Three types of skills for effective forensic psychological assessments

This article examines three types of skills required for effective assessments in the forensic arena. Forensic psychology is the application of scientific psychology to the resolution of legal conflicts. The first skill is knowledge of the legal issues to be addressed. Examples of such issues are criminal responsibility, legal competencies, and linking mental states to legal issues in question. The second set of skills comprises those skills often required by the demands of the legal system--specifically, gathering complete information about the case at hand, striving for neutrality, reconstructing the past, and predicting the future. The last set of skills includes practical ones required during the process of litigation--that is, supporting the retaining attorney's overall strategy, addressing the testimony to the appropriate audience, and deferring to the prerogative of the fact finder.     

Choice freedom

Individuals seek and value choice freedom, firms provide consumers ever-increasing opportunities to exercise it, citizens worry about protecting their right to choose freely, and scholars across different disciplines study the topic around the globe. We adopt a consumer psychology perspective to systematize the vast literature on choice freedom, and we present a framework to examine the relationship between choice freedom and personal and societal well-being. We begin by proposing choice freedom as an antecedent of autonomy and personal control and by clarifying the meaning of these interrelated constructs. We then use autonomy and personal control as separate processes to explain benefits and limits of choice freedom for well-being, and we review interventions that mitigate the limits. Finally, we discuss future research questions related to autonomy and personal control. Whereas extant literature focuses on the presence of freedom and on the relationship between choice freedom and the individual, we reflect on the extent to which consumers actually have freedom of choice and on the role of others in the provision and exercise of choice freedom.     

Timelessness and freedom

One way that philosophers have attempted to defend free will against the threat of fatalism and against the threat from divine beliefs has been to endorse timelessness views (about propositions and God’s beliefs, respectively). In this paper, I argue that, in order to respond to general worries about fatalism and divine beliefs, timelessness views must appeal to the notion of dependence. Once they do this, however, their distinctive position as timelessness views becomes otiose, for the appeal to dependence, if it helps at all, would itself be sufficient to block worries about fatalism and divine beliefs. I conclude by discussing some implications for dialectical progress.

     

Chisholm on freedom

Abstract: This critical examination of Roderick Chisholm's agent causal brand of libertarianism develops a problem about luck that undermines his earlier and later libertarian views on free will and moral responsibility and defends the thesis that a modest libertarian alternative considerably softens the problem. The alternative calls for an indeterministic connection in the action‐producing process that is further removed from action than Chisholm demands. The article also explores the implications of a relatively new variant of a Frankfurt‐style case for Chisholm's views of free will and moral responsibility and for libertarianism in general. It is suggested that Chisholm's efforts will and should continue to offer important assistance to libertarians who are determined to succeed where he apparently fell short.     

Tracing and heavenly freedom

A new version of the ontological argument for the existence of God is outlined and examined. After giving a brief account of some traditional ontological arguments for the existence of God, where their defects are identified, it is explained how this new argument is built upon their foundations and surmounts their defects. In particular, this version uses the resources of impossible worlds to plug the common escape route from standard modal versions of the ontological argument. After outlining the nature of impossible worlds, and motivating the need for positing them, the new argument is delineated and its premises justified. It is taken for granted that the argument cannot be sound, since it would prove too much. However, its premises are all plausible, and their denial promises to have significant ramifications. Several intuitive lines of objections are then explored in order to illuminate their shortcomings. The puzzle that the argument poses is therefore not whether the argument is sound, for it clearly cannot be. Rather, it is to place pressure on its plausible premises, so some plausible account of how the argument fails can be identified, and that the devising of such an account promises to be insightful. In the process, we should gain an improved understanding of how such ontological arguments work.