Nagasawa vs. Nagel: Omnipotence,Pseudo‐Tasks,and a Recent Discussion of Nagel's Doubts About Physicalism1

In his recent “Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument”, Yujin Nagasawa interprets Thomas Nagel as making a certain argument against physicalism and objects that this argument transgresses a principle, laid down by Thomas Aquinas, according to which inability to perform a pseudo‐task does not count against an omnipotence claim. Taking Nagasawa's interpretation of Nagel for granted, I distinguish different kinds of omnipotence claims and different kinds of pseudo‐tasks, and on that basis show that Nagasawa's criticism of Nagel is unsuccessful. I also show how his reflections do nonetheless point to a limitation of the approach he means to criticize.     

Causal Closure,Causal Exclusion,and Supervenience Physicalism

This article considers the recent defense of the supervenience approach to physicalism due to Jaegwon Kim. Kim argues that supervenience supports physical causal closure, and that causal closure supports physicalism – indeed, a kind of reductive physicalism – and thus that supervenience suffices for physicalism. After laying out Kim's argument, I ask whether its success would truly vindicate the role of supervenience in defining physicalist positions. I argue that it would not, and that insofar as Kim's defense of supervenience physicalism succeeds, it does so by showing that supervenience physicalism is not a unique, nonredundant way to be a physicalist.     

Spinoza's Thinking Substance and the Necessity of Modes

How should ‘the physical’ be defined for the purpose of formulating physicalism? In this paper I defend a version of the via negativa according to which a property is physical just in case it is neither fundamentally mental nor possibly realized by a fundamentally mental property. The guiding idea is that physicalism requires functionalism, and thus that being a type identity theorist requires being a realizer‐functionalist. In §1 I motivate my approach partly by arguing against Jessica Wilson's no fundamental mentality constraint. In §2 I set out my preferred definition of ‘the physical’ and make my case that physicalism requires functionalism. In §3 I defend my proposal by attacking the leading alternative account of ‘the physical,’ the theory‐based conception. Finally, in §4 I draw on my definition, together with Jaegwon Kim's account of intertheoretic reduction, to defend the controversial view that physicalism requires a priori physicalism.     

Thomas Bradwardine on God and the Foundations of Modality

Scholars have claimed that the fourteenth-century thinker Thomas Bradwardine held that God's will freely determined what was necessary, possible and impossible and in this regard, he was a medieval precursor to Descartes. In this article, I argue against this interpretation of Bradwardine. I show that Bradwardine held that objects derive their modal status based on whether God's necessary and immutable being isrepugnant or non-repugnant to their existence. I offer readings of thepassages in which Bradwardine appears to state that God's will determines modality that render them consistent with the non-voluntarist interpretation of his modal theory.     

Murakami,Connoisseur of Uncertainty: Commentary on Paper by Thomas Rosbrow

My discussion embroiders around Thomas Rosbrow's view of Murakami as a “trauma analyst.” I highlight the ways in which Murakami's writing reflects his keen sensitivity to existential uncertainty and how he seems to understand trauma, much as I do, as a shattering experience that destroys the certainties that organize psychological life and generates efforts at self restoration. Although I share Rosbrow's view that “After the Quake” depicts a character's awakening from the dissociative manifestations of trauma, I spell out how my perspective on this process differs from his.     

W. I. Thomas,behaviorist ethnologist

Over the course of his academic career in the anthropology wing of the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology and Anthropology, W. I. Thomas rejected the influence of Herbert Spencer, became skeptical of the instinctual explanations for human behavior, and became increasingly Boasian. His study of Polish peasant acculturation to American cities is Boasian in its focus on texts and on culture. After his dismissal by the University of Chicago in 1918 Thomas was influenced by John B. Watson. In the national interdisciplinary conferences of the 1920s, Thomas was an advocate for behaviorism and critical of Freudian doctrines and other subjectivist approaches to human science. Recalling Thomas's behaviorism and his long-running interest in comparing cross-cultural data should call into question the enlistment of Thomas as a father of subjectivist traditions of symbolic interactionism.     

Problems with the ‘physical’ in physicalism

Hempel's Dilemma is a challenge that has to be met by any formulation of physicalism that specifies the physical by reference to a particular physical theory. It poses the problem that if one's specification of the physical is ‘current’ physical theory, then the physicalism which depends on it is false because current physics is false; and if the specification of the physical is a future or an ideal physics, the physicalism based on it would be trivial as it would be tautologously true, or because very little (if anything at all) can be inferred from or about a physics that does not yet exist. I review the reasons for thinking that the dilemma is a perpetual problem for currentist specifications of the physical, then introduce the argument that the standard positions on the specification question are wanting because they lack a generality which physicalism is generally accepted to have. I end with a suggestion for a way forward for physicalism.     

Saint Thomas Aquinas's Pagan Virtues?

Today's conversations in virtue ethics are enflamed with questions of “pagan virtues,” which often designate non‐Christian virtue from a Christian perspective. “Pagan virtues,” “pagan vices,” and their historied interpretations are the subject of Jennifer Herdt's book Putting On Virtue: The Legacy of the Splendid Vices (2008). I argue that the questions and language animating Herdt's book are problematic. I offer an alternative strategy to Herdt's for reading Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae. My results are twofold: (1) a different set of conclusions and questions regarding the moral life that lend a fresh perspective to “pagan virtues” and (2) corresponding methodological suggestions for improving Herdt's project that would, to my mind, reaffirm her normative conclusions regarding the most viable ways forward for contemporary discussions of virtue.     

Ronald Thiemann, Thomas Torrance and Epistemological Doctrines of Revelation

Abstract: Ronald Thiemann goes against the grain of much recent theology in arguing that the Christian doctrine of revelation is worth believing and defending, but he finds most modern expressions and defences of it to be fatally infected with epistemological foundationalism. He criticizes the foundationalism of Thomas F. Torrance; in its place he offers a coherentist account and defence of the doctrine of revelation. In this article I look closely at some of the distinctly theological strengths and weaknesses of Thiemann's coherentism and Torrance's foundationalism. I argue that Thiemann's understanding of foundationalism is fraught with ambiguity and his dismissal of it somewhat premature. I argue further that his coherentism produces problems that make it less than ideally suited for a doctrine of revelation, and I suggest that the modest foundationalism of Torrance is a much stronger position.     

Thomas More on the Sadness of Christ: From Mystagogy to Martyrdom

Thomas More presents us with a wonderful example of martyrological exegesis where his exegetical work was intended to inspire his readers to live the virtues, to follow Christ, and to provide consolation amidst tribulation. Such exegesis aimed to aid the reader to live the martyrdom required in ordinary life and beyond that, if necessary, with mental anguish, physical torture, and even death on behalf of Christ. Before examining More's work, I first situate this discussion within the broader conversation concerning modern biblical interpretation‐ in particular the notion of senses of Scripture ‐ therein explaining how I shall be using terms like mystagogy and martyrdom in this article. I shall then examine More's spiritual exegesis of Jesus' passion narratives, paying particular attention to the agony in the garden. I shall conclude with a look at the saint's life, which provides a background for his interpretation of Scripture.     

Realization and the metaphysics of mind1

According to a familiar view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are realized by physical states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called realization physicalism. But what is realization? I argue that recent approaches to realization, represented by Carl Gillett's ‘dimensioned’ view, fail to acknowledge some textbook cases of realization. I also argue Gillett's account in particular admits realization relations that should not count if realization physicalism is to be distinguished from its competitors in the usual ways. I offer my own account of realization, and argue that it is superior not only in passing the above tests but also in its utility for answering questions about multiple realizability.     

A Fuller Account: The Role of ‘Fittingness’ in Thomas Aquinas' Development of the Doctrine of the Atonement

This article draws attention to Thomas Aquinas' under‐appreciated development of the doctrine of the atonement. I argue that Thomas' pursuit of the ‘fittingness’ of the passion yields an exceptional grasp of the multiplicity of effects accomplished by Christ's death. To defend this thesis, I explore the methodology underlying Thomas' approach to the atonement, contrasting it with that of Anselm. I then follow the implications of Thomas' methodology in his stance toward the diverse atonement theories of his day. In conclusion, I briefly note the significance of Thomas' method and conclusions for contemporary debates concerning the efficacy of Christ's passion.     

On the causal role of privation in Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics

“Privation” (privatio) is defined by Thomas Aquinas as the want of some property in a subject that ought naturally to possess that property. In this paper, I explicate the ontological status of privation as a form of nonbeing in order to shed light on the challenging question whether privation, as a kind of absence, can play a causal role for Aquinas, and if so, how. According to Aquinas, I argue, privations in a subject serve to determine what sort of (efficient) causal relations that subject can enter into, but, as nonbeings, privations cannot be the cause of the subject's entering into those relations, and in this way, they cannot be efficient causes of effects distinct from the subject.     

Color and Similarity1

Similarity claims about the colors, for instance that blue is more similar to purple than to yellow, are Sometimes held to pose a serious problem for physicalism about color: the view that colors are physical properties of some kind. I examine various responses to this problem, find them wanting, and give my own solution, which appeals to the way colors are visually represented. Finally, I argue that the proposed account removes the principal motivation for Lewis's and Walker's response to Kripke's Wittgenstein, in terms of “natural” properties.     

Thomas Cranmer's Register: Little Understood and Unpublished

Abstract

Thomas Cranmer's register in Lambeth Palace Library is a document which is little understood and as yet unpublished. Episcopal registers trace the work of bishops and archbishops in their dioceses and provinces. As such, they are fundamental primary source documents. In a series of two articles, the author will first examine the composition and history of use of Thomas Cranmer's register and then, in a second article to be published in the next issue of this journal (RRR 7.1), set the contents of the register in the context of modern historical scholarship. This article fulfils the first of these two aims.     

Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together

Though physicalism remains the most popular position in the metaphysics of mind today, there is still considerable debate over how to retain a plausible account of mental concepts consistently with a physicalistic world view. Philip Goff (Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89(2), 191–209, 2011) has recently argued that physicalism cannot give a plausible account of our phenomenal concepts, and that as such, physicalism should be rejected. In this paper I hope to do three things, firstly I shall use some considerations from ontology to rebut Goff’s argument and consider some objections and replies. Secondly, I shall outline a version of a posteriori physicalism about phenomenal consciousness which draws on this particular ontology. Thirdly, I shall give support to this version of physicalism by arguing that it marries well with prominent theories in cognitive science, and has important advantages over other versions of a posteriori physicalism.     

Plato,Thomas and the Daring Ethics of Friendship

Abstract

Fergus Kerr observed that Thomas Aquinas inaugurates a new way of doing Christian ethics focused on human flourishing. It is based on a daring model of Christian friendship that has, though, found little success. Why? Because it stems from Aristotle's model of friendship which is, in turn, based upon self-love and exclusivity. Augustine, in particular, is a figure who portrays such friendship as antithetical to God's selfless and universal love: friendship, for him, needs to be ‘triangulated’ in divine love. However, Thomas suggests charity as friendship because he recognizes that friendship is the best ‘school of love’ for human beings: within the ambivalences of friendship, Christians can practise the habits of divine love so that it becomes an overarching principle in their lives. But, there is an irony in Thomas turning to Aristotle for a model of love that embraces rather than transcends human experience, since Aristotle too cannot quite shake off a vision of the ideal life that is uneasy with friendship. For that, we must turn to the work of Plato on friendship, in his dialogue the Lysis, which not only offers a model of friendship wholly committed to it as a school of love, philosophy and the good life, but does so recognizing the ‘in between’ status of human beings similar to that with which Thomas was concerned.     

Whistles,bells, and cogs in machines: Thomas Huxley and epiphenomenalism

In this paper I try to shed some historical light upon the doctrine of epiphenomenalism, by focusing on the version of epiphenomenalism championed by Thomas Huxley, which is often treated as a classic statement of the doctrine. I argue that it is doubtful if Huxley held any form of metaphysical epiphenomenalism, and that he held a more limited form of empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness but not with respect to mentality per se. Contrary to what is conventionally supposed, Huxley's empirical epiphenomenalism with respect to consciousness was not simply based upon the demonstration of the neurophysiological basis of conscious mentality, or derived from the extension of mechanistic and reflexive principles of explanation to encompass all forms of animal and human behavior, but was based upon the demonstration of purposive and coordinated animal and human behavior in the absence of consciousness. Given Huxley's own treatment of mentality, his characterization of animals and humans as “conscious automata” was not well chosen. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Truth as transcendental in Thomas Aquinas

Aquinas presents his most complete exposition of the transcendentals inDe veritate 1, 1, that deals with the question “What is truth?”. The thesis of this paper is that the question of truth is essential for the understanding of his doctrine of the transcendentals. The first part of the paper (sections 1–4) analyzes Thomas's conception of truth. Two approaches to truth can be found in his work. The first approach, based on Aristotle's claim that “truth is not in things but in the mind”, leads to the idea that the proper place of truth is in the intellect. The second approach is ontological: Thomas also acknowledges that there is truth in every being. The famous definition of truth as “adequation of thing and intellect” enables him to integrate the two approaches. Truth is a relation between two terms, both of which can be called “true” because both are essential for the conformity between thing and intellect. The second part of the paper (sections 5–7) deals with the manner in which Thomas gives truth a place in the doctrine of the transcendentals, and shows that his conception of truth leads to important innovations in this doctrine: the introduction of relational transcendentals and the correlation between spirit and being. If “truth” is transcendental, it must be convertible with “being”. Sect. 6 discusses objections that Thomas advances himself to this convertibility. Sect. 7 deals with a difficulty in his account of truth as a relational transcendental. Ontological truth expresses a relation to an intellect but the relation to the human intellect is accidental for the truth of things. Essential for their truth can only be a practical intellect that causes things. In this way, Thomas argues, the divine intellect relates to all things.