Lying in the name of the collective good: a developmental study

The present study examined the developmental origin of 'blue lies', a pervasive form of lying in the adult world that is told purportedly to benefit a collective. Seven, 9-, and 11-year-old Chinese children were surreptitiously placed in a real-life situation where they decided whether to lie to conceal their group's cheating behavior. Children were also assessed in terms of their willingness in hypothetical situations to endorse lying or truth-telling that benefits a collective but at the same time harms an individual. Results showed that as age increased, children became more inclined to endorse lying in the name of the collective good, and to tell lies for their group themselves. Furthermore, children's endorsement about blue lies in hypothetical situations predicted their actual lying behavior.     

Giving cognition a helping hand: The effect of congruent gestures on object name retrieval

The gestures that accompany speech are more than just arbitrary hand movements or communicative devices. They are simulated actions that can both prime and facilitate speech and cognition. This study measured participants’ reaction times for naming degraded images of objects when simultaneously adopting a gesture that was either congruent with the target object, incongruent with it, and when not making any hand gesture. A within‐subjects design was used, with participants (N= 122) naming 10 objects under each condition. Participants named the objects significantly faster when adopting a congruent gesture than when not gesturing at all. Adopting an incongruent gesture resulted in significantly slower naming times. The findings are discussed in the context of the intrapersonal cognitive and facilitatory effects of gestures and underline the relatedness between language, action, and cognition.     

Brand logo and name association: it's all in the name

Despite the expense of designing and the popularity of using logos to represent brands, there is a paucity of information on how such symbols are processed. This series of experiments used Repetition Blindness (RB) to measure implicit association of logos and names that varied in (1) the abstractness of the logo, and (2) the level of familiarity with the logo. RB is a perceptual phenomenon that occurs when two items, presented in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), are encoded along repeated dimensions (e.g. visual, phonological, semantic) resulting in only one item being perceived (Bavelier, 1994 ; Buttle, Ball, Zhang, & Raymond, 2005 ; Kanwisher, 1987 ). Phonological RB was revealed for both abstract and figurative logos and occurred regardless of familiarity. The results suggest that as long as a consumer has the opportunity to be exposed to the name of a logo then logo‐name association learning is a rapid process. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Testing the generality of the name letter effect: name initials and everyday attitudes

The name letter effect is the tendency to evaluate alphabetical letters in one's name, especially initials, particularly favorably. Recent evidence suggests that name initials may even predict career choices. The authors investigated whether people possess favorable attitudes toward basic attitude objects beginning with name initials, both between individuals (e.g., does Judy like jam more than does Doug?) and within individuals (e.g., does Judy like jam more than honey?). Ratings of animals, foods, leisure activities (Studies 1-4) and national groups (Studies 2-4) revealed no object preference as a function of matching name initials. However, the name letter effect emerged (Studies 3-4), as did a clear preference for brand names starting with one's name initials (Study 4). Self-esteem, narcissism, and stimuli characteristics did not reliably influence these effects. Implications for extending name letter effects to basic attitude processes are discussed.     

A rose by any other name: Maintaining the name and highlighting the uniqueness of psychology as a health care profession

In this article, we reply to the comments made by Holden and Levant (preceding articles). While we agree with their goals of expanding the scope of practice of psychology, standardizing training, and educating the public and other health care professionals about the field of clinical psychology, we do not agree that changing the discipline's name to psychological physician is a necessary or sufficient means to these ends. We outline the bases for our disagreement with the name change proposal and provide other proposals for reaching the goals set forth by Holden and Levant.     

Giving the Benefit of the Doubt

Abstract

Faced with evidence that what a person said is false, we can nevertheless trust them and so believe what they say – choosing to give them the benefit of the doubt. This is particularly notable when the person is a friend, or someone we are close to. Towards such persons, we demonstrate a remarkable epistemic partiality. We can trust, and so believe, our friends even when the balance of the evidence suggests that what they tell us is false. And insofar as belief is possible, it is also possible to acquire testimonial knowledge on those occasions when the friends know what they tell us. This paper seeks to explain these psychological and epistemological possibilities.     

A Comparison between the Psychological Benefits of Giving Money vs. Giving Time

Journal of Happiness Studies - Four studies investigated the differential effects of giving time vs. giving money on well-being and related mechanisms. Studies 1 and 2 used a recall paradigm,...     

Keep 'Gestalt' in the name of the test: the curious name permutations of the Bender-Gestalt Test

The Bender-Gestalt Test is often referred to in the literature by several different names, or just as the Bender Test, without the term Gestalt. As a consequence, the figures of the test are frequently called Bender figures or Bender designs, terms which are unjustified and misleading because the figures have been taken from Wertheimer's classical study of Gestalt laws. In this article, I trace the beginnings of the name of the test and its curious permutations, and I advocate the retention of the term Gestalt in the name of the test for logical and historical reasons.     

Not Giving the Skeptic a Hearing: Pragmatism and Radical Doubt

Pragmatist responses to radical skepticism do not receive much attention in contemporary analytic epistemology. This observation is my motivation for undertaking a search for a coherent pragmatist reply to radical doubt, one that can compete, in terms of clarity and sophistication, with the currently most popular approaches, such as contextualism and relevant alternatives theory. As my point of departure I take the texts of C. S. Peirce and William James. The Jamesian response is seen to consist in the application of a wager argument to the skeptical issue in analogy with Pascal's wager. The Peircean strategy, on the other hand, is to attempt a direct rejection of one of the skeptic's main premises: that we do not know we are not deceived. I argue that while the Jamesian attempt is ultimately incoherent, Peirce's argument contains the core of a detailed and characteristically "pragmatic" rebuttal of skepticism, one that deserves to be taken seriously in the contemporary debate.     

What's in a name: implicit self-esteem and the automatic self

This article explores the links between implicit self-esteem and the automatic self (D. L. Paulhus, 1993). Across 4 studies, name letter evaluations were positively biased, confirming that implicit self-esteem is generally positive (A. G. Greenwald & M. R. Banaji, 1995). Study 1 found that this name letter bias was stable over a 4-week period. Study 2 found that positive bias for name letters and positive bias for birth date numbers were correlated and that both biases became inhibited when participants were induced to respond in a deliberative manner. Studies 3-4 found that implicit self-evaluations corresponded with self-reported self-evaluations, but only when participants were evaluating themselves very quickly (Study 3) or under cognitive load (Study 4). Together, these findings support the notion that implicit self-esteem phenomena are driven by self-evaluations that are activated automatically and without conscious self-reflection.