On the consistency of a three-valued logical calculus

[This résumé was published in English in Matematicheskii Sbornik along with the article.]The present paper contains an investigation of a three-valued logical calculus (the system) previously described by the author [Recueil Mathématique 4 (46), 2 (1938)].A constructive consistence proof is given for a part of this calculus rendering the results previously published concerning the Russell paradox. A method for a non-constructive completeness proof for the complete calculus is briefly indicated.     

On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis of the paradoxes of the classical extended functional calculus

A three-valued propositional logic is presented, within which the three values are read as ‘true’, ‘false’ and ‘nonsense’. A three-valued extended functional calculus, unrestricted by the theory of types, is then developed. Within the latter system, Bochvar analyzes the Russell paradox and the Grelling-Weyl paradox, formally demonstrating the meaninglessness of both.     

Attributive adjectives and the predicate calculus

Conclusion I have attempted to show that many attributive adjectives can be dealt with within the framework of first-order predicate calculus by the method suggested in this paper. I've also supplied independent reasons for the claim that attributive adjectives that are not responsive to this method require a formal treatment different from the one that the adjectives successfully dealt with by that method require. Thus, if the method I've argued for is sound, then the scope of first-order predicate calculus was shown to be wider than assumed by several logicians. This I take to be of interest from a logical point of view.     

On the consistency problem for the calculus

In this paper, we further investigate the consistency problem for the qualitative temporal calculus introduced by Pujari et al. [A.K. Pujari, G.V. Kumari, A. Sattar, INDU: An interval and duration network, in: Australian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1999, pp. 291–303]. We prove the intractability of the consistency problem for the subset of pre-convex relations, and the tractability of strongly pre-convex relations. Furthermore, we also define another interesting set of relations for which the consistency problem can be decided by the -closure method, a method similar to the usual path-consistency method. Finally, we prove that the -closure method is also complete for the set of atomic relations of implying that the intervals have the same duration.     

Interpreting HOL in the calculus of constructions

The purpose of this paper is to consider a representation of the HOL theorem-prover in the calculus of constructions with the property that consistency results from the calculus of constructions imply such results in HOL. This kind of representation is impossible using the propositions-as-types representation of logic and equality, but it is possible if a different representation is used.     

Three contributions to the two-valued propositional calculus

Summary Three chapters contain the results independent of each other. In the first chapter I present a set of axioms for the propositional calculus which are shorter than the ones known so far, in the second one I give a method of defining all ternary connectives, in the third one, I prove that the probability of propositional functions is preserved under reversible substitutions. This paper appeard orginally under the title “Trois contributions an calcul des propositions bivalent” inStudia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Toruń, Polonia, Sectio A, vol. I (1948), pp. 3–15.     

The abstract variable-binding calculus

Theabstract variable binding calculus (VB-calculus) provides a formal frame-work encompassing such diverse variable-binding phenomena as lambda abstraction, Riemann integration, existential and universal quantification (in both classical and nonclassical logic), and various notions of generalized quantification that have been studied in abstract model theory. All axioms of the VB-calculus are in the form of equations, but like the lambda calculus it is not a true equational theory since substitution of terms for variables is restricted. A similar problem with the standard formalism of the first-order predicate logic led to the development of the theory of cylindric and polyadic Boolean algebras. We take the same course here and introduce the variety of polyadic VB-algebras as a pure equational form of the VB-calculus. In one of the main results of the paper we show that every locally finite polyadic VB-algebra of infinite dimension is isomorphic to a functional polyadic VB-algebra that is obtained from a model of the VB-calculus by a natural coordinatization process. This theorem is a generalization of the functional representation theorem for polyadic Boolean algebras given by P. Halmos. As an application of this theorem we present a strong completeness theorem for the VB-calculus. More precisely, we prove that, for every VB-theory T that is obtained by adjoining new equations to the axioms of the VB-calculus, there exists a model D such that _T s=t iff _D s=t. This result specializes to a completeness theorem for a number of familiar systems that can be formalized as VB-calculi. For example, the lambda calculus, the classical first-order predicate calculus, the theory of the generalized quantifierexists uncountably many and a fragment of Riemann integration.The work of the first author was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant #DMS 8805870.     

Variants of the basic calculus of constructions

In this paper, a number of different versions of the basic calculus of constructions that have appeared in the literature are compared and the exact relationships between them are determined. The biggest differences between versions are those between the original version of Coquand and the version in early papers on the subject by Seldin. None of these results is very deep, but it seems useful to collect them in one place.     

On Magari's concept of general calculus: notes on the history of tarski's methodology of deductive sciences

This paper is an historical study of Tarski's methodology of deductive sciences (in which a logic S is identified with an operator Cn _S , called the consequence operator, on a given set of expressions), from its appearance in 1930 to the end of the 1970s, focusing on the work done in the field by Roberto Magari, Piero Mangani and by some of their pupils between 1965 and 1974, and comparing it with the results achieved by Tarski and the Polish school (?o?, Suszko, S?upecki, Pogorzelski, Wójcicki). In the last section of the paper we will then compare these works with some recent developments in algebraic logic: this will lead to a better understanding of the results of the methodology of deductive science, but at the same time will show some intrinsic limits to such an approach to logic.

Even if Magari's work on diagonizable algebras and universal algebra and Mangani's axiomatization of MV-algebras and results in model theory are rather famous, the articles on closure operators, published in the 1960s, are almost totally unknown outside Italy (mainly because of a linguistic limitation, the papers we analyse having been written and published in Italian). This paper aims to fill the gap in the literature and to enable the international community to get acquainted with this part of Italian logic. The same applies to some works published in Barcelona (in Catalan) at the end of the 1970s, analysed in the last section.     

An extension of the deontic calculus DSC1

The chief aim of the paper is to extend the calculusDSC ₁ (see [4]) in such a way as to satisfy all the requirements listed in [4] as well as a further stipulation — called ‘the principle of uninvolvement’ — to the effect that neither deontic compatibility nor deontic incompatibility of codes (see [2]) should be presupposed in deontic logic.     

Attributions of trust and the calculus of reciprocity

This research investigated trust and reciprocity in two experiments using the Trust Game. In the Trust Game, Player 1 can “trust” an unknown Player 2 by sending some portion of a monetary endowment. The amount sent triples on its way to Player 2, who can then “reciprocate” by returning as much as he or she wishes to Player 1. Initial endowments were either $10 or $20 and were known to recipients; amounts sent were experimentally manipulated and varied from $2 to the entire endowment. Although many trusted parties returned enough money to equalize outcomes, trustors only benefited, on average, when they sent all or almost all of their endowments. Results suggested that recipients viewed sending less than everything as a lack of trust and that felt obligations mediated choices to reciprocate. These and other results contrast markedly with traditional, incremental models of the trust process, which suggest that initial trustors should take small risks and build trust gradually.