The empathizing–systemizing (E–S) model of autism and psychoanalytic theories of truth,play and symbolization

Little psychoanalytic material or theory features today in psychological work on autism and autistic traits and vice versa. Baron-Cohen's (2003) empathizing–systemizing (E–S) model of the autism spectrum posits two main clusters of autistic features: those surrounding impaired empathy, and those surrounding heightened systemizing behaviours. (Baron-Cohen, 2009) speculates that the common root of these two clusters is the individual's concept of truth. Psychoanalysis has addressed the related issue of internal and external reality since (Freud, 1897) differentiated ‘psychic’ from ‘historical’ truths. This could be of interest to those espousing the E–S model from a cognitive paradigm, as a ‘truth’-oriented cognitive style in autism may develop interdependently with the individual's experience of internal and external realities. Psychoanalysis has developed further ideas of relevance to the E–S model surrounding play and symbolization, the latter being an often-overlooked aspect of Wing and Gould's (1979) triad of autistic features. Seen from a psychodynamic perspective, the E–S model might provide a means to increase therapists' awareness of milder autistic traits amongst service users and analysands. Equally, it could offer a tool to structure empirical research into psychodynamic therapy with autism spectrum conditions.     

Learning to cheat: The interaction of moral‐development and social learning theories

A possible interaction between moral‐development levels and social learning variables is tested with self‐report data on test cheating from 175 college students. Among those at lower developmental levels, peer reactions best explain cheating behavior. For those at middle development levels, internalized definitions are most explanatory. Among those with more autonomous moralities, no pattern of social variables emerges to explain cheating.     

Lepore and Ludwig on ‘explicit meaning theories’

The fundamental problem proponents of truth conditional semantics must face is to specify what role a truth theory is supposed to play within a meaning theory. The most detailed proposal for tackling this problem is the account developed by Ernest Lepore and Kirk Ludwig. However, as I will show in this paper, theories along the lines of Lepore and Ludwig do not suffice to put someone into the position to understand the objectlanguage. The fundamental problem of truth conditional semantics thus remains unsolved.     

The status of psychoanalytic theory∗

What is the place of Psychoanalytic Theory on our map of knowledge and belief? Various alternatives are considered. Is it a scientific theory? — a myth? — or like a prescientific example of natural philosophy? — a branch of medical knowledge? — a premature empirical synthesis that is an approximation to the truth? Each of these answers runs into objections and difficulties, some of which are examined or noted. On the assumption that it is a provisional story which approximates to the truth, the question is then raised: what can we do to find out how much of an approximation to the truth the theory really is? The relevance and value of psychological studies are discussed; and the suggestion is made that the status of Psychoanalytic Theory will remain an ambiguous one for some time to come.     

The meaning of “Evolution”

In a recent article [Mertz 2001] in this journal I argued for the virtues of a realist ontology of relation instances (unit attributes). A major strength of this ontology is an assay of ontic ('material') predication that yields an account of individuation without the necessity of positing and defending 'bare particulars'. The crucial insight is that it is the unifying agency or combinatorial aspect of a relation instance as predicable that is for ontology the principium individuationis [Mertz 2002; 1996]. Or in short, what is ontically predicable, precisely as such, is the cause of individuation. As a preface to this positive doctrine I offered arguments against the coherence of bare particulars as defended in an article by J. P. Moreland [1998]. In a reply contained in this issue Moreland and Timothy Pickavance (hereafter M/P) propose to answer my objections [2002]. The response that follows provides reasons why, I contend, M/P have not succeeded in parrying my objections to bare particulars.     

The “death of freud”; and the rebirth of free psychoanalytic inquiry

The relevance of Grunbaum's recent critique of psychoanalytic theory is explored as it relates to relational/interpersonal theories. Griinbaum finds no scientific evidence for repression, the cornerstone of psychoanalysis. I argue that studies demonstrating the effects of motivated, unconscious processes are beginning to emerge in psychological research. This research, as well as interpersonal theory, refers to these processes as dissociated, not “repressed.”; I agree with Griinbaum that scientific validation of psychoanalytic theories of the mind, personality, and change cannot be gleaned from case studies alone. In relational theories the analytic situation is admittedly “contaminated”; with the analyst's participation by its very nature. There is beginning to be support for some relational hypotheses, but measures to validate these hypotheses are only now being developed. Grunbaum's criticisms have come at a time when the convergence between relational theories and theories in social/clinical psychology makes it more likely that relational hypotheses will be articulated in a more precise manner by researchers, if not by analysts.

The issues of the difficulty of measuring unconscious processes and the quest for knowledge seemingly beyond human limitations are addressed. Psychoanalysis is not only less than scientific, but more encompassing, in that it is also a creative activity that cannot be understood through science alone.

Science is not enough, nor art: In this work patience plays a part [Goethe].

The most beautiful and deepest experience a man can have is the sense of the mysterious.... To me it suffices to wonder at these secrets and to attempt humbly to grasp with my mind a mere image of the lofty structure of all that there is [Albert Einstein, quoted in Pagels, 1985].     

The spirit and development of Neo‐Gonfugianism

The ideal of human life as a life of sagehood is the core of Confucian thought. In neo‐Confucianism the stress is on the self‐perfectibility of man, and the central concern of neo‐Confucianist thinkers has accordingly been with the question of how man can cultivate his own potentiality to be a sage. The different answers they give are in the form of teachings about the ‘way’, these teachings incorporating different philosophical views of mind, human nature, and the universe. The author outlines the views of successive neo‐Confucianists and their versions of the ‘way’, seeing their teachings as developments towards the doctrine presented by Wang Yang‐ming (b. 1472), whose thought can be seen in particular as a synthesis of the views of Chu Tzu and Lu Shiang‐shan.     

Parent‐infant‐psychotherapy and psychoanalytic treatment: contradiction or mutual inspiration?

Psychoanalysis and parent‐infant‐psychotherapy are compared. Although parent‐infant‐psychotherapy developed from psychoanalysis, it appears at first glance not to be “analytic” with its aim of dealing quickly with the symptoms presented and also with its different setting. The author shows that an analytic approach in understanding the multi‐facetted net of relationships between family members and the infant in its “phantasmic interaction” and a consideration of the implication for analysis of the empirical research carried out in conjunction with parent‐infant‐therapy can lead to a fruitful exchange of ideas. One example of this is research into the correlation between attachment patterns and the processing of conflicts. Furthermore a dialogue between these two disciplines can remind psychoanalysts that a critical discussion of the external circumstances of their methods does not immediately call into question their fundamental approach to therapy: the work in transference on relationship fantasies.     

How do valence and meaning interact? The contribution of semantic control

The hub-and-spoke model of semantic cognition proposes that conceptual representations in a heteromodal ‘hub’ interact with and emerge from modality-specific features or ‘spokes’, including valence (whether a concept is positive or negative), along with visual and auditory features. As a result, valence congruency might facilitate our ability to link words conceptually. Semantic relatedness may similarly affect explicit judgements about valence. Moreover, conflict between meaning and valence may recruit semantic control processes. Here we tested these predictions using two-alternative forced-choice tasks, in which participants matched a probe word to one of two possible target words, based on either global meaning or valence. Experiment 1 examined timed responses in healthy young adults, while Experiment 2 examined decision accuracy in semantic aphasia patients with impaired controlled semantic retrieval following left hemisphere stroke. Across both experiments, semantically related targets facilitated valence matching, while related distractors impaired performance. Valence congruency was also found to facilitate semantic decision-making. People with semantic aphasia showed impaired valence matching and had particular difficulty when semantically related distractors were presented, suggesting that the selective retrieval of valence information relies on semantic control processes. Taken together, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that automatic access to the global meaning of written words affects the processing of valence, and that the valence of words is also retrieved even when this feature is task-irrelevant, affecting the efficiency of global semantic judgements.     

Challenges of patient‐led mental health services to psychoanalytic clinicians

This paper considers implications to psychoanalytic psychotherapy of the British Government's decision to implement a patient choice agenda for state‐funded mental health services in England and Wales. It places the patient choice agenda in the context of consumerist society and argues that the complex nature of psychoanalytic psychotherapy leaves it more vulnerable than other psychological therapy modalities to compete in the current reality of ‘consumer’‐led public mental health, which, in turn reflects a profoundly changed social context from that to which psychoanalysis traces its roots. Unless psychoanalytic clinicians recognize and find ways to adjust to this context they will jeopardize the survival of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in an increasingly market‐orientated model of mental healthcare provision in the public sector, eager to promote more ‘consumer friendly’ psychological therapy models.     

Models of learning and psychoanalytic traditions can reform be sustained in psychoanalytic training?

This paper presents a series of training vignettes which suggest that a subtext of defensiveness regarding exposure to our patients, fear of feelings, adherence to an unwritten set of rules, and a profound need to control our way of thinking and working pervades the way psychoanalysis is taught and practiced in many settings. The paper explores the way in which the basic culture of psychoanalysis, and the manner in which psychoanalysts are socialized, may make these kinds of episodes commonplace. The paper suggests that a paradigm shift that has been taking place in psychoanalytic clinical thinking has not yet affected the training process because of the danger that the new paradigm might undermine the safety, clarity, and ways of knowing that our traditional theories and clinical practices have provided.     

The shattering of meaning. Jan Patočka and his triple concept of history

Continental Philosophy Review - My paper aims at laying out the main tenets of Pato?ka’s unusual and highly provocative position with regard to the question of history, drawing...     

The breadth and boundaries of a self‐psychological immersion in shame a one‐and‐a‐half‐person perspective

Shame colors other feelings and perceptions about the self. From reflections about his own personal experiences and observations regarding a particular manic‐depressive patient, the author discusses the evolution of his current clinical and theoretical understanding of shame. The framework of analytic self psychology is offered as a particularly useful perspective from which to consider shame, with its emphasis on the concept of selfobject to account both for shame's development (through selfobject misattunement and unresponsive‐ness) and for its amelioration (through empathic mirroring, idealization, and twinning). A developmental sequence for shame is advanced reflecting limitations in selfobject responsiveness, and problems are noted in the ability of current self psychology theory to fully account for the alleviation of shame. The self plays its part in the construction of those selfobjects needed to ease shame, representing the “one‐and‐a‐half‐person psychology”; of the paper's subtitle. Finally, the important role of countertransference shame is considered through a clinical example of therapist disclosure of his own shame to his patient, utilized in order to repair an interrupted kinship selfobject transference.     

Discussion: Toward a social‐constructivist view of the psychoanalytic situation

The three papers by Modell, Aron, and Greenberg are discussed in terms of their relationship to a new paradigm for understanding the psychoanalytic situation. The paradigm is called social‐construct‐ivist to capture both the idea of the analyst's participation and the idea of construction of meaning. It is argued that these theorists, as well as many of the authors they cite as part of a broad movement in the field, do not consistently meet the criteria for this paradigm, although they seem to be aiming for it. An important source of inconsistency and confusion derives from the confounding of the two axes: drive‐relational and positivist‐constructivist. Many relational theorists who hold fast to the idea that analysts can grasp the truth of both their own experience and that of the patient are no closer to the constructivist point of view than was Freud. The call by Aron and Greenberg for greater attention to the patient's resisted experience of the analyst's subjectivity is discussed in terms of its potential benefits and problems. The ritualized asymmetry of the psychoanalytic situation is said to have important functions, including prevention of excessive involvement and protection of the unobjectionable positive transference and of a degree of idealization. Modell's notion of paradox, which makes the therapeutic relationship seem “real”; and “unreal”; at the same time, is seen as a special instance of the always precarious social construction of reality. It is argued, moreover, that the social and individual aspects of experience are interdependent. Neither is reducible to the other, and both should be understood, like many other issues in the new paradigm, in terms of a dialectical interplay of figure and ground in experience.     

The dream between “here‐and‐now” and “there‐and‐then”

The analysand recounts his/her dream now, and here, in the setting. Though a dream may be recounted repeatedly, the human situation in which the recounting takes place is unrepeatable. Each moment of the analytic relationship is unique, and the recounting is essentially relational. Even if the dreamer were to read from a written text, his/her voice and non‐verbal aspects would render the communication unique. Not only the recounting but also the content recounted may present relational aspects, manifest or latent, but of a relational nature different from that of the session “here‐ and‐now”. The dream dreamt belongs to the “there‐and‐then”, and its analysis, like every analysis, implies an objectification. The analyst reacts to the recounted dream, trying to objectify it in its “there‐and‐then” and also inviting the dreamer to a common task. Working on the manifest content, free associations and interpretations of symbols, they voyage through the time and space of the analysand's life. The recounted dream involves the “here‐and‐now” of the session and asks to be meaningful as a cue in the analytic dialogue (what is the meaning of recounting this dream at this moment). At the same time it refers back to the dream dreamt, to a “there‐and‐then” which, if it is not to remain “an unopened letter”, must be received as an enigmatic challenge and a window on the unconscious, open and ready to close. Thinking of an opening of the dreamer's unconscious the analyst may find himself/herself faced with an opening of his/her own unconscious.     

The wish to die and the wish to commit suicide in the adolescent: two different matters?

We shall try to demonstrate the difference between two wishes--the wish to die and the wish to commit suicide--as they express themselves during adolescence. First, death is seen as irreversible, while the suicidal act, at least during adolescence, is seen as reversible. While thoughts of suicide may be a part of normal adolescence, and the suicidal act a manifestation of pathological development specific to this stage in life, the wish to die has no age restrictions and may accompany life as a shadow, devoid of any suicidal act, for many years. It should be noted that both of these wishes may be balanced with the wish to live. Pathology appears when there is an imbalance of wishes and abnormal developmental processes. This imbalance can result in two distinct activities: suicidal acts and death behaviors. We suggest that the two stem from different mechanisms and personality pathologies. Therefore, they should be evaluated separately in order to better understand differences between suicidal and other aggressive acts and manifestations of the death wish during adolescence.     

Ajātasattu and the future of psychoanalytic anthropology. Part I: The promise of a culture

Conclusion Thus, we can see that Obeyesekere’s notion and usage of some psychoanalytic concepts is at variance with Freud’s formulations and with those of standard psychoanalytic theory. This divergence is also evident in Obeyesekere’s formulation of the concept of disconnection, which is arguably the most important construct in the first chapter of The work of culture. Space constraints prevent us taking-up this concept here. So let me now conclude this first part of the essay, and begin part 2 with an examination of ‘disconnection’ in the context of a discussion of Obeyesekere’s accounts of two South Asian ecstatics.