Situational features influencing young children's mentalistic explanations of action

This research assessed whether variable self-initiated movement and perceptual access to goals influence children to regard an action as mentalistically caused. In Study 1, preschoolers, first graders, and adults chose whether the actions of artifacts, insects, mammals, or humans were caused by mental or physical states. At all ages mental explanations were generally preferred in the presence (but not the absence) of the three situational cues (ps < .001). Also, the proportion of mental explanations by adults, and to a lesser extent by first graders, significantly increased depending upon the biological sophistication of the actor. In Study 2, preschoolers and first graders witnessed scenarios in which the presence of perceptual access or variable self-initiated movement was varied. Spontaneous mentalistic explanations of action were more common in both age groups when the feature of interest was present than when it was absent, ps < .001. Taken together, these studies suggest that children abstract specific features of action when construing its cause across disparate situations and actors and that doing so plays a vital role in learning when to generalize mentalistic explanations to new situations.     

The proper role of history in evolutionary explanations

Evolutionary explanations are not only common in the biological sciences, but also widespread outside biology. But an account of how evolutionary explanations perform their explanatory work is still lacking. This paper develops such an account. I argue that available accounts of explanations in evolutionary science miss important parts of the role of history in evolutionary explanations. I argue that the historical part of evolutionary science should be taken as having genuine explanatory force, and that it provides how-possibly explanations sensu Dray. I propose an account of evolutionary explanations as comparative-composite explanations consisting of two distinct kinds of explanations, one processual and one historical, that are connected via the explanandum's evolvability to show how the explanandum is the product of its evolutionary past. The account is both a reconstruction of how evolutionary explanations in biology work and a guideline specifying what kind of explanations evolutionary research programs should develop.     

The covering law model of historical explanation

It is often argued (as by Hempel and Nagel) that genuine historical explanations — if these are to be had — must exhibit a connection between events to be explained and universal or probabilistic laws (or ‘hypotheses'). This connection may take either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ form. The historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained is a logical consequence of statements of reasonably well‐confirmed universal laws and occurrences linked by the laws to the event to be explained. Or the historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained has high inductive probability conferred upon it given statements of reasonably well‐confirmed probabilistic laws and occurrences so linked by the laws to the type of event to be explained that one finds the occurrence of the particular event likely. This essay focuses on ‘strong’ explanations which meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement (for reasons given in the body of the article). It is argued that explanations in history (at least where it is plausible to construe them as ‘non‐rational') may meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement and count as genuine historical explanations although they do not meet a ‘covering law’ requirement (i. e. none of the premises of these explanations state universal or probabilistic hypotheses). It is required, however, that at least one premise in such explanations assert a reasonably well‐confirmed condition (e. g., a co‐variation) which can be taken as a sign or indication of the presence of laws. Rather than appealing to laws, the historian may appeal to the well‐founded possibility of laws.     

Why Friedman's non-monotonic reasoning defies Hempel's covering law model

In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the covering law model, turns out to be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is needed. And we will investigate to what extent non-monotonic epistemic logic can provide such an alternative logical framework. Finally we will show that our non-monotonic logical analysis of explanation is not only suitable for simple cases such as the electric circuit, but that it also sheds new light on more controversial causal explanations such as Milton Friedman's explanation of the business cycle.We gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions and critical comments of Johan van Benthem, Bert Hamminga, Kevin Hoover, Theo Kuipers, and Rick Looyen.     

Elimination problems in logic: a brief history

A common aim of elimination problems for languages of logic is to express the entire content of a set of formulas of the language, or a certain part of it, in a way that is more elementary or more informative. We want to bring out that as the languages for logic grew in expressive power and, at the same time, our knowledge of their expressive limitations also grew, elimination problems in logic underwent some change. For languages other than that for monadic second-order logic, there remain important open problems.     

Natural law and history in Locke's theory of distributive justice

According to the tradition of natural law justice is inherent to, and should always be observed in, all interpersonal relations: the science of natural law is nothing more or less than the expression of such principles of justice. The theoretical peculiarities that crop up regarding the lawfulness of appropriation are determined by the indirect interpersonal relations that take place within the process of appropriation: though appropriation is an action directed not towards another person or his property, but towards tangible external goods, this action may have important consequences for other people. Therefore Locke's theory of appropriation is a theory of justice.Locke's solution is made possible by the methodological improvement which allows a clear separation between the natural law and the historical and empirical conditions of its application: this improvement is a consequence of the distinction between modes and substances established in Locke's Essay.Locke's theory can be considered an extensive re-elaboration, in polemic against Filmer, of the anti-monopolistic principle characteristic of the whole of Scholastic social thought: this principle is intimately connected with the principle of man's natural liberty.Locke maintains a negative and formal conception of justice: justice prohibits interference with others' liberty of appropriation. Alongside the justice is the positive and conditional obligation of charity which prescribes the transfer of some of one's own goods to others who need them in order to survive. But for Locke there are precise limits on the obligation of charity: the application of charity suspends the application of justice only when the immediate physical survival is at stake; in all other cases justice leaves no room for charity.The Lockian negative conception of justice, which allows unlimited liberty of appropriation, is dependent on the empirical and historical condition of the incommensurability of the main resource. The widespread use of money acts as an accelerating element in the process of exhaustion of the incommensurability of land-resources but, at the same time, it renders self-preservation and appropriation almost completely independent of the natural environment. Money creates an infinite number of opportunities for the outlay of labour irrespective of the availability of land, that is, it renders labour the principal resource of the civilized world, and labour is an incommensurable and infinitely reproducible resource. The incommensurability of the labour resource thus supports the Lockian theory of negative distributive justice; but over the Lockian solution already loomed the threatening shadow of pauperism.The subject of this essay is further dealt with in my book on Locke's political and social philosophy Nel crepuscolo della probabilitá, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1983. There I develop further the interpretation of Locke's theory of justice presented here and analyse his theoretical and historical presuppositions.     

Ernst troeltsch and the philosophical history of natural law

J. G. Fichte (1762–1814) articulates and defends a conception of autonomy as rational self-identification. This paper reconstructs this conception and examines various difficulties recognized by Fichte during the earliest phases of his career (1780s–1790s), with the heterogeneity of natural drives and freedom as the principal threat. Theoretically, this heterogeneity is overcome for Fichte by his deduction of the compound nature of humanity as a condition of rational agency. But, from the standpoint of the deliberating agent herself, this deduction is not sufficient. The harmony of nature and freedom is, for Fichte, a desideratum of practical rationality, and so must be addressed as such. Fichte's argument at this point is that a further perspective on oneself must be at least implicit in the moral outlook of a deliberating agent in order for this harmony to be attained on a practical level. This is because the harmony that is achieved at the deliberative level is occasional, temporary, and fundamentally uncertain. The required perspective turns out to be religious faith, the idea that the ‘infinite task’ of morality is eternally realized in divine reason, or that there is a ‘moral world order’ in which nature and freedom are reconciled.     

Estimating Trait and Situational Variance in a Situational Judgment Test

In organizational research, situational judgment tests (SJTs) consistently demonstrate incremental validity, yet our theoretical understanding of SJTs is limited. Our knowledge could be advanced by decomposing the variance of SJT items into trait variance and situation variance; we do that by applying statistical methods used to analyze multitrait–multimethod matrices. A college-student sample (N = 2,747) was administered an SJT of goal orientation traits (i.e., mastery, performance-approach, and performance-avoid). Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the proportions of item variance to attributable to situational differences (across students) and to trait-based differences in students (across situations). Situation factors accounted for over three times the amount of variance as did individual difference factors. We conclude with general implications for the design of SJTs in organizational research.     

When the past becomes history: effects of temporal order on explanations of trends

When people are asked to ‘explain’ a time series consisting of population statistics, they will suggest factors responsible for later events rather than for earlier events. This is shown in Experiment 1 for pairs of events and in Experiment 2 for triads of events with one deviant member. When the deviant statistic is the most recent one, it will in most cases be singled out for explanation. When it comes first, it is rarely explained, but accepted as a given fact. This is seen as an instance of the temporal order effect, where the first event in a pair or a series is taken for granted, whereas later events are considered more ‘mutable’, i.e. they could have been different. In line with this, later statistics are considered to be more in need of support from additional information than earlier statistics (Experiment 3). The focus on temporally later events can be distinguished from other primacy and recency effects by being due to chronological order, rather than order of presentation. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The evolution of explanations of a perceptual phenomenon: a case history using the Ternus effect

The Ternus effect involves a multi-element stimulus that can lead to either of two different percepts of apparent movement depending upon a variety of stimulus conditions. Since Ternus's 1926 discussion of this phenomenon, many researchers have attempted to explain it. We examine the history of explanations of the Ternus effect and show that they have evolved to contemporary theoretical positions that are very similar to Ternus's own ideas. Additionally, we describe a new experiment showing that theoretical positions that emphasize element grouping and element identity within groups can predict the effects of certain stimulus manipulations on the Ternus effect.     

Situational factors in meaning

Summary Our hypothesis:The meaning of a word experienced by the speaker/ listener using this word depends, in part, on the cognition of the situation in which the sentence is uttered. In order to test this hypothesis drawings showing two persons each were selected; the persons had been rated on the Semantic Differential as being high (or low) on one of the dimensions of Activity, Potency, or Evaluation, and medium on the two other dimensions. In the next step, 36 Ss rated on the Semantic Differential the verb of a short utterance (e.g. ich bitte dich) shown as being spoken by one person of the drawing to the other person. The same words were rated in isolation.Result:The connotative meaning of an utterance (as assessed by the SD) is determined not less by the persons perceived in verbal communication than by what is being said. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

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Zusammenfassung Nach unserer Ausgangshypothese hängt die Bedeutung eines Wortes, das ein Sprecher/Hörer verwendet, mit davon ab, wie dieser Sprecher/ Hörer die Situation kognitiv erfaßt, in welcher das Wort geäußert wird. Zur Prüfung dieser Hypothese wurden Zeichungen ausgesucht, auf denen jeweils zwei Personen zu sehen waren. Diese Personen waren auf dem Semantischen Differential eingestuft worden und zeigten hohe (oder niedere) Werte auf einer der drei Dimensionen Aktivität, Potenz bzw. Valenz, und mittlere Werte auf den beiden anderen Dimensionen. Im nächsten Abschnitt des Versuchs stuften 36 Vpn. das Verb eines kurzen Satzes (z. B. ich bitte dich), der in der Zeichung als von einer Person zur anderen gesprochen dargestellt wurde, ebenfalls auf dem SD ein. Die gleichen Wörter wurden dann noch isoliert eingestuft.Ergebnis: Die konnotative Bedeutung einer Äußerung scheint mindestens so sehr davon determiniert zu werden, wie man Sprecher/Hörer auffaßt, als von einer dem Wort sozusagen inhärenten Bedeutung.

     

Topological explanations and robustness in biological sciences

This paper argues that besides mechanistic explanations, there is a kind of explanation that relies upon “topological” properties of systems in order to derive the explanandum as a consequence, and which does not consider mechanisms or causal processes. I first investigate topological explanations in the case of ecological research on the stability of ecosystems. Then I contrast them with mechanistic explanations, thereby distinguishing the kind of realization they involve from the realization relations entailed by mechanistic explanations, and explain how both kinds of explanations may be articulated in practice. The second section, expanding on the case of ecological stability, considers the phenomenon of robustness at all levels of the biological hierarchy in order to show that topological explanations are indeed pervasive there. Reasons are suggested for this, in which “neutral network” explanations are singled out as a form of topological explanation that spans across many levels. Finally, I appeal to the distinction of explanatory regimes to cast light on a controversy in philosophy of biology, the issue of contingence in evolution, which is shown to essentially involve issues about realization.