Wittgenstein's picture‐theory

In a paper published in this journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1962, pp. 46–64, Mr. H. R. G. Schwyzer has argued that ‘the current view (as held by, eg., Wamock, Anscombe and Stemus) of Wittgenstein's theory of language in the Tractatus is mistaken’. The editor of the journal has asked me for a reply. My reply concerns only my own book, and it amounts to the statement that Mr. Schwyzer's attack on the book has very little to do with what is said in it.     

An existential‐phenomenological counter‐theory of transference

The hypothesis of transference has become such a fundamental assumption for many therapeutic practitioners, that it is rarely questioned either in terms of its theoretical value or its function. This paper will critically examine the notion of transference from an existential‐phenomenological perspective and will argue the case for an alternative perspective. Further, it will seek to demonstrate that numerous and significant logical and applied problems arise with regard to the hypothesis of transference—problems which have a major negative impact upon the therapeutic relationship in general and upon the possibility of ‘encounter‘—or ‘meeting‘—between therapist and client. Finally, the paper will seek to show how, in many cases, the adoption of the hypothesis of transference can be seen as a defensive and power‐preserving (or enhancing) activity on the part of the therapist whose benefit to the client is, at best, questionable.     

The role of imagination,rule‐operations,and atmosphere in Wittgenstein's language‐games

Wittgenstein argues that understanding a language consists of mastery of techniques for playing language‐games rather than some sort of mental state or episode such as mental imagery, rule invocation, or atmosphere investing our experience of words. His elimination of the three mentalistic alternatives presupposes the peculiar distinction, or its virtual lack, between speaker and listener presupposed by his positive claim, instead of establishing the latter. This paper vindicates the episodic nature of certain types of understanding, and gives each of his three alternatives a suitably qualified role therein, by drawing the distinctions in a less biassed way.     

Is Wittgenstein's Resort to Ordinary Language an Appeal to Empirical facts?

There are two widely held views in the literature as regards Wittgenstein's philosophy. One says that Wittgenstein in his later work appeals to ordinary language in his effort to show how the philosophical problems can be dissolved, and the other says that his investigation is a grammatical one. This paper undertakes to examine what is meant by a grammatical investigation, especially in view of the fact that this investigation relies on empirical facts that have to do with linguistic usage. The examination is carried out by concentrating on what Wittgenstein has to say on the issue of knowledge – in particular, how the way we use the word contributes to the dismissal of Moore's answer to the challenge of scepticism. The conclusion is that Wittgenstein's resort to ordinary language is not typically empirical. The examples of ordinary usage that he cites may be contingent, but they could not have been different given the language games they are part of. The correct use of words Wittgenstein appeals to is not fixed by some kind of essence, but neither is it decided by a majority rule. It gets entrenched in a complex nexus of practices. Wittgenstein's reference to "use" instead of 'usage"and to "linguistic facts" instead of "sociological facts" lends support more to a logical than to an empirical investigation.     

Depiction and plastic perception. A critique of Husserl’s theory of picture consciousness

In this paper, I will present an argument against Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness. Husserl’s analysis of picture consciousness (as it can be found primarily in the recently translated volume Husserliana 23) moves from a theory of depiction in general to a theory of perceptual imagination. Though, I think that Husserl’s thesis that picture consciousness is different from depictive and linguistic consciousness is legitimate, and that Husserl’s phenomenology avoids the errors of linguistic theories, such as Goodman’s, I submit that his overall theory is unacceptable, especially when it is applied to works of art. Regarding art, the main problem of Husserl’s theory is the assumption that pictures are constituted primarily as a conflict between perception/physical picture thing and imagination/picture object. Against this mentalist claim, I maintain, from a hermeneutic point of view, that pictures are the result of perceptual formations [Bildungen]. I then claim that Husserl’s theory fails, since it does not take into account what I call “plastic perception” [Bildliches Sehen], which plays a prominent role not only within the German tradition of art education but also within German art itself. In this connection, “plastic thinking” [Bildliches Denken] was prominent especially in Klee, in Kandinsky, and in Beuys, as well as in the overall doctrine of the Bauhaus. Ultimately, I argue that Husserl’s notion of picture consciousness and general perceptive imaginary consciousness must be replaced with a more dynamic model of the perception of pictures and art work that takes into account (a) the constructive and plastic moment, (b) the social dimension and (c) the genetic dimension of what it means to see something in something (Wollheim).

The bodily complexity of truth‐telling in qualitative research: Some implications of Gendlin's theory

Abstract

Gendlin's philosophy of the body is used as an approach to the “truth values” of qualitative research. In this view, our bodily participation in life provides a grounded quality to understanding, a shared reference point for an experientially‐grounded language that can “'work.” This understanding is a bodily‐informed practice and involves the body's access to “more than words can say.” As such, the body is intimate to understanding and such bodily‐informed sense‐making adds a dimension to the ways we have access to and present truth. Implications of this approach for qualitative methodology will be discussed, in particular the implications for the informant's task, the interviewer's task, the task of analysis and the task of the reader.     

A difficulty for Everett's many‐worlds theory

An argument originated by Brandon Carter presents humankind's imminent extinction as likelier than we should otherwise have judged. We ought to be reluctant to think ourselves among the earliest 0.01 %, for instance, of all humans who will ever have lived; yet we should be in that tiny group if the human race survived long, even at just its present size. While such reasoning attracts many criticisms, perhaps the only grave one is that indeterminism means there is not yet any firm, theoretically predictable fact of how long the human race will survive. This, though, might not save Everett's many‐worlds theory from a variant on Carter's point. Everett seemingly pictures observers as splitting into ever more versions, which explains away all apparent indeterminism; but then, absurdly, all except a vanishingly tiny proportion of one's versions would come into existence near one's death, outweighing all apparent evidence that death was not imminent. The need to avoid such a result severely constrains Everett‐type theories. We need theories in which observer‐versions diverge without increasing their numbers in any straightforward way.     

Meaning and mind: Wittgenstein's relevance for the ‘Does Language Shape Thought?’ debate

This paper explores the relevance of Wittgenstein's philosophical psychology for the two major contemporary approaches to the relation between language and cognition. As Pinker describes it, on the ‘Standard Social Science Model’ language is ‘an insidious shaper of thought’. According to Pinker's own widely-shared alternative view, ‘Language is the magnificent faculty that we use to get thoughts from one head to another’. I investigate Wittgenstein's powerful challenges to the hypothesis that language is a device for communicating independently constituted (or individuated) thoughts. I argue that Wittgenstein offers instead a subtle version of the thesis that language determines thought.     

Get the picture? The effects of iconicity on toddlers' reenactment from picture books

What do toddlers learn from everyday picture-book reading interactions? To date, there has been scant research exploring this question. In this study, the authors adapted a standard imitation procedure to examine 18- to 30-month-olds' ability to learn how to reenact a novel action sequence from a picture book. The results provide evidence that toddlers can imitate specific target actions on novel real-world objects on the basis of a picture-book interaction. Children's imitative performance after the reading interaction varied both as a function of age and the level of iconicity of the pictures in the book. These findings are discussed in terms of children's emerging symbolic capacity and the flexibility of the cognitive representation.     

Self‐esteem and anomie: An integration of Adler and Merton as a theory of deviance

The purpose of this paper is to show that while anomie theory on the social level offers a valid explanation of deviance, in order to understand the phenomenon in its entirety, we must consider the individual level as well. The psycho‐dynamic dimension of individual action is a crucial component of deviant behavior and one which must be integrated into a broader theory of overall deviance. With this in mind we will attempt to integrate the social and the psychological by incorporating the Adlerian and Mertonian models in order to create a more dynamic theory of deviance.     

On short‐selling the investment theory of creativity: A reply to Runco

In creativity, there is scant evidence of significant racial and gender differences, and when such differences are found, there is no consistency regarding which groups perform best. There has been little work focusing on racial and gender biases and/or stereotypes within creativity assessment. It is study these issues by using a modified version of the Consensual Assessment Technique in which the judges are provided with information about the creators' gender and/or race. A total of 455 undergraduates assigned ratings for creativity, writing ability, and enjoyment to 60 poems downloaded from a poetry Web site. These poems either had no attribution or had (fictional) stereotypical Black, White, and Crossover names for each gender. Results suggest that novice raters using CAT methodology display little evidence of bias in their ratings of creativity, writing ability, and poem enjoyment. Very slight preference was found for poems assigned names of White females.     

The theory‐ladenness of observations,the role of scientific instruments,and the Kantian a priori

During the last decades it has become widely accepted that scientific observations are ‘theory‐laden’. Scientists ‘see’ the world with their theories or theoretical presuppositions. In the present paper it is argued that they ‘see’ with their scientific instruments as well, as the uses of scientific instruments is an important characteristic of modern natural science. It is further argued that Euclidean geometry is intimately linked to technology, and hence that it plays a fundamental part in the construction and operation of scientific instruments. Finally, Euclidean geometry is compared to fractal geometry, and the question of its a priori status is raised. Although the position that Euclidean geometry is a priori in the original Kantian sense is untenable, the paper concludes that in some restricted sense Euclidean geometry may be said to be a priori.     

Rycroft’s Idea of Language

This paper outlines some of Charles Rycroft's thoughts about language. It divides into three parts: the first addresses the general hypothesis of communicative interaction, with particular reference to (a) the presence or fullness of signs and (b) original speech. In the second part of the paper I trace some of the theoretical background to the concept of affective communication. This includes a brief comparative reading of Rycroft and Brierley. The third part concentrates more specifically on technique, including the analysis of Miss Y whose case helps to illustrate the nature of affective interaction in Rycroft's account of the analytic relationship.     

What does naming a picture do? Effects of prior picture naming on recognition of identical and same-name alternatives

Three experiments investigated the effects of naming pictures of objects during study on the subsequent recognition of physically identical, name-match, and new objects. Prior naming improved correct classification of all three item types at recognition. For line drawings and for photographs of functionally distinct objects, prior naming reduced the tendency to confuse identical and same-name alternatives. In Experiment 2, prior naming eliminated the right visual field/left hemisphere advantage for speeded recognition of name-match pictures, suggesting that prior naming reduces the likelihood that pictures are named at recognition. The implications of these results for dual-encoding (Paivio, 1971) and sensory-semantic (Nelson, Reed, & McEvoy, 1977) models of picture and word processing are discussed. The results suggest that the semantic representations of objects that are perceptually distinct but share a common name are not identical, and that the effect of naming such objects is to insure that a distinct semantic representation becomes a part of the resulting memory code.     

Insidious syncretism in the political philosophy of Huai‐nan‐tzu 1

This is a study of the ninth chapter of the Huai‐nan‐tzu, a Chinese philosophical text compiled in the mid‐second century BC. The chapter (entitled Chu‐shu [The techniques of the ruler]) has been consistently interpreted as a proposal for a benign government that is rooted in the syncretic Taoist principles of the Huai‐nan‐tzu and is designed to serve the best interests of the people. I argue, on the contrary, that the text makes skilful (and deliberately deceptive) use of vocabulary from the major philosophical traditions of the day, in an attempt to subdue all philosophical sectarianism and wrench various antecedent philosophical ideas into the justification of a supreme political state. The best interests of the people are understood as nothing more than their material needs, since the text also denies that the ruler's subjects are possessed of ‘minds’ in any philosophical sense. It is this process of systematically undermining other philosophical traditions that I call ‘insidious syncretism. ‘