What Does Heidegger Mean by the Transcendence of Dasein?

Abstract

In this paper, I shall examine the evolution of Heidegger’s concept of ‘transcendence’ as it appears in Being and Time (1927), ‘On the Essence of Ground’ (1928) and related texts from the late 1920s in relation to his rethinking of subjectivity and intentionality. Heidegger defines Being as ‘transcendence’ in Being and Time and reinterprets intentionality in terms of the transcendence of Dasein. In the critical epistemological tradition of philosophy stemming from Kant, as in Husserl, transcendence and immanence are key notions (see Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, 1907, and Ideas I, 1913). Indeed, ‘transcendence in immanence’ is a leitmotif of Husserl’s phenomenology. Husserl discusses transcendence in some detail in Cartesian Meditations §11 in a manner that is not dissimilar to Heidegger. Heidegger is critical of Husserl’s understanding of consciousness and intentionality and Heidegger deliberately chooses to discuss transcendence as an exceptional domain for the discussion of beings in his ‘On the Essence of Ground’, his submission to Husserl’s seventieth-birthday Festschrift. Despite his championing of a new concept of transcendence in the late 1920s, Heidegger effectively abandons the term during the early 1930s. In this paper, I shall explore Heidegger’s articulation of his new ontological conception of finite transcendence and compare it with Husserl’s conception of the transcendence of the ego in order to get clearer what is at stake in Heidegger’s conceptions of subjectivity, Dasein and transcendence.     

What Does it Mean to call God Good?

Contemporary expositions of God's goodness commonly err either (1) by subjecting God to moral laws, which is to question His sovereignty, or (2) by failing to establish that God will always act in accordance with moral principles, which removes the theist's ability to appeal to God's goodness in response to problems of evil. Current attempts at intermediate positions which avoid these two problems fall short. In this paper, I aim to construct a better intermediate position and account of God's goodness. I do this by claiming that God's ability to create is best explained in terms of God's self-love. Since God, as the greatest possible being, must be able to create, He must love Himself. I argue that this in turn entails that God loves all things, since by loving Himself, God loves the pre-existent ideas of everything that will come to exist, and by extension the things themselves. This, I argue, allows us to have confidence that God will act in accordance with moral principles, but without subjecting Him to moral laws.     

What Was Abstract Art? (From the Point of View of Heidegger)

To understand and begin to answer the question of this article, I compare Heidegger's position to Hegel's, since the two appear structurally similar and Heidegger is explicitly indebted to Hegel's aesthetics. On the basis of this comparison, I argue that abstract art has the potential to play an important role on Heideggerian grounds. I conclude that modernist art should be understood not as a supplement to the project of self‐realization that characterizes Hegelian freedom but rather as a disruptive event that could potentially challenge the constraining technological mindset that is characteristic of our time.     

What Does “Mind-Wandering” Mean to the Folk? An Empirical Investigation

Although mind-wandering research is rapidly progressing, stark disagreements are emerging about what the term “mind-wandering” means. Four prominent views define mind-wandering as (a) task-unrelated thought, (b) stimulus-independent thought, (c) unintentional thought, or (d) dynamically unguided thought. Although theorists claim to capture the ordinary understanding of mind-wandering, no systematic studies have assessed these claims. Two large factorial studies present participants (N = 545) with vignettes that describe someone's thoughts and ask whether her mind was wandering, while systematically manipulating features relevant to the four major accounts of mind-wandering. Dynamics explains between four and 40 times more variance in participants' mind-wandering judgments than other features. Our third study (N = 153) tests and supports a unique prediction of the dynamic framework—obsessive rumination contrasts with mind-wandering. Our final study (N = 277) used vignettes that resemble mind-wandering experiments. Dynamics had significant and large effects, while task-unrelatedness was nonsignificant. These results strongly suggest that the central feature of mind-wandering is its dynamics.     

Respect for the Dignity of People: What Does This Principle Mean in Practice?

Researchers have found that disrespectful behaviour can have a notable psychological impact on victims and observers thereof. It is not surprising, therefore, that law and all the major psychology codes of ethics acknowledge the principle of respect for the dignity of persons. The practical implications of this principle, however, are not clear. In this article we argue, with reference to the philosophical roots of the principle, that there are rules of manners in all societies that describe how people should demonstrate respect for persons. Generally, the profession cannot require psychologists to adhere to the rules of manners, not even those that demonstrate respect for persons, but it can, and does, prescribe to psychologists how they should act while they practice as psychologists. We proceed to examine the principles and standards of the Australian Psychology Society's Code of Ethics (2007) that require psychologists to demonstrate respect for persons while acting as psychologists.     

What Does the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) Really Measure?

The present study seeks to investigate the extent to which the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II) is successful in discriminating between experiential avoidance/psychological flexibility on the one hand and the supposed outcomes in terms of psychological well-being of having this trait on the other. This was done using exploratory factor analysis on an item pool containing the AAQ-II items, and items designed for the present study to measure distress and acceptance/non-acceptance, to see what factors are identified and on which factor(s) the AAQ-II items had the highest factor loadings. Interestingly, the analysis found the items of the AAQ-II to be more strongly related to items designed to measure distress than items designed to measure acceptance/nonacceptance with minimal references to functional outcomes. The results of the study are interpreted and discussed in relation to the widespread use of the AAQ in both clinical and scientific contexts and given the centrality of the measure in empirically validating the ACT model of psychopathology and treatment.     

What Does it Mean to be a Man Today?: Bloke Culture and the Media

Psychologists have paid scant attention to the positive relationships and community contributions of working class men who are not in trouble, and have focused instead on men who are ‘in trouble.’ In addressing this oversight, we draw on insights from ethnographic observations, life narrative interviews, photographic techniques and media items, which have been compiled by 12 working class men from a shared community of practice in New Zealand. We illustrate how these men often appropriate aspects from contemporary media deliberations regarding what it means to be a man today in order to make sense of their own lives. The implications of participants’ emphasis on friendship, support, familial obligations, and community participation are discussed in relation to the place of working class men in society.     

What Does It Mean to Think Developmentally in Doing Clinical Work?

Thinking developmentally is a theoretically integrative, pluralistic approach to clinical work. It entails working in a fluid, developmentally informed manner. This article fleshes out this kind of thinking and demonstrates the multilayered way it works when looking at case material.     

The Educational Reform Movement: What Does it Mean for Counseling?

Case, C.W., Lanier, J.E., & Miskel, C.G. (1986). The Holmes Group report: Impetus for gaining professional status for teachers. Journal of Teacher Education, 37(4), 36–43.     

What Can Causal Claims Mean?

How can Hume account for the meaning of causal claims? The causal realist, I argue, is, on Hume's view, saying something nonsensical. I argue that both realist and agnostic interpretations of Hume are inconsistent with his view of language and intentionality. But what then accounts for this illusion of meaning? And even when we use causal terms in accordance with Hume’s definitions, we seem merely to be making disguised self-reports. I argue that Hume’s view is not as implausible as it sounds by exploring his conception of language.     

What is an organ? Heidegger and the phenomenology of organ transplantation

This paper investigates the question of what an organ is from a phenomenological perspective. Proceeding from the phenomenology of being-in-the-world developed by Heidegger in Being and Time and subsequent works, it compares the being of the organ with the being of the tool. It attempts to display similarities and differences between the embodied nature of the organs and the way tools of the world are handled. It explicates the way tools belong to the totalities of things of the world that are ready to use and the way organs belong to the totality of a bodily being able to be in this very world. In so doing, the paper argues that while the organ is in some respects similar to a bodily tool, this tool is nonetheless different from the tools of the world in being tied to the organism as a whole, which offers the founding ground of the being of the person. However, from a phenomenological point of view, the line between organs and tools cannot simply be drawn by determining what is inside and outside the physiological borders of the organism. We have, from the beginning of history, integrated technological devices (tools) in our being-in-the-world in ways that make them parts of ourselves rather than parts of the world (more organ- than tool-like), and also, more recently, have started to make our organs more tool-like by visualising, moving, manipulating, and controlling them through medical technology. In this paper, Heidegger’s analysis of organ, tool, and world-making is confronted with this development brought about by contemporary medical technology. It is argued that this development has, to a large extent, changed the phenomenology of the organ in making our bodies more similar to machines with parts that have certain functions and that can be exchanged. This development harbours the threat of instrumentalising our bodily being but also the possibility of curing or alleviating suffering brought about by diseases which disturb and destroy the normal functioning of our organs.     

Increased Proportion of Farm Animal Names Generated by Patients with Alzheimer's Disease: What Does it Mean?

Binetti et al. (1995) reported that patients with Alzheimer's disease (AD) produced fewer semantic clusters than controls on the Animals Fluency task; of the clusters produced, 80% involved farm animals for the patients with AD compared to 40% for controls. In the present study we replicated the finding of Binetti et al.; however, the differential distribution of animal names by subcategory for the patients and controls could be accounted for by differences in the overall output and by assuming that word generation was strictly determined by prototypicality of the animal names. Thus, the increased proportion of farm animal names produced by patients with AD can be accounted for simply by postulating impaired access to semantic memory rather than degraded representations, the idea favored by Binetti et al.     

What Does It Mean That “Space Can Be Transcendental Without the Axioms Being So”?

In 1870, Hermann von Helmholtz criticized the Kantian conception of geometrical axioms as a priori synthetic judgments grounded in spatial intuition. However, during his dispute with Albrecht Krause (Kant und Helmholtz über den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der Raumanschauung und der geometrischen Axiome. Lahr, Schauenburg, 1878), Helmholtz maintained that space can be transcendental without the axioms being so. In this paper, I will analyze Helmholtz’s claim in connection with his theory of measurement. Helmholtz uses a Kantian argument that can be summarized as follows: mathematical structures that can be defined independently of the objects we experience are necessary for judgments about magnitudes to be generally valid. I suggest that space is conceived by Helmholtz as one such structure. I will analyze his argument in its most detailed version, which is found in Helmholtz (Zählen und Messen, erkenntnistheoretisch betrachtet 1887. In: Schriften zur Erkenntnistheorie. Springer, Berlin, 1921, 70–97). In support of my view, I will consider alternative formulations of the same argument by Ernst Cassirer and Otto Hölder.     

What Do We Mean by “The Biology of Menopause”?

Most commonly, the biology of menopause is equated with the biomedical model of menopause. The biomedical model emphasizes the central importance of estrogen and has an overriding focus on disease. A broader-biological model is presented, which emphasizes the role of hormones in healthy functioning. Hormones are team players in complex, multidetermined systems that have a purpose. Hormones act in concert with other physiological systems and with sensory and social inputs. Human biology is both similar to and different from that of other animals. The implications of these assumptions for understanding menopause are discussed, especially the kinds of questions that are asked and the kinds of evidence needed before conclusions are drawn with regard to clinically significant areas. A broader-biological model of menopause provides a framework within which health-related issues can be considered from a perspective that is, on the one hand, more holistic, and on the other hand, more attentive to individual differences.