I. Frege and the rise of analytic philosophy∗

Since the beginning of the ‘eighties of the present century, a circle of relatively young American sociologists who are followers of Jeffrey Alexander are making energetic and spectacular efforts to supply sociology with a uniform and comprehensive theoretical framework by continuing Talcott Parsons' lifework. The present article is an appreciation of Alexander's achievements in the justification of a general sociological theory (especially a theory of action and social order) while pointing to objections that can be raised against the character of his theory. A scrutiny of Alexander's metatheoretical deliberations and of his interpretations of sociological classics such as Marx, Durkheim, Weber, and Parsons reveals that Alexander's metatheoretical frame is not flexible enough to actually reconstruct the problem situation of the classics. Pointers are given toward a theory of action that is not subject to the antinomy of utilitarianism and normativism, so that it is more adequate and appropriate to the heritage of the sociological classics, both from a theoretical and an interpretative angle.     

Parallel,additional or alternative histories of philosophy? Questions on the theory and methodology of the history of philosophy

ABSTRACT

Methodologies and theories for writing histories of philosophy are particularly relevant today due to the abounding challenges to the discipline that have emerged: e.g. the problem concerning the precise mode of the inclusion of non-Western philosophies in the history of philosophy, the response to postcolonial considerations at large, the transformative impact of new media and the question whether the history of philosophy is primarily a philosophical, rather than merely historical, enterprise. À propos the relative scarcity that is to be witnessed in explicit articulations of methodologies and theories for writing histories of philosophy, in this note I focus on certain spontaneous, rather than theoretically planned, responses that have emerged to the above challenges – in particular, Peter Adamson’s History of Philosophy without any gaps – and in conclusion, as an example of methodological development, I touch on some of the problems we encounter in the case of the inclusion of Byzantine philosophy in the history of philosophy.     

Art history, the problem of style, and Arnold Hauser’s contribution to the history and sociology of knowledge

Much of Arnold Hauser??s work on the social history of art and the philosophy of art history is informed by a concern for the cognitive dimension of art. The present paper offers a reconstruction of this aspect of Hauser??s project and identifies areas of overlap with the sociology of knowledge??where the latter is to be understood as both a separate discipline and a going intellectual concern. Following a discussion of Hauser??s personal and intellectual background, as well as of the shifting political and academic setting of his work, the paper addresses one of Hauser??s central questions, viz. how best to square a thoroughgoing commitment to the social nature of art with the reality of successive artistic styles, given that the latter seem to be characterizable on purely formal grounds. This is followed by a discussion of Hauser??s conflicted views on the relation between art, science, and technology. This injects a tension into Hauser??s work, due to his initial reluctance to explain just how the aesthetic and the cognitive realms relate. The final part of the paper, through a closer examination of the analogies and disanalogies that Hauser sees between art history and the history of science, attempts to give a positive answer????on Hauser??s behalf??, as it were??to the question of whether art may be credited with a specific cognitive dimension of its own, and if so, what its contribution to our cognitive enterprise may consist in.     

Hegel’s spirit,Marxist aesthetics and Stalinist restoration: the tragic philosophy of history of Mikhail Lifshits

The article focuses on one highly idiosyncratic trait of Lifshits’ reading of Hegel, namely his assertion that the epoch of Restoration during which Hegel produced his main works was analogous to the period of the 1930s in the USSR. In both cases, “constructive” tasks came to the fore as the fermentation of the revolutionary era waned. On this assumption, Lifshits built up his idea of a Restauratio magna, which should serve as the guiding star of cultural politics. In fact, Lifshits came very near to rehabilitating of Edmund Burke’s views about the conservation of cultural heritage, which is highly problematic in light of his initial Marxist convictions.     

The curious incident of wisdom in the thought of Feng Qi (1915–1995): comparative philosophy,historical materialism,and metaphysics

After some introductory remarks on the work of the modern Chinese philosopher Feng Qi, I begin this article by providing some observations concerning the ambiguous notion of ‘wisdom’ in Orientalist representations of non-Western thought and in comparative philosophy, as well as on the peculiar form of subjectivity ascribed to the ‘wise’ subject. I then proceed by offering an account of Feng’s philosophical universalism and historical materialist outlook, outlining the identification of wisdom with metaphysics in his early work and exploring the status and function of wisdom in his mature writings. In doing so, I analyze the tension in Feng’s work between the theoretical rationality and systematicity of ‘metaphysics’ on the one hand and the existential and transformative orientation of ‘wisdom’ on the other.     

Variations on da Costa C Systems and dual-intuitionistic logics I. Analyses of C ω and CC ω

Da Costa's C systems are surveyed and motivated, and significant failings of the systems are indicated. Variations are then made on these systems in an attempt to surmount their defects and limitations. The main system to emerge from this effort, system CC , is investigated in some detail, and dual-intuitionistic semantical analyses are developed for it and surrounding systems. These semantics are then adapted for the original C systems, first in a rather unilluminating relational fashion, subsequently in a more illuminating way through the introduction of impossible situations where and and or change roles. Finally other attempts to break out of impasses for the original and expanded C systems, by going inside them, are looked at, and further research directions suggested.I have been much helped through comments and corrections, criticism and proofs, generously offered by Newton da Costa, Chris Mortensen, John Slaney and Igor Urbas. A part of my role is no more than that, not of under-labourer, but of organiser of their results.The paper, still incomplete at the edges, has been a good while in the making. It was first drafted in around 1980 for a Festschrift for Newton da Costa; hence the introductory remarks, which it has since seemed should stand. More recent literature on the C systems will be taken in account in a sequel.     

Self-control of smoking—I. effects of experience with imposed,increasing, decreasing and random delays

A test of a passive self-control training procedure suggested by Skinner was performed. After smoker's tolerance for delay of smoking was assessed, they were exposed to either an increasing, decreasing or random sequence of imposed delay of smoking and were then tested for tolerance to delay. Increasing delay significantly improved subjects' smoking inhibition while decreasing and random sequences had no significant effect. The results are attributed to either frustration extinction or rehearsal of coping responses to the aversiveness of delay.     

Symposium “Analytical Philosophy and Philosophy of Science Today”, 23.–24. Juli 1995 in Peking, VR China

Report on a symposium “Analytical Philosophy of Science today”, July 23–24, 1995, in Beijing. The symposium demonstrates the actual interest and familiarity of Chinese researchers with Western philosophy of science and especially with analytical philosophizing. Main topics were diagnoses of the actual state of the art, discussion and critique of some classics and classical analytical conceptions, application of analytical thinking on hermeneutical problems, and its possible social function. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The arc of the rope swing: humour,poetry, and spirituality in Charlotte’s Web by E. B. White

This essay analyzes the classic American children’s novel, Charlotte’s Web, by E.B. White, which tells of a sophisticated spider’s rescue of a piglet who is being prepared for slaughter. The ‘arc of the rope swing' refers to a rope swing enjoyed by children in the novel; it is also a metaphor for the way White holds opposing forces in tension. Most noteworthy is the tension between poetic language and humour in the novel; White uses both to convey a sense of ultimate goodness and trust-in-being. Poetic language sets a contemplative tone (‘poetic pauses’) and conveys spiritual themes, including delight, wonder at the beauty of the natural world, ‘divine discontent’ (yearning), memento mori, sorrow and hope. In contrast, White’s ‘gracious humour’ is fast-paced and entertaining; it keeps the novel from being too preachy or solemn. His humour includes 1) wordplay (including the juxtaposition of incongruous words and images; dramatic irony; and puns ), 2) comedic characters (Wilbur as lovable buffoon, Charlotte as incisive wisdom figure) and 3) satire (scorn for human gullibility, arrogance and poor treatment of animals). White sharply satirises human arrogance and demonstrates the value of humility (embodied in Charlotte and Wilbur). The article also contains brief summaries of Charlotte's Web and of White's biography, and it concludes with a substantial set of “talking points” for discussing the novel’s spiritual themes with children.     

Affective Honesty and Compassion Come in Many Forms: Discussion of “Love (and Hate) With the Proper Stranger: Affective Honesty and Enactment,” By Holly Levenkron,L.I.C.S.W.

Holly Levenkron's work with her patient, Ali, beautifully illustrates one way that a creative analyst makes superb use of her own experience to communicate and negotiate with great affective honesty. Holly's analytic style emphasizes the effective use of a particular kind of self-disclosure and a way of thinking about intersubjectivity and enactment associated with the contemporary Relational movement. Yet, it may be Holly's personal willingness to allow the analytic relationship to profoundly destabilize and influence her that most engages Ali in their work.

An imaginary analytic scenario is described with an analyst, Dr. X, who like Holly is destabilized by Ali but whose thinking about intersubjectivity and enactment emphasizes an empathic immersion in Ali's experience of the analytic relationship. In contrast to Holly, Dr. X focuses primarily on grasping and interpreting the adaptive strivings that animate Ali's differently organized subjective world.

The underlying capacity to acknowledge and use the analyst's own version of the patient's issues may also characterize analyses such as that of the hypothetical Dr. X—in style that are more explicitly “interpretive” (less confrontative) than Holly's work. These two contrasting approaches highlight the wide range of ways to think about intersubjectivity, enactment, and affective honesty in the analytic process.     

I know you are, but what am I? Self-evaluative consequences of judging in-group and out-group members.

When judging another person, people often spontaneously compare this person with themselves. Six studies examined the self-evaluative consequences of such spontaneous comparisons with in-group versus out-group members. They demonstrate that spontaneous comparisons with in-group members primarily involved the activation of specific individuating knowledge about the self. In particular, knowledge indicating that the self is similar to the judged target was rendered accessible. As a consequence, subsequent self-evaluations that were based on the implications of accessible self-knowledge were assimilated toward in-group targets. Spontaneous comparisons with out-group members, however, primarily involved the activation of more general category knowledge about the self. Specifically, knowledge about judges' membership in a group that distinguished them from the target was rendered accessible. Consequently, self-evaluations were contrasted away from out-group targets.