Routes for Roots: A Mapping Shorthand Symbolism with Reference to Nelson Goodman’s Hidden Ars Combinatoria

A shorthand symbolism for the relational mapping of categories (MSS) is introduced and developed on the basis of Nelson Goodman's structural methodology. Through a reconstruction of extensional isomorphism that Goodman introduces as a criterion for definitional accuracy, and a brief reminder of the argument structure behind his ‘new riddle of induction’, Goodman's radical ontological relativism is turned into a protological principle of what I call ‘domain constituting philosophy’. MSS is demonstrated with reference to Goodman's symbol theory, particularly his notion of exemplification, as well as in a final structured comparison of Frege's ‘sense’ with Goodman's straightforward construction of ‘secondary extension’.     

SAMPLES AS SYMBOLS

Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called ‘exemplification’ (Goodman, Elgin) or ‘exemplarisation’ (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, Goodman's account of exemplification has several flaws. In this paper I will offer an alternative account of exemplification that is inspired by Grice's idea that one can communicate something by providing one's audience with intention‐independent evidence and letting them draw the obvious conclusion for themselves. This explication of exemplification will solve the problems that arose for Goodman's theory in the spirit of his approach. 1     

Elster on the Emotions

Don Mannison levels three criticisms at the claims I make in ‘Faking Nature’. First, he claims that I argue from (1) X is valued to (2) X has value. I do not. Second, he criticizes an argument of Nelson Goodman's to which I allude. While his criticism has point he misrepresents the role I assign to Goodman's argument. Third, he suggests that there is no need for me to count environmental evaluations as evaluations of the moral kind. However, he offers no account of why I should not and ignores an important consideration that requires that I should.     

Are Digital Images Allographic?

Nelson Goodman's distinction between autographic and allographic arts is appealing, we suggest, because it promises to resolve several prima facie puzzles. We consider and rebut a recent argument that alleges that digital images explode the autographic/allographic distinction. Regardless, there is another familiar problem with the distinction, especially as Goodman formulates it: it seems to entirely ignore an important sense in which all artworks are historical. We note in reply that some artworks can be considered both as historical products and as formal structures. Talk about such works is ambiguous between the two conceptions. This allows us to recover Goodman's distinction: art forms that are ambiguous in this way are allographic. With that formulation settled, we argue that digital images are allographic. We conclude by considering the objection that digital photographs, unlike other digital images, would count as autographic by our criterion; we reply that this points to the vexed nature of photography rather than any problem with the distinction.     

An epistemic solution to Goodman's new riddle of induction

Goodman'snew riddle of induction can be characterized by the following questions: What is the difference between ‘grue’ and ‘green’?; Why is the hypothesis that all emeralds are grue not lawlike?; Why is this hypothesis not confirmed by its positive instances?; and, Why is the predicate ‘grue’ not projectible? I argue in favor of epistemological answers to Goodman's questions. The notions of ‘lawlikeness’, ‘confirmation’, and ‘projectibility’ have to be relativized to (actual and counterfactual) epistemic situations that are determined by the available background information. In order to defend this thesis, I discuss an example that is less strange than the grue example. From the general conclusions of this discussion, it follows that ‘grue’ is not projectible in the actual epistemic situation, but it is projectible in certain counterfactual epistemic situations.     

On Not Changing the Problem: A Reply to Howson

Howson's critique of my essay on Hume's problem of induction levels two main charges. First, Howson claims that I have attributed to him an error that he never made, and in fact which he warned against in the very text that I cite. Secondly, Howson argues that my proposed solution to Hume's problem is flawed on technical and philosophical grounds. In response to the first charge, I explain how Howson's text justifies attributing to him the claim that the principle of induction is shown to be inconsistent by Goodman's riddle. In regards to the second, I show that Howson's objections rest on misunderstandings of formal learning theory and on conflating the problem of induction with the problem of unconceived alternatives.     

ROBUSTNESS AND THE NEW RIDDLE REVIVED

The problem of induction is perennially important in epistemology and the philosophy of science. In response to Goodman's ‘New Riddle of Induction’, Frank Jackson made a compelling case for there being no new riddle, by arguing that there are no nonprojectible properties. Although Jackson's denial of nonprojectible properties is correct, I argue here that he is mistaken in thinking that he thereby shows that there is no new riddle of induction, and demonstrate that his solution to the grue paradox fails to rule out the possibility of equally justified contradictory inductions. More importantly, in illuminating where Jackson's argument fails, the paper casts a new light on the problem of induction, locating the problem not in the nature of the next (unexamined) x, but in the counterfactual robustness of properties of already examined x's.     

When is a picture?

Philosophical discussions of depiction sometimes suffer from a lack of differentiation between several questions concerning the ‘nature’ of pictorial representation. To provide a suitable framework I distinguish six such questions and several levels on which one might want to proceed in order to answer some of them. With this background, I reconstruct Goodman's and Elgin's answer to the specific question: ‘What distinguishes the pictorial from the verbal or linguistic?’ I try to reveal some major motivations behind their system-oriented approach and to indicate some reasons why a strategy of this kind is to a certain extent mandatory to grasp the ‘nature of the pictorial’. The system-relative and functional character of depiction has to be captured by every adequate theory.     

Cumulative and local odds-ratio measures of uniformity of association in two-way ordered contingency tables

The cumulative odds-ratio model of uniformity of association in a two-way ordered contingency table is studied, and compared with Goodman's local odds-ratio model. It is shown that the cumulative model can be adapted to the deletion of cells, particularly deletion of diagonal cells in square tables, and an example of the improvement of fit obtained is given, and compared with the fit of the local model. The sensitivity of both models to collapse of categories and to changes in marginal totals is discussed, suggesting criteria for choosing between them. The Appendix describes simple computational algorithms for both models, based on minimizing the likelihood ratio over a range of trial parameters.     

Sport,nature and worldmaking

Many philosophers of sport maintain that athletics can contribute to our understanding of ourselves and the environments in which we live. It may be relatively easy to offer accounts of how athletes might acquire self-knowledge through sport; however, it is far more difficult to see how sport could add to the general understanding of human individuals, cultural frameworks or the material world. The study of sport as a way of worldmaking is helpful in understanding how sport can contribute to the pursuit of knowledge in such areas.

The position I present is based on arguments made by Gunter Gebauer in his 1993 presidential address to the Philosophic Society for the Study of Sport, ‘Sport, theater, and ritual: Three ways of worldmaking’, and in my explanation and interpretation of Gebauer's position, I rely heavily on Nelson Goodman's Ways of worldmaking. Gebauer's work is focused on traditional sports, and he argues that such sports create worlds that represent fundamental attitudes and values of the cultures that produce them. I argue that alternative sports are well suited to create new and original worlds that instantiate value systems in opposition to mainstream culture. I argue further that nature sports such as climbing and surfing represent relationships between humans and natural features, and that such sports, as a subcategory of alternative sports, are in a position to create new and original frameworks that can help us to better comprehend our relationships with natural environments.     

Models and lawlikeness

Do analogical models ever play an essential role in scientific explanation and confirmation, or is their role (at most) heuristic? For many years scientists and philosophers have debated this question. I argue that such models may sometimes play an essential role. My argument is based on a proposal to augment Goodman's theory of projection in order to make it easier for novel predicates (extensions) to acquire entrenchment. The heart of this proposal is the claim that analogical models may, under certain conditions, be the medium whereby entrenchment is passed from well established predicates to new and unfamiliar ones.     

SELF-INSTRUCTIONAL TRAINING TO INCREASE INDEPENDENT WORK PERFORMANCE IN PRESCHOOLERS

The generalized effects of self-instructional training on the classroom performance of three “impulsive” preschool children were investigated using a multiple-baseline design across subjects. Measures of child and teacher behavior in the classroom were obtained through direct observations during a daily independent work period. Self-instructional training followed Meichenbaum and Goodman's (1971) approach, except that training materials consisted of naturalistic task worksheets rather than psychometric test items and training sessions were of shorter duration. For all three children, self-instructional training resulted in increased levels of accuracy on worksheets in the classroom that were similar to those used in training. Results related to several supplementary measures were less clear; however, they suggested that rates of on-task behavior may also have improved, and that a mild classroom intervention further strengthened on-task rates and effected consistent work completion for all three children. The findings suggested that generalized increases in accuracy on classroom worksheets were related to the naturalistic format of the self-instructional training sessions. The level of teacher attention was controlled to rule out its effect on changes in child behavior.     

Social Comparison of Health Risks: Locus of Control,the Person-Positivity Bias,and Unrealistic Optimism1

People typically attribute lower health risks to themselves than to others, a phenomenon referred to as unrealistic optimism. The present study tested the person positivity bias as a previously unexamined explanation of the phenomenon and analyzed the relationship between unrealistic optimism and expectations of control. High-school students estimated their own and one of three other persons’(the average student's, a randomly chosen student's, or their best same-sex friend's) chances of getting health problems. They also filled out questionnaires measuring locus of control and health-protective behavior. In contrast with the person positivity explanation, unrealistic optimism was not restricted to the “average other” condition. However, unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects with a more internal locus of control than in subjects with a rather external locus of control. An unpredicted effect of estimation order was observed: Unrealistic optimism was stronger in subjects who estimated the comparison person's risks first than in subjects who started with own risks. This effect can be understood in terms of Codol's observation that people perceive others as more similar to themselves than they themselves are to others.     

THE VISUAL CLIFF'S FORGOTTEN MENAGERIE: RATS,GOATS, BABIES,AND MYTH‐MAKING IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY

Eleanor Gibson and Richard Walk's famous visual cliff experiment is one of psychology's classic studies, included in most introductory textbooks. Yet the famous version which centers on babies is actually a simplification, the result of disciplinary myth‐making. In fact the visual cliff's first subjects were rats, and a wide range of animals were tested on the cliff, including chicks, turtles, lambs, kid goats, pigs, kittens, dogs, and monkeys. The visual cliff experiment was more accurately a series of experiments, employing varying methods and a changing apparatus, modified to test different species. This paper focuses on the initial, nonhuman subjects of the visual cliff, resituating the study in its original experimental logic, connecting it to the history of comparative psychology, Gibson's interest in comparative psychology, as well as gender‐based discrimination. Recovering the visual cliff's forgotten menagerie helps to counter the romanticization of experimentation by focusing on the role of extrascientific factors, chance, complexity, and uncertainty in the experimental process.     

A simplification of the theory of simplicity

Nelson Goodman has constructed two theories of simplicity: one of predicates; one of hypotheses. I offer a simpler theory by generalization and abstraction from his. Generalization comes by dropping special conditions Goodman imposes on which unexcluded extensions count as complicating and which excluded extensions count as simplifying. Abstraction is achieved by counting only nonisomorphic models and subinterpretations. The new theory takes into account all the hypotheses of a theory in assessing its complexity, whether they were projected prior to, or result from, projection of a given hypothesis. It assigns simplicity post-projection priority over simplicity pre-projection. It better orders compound conditionals than does the theory of simplicity of hypotheses, and it does not inherit an anomaly of the theory of simplicity of predicates — its failure to order the ordering relations. Drop Goodman's special conditions, and the problems fall away with them.     

Covariation information,causal questioning,and interpersonal behavior

The effects of covariation information on perceivers' behavior toward a target person were investigated in a face-to-face setting. Subjects observed a female stimulus person behave in an impolite fashion. They were then presented with consensus, consistency, and distinctiveness information, patterned to imply either a person or an entity explanation for the rude behavior. Some subjects immediately completed a measure of their attributions, whereas others did not answer any attribution question. Subjects then interacted with the target person in an interview setting and afterward rated her on several evaluative dimensions. As predicted, the covariation information presented to subjects affected their impressions of the target person and their behavior toward her during the interaction. These effects were consistent across measures when subjects did not answer the attribution question, but appeared only on certain measures when subjects answered the attribution item prior to the interaction. This pattern of findings was interpreted as showing that the attribution question made subjects uncertain about the true cause of the target's rude behavior.     

Robert Greville on Sins,Privations, and Dialetheism

In the history of Western philosophy, dialetheism – the view that some sentences are both true and false – has been unpopular. This paper recovers a previously overlooked episode in the history of dialetheism. Specifically, it reconstructs a section of Robert Greville's The Nature of Truth (1640) in order to show that he was a dialetheist. Greville's consideration of the view that evil is a privation led him to endorse the claim that sinful acts are contradictory; they are the subjects of both being and non-being. The paper also explores responses to Greville from John Wallis and Nathaniel Culverwell.     

A Study of Some Factors Involved in Place Learning

Through the technique of Goodman's log linear method, longitudinal data are analyzed to clarify the relationship between depressive mood and illicit drug use among youths. A representative sample of adolescents (N = 8206) from New York State secondary schools was followed over one academic year. At one point in time, users of illicit drugs other than marihuana (multiple drug users) were significantly more depressed than either nonusers or users of marihuana only. Differing interactive relationships were found over time depending upon the drugs involved. Depressive mood was related to the onset of marihuana use among nonusers and to the termination of marihuana use among users. Depressive mood also predicted the use of other illicit drugs by marihuana users. While the beginning use of illicit drugs other than marihuana was positively associated with increased depressive mood, continued multiple drug use was related to reduced depressive mood.