Confirmation holism and semantic holism

Fodor and Lepore, in their recent book Holism, maintain that if an inference from semantic anatomism to semantic holism is allowed, certain fairly deleterious consequences follow. In Section 1 Fodor and Lepore's terminology is construed and amended where necessary with the result that the aforementioned deleterious consequences are neither so apparent nor straightforward as they had suggested. In Section 2 their Argument A is considered in some detail. In Section 3 their argument attributed to Quine is examined at length and a shorter and more perspicacious argument suggested which avoids their charge that the Quinean argument is guilty of an equivocation on the word statement.     

Two notions of holism

Synthese - A simple argument proposes a direct link between realism about quantum mechanics and one kind of metaphysical holism: if elementary quantum theory is at least approximately true, then...     

Quine and Davidson on Language,Thought and Reality

Books reviewed: Hans‐Johann Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality. Cambridge University Press, 2003; xi + 311 pp. £45.00, $60.00 (hardcover).
Reviewed by Dale Jacquette, The Pennsylvania State University
Department of Philosophy
The Pennsylvania State University
246 Sparks Building
University Park, PA 16802 / USA
dlj4@psu.edu
http://www.personal.psu.edu/dlj4/     

Structural realism and Davidson

Structural realism is an attempt to balance the competing demands of the No Miracles Argument and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. In this paper I trace the development of the structuralist idea through the work of one of its leading advocates, John Worrall. I suggest that properly thought through what the structuralist is offering or should be offering is not an account of how to divide up a theory into two parts—structure and ontology—but (perhaps surprisingly) a certain kind of theory of meaning—semantic holism. I explain how a version of structural realism can be developed using Davidson’s theory of meaning and some advantages this has over the Ramsey-sentence version of structuralism.     

On Davidson and interpretation

Davidson's theory of interpretation, I argue, is vulnerable to a number of significant difficulties, difficulties which can be avoided or resolved by the more Quinean approach which I develop. In Section 1 I note difficulties which apply to T-theories but are avoided by translation manuals. In Section 2 I show how to construct what I call T-manuals, which are like T-theories in requiring Tarskian structure, but like translation manuals in avoiding the difficulties discussed in Section 1. In Section 3 I show that the approach using T-manuals does at least as well as Davidson's with respect to a number of other concerns of his. In Section 4 I show that it does better than Davidson's with respect to reporting interpretations, especially where demonstrative utterances are concerned. In Section 5 I argue for (somewhat modified) Quinean empirical constraints, which go with manuals, as superior to the empirical constraints Davidson imposes, which go with T-theories. In Section 6 I show that Davidson is unable to offer an adequate account of what an interpreter knows; and propose a more acceptable theory of language mastery which gives a central role to the requirement that the interpreter's language usage satisfy the refined and amplified Quinean empirical constraints of Section 5.I wish to thank Susan Haack for her help in turning a draft into the present paper.     

Davidson on the Identity Theory

Abstract

… if we bear well in mind the scope of our senses and what it is exactly that reaches our faculty of thinking by way of them, we must admit that in no case are the ideas of things presented to us by the senses just as we form them in our thinking. So much so that there is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to the mind or the faculty of thinking, with the sole exception of those circumstances which relate to experience, such as the fact that we judge that this or that idea which we now have immediately before our mind refers to a certain thing situated outside us. We make such a judgment not because these things transmit the ideas to our mind through the sense organs, but because they transmit something which, at exactly that moment, gives the mind occasion to form these ideas by means of the faculty innate to it. Nothing reaches our mind from external objects through the sense organs except certain corporeal motions… in accordance with my own principles. But neither the motions themselves nor the figures arising from them are conceived by us exactly as they occur in the sense organs, as I have explained at length in my Optics. Hence it follows that the very ideas of the motions themselves and of the figures are innate in us. The ideas of pains, colors, sounds and the like must be all the more innate if, on the occasion of certain corporeal motions, our mind is to be capable of representing them to itself, for there is no similarity between these ideas and the corporeal motions.     

To Flourish or Languish,that is the question: Exploring the mental health profiles of Danish elite athletes

ObjectivesThe purpose of this study was (a) to investigate mental well-being and the prevalence of anxiety and depressive symptoms in Danish male and female elite athletes, (b) to identify latent profiles in athletes based on their mental health and ill health, and (c) to examine whether the different profiles vary in selected protective and risk factors concerning mental health.MethodsA total of 612 Danish athletes (M = 18.99, SD = 4.29) from 18 different sports completed an online version of the Holistic Athlete Mental Health Survey that assessed well-being, depression, and anxiety together with potential risk and protective factors (e.g., injuries, stress, sleep, social support, sport environment).ResultsOverall, 13.9% of athletes reported moderate or severe anxiety symptoms while 21.1% reported moderate or severe depressive symptoms. Female athletes had a significantly higher prevalence of anxiety and depressive symptoms and lower mental well-being scores than male athletes. Through a latent profile analysis, three distinctive mental health profiles (flourishing, moderate mental health, languishing) were discovered. MANOVA following Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed substantial differences between these profiles regarding their perception of social support, sport environment, and stressors from different life domains.Conclusions: Danish elite athletes display similar levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms as the Danish general population. Flourishing athletes report lower stress levels, receive higher support from the private and sport domain, and perceive their sport environment as more supportive than athletes who are languishing. A tailored approach is proposed to support athletes' mental health.