The covering law model of historical explanation

It is often argued (as by Hempel and Nagel) that genuine historical explanations — if these are to be had — must exhibit a connection between events to be explained and universal or probabilistic laws (or ‘hypotheses'). This connection may take either a ‘strong’ or ‘weak’ form. The historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained is a logical consequence of statements of reasonably well‐confirmed universal laws and occurrences linked by the laws to the event to be explained. Or the historian may show that a statement of the event to be explained has high inductive probability conferred upon it given statements of reasonably well‐confirmed probabilistic laws and occurrences so linked by the laws to the type of event to be explained that one finds the occurrence of the particular event likely. This essay focuses on ‘strong’ explanations which meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement (for reasons given in the body of the article). It is argued that explanations in history (at least where it is plausible to construe them as ‘non‐rational') may meet a ‘deducibility’ requirement and count as genuine historical explanations although they do not meet a ‘covering law’ requirement (i. e. none of the premises of these explanations state universal or probabilistic hypotheses). It is required, however, that at least one premise in such explanations assert a reasonably well‐confirmed condition (e. g., a co‐variation) which can be taken as a sign or indication of the presence of laws. Rather than appealing to laws, the historian may appeal to the well‐founded possibility of laws.     

Why Friedman's non-monotonic reasoning defies Hempel's covering law model

In this paper we will show that Hempel's covering law model can't deal very well with explanations that are based on incomplete knowledge. In particular the symmetry thesis, which is an important aspect of the covering law model, turns out to be problematic for these explanations. We will discuss an example of an electric circuit, which clearly indicates that the symmetry of explanation and prediction does not always hold. It will be argued that an alternative logic for causal explanation is needed. And we will investigate to what extent non-monotonic epistemic logic can provide such an alternative logical framework. Finally we will show that our non-monotonic logical analysis of explanation is not only suitable for simple cases such as the electric circuit, but that it also sheds new light on more controversial causal explanations such as Milton Friedman's explanation of the business cycle.We gratefully acknowledge the helpful suggestions and critical comments of Johan van Benthem, Bert Hamminga, Kevin Hoover, Theo Kuipers, and Rick Looyen.     

Elimination problems in logic: a brief history

A common aim of elimination problems for languages of logic is to express the entire content of a set of formulas of the language, or a certain part of it, in a way that is more elementary or more informative. We want to bring out that as the languages for logic grew in expressive power and, at the same time, our knowledge of their expressive limitations also grew, elimination problems in logic underwent some change. For languages other than that for monadic second-order logic, there remain important open problems.     

Natural law and history in Locke's theory of distributive justice

According to the tradition of natural law justice is inherent to, and should always be observed in, all interpersonal relations: the science of natural law is nothing more or less than the expression of such principles of justice. The theoretical peculiarities that crop up regarding the lawfulness of appropriation are determined by the indirect interpersonal relations that take place within the process of appropriation: though appropriation is an action directed not towards another person or his property, but towards tangible external goods, this action may have important consequences for other people. Therefore Locke's theory of appropriation is a theory of justice.Locke's solution is made possible by the methodological improvement which allows a clear separation between the natural law and the historical and empirical conditions of its application: this improvement is a consequence of the distinction between modes and substances established in Locke's Essay.Locke's theory can be considered an extensive re-elaboration, in polemic against Filmer, of the anti-monopolistic principle characteristic of the whole of Scholastic social thought: this principle is intimately connected with the principle of man's natural liberty.Locke maintains a negative and formal conception of justice: justice prohibits interference with others' liberty of appropriation. Alongside the justice is the positive and conditional obligation of charity which prescribes the transfer of some of one's own goods to others who need them in order to survive. But for Locke there are precise limits on the obligation of charity: the application of charity suspends the application of justice only when the immediate physical survival is at stake; in all other cases justice leaves no room for charity.The Lockian negative conception of justice, which allows unlimited liberty of appropriation, is dependent on the empirical and historical condition of the incommensurability of the main resource. The widespread use of money acts as an accelerating element in the process of exhaustion of the incommensurability of land-resources but, at the same time, it renders self-preservation and appropriation almost completely independent of the natural environment. Money creates an infinite number of opportunities for the outlay of labour irrespective of the availability of land, that is, it renders labour the principal resource of the civilized world, and labour is an incommensurable and infinitely reproducible resource. The incommensurability of the labour resource thus supports the Lockian theory of negative distributive justice; but over the Lockian solution already loomed the threatening shadow of pauperism.The subject of this essay is further dealt with in my book on Locke's political and social philosophy Nel crepuscolo della probabilitá, Bibliopolis, Napoli, 1983. There I develop further the interpretation of Locke's theory of justice presented here and analyse his theoretical and historical presuppositions.     

The evolution of explanations of a perceptual phenomenon: a case history using the Ternus effect

The Ternus effect involves a multi-element stimulus that can lead to either of two different percepts of apparent movement depending upon a variety of stimulus conditions. Since Ternus's 1926 discussion of this phenomenon, many researchers have attempted to explain it. We examine the history of explanations of the Ternus effect and show that they have evolved to contemporary theoretical positions that are very similar to Ternus's own ideas. Additionally, we describe a new experiment showing that theoretical positions that emphasize element grouping and element identity within groups can predict the effects of certain stimulus manipulations on the Ternus effect.     

Situational factors in meaning

Summary Our hypothesis:The meaning of a word experienced by the speaker/ listener using this word depends, in part, on the cognition of the situation in which the sentence is uttered. In order to test this hypothesis drawings showing two persons each were selected; the persons had been rated on the Semantic Differential as being high (or low) on one of the dimensions of Activity, Potency, or Evaluation, and medium on the two other dimensions. In the next step, 36 Ss rated on the Semantic Differential the verb of a short utterance (e.g. ich bitte dich) shown as being spoken by one person of the drawing to the other person. The same words were rated in isolation.Result:The connotative meaning of an utterance (as assessed by the SD) is determined not less by the persons perceived in verbal communication than by what is being said. The theoretical implications of these results are discussed.

---

Zusammenfassung Nach unserer Ausgangshypothese hängt die Bedeutung eines Wortes, das ein Sprecher/Hörer verwendet, mit davon ab, wie dieser Sprecher/ Hörer die Situation kognitiv erfaßt, in welcher das Wort geäußert wird. Zur Prüfung dieser Hypothese wurden Zeichungen ausgesucht, auf denen jeweils zwei Personen zu sehen waren. Diese Personen waren auf dem Semantischen Differential eingestuft worden und zeigten hohe (oder niedere) Werte auf einer der drei Dimensionen Aktivität, Potenz bzw. Valenz, und mittlere Werte auf den beiden anderen Dimensionen. Im nächsten Abschnitt des Versuchs stuften 36 Vpn. das Verb eines kurzen Satzes (z. B. ich bitte dich), der in der Zeichung als von einer Person zur anderen gesprochen dargestellt wurde, ebenfalls auf dem SD ein. Die gleichen Wörter wurden dann noch isoliert eingestuft.Ergebnis: Die konnotative Bedeutung einer Äußerung scheint mindestens so sehr davon determiniert zu werden, wie man Sprecher/Hörer auffaßt, als von einer dem Wort sozusagen inhärenten Bedeutung.

     

Topological explanations and robustness in biological sciences

This paper argues that besides mechanistic explanations, there is a kind of explanation that relies upon “topological” properties of systems in order to derive the explanandum as a consequence, and which does not consider mechanisms or causal processes. I first investigate topological explanations in the case of ecological research on the stability of ecosystems. Then I contrast them with mechanistic explanations, thereby distinguishing the kind of realization they involve from the realization relations entailed by mechanistic explanations, and explain how both kinds of explanations may be articulated in practice. The second section, expanding on the case of ecological stability, considers the phenomenon of robustness at all levels of the biological hierarchy in order to show that topological explanations are indeed pervasive there. Reasons are suggested for this, in which “neutral network” explanations are singled out as a form of topological explanation that spans across many levels. Finally, I appeal to the distinction of explanatory regimes to cast light on a controversy in philosophy of biology, the issue of contingence in evolution, which is shown to essentially involve issues about realization.     

Research traditions and evolutionary explanations in medicine

In this article, I argue that distinguishing ‘evolutionary’ from ‘Darwinian’ medicine will help us assess the variety of roles that evolutionary explanations can play in a number of medical contexts. Because the boundaries of evolutionary and Darwinian medicine overlap to some extent, however, they are best described as distinct ‘research traditions’ rather than as competing paradigms. But while evolutionary medicine does not stand out as a new scientific field of its own, Darwinian medicine is united by a number of distinctive theoretical and methodological claims. For example, evolutionary medicine and Darwinian medicine can be distinguished with respect to the styles of evolutionary explanations they employ. While the former primarily involves ‘forward looking’ explanations, the latter depends mostly on ‘backward looking’ explanations. A forward looking explanation tries to predict the effects of ongoing evolutionary processes on human health and disease in contemporary environments (e.g., hospitals). In contrast, a backward looking explanation typically applies evolutionary principles from the vantage point of humans’ distant biological past in order to assess present states of health and disease. Both approaches, however, are concerned with the prevention and control of human diseases. In conclusion, I raise some concerns about the claim that ‘nothing in medicine makes sense except in the light of evolution’.     

Alignable and nonalignable differences in causal explanations

Prior research indicates that people may base their causal explanations on distinctive features between an event and a contrasting background instance in which the event did not occur. Research on similarity judgments suggests that there are two types of distinctive features: alignable differences, which are corresponding characteristics of a pair, and nonalignable differences, which are characteristics of one item for which there are no corresponding characteristics in the other. In three experiments, the hypothesis that people's evaluations of causal explanations vary as a function of feature alignment was examined. The results suggest that people will rate explanations differently on the basis of alignable or nonalignable differences, depending on the type of the event, and that alignability depends on the relational structure among the features of the event.     

Viewing-as explanations and ontic dependence

Philosophical Studies - According to a widespread view in metaphysics and philosophy of science (the “Dependence Thesis”), all explanations involve relations of ontic dependence between...