Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's Kant's Ethical Thought

Karl Ameriks has recently devoted an entire volume to defending what he calls "orthodox" Kantianism against what he judges to be the "errors" of such post-Kantian idealists as K. L. Reinhold and J. G. Fichte and to exposing what he claims is the frequently unnoticed but always deleterious influence of post-Kantianism upon certain prominent strands of contemporary philosophy. In response, this paper challenges Ameriks' interpretation of Kantianism itself and of the "post-Kantian project", as well as his construal of transcendental idealism. This is followed by some remarks concerning Reinhold's and Fichte's actual "arguments" for transcendental idealism and a rejection of Ameriks' characterizations of the same. Ameriks' interpretation of "the primacy of the practical" within Fichte's philosophy is also analyzed and criticized, as are his unsubstantiated claims concerning the powerful "indirect" influence of the writings of Reinhold and Fichte upon contemporary philosophy.     

Kant's Conception of Analytic Judgment

In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant appears to characterize analytic judgments in four distinct ways: once in terms of "containment," a second time in terms of "identity," a third time in terms of the explicative-ampliative contrast, and a fourth time in terms of the notion of "cognizability in accordance with the principle of contradiction." The paper asks which, if any, of these characterizations—or apparent characterizations—has the best claim to be Kant's fundamental conception of analyticity in the first Critique. It argues that it is the second. The paper argues, further, that Kant's distinction is intended to apply only to judgments of subject-predicate form, and that the fourth alleged characterization is not properly speaking a characterization at all. These theses are defended in the course of a more general investigation of the distinction's meaning and tenability.     

Faultless Disagreement,Assertions and the Affective-Expressive Dimension of Judgments of Taste

Contextualists and assessment relativists neglect the expressive dimension of assertoric discourse that seems to give rise to faultless disagreement. Discourse that generates the intuition makes public an attitudinal conflict, and the affective-expressive dimension of the contributing utterances accounts for it. The FD-phenomenon is an effect of a public dispute generated by a sequence of expressing opposite attitudes towards a salient object or state of affairs, where the protagonists are making an attempt to persuade the other side into joining the other’s camp.     

A Dilemma for Kant's Theory of Substance

This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant's different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the Opus postumum.     

Studies in the Principles of Judgments and Attitudes: I. Two Basic Principles of Judgment

The psychological test performance of 10 seven-year-old boys from an isolated, rural Guatemalan village was compared with ratings of their intelligence made by 42 adult village members. The adults' judgments were found to correlate strongly with the children's performance on the Embedded Figures, Verbal Analogies, and Memory-for-Designs Tests.     

Information Integration in an Area Judgment Task: Effect of Aids on Children's Perceptual Judgments

This study was designed to examine the cognitive processes involved in perceptual judgments of area with the methodology and concepts of Anderson's (1981) information integration theory. The Area = Height + Width rule, which Anderson and Cuneo (1978) showed to be operant in children's judgments, can in fact cover two different processes. Children may make a height judgment and then a length judgment and apply an additive integration operation to both. Alternatively, children may base themselves on the figure outline and estimate total length directly as a function of the distance scanned. Similarly, the multiplicatory integration pattern can result either from applying a multiplicatory operation to separate estimates or from visual exploration of the area bounded by the figure. In the present experiment, the characteristics of the areas of the test figures were modified (perimeter marking, rows of Xs covering the area, etc.) to elicit additive or multiplicatory integration patterns as a function of condition. The findings demonstrate that the second interpretation of both rules is more likely.     

道德判断的分级现象

Blair(1996)发现即使没有心理理论的孤独症儿童,也具备道德判断能力。而Kahn(2004)认为没有心理理论就不可能完成道德判断。已有研究表明,道德判断可能需要一定程度的心理理论。孤独症儿童心理理论存在困难,影响他们理解道德情景并进行正确的道德判断,但这是否与任务的要求道德判断能力的程度不同有关呢?研究增加道德情景的复杂程度,进一步考察儿童道德判断规律。结果发现,道德判断有分级现象,第一级是直接对道德行为进行判断,孤独症和正常儿童都能完成该任务,可能是以原始情绪为基础的;第二级道德判断是对简单道德情景进行判断,需要以心理理论为基础,只有正常儿童才能完成;而对行为与意图不一致的复杂道德判断则需要以更加丰富的经历或者经验为基础,但其属于三级道德判断还是二级道德判断的高级形式还需要进一步的研究。     

试论康德的人性与"原罪"学说

康德在《纯然理性界限内的宗教》一书中,以人性的善恶问题开始了他在后批判时期的宗教哲学论著。在《论恶的原则与善的原则的共居或论人性中的根本恶》一篇中,康德集中论述了人性的善恶和原罪的含义。本文通过梳理康德的人性论和原罪观及其交互关系,从中引出康德与基督教传统教义的原罪观在自由意志层面上的比较分析。