Deviant Peer Affiliation and Bullying Perpetration in Adolescents: The Mediating Role of Moral Disengagement and the Moderating Role of Moral Identity

Abstract

Based on the integration of the group socialization theory and the individual–context interaction model, we examined whether moral disengagement mediated the association between deviant peer affiliation and bullying perpetration and whether this mediation model was moderated by moral identity. A total of 438 adolescents participated in the current study. They completed measures regarding deviant peer affiliation, bullying perpetration, moral disengagement, and moral identity. Deviant peer affiliation positively predicted adolescents’ bullying perpetration at six months later and this relationship was partially mediated by moral disengagement. Moral identity did not moderate the direct relationship between deviant peer affiliation and adolescents’ bullying perpetration. Moral identity moderated the relationship between moral disengagement and adolescents’ bullying perpetration and in turn moderated the indirect relationship between deviant peer affiliation and bullying perpetration. Specifically, the relationship between moral disengagement and bullying perpetration and the indirect relationship between deviant peer affiliation and bullying perpetration via moral disengagement both became nonsignificant for adolescents with high moral identity.     

Identity configurations and well-being during normative cultural conflict: The roles of multiculturals’ conflict management strategies and academic stage

Multiculturals encounter normative cultural conflicts (intrapersonal conflicts between their cultures’ norms). Yet, no research has examined how these conflicts are managed, nor their antecedents and repercussions. This article examined how these conflicts are managed using two sets of conflict management strategies (active and agreeable) and tested whether they mediate the associations between identity configurations and well-being. Also, as the benefits of having integrated selves typically increase in later life stages, this article examined whether the associations between identity configurations and well-being differ between earlier (pre-university) and later academic stages (university). In Study 1 (N = 235), active strategies mediated the link between identity integration and well-being, whereas agreeable strategies mediated the link between compartmentalization and ill-being. In Study 2 (N = 241), these results were replicated. Study 2 further showed that the association between identity integration and well-being was stronger among university than pre-university students. Implications of these results are discussed.     

Sensitivity Theory and the Individuation of Belief-Formation Methods

In this paper it is argued that sensitivity theory suffers from a fatal defect. Sensitivity theory is often glossed as: (1) S knows that p only if S would not believe that p if p were false. As Nozick showed in his pioneering work on sensitivity theory, this formulation needs to be supplemented by a further counterfactual condition: (2) S knows that p only if S would believe p if p were true. Nozick further showed that the theory needs a qualification on the method used to form the belief. However, when these complications are spelled out in detail, it becomes clear that the two counterfactuals are in irresolvable tension. To jibe with the externalist intuitions that motivate sensitivity theory in the first place, (1) needs a fine-grained grouping of belief-formation methods, but (2) needs coarse-grained grouping. It is therefore suggested that sensitivity theory is in dire straits: either its proponents need to provide a workable principle of method individuation or they must retrench and give up their claims to providing sufficient conditions for knowledge.

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II. The business of anthologies

This article examines Nozick's claim (in Anarchy, State and Utopia) to have shown that a commitment to individual liberties requires acceptance of full capitalist property rights. The main gap in Nozick's argument is that he fails to show how individuals can become entitled to full control over previously unheld resources. Nozick draws on Locke's view that title is acquired by ‘mixing one's labour’. But he excises certain (dubious) premisses on which Locke's theory relies and provides no alternative grounds for thinking that the labourer is entitled to full control over his product.     

Socially creative appraisals of rejection bolster ethnic migrants' subjective well‐being

We examined a proposition based on social identity theory that socially creative appraisals of rejection can boost the well‐being of strongly identifying ethnic migrants. We piloted this proposition amongst women (N = 80) and found that strong (but not weak) group identifiers who considered the positive views that society holds about their social identity reported higher subjective wellbeing (self‐esteem) relative to those who dwelt on rejection. In a subsequent field experiment (N = 179) conducted amongst ethnic migrants in London, we added a further social creativity treatment in which participants were encouraged to consider how they would view immigrants if they were native British (accommodation). Results revealed that the two social creativity mindsets (accommodation and positive) combined: (a) reduced perceptions of social rejection and increased optimism over the openness and fairness of society relative to a rejection mindset, (b) enhanced the self‐esteem of strongly (but not weakly) identified ethnic migrants, and (c) enhanced ethnic migrant's wellbeing by minimizing the recall of social rejection and by strengthening optimism over the host society's openness and fairness. Implications for social change are discussed.     

Creative value

Free agents can create and destroy value, for how much value is realized may well depend on what such agents choose to do. Not only may such agents create and destroy value, but such creation and destruction seem to involve a dimension of value: I call it creative value. An explication of the twin concepts of creating value and creative value is given, motivated by two desiderata. It is then shown that creative value turns out to be equivalent to what Nozick has dubbed originative value, when his suggestive remarks are given a rigorous, although very natural, interpretation. Thus two highly plausible, but quite different, ways of characterizing creative value converge on a single concept. Furthermore, the account throws considerable light on two further areas of moral theory (namely, moral satisficing and the comparison principle) which turn out, rather unexpectedly, to be linked.     

Collective Affordances

Abstract

This article develops an ecological framework for understanding collective action. This is contrasted with approaches familiar from the collective intentionality debate, which treat individuals (with collective intentions) as fundamental units of collective action. Instead, we turn to social ecological psychology and dynamical systems theory and argue that they provide a promising framework for understanding collectives as the central unit in collective action. However, we submit that these approaches do not yet appreciate enough the relevance of social identities for collective action. To analyze this aspect, we build on key insights from social identity theory and synthesize it with embodied and ecological accounts of perception and action. This results in the proposal of two new types of affordances. For an individual who enacts her “embodied social identity” of being a member of a particular collective, there can be what we call embodied social identity affordances. Moreover, when several individuals dynamically interact with each other against the background of their embodied social identities, this might lead to the emergence of a collective, which we understand as a dynamically constituted and ecologically situated perception-action system consisting of several individuals enacting relevant embodied social identity affordances. Building on previous work in social ecological psychology, we suggest that there can be genuine collective affordances, that is, affordances whose subject is not an individual, but a collective.     

Property and economic planning in Fichte's contractualism

My paper reconstructs Fichte's property theory and political economy in Foundations of Natural Right and The Closed Commercial State. Fichte's theory of property requires the rejection of the classical liberal theory of property rights. Fichte's alternative theory of property, in conjunction with his republican account of the state's role in guaranteeing individual rights, further requires the rejection of a market economy in favor of a planned economy. For Fichte's view entails the normative necessity of a political economy in which the production and transfer of goods and services, across large sectors of the economy, are mandated by the state in advance in accordance with an economic plan. As a result, Fichte reconceives his contractualism as necessarily including the negotiation of a state‐enforced plan for economic activity. Thus, Fichte's new theory of property in Foundations of Natural Right has extremely wide‐ranging implications for the rest of his political and economic thought. The negotiation of fair terms of political association characteristic of classical contractualist thought becomes in Fichte's hands the negotiation of an economic plan that defines each individual's socioeconomic rights. I conclude with some brief remarks on the sense in which Fichte's theory serves as a cautionary tale for later socialists.     

The how and the when of the social cure: A conceptual model of group- and individual-level mechanisms linking social identity to health and well-being

In this article, we aim at theoretical specification and integration of mechanisms proposed within the Social Identity Approach to Health and Well-being. We differentiate group-level and individual-level effects of shared social identity by distinguishing three different aspects: individual identification, group identification, and individually perceived group identification. We discuss specific group-level mechanisms (i.e., mutual social support and collective self-efficacy) and individual level-mechanisms (i.e., attribution and appraisal processes regarding stressors and resources) for each of the three aspects. A core conclusion is that the positive effects of shared social identity on health and well-being crucially depend on its close relationship with social support, and that although social support is an interindividual phenomenon, it is intraindividual mechanisms—attribution and appraisal—that shape the psychological partnership between social identity and social support. Therefore, we put special emphasis on cross-level interactions between group- and individual-level mechanisms, which have been widely neglected in earlier research.     

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

The morning after: Trauma,memory and the Sikh predicament since 1984

This article examines the possibilities opened up by critical international theory for the articulation of a post-nationalist diasporic Sikh identity which seeks to go beyond Khalistan. Critical theories of international relations contest the hegemony of realism within international relations (IR) by examining the origins, development and potential transformation of the bounded territorial state and the Westphalian order of territorialized nation-states. It is argued that realism, based on a positivist methodology, ‘naturalizes’ the Westphalian order by recognizing the nation-state as the only significant actor in IR. This, consequently, serves to ‘territorialize’ Sikh identity and stimulates the demand for an independent Sikh homeland, Khalistan. However, the twin processes of globalization and fragmentation have made the notion of a bordered, self-contained community that is at the heart of international political theory difficult to sustain in the post-Cold War world. This has created space for the articulation of a deterritorialized Sikh identity which challenges the Westphalian order in its rejection of sovereign statehood and its assertion of the sovereignty of the Khalsa Panth.     

罗尔斯“分配的正义观”与诺齐克“持有的正义观”对照研究

分配正当性的根据是什么 ?人的基本权利与平等的要件如何分配才是符合正义的 ?罗尔斯和诺齐克从两个向度上对此作了深入研究。罗尔斯从平等的权利出发 ,主张用“公平正义的两个原则”来取代功利主义 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当不平等 ,否则就应当平等。并要求依据“公平的正义原则”分配公共资源和自由体系 ;诺齐克从人的不可剥夺的权利出发 ,认为除非有充足理由证明应当平等 ,否则就应当不平等 ,通过“资格”理论确立“持有”的正当性。在功利主义、财产权、国家的作用、自由平等、分配模式和社会稳定的意义等方面 ,罗尔斯与诺齐克的观点也各有契合与对立。     

From philosophy to criticism of myth: Cassirer’s concept of myth

This article discusses the question whether or not Cassirer’s philosophical critique of technological use of myth in The Myth of the State implies a revision of his earlier conception and theory of myth as provided by The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In the first part, Cassirer’s early theory of myth is compared with other approaches of his time. It is claimed that Cassirer’s early approach to myth has to be understood in terms of a transcendental philosophical approach. In consequence, myth is conceived as a form of cultural consciousness which is constituted by specific symbolic processes. In the second part, the theoretical assumptions underlying Cassirer’s criticism of myth are discussed and compared with his earlier theory. It is argued that there is a strong conceptual and theoretical continuity between Cassirer’s early views on myth as a symbolic form and his later critique of technological use of myth.     

Can Collective Responsibility for Perpetrated Evil Persist over Generations?

In the first part of the paper an argument is developed to the effect that (1) there is no moral ground for individual persons to feel responsible for or guilty about crimes of their group to which they have in no way contributed; and (2) since there is no irreducibly collective responsibility nor guilt at any time, there is no question of them persisting over time. In the second part it is argued that there is nevertheless sufficient reason for innocent individual members of a group (that persists over time) to take on responsibility and guilt for the evil other (earlier) members have committed. The reason depends on the acceptability of a particular psychological theory of personal identity.     

Is identity illusory?

Certain of our traits are thought more central to who we are: they comprise our individual identity. What makes these traits privileged in this way? What accounts for their identity centrality? Although considerations of identity play a key role in many different areas of moral philosophy, I argue that we currently have no satisfactory account of the basis of identity centrality. Nor should we expect one. Rather, we should adopt an error theory: we should concede that there is nothing in reality corresponding to the perceived distinction between the central and peripheral traits of a person.     

Hume's Reflections on the Identity and Simplicity of Mind1

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet.     

The Linguistic Territoriality Principle — A Critique

In this essay, I develop a critique of the linguistic territoriality principle, which states that, for reasons related to the value of language identity, language groups should be territorially accommodated. While I acknowledge the desirability of implementing a linguistic territoriality principle in some specific cases, I claim that this principle is in general inappropriate for the ‘post‐Westphalian’ linguistic world in which we live. I identify, analyze and reject two distinct justifications for the linguistic territoriality principle: the Linguistic Context justification and the Language Survival justification. Finally, I argue for different means of giving political recognition to the fact that most people value their language as an importance source of identity. This alternative theory sets out to officially recognize multiple languages in a given territory.     

Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Robert Nozick,Libertarian?

Abstract

We set out a variety of material from Nozick’s work after -Anarchy, State, and Utopia- that tends to show that, despite his protestations of fidelity to libertarianism in-Invariances- and interviews before his death, his thought took directions inconsistent with the version of libertarianism in that book, in which only negative rights (or the ‘ethic of respect’ as he called it later) can be coercively enforced by the State. We explore one interpretive possibility, taking a second look at a footnote in ASU that acknowledges a moral permission to violate the ethic of respect under circumstances of ‘catastrophic moral horror.’     

Editorial

Austrian economics ‐ the school of thought associated with Carl Menger, Frederick von Weiser, Eugen von Bohm‐Bawerk, and in this century, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Murray N. Rothbard, and Israel Kirzner ‐ is based on a framework of methodological principles and assumptions much at variance with those of traditional or ‘orthodox’ economists. Robert Nozick, in his ‘On Austrian Methodology’, focuses attention on the most fundamental features of this framework, and subjects them to a thoroughgoing and scathing analysis. Singled out for detailed and critical review are: (1) the praxeological concepts of methodological individualism; (2) the claim that economics is an a priori science of human action; (3) the nature of preference and its relation to choice and action; and (4) the assumptions of time‐preference theory. Although Nozick does not consider Austrian views on business cycles, market process analysis, the coordinative and informational effects of the price system, competition, and several other fundamental aspects of praxeology, his criticism strikes at the very root of the praxeological school. This paper attempts to refute each criticism made of the praxeological school by Nozick on a point‐by‐point basis. It thus follows the same pattern as the original paper, and scrutinizes in detail the arguments made by its author.