Husserl,Protention, and the Phenomenology of the Unexpected

Although there has been a great deal said about Husserl’s account of time-consciousness, little attention has been specifically paid to future-consciousness. This article gives an Husserlian account of future-consciousness. It begins by arguing that protention should be understood as a future-directed version of retention and so that future-consciousness should be understood as perception. This account is developed in two ways: (1) the future need not be determinately given in protention and so future-consciousness can be vague; (2) cases when the future turns out to be other than we perceived it to be (cases when the unexpected happens) can be understood as temporal illusions. This account of future-consciousness both illuminates some of Husserl’s more obscure remarks on time-consciousness and (more importantly) provides a means of understanding an often neglected phenomenon of independent philosophical interest: our awareness of the future.     

广松涉对胡塞尔现象学的批判及其克服

以马克思、卡西尔和马赫哲学为立足点,以对胡塞尔现象学的批判为突破口,广松涉提出了“现象的所与-意义的所识”-“能知的某人-能识的某人”的四肢结构论,由此实现了由物的世界观到事的世界观、由实体主义到关系主义的哲学变革,标志着具有独创性的广松哲学的正式形成,在格外注重生态平衡与可持续发展的今天,它显示出独特的理论价值与现实意义。     

Phenomenology and artificial intelligence: Husserl learns Chinese

For over a decade John Searle's ingenious argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence has held a prominent place in contemporary philosophy. This is not just because of its striking central example and the apparent simplicity of its argument. As its appearance in Scientific American testifies, it is also due to its importance to the wider scientific community. If Searle is right, artificial intelligence in the strict sense, the sense that would claim that mind can be instantiated through a formal program of symbol manipulation, is basically wrong. No set of formal conditions can provide us with the characteristic feature of mind which is the intentionally of its mental contents. Formally regarded, such intentionally is an irreducible primitive. It cannot be analyzed into non-intentional (purely syntactic, symbolic) components. This paper will argue that this objection is based on a misunderstanding. Intentionality is not simply something given which is incapable of further analysis. It only appears so when we mistakenly abstract it from time. When we regard its temporal structure, it shows itself as a rule-governed, synthetic process, one capable of being instantiated both by machines and men.     

现象学、解释学、生命哲学——海德格尔与胡塞尔、狄尔泰及雅斯贝尔斯遭遇

近来,海德格尔早期的一些弗赖堡讲座稿[《全集》56/57卷,《全集》58卷,《全集》61卷,《全集》63卷和"那托普论文":《对亚里士多德的现象学解释(解释学境域的显示)》]等相关手稿,以及关于时间概念的演讲稿(《时间概念》)被发表了,于是我们现在可以更好地理解海德格尔通向《存在与时间》的哲学道路(这是一条由于在《存在与时间》之前十年的沉默而长期不为我们所知的道路),从而也能更好地理解这部杰作本身了.战后期间海德格尔的另一重要早期文献,即他未发表的关于雅斯贝尔斯的详尽评论,一段时间以来就已为世人所见了(《全集》9卷1-44页).他1925年夏季学期的讲座稿(《全集》20卷)也是如此.这个文本突出地显示了在通往《存在与时间》的道路上,海德格尔与胡塞尔现象学甚为广泛而细致的遭遇.     

Edmund Husserl in Talcott Parsons: Analytical Realism and Phenomenology

This article aims at clarifying the philosophical (=phenomenological) implication of Talcott Parsons’s analytical realism. Generally, his theory is understood as being confrontational to phenomenology; however, in his first book, The Structure of Social Action, Parsons positively referred to Husserl’s Logical Investigations. They shared a sense of crisis: Husserl thought that there was no certain basis in modern science, and Parsons had the feeling that there was no common theory to establish sociology as a science. Thus, both of them criticized the factual sciences of positivism (positivistic empiricism) and showed a strong orientation to the general theory. For this, they depended on conceptual realism (Platonic realism). According to Husserl, scientific knowledge will be arbitrary if the Ideal is not there as the norm of fact. He believed that in truth all people always see Ideas. Similarly, Parsons thought that in truth all people always act toward the Ideal, because the Ideal element is necessarily found through the logical framework of sociology, i.e., the action frame of reference. Hence, he maintained that the Ideal element that gives a normative orientation to actions is real, though analytical, insofar as the social order is established.     

胡塞尔思想发展脉络中的心理学与现象学:从对立到调和

胡塞尔早期在对心理主义的批判中指出心理之物或心理学经验指涉相对于意向对象的实项内容,心理学则是有关于心理事实的经验科学。这时,现象学与心理学是被严格区分的。20世纪20年代初开始,心理学经验逐渐取得新的涵义,在1925年的《现象学心理学夏季讲稿》中,胡塞尔指出心理学经验本身也具有意向对象,心理学经验与超越论经验遂形成平行关系,甚至成为迈向超越论经验领域或超越论现象学的途径之一。胡塞尔对于心理学两种不同的看法是如何转变的?为了说明这个问题,我们有必要针对相关的文本进行考察,其中包括《逻辑研究》(1900/1901)、《现象学的观念》(1907)、《哲学作为严格的科学》(1911)、《观念》第一卷(1913)以及《第一哲学》(1923/1924),等等。胡塞尔在1913年的《观念》第一卷以及1917年的《现象学与心理学》讲稿中虽仍然严格区分心理学与现象学,但从20世纪20年代中期开始,胡塞尔已经不再严格区分现象学与心理学。为了说明这项演变,对于"心理现象"概念进行阐释是十分必要的。