情感与罗尔斯公共理性再释

个人自主与"强迫自由"之间的紧张是后现代政治哲学所面临的重要困境:一方面,现代政治哲学预设了个体的自由和自主;另一方面,人可能是无知、自私和反复无常的,所以自由的内涵往往被精英们所定义,这种"强迫自由"沦为他治和权威。罗尔斯的公共理性是解决这种困境的一种尝试,他论证了一种不依赖于分歧观念的政治正义观,以此兼顾人的自主与政治的共识。不过,罗尔斯的方案缺乏实践的可行性。本文重新思考情感在公共理性所扮演的角色,从情感角度修正罗尔斯的理论。     

Religious Political Parties and the Limits of Political Liberalism

Political parties have only recently become a subject of investigation in political theory. In this paper I analyse religious political parties in the context of John Rawls’s political liberalism. Rawlsian political liberalism, I argue, overly constrains the scope of democratic political contestation and especially for the kind of contestation channelled by parties. This restriction imposed upon political contestation risks undermining democracy and the development of the kind of democratic ethos that political liberalism cherishes. In this paper I therefore aim to provide a broader and more inclusive understanding of ‘reasonable’ political contestation, able to accommodate those parties (including religious ones) that political liberalism, as customarily understood, would exclude from the democratic realm. More specifically, I first embrace Muirhead and Rosenblum’s (Perspectives on Politics 4: 99–108 2006) idea that parties are ‘bilingual’ links between state and civil society and I draw its normative implications for party politics. Subsequently, I assess whether Rawls’s political liberalism is sufficiently inclusive to allow the presence of parties conveying religious and other comprehensive values. Due to Rawls’s thick conceptions of reasonableness and public reason, I argue, political liberalism risks seriously limiting the number and kinds of comprehensive values which may be channelled by political parties into the public political realm, and this may render it particularly inhospitable to religious political parties. Nevertheless, I claim, Rawls’s theory does offer some scope for reinterpreting the concepts of reasonableness and public reason in a thinner and less restrictive sense and this may render it more inclusive towards religious partisanship.     

Political Correctness: the Twofold Protection of Liberalism

Philosophia - As understood today, political correctness aims at preventing social discrimination by curtailing offensive speech and behaviour towards underprivileged groups of...     

Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples

In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice. This paper explores theoretical ideas I introduced in embryonic form in a paper presented at the International Conference on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, 17–18 May, 2003, Mofid University (Qom, Iran). That paper, “Political Liberalism and Religious Freedom: Asymmetrical Tolerance for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines” (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the conference), addressed specific issues related to religious toleration, but left unexplored theoretical questions regarding the status of decent peoples. I wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on my interpretation of Rawls' international political theory, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar Dahbour, Yasien Ali Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. In addition, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to the Executive Committee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh.     

政治的优先性及其限度——对《政治自由主义》一个理论预设的反思

罗尔斯的《政治自由主义》不仅是只在政治的范围内、而且是直接在政治的范围内运作,因而除了主张政治的独立性,它事实上还同时预设了政治的优先性。但由于政治与人性的内在关联不再是现代社会的共识,疏离于政治与强调政治的优先性就成了两种对立的政治哲学思路。政治自由主义强调政治的优先性,是要优先考虑政治的背景制度和合理的政治关系,因为由此构成的政治社会是一种人们应当共享的、内在的政治之善。但政治的优先性被限制在正义问题的理论建构方法与思维方式上,它并不在实质性的正义原则中对公民课以积极参与政治的责任,这就使得《政治自由主义》在两种对立的政治哲学思路之间取得了某种平衡。     

Creating Greener Citizens: Political Liberalism and a Robust Environmental Education

Proponents of environmentalist views often urge the teaching of such views and the inculcation of ‘green’ values within the educational curriculum of schools as a key component of achieving their ends. It might seem that modern versions of political morality that refuse to take a stance on controversial questions—religious, ethical, philosophical—or eschew appeal to perfectionist doctrines, such as Rawlsian political liberalism, are beset by a particularly acute difficulty in this regard. To the extent that environmentalist views embody claims about ethical matters such as how individuals should live their lives, they fall foul of this version of political morality. This article evaluates the resources available to political liberalism to respond to the challenge of bringing the teaching of green values and virtues within the national curriculum. It argues that environmental concerns differ in morally important ways from other ethical, philosophical, and religious views that are typically off-limits to political liberalism. Much that passes as green ideals are not simply a conception of the good life in the manner that religious views, for example, are. Rather, many environmental goods are crucial to the realisation of socioeconomic justice and therefore escape the requirement of state neutrality on endorsing the truth or importance of their role. A minimal political liberal education includes teaching about justice-based concerns as part of a compulsory national curriculum.     

Political Liberalism and the Interests of Children: A Reply to Timothy Michael Fowler

Timothy Michael Fowler has argued that, as a consequence of their commitment to neutrality in regard to comprehensive doctrines, political liberals face a dilemma. In essence, the dilemma for political liberals is that either they have to give up their commitment to neutrality (which is an indispensible part of their view), or they have to allow harm to children. Fowler??s case for this dilemma depends on ascribing to political liberals a view which grants parents a great degree of freedom in deciding on the education of their children. I show that ascribing this view to political liberals rests upon a misinterpretation of political liberalism. Since political liberals have access to reasons based upon the interests of children, they need not yield to parent??s wishes about the education of their children. A correct understanding of political liberalism thus shows that political liberals do not face the dilemma envisaged by Fowler.     

Kenneth Rose,Knowing the Real: John Hick on the Cognitivity of Religions and Religious Pluralism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Applying a Modified Moral Decision Making Model to Change Habitual Car Use: How Can Commitment be Effective?

Une intervention basée sur une théorie a été réalisée auprès d’un échantillon de 297 automobilistes pour tenter de lancer de nouvelles habitudes de déplacement (essayer de préférer les transports en commun plutôt que la voiture). Un modèle de modification d’une décision morale relevant de la théorie de Schwartz et Howard (1981) fut exploité dans la conception d’une intervention associant une technique de décristallisation des comportements antérieurs (remise provisoire d’une carte gratuite) avec une technique focalisée sur une norme (appel à l’implication). L’échantillon était constitué de 297 citoyens allemands pouvant utiliser facilement leur voiture et vivant dans des quartiers bien desservis par les transports en commun. Les participants ont été répartis au hasard dans quatre conditions (implication précédée par une carte gratuite, seulement l’implication, seulement la carte gratuite et groupe contrôle) et durent faire part de leur choix de transport pour un trajet précis et habituel (par exemple aller au travail) sur une durée de huit semaines suivie d’une période contrôle de deux semaines. En outre, les variables du modèle (la règle personnelle de réduction de l’utilisation de la voiture, les normes sociales, les coûts comportementaux ressentis et les habitudes) ont été enregistrées toutes les deux semaines. Bien que les effets globaux de l’intervention aient été faibles, les résultats montrent qu’une motivation morale est un prédicteur pertinent du choix d’un mode de transport qui peut être renforcé par une intervention portant sur l’implication précédée par un changement temporaire de la situation. A theory‐driven intervention was carried out to initiate the try‐out of a new travel mode behavior (try out taking public transport instead of car) in a sample of habitual car users (N= 297). A modified moral decision making model based on the theory of Schwartz and Howard (1981 ) served as background for the design of an intervention combining a habit‐defrosting technique (temporary gift of a free ticket) with a norm‐focused technique (plea for commitment). The sample consisted of 297 German citizens with good car access and living in areas with a convenient supply of public transportation. Participants were randomly assigned to four groups (commitment preceded by a free ticket, commitment only, free ticket only, and control) and had to report their travel mode choice for a particular, regular trip (e.g. trip to work) for a period of 8 weeks and a 2‐week follow‐up period. Additionally, model variables (personal norm to reduce car use, social norm, perceived behavioral costs, and habit) were recorded every 2 weeks. Although overall effects of the interventions were small, results indicate that a moral motivation is a relevant predictor for travel mode choices and can be stabilised by a commitment intervention preceded by a temporary change of the situation.     

Conjecture and the Division of Justificatory Labour: A Comment on Clayton and Stevens

Res Publica - Clayton and Stevens (Res Publica 20: 65–84, 2014) argue that political liberals should engage with the religiously unreasonable by offering religious responses and showing that...     

Political Liberalism,Group Rights,and the Politics of Fear and Trust

Studies in East European Thought -