”The program consists of two courses: “Ethics for a Technological Era,” and “Values: Conflict and Compromise.” The first course emphasizes skills necessary for ethical decision making. The second course follows through with an opportunity to apply these skills to a major social policy program. This article discusses the approach to ethics, and participation, and the theoretical approach, including role modeling, speakers, and reading and discussion material, for “Professional Ethics in a Technological Era.”     

Human Rights and the Defense of Liberal Democracy

In recent issues of the Journal of Religious Ethics (2006, 2007), David Little has defended the contemporary regime of international human rights against what he thinks of as the relativizing influences of the genealogical “just‐so” story told by Jeffrey Stout in his Democracy and Tradition (2004). I argue that Stout is correct about just‐so stories, and that Little does not go far enough in his reclamation of liberalism against Stout's “new traditionalists.” The main weaknesses of Little's approach are his insistence on the idea that human rights are to be thought of as natural rights, and that these in turn are to be thought of as self‐evident and self‐justifying. I argue that they are neither: they come to us via a Stoutian just‐so story, and that as part of a broader reclamation of liberalism, they can continue to serve as the basis for the kind of international liberal constitutionalism that Little advocates.     

The Distinction between Reason and Intuitive Knowledge in Spinoza's Ethics

While both intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitiva) and reason (ratio) are adequate ways of knowing for Spinoza, they are not equal. Intuitive knowledge, which Spinoza describes as the ‘greatest virtue of mind’, is superior to reason. The nature of this superiority has been the subject of some controversy due to Spinoza's notoriously parsimonious treatment of the distinction between reason and intuitive knowledge in the Ethics. In this paper, I argue that intuitive knowledge differs from reason not only in terms of its method of cognition—but also in terms of its content. More specifically, I maintain that there is something that is known by intuition, namely the unique essences of things, that is not known by reason. My argument is supported by an examination of Spinoza's account of essences in the Ethics, which reveals that he is committed to both unique and shared essences. Based on this dual commitment, I argue that whereas for Spinoza both reason and intuition can be said to reach adequate knowledge of the shared essence of a thing, the unique essence of a singular thing, which is nothing but its actual essence, can only be known through intuitive knowledge.     

Spinoza and mental health

With the proviso that Spinoza's concerns were philosophical, not medical, we examine the Ethics with a view to bringing out those aspects of it which are of import for mental health. We find that the Ethics surrounds the idea that man can be egoless in the Buddhist sense of that term. This concept provides a criterion of mental health. Further, according to Spinoza's theory of the Affections, those which are passive include some which are based on pain. These he ‘enumerates among the diseases’. And for them he provides, in Part V, specific ‘remedies’. This in turn leads him to equate ‘Mental Freedom or beatitude’ with a ‘healthy Mind’. We thus have in Part V additional possible criteria of mental health. Finally, there is the suggestion that philosophy for Spinoza was a kind of therapy.’

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. — The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness. — A main cause of philosophical disease — a onesided diet . . .

Wittgenstein

This doctrine of knowledge first and action later is not a minor disease . . . My present advocacy of the unity of knowledge and action is precisely the medicine for that disease.

Wang Yang‐ming

When asked by two disciples which of the views of each was correct, Wang replied: both are. Which is used depends on the kind of person you are trying to help. Some persons need this one, others that.     

New Concepts in the 2014 ACA Code of Ethics

The 2014 revision of the ACA Code of Ethics (American Counseling Association [ACA], 2014 ) substantially raises the bar for the ethical practice of professional counselors. This article provides interviews with members of the ACA Ethics Revision Task Force that explore and clarify new imperatives in the areas of ethical decision making, professional values, managing and maintaining boundaries, technology (including social media), the nonimposition of counselor personal values, counselor education, legal issues, sliding scales, and fee splitting.     

Knowledge,certainty and probability

In this essay, I discuss some of the important logical principles governing the concepts of knowledge, certainty and probability. In the first section, I suggest a series of definitions of epistemic terms, employing as primitive the locution ‘p is epistemi‐cally possible to S’ In the second section, I develop an epistemic concept of probability and compare it to the concepts of certainty and knowledge. In the third section, I relate the epistemic concepts of certainty and probability to the quantifiers of traditional logic and to a non‐episteznic concept of probability. I conclude by noting similarities and differences between the two concepts of probability.