Reply to Comments

We will respond to our commentators individually, but the order of our responses follows naturally from the issues they bring up. Judea Pearl describes SEM's unfortunate retreat from the clear causal semantics articulated by Sewall Wright (1921) and later by Haavelmo (1943) to the algebraic interpretation preferred more recently by econometricians. We agree with Pearl about the history and also the problem, namely that the algebraic interpretation is suitable for estimation but expressively too weak to even distinguish among competing causal claims. Here we try to elaborate on the distinction between the semantics of a causal SEM and the epistemological connections between statistical data, background knowledge, and causal structure. We argue that many modern critics of SEM make their hay by conflating this distinction. Having tried to make it clear, we then turn to the assumptions that give the epistemological issues their structure, namely the Causal Independence and Faithfulness assumptions. Jim Woodward questions these assumptions at length, especially the Causal Independence assumption, and we spend the second part of our response defending it. Phil Wood seems to accept the fundamental assumptions upon which TETRAD rests, and even the utility of tools like it, but he brings out a wide array of subtle difficulties that we have not had time to discuss, some of which we now cover. Kwok-fai Ting questions the utility of any specification search done by computer, and we attempt to address his concerns last.     

Longuenesse on Kant and the Priority of the Capacity to Judge

'Hobbes and the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 44, 223-6) is Eric Brandon's criticism of my article, 'Thomas Hobbes and the Constraints that Enable the Imitation of God' ( Inquiry , 42, 149-76). Brandon's criticisms are rooted in a misunderstanding of what is argued. Observations made concerning Hobbes's claims about prudence - a form of thinking Hobbes distinguishes from philosophic practice - are erroneously described by Brandon as a part of arguments concerning Hobbes's claims about philosophy. Brandon's own account reaffirms a conventional interpretation by claiming that Hobbes envisioned philosophers discovering order, an interpretation challenged in the original argument. Hobbes privileged the creation of order over attempts to discover the order of the world, and this is reflected in his affinity for geometry over physics.     

What Was Not Discussed: Reply to Comments

Here I respond to comments and questions raised in commentary papers (Castro and Lafuente, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Charles, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007; Woodward and Hetley, Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 42, 2007) and address three issues not discussed on my previous paper: (1) the historiography used in the history of Japanese psychology, (2) the first generation of Japanese women psychologists to flesh out the history of psychology in Japan, and (3) how applied psychology and psychical research existed in the early phase of psychology in Japan. Consequently, this paper, together with the previous one, provides a broader picture of the development of psychology in Japan.

Thinking Outside the Disciplinary Box: a Reply to the Comments

This article is a reply to the comments on my target article, “Presentism and diversity in the history of psychology” (Brock Psychological Studies, 60, 2015a). The most controversial aspect of the article by far was my views on what it is appropriate to call, “psychology” and what it is not. Having established that psychology has its origins in Europe, I refer to the efforts of psychologists from outside the Western world to construct an “indigenous psychology”. I conclude by discussing the view of Staeuble (2006) that the disciplinary order of the social sciences is “Eurocentric” in that it reflects the assumptions of the culture in which it was produced. As long as psychologists outside the Western world continue to unquestioningly adopt a disciplinary order that reflects its cultural origins in the West, and even insist on projecting it backwards onto their own intellectual traditions, the process of indigenisation will be incomplete.     

Ginsborg on a Kantian-Brandomian View of Concepts

ABSTRACT

According to a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the use of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the relevant conceptual norms. Recently, Ginsborg raises two important objections against this view. According to her, the normativity Brandom ascribes to concepts lacks the internalist or first-person character of normativity that Kant’s view demands, and the relevant normativity belongs properly not to concepts as such, but rather to belief or assertion. The purpose of this paper is to defend a Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against these objections.     

Double Trouble: A Reply to Coles' Comments on the Imaginary Lovers Delusion

Coles' case for viewing the Imaginary Lovers Delusion as “false recognition” is based on Coleman's dichotomous reclassification of the various delusions of doubles reported in the literature. It is suggested that Coleman's position is logical but not compelling.     

Concerning the Importance of Ontological Issues for Cultural Psychology: a Reply to Comments

The paper continues the “ontological” discussion in IBPS, addressing the question of the importance of ontological issues for contemporary development of cultural psychology. The language psychological science speaks is considered as an ontological issue and a most topical one for cultural psychology, aiming at “constructing a psychology that is universal while being culture-inclusive” (Valsiner 2009, p.2). Ontological issues could stay implicit and neglected, as long as the ‘etant, “the mode of being”, “the particularities” were discussed within the circle of adherents of one and the same school, who implicitly had in mind the same ‘entre. However, as soon as the discussion involves representatives of different schools, ontological issues become crucial for mutual understanding and meanings of the words have to be explicated. Same words like “psyche”, “subjectivity”, “social”, “culture”, etc., ? often mean different things when they are pronounces or written by representatives of different theoretical trends. The discussion of the ‘etant without clear indicating of the ‘entre under consideration is likely to turn into a Babel. Global modernity requires constant efforts and insistent desire for mutual understanding across the diversified global scientific community. Thus, creative collaboration in epistemological developments has to ground on clear comprehension of the ontological stances of the debaters.     

Studying Canonical Analysis: A Reply To Thorndike's Comments

Robert M. Thorndike (1976) commented on the results of a Monte Carlo study on the stability of canonical correlations, canonical weights, and canonical variate-variable correlations (Barcikowski and Stevens, 1975). In this paper each of his comments are examined by the authors of the Monte Carlo Study. In addition, a possible solution to the large number of subjects necessary for stable weights and variate-variable correlations using ridge regression procedures is suggested.     

Reply to Comments on <Emphasis Type="Italic">Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom</Emphasis>

In this article I reply to comments made by Agustin Vicente and Giridhari Lal Pandit on Science and the Pursuit of Wisdom (McHenry 2009). I criticize analytic philosophy, go on to expound the argument for the need for a revolution in academic inquiry so that the basic aim becomes wisdom and not just knowledge, defend aim-oriented empiricism, outline my solution to the human world/physical universe problem, and defend the thesis that free will is compatible with physicalism.     

Reply to Letter to the Editor

The current policy of the National Institute of Health designed to increase the participation of women and minorities is radically different from previous policies designed to protect minorities from abuses in research studies. The principal arguments to support this policy are twofold: 1) Increased representation of minorities and women in research would increase the generalizability of research data and allow for valid analyses of differences in subpopulations; and 2) being in a clinical research study is advantageous to participants regardless of the final research study results. It remains unclear whether minorities find these arguments compelling. Instead of telling minorities that participation in research is good for them, the research community should focus on understanding what minority communities want from clinical research and then tailoring the message to meet this need. Persuasive arguments to promote long-term increased representation of minorities in clinical research must come from within minority communities.