The effect of presemantic acoustic adaptation on semantic “satiation”

A decrement in the strength of the meaning of a word after rapid repetition of that word has been called “semantic satiation.” This study asked whether this “satiation” might be produced by presemantic acoustic adaptation. Category words were utilized to prime the meaning of target words. The adaptation or “satiation” procedure, 30 rapid repetitions of the primes, was compared with a control condition of 3 repetitions. Participants listened to a series of prime words, each repeated by either the same speaker or many speakers, and then made semantic decisions on target words. When all the repetitions of a prime word are produced by the same speaker, presemantic and semantic repetitions are confounded. When the repetitions are produced by different speakers, presemantic acoustic repetition is abolished. A semantic decrement was detected with single-speaker, but not with multiple-speaker, repetitions of prime words. This study concluded that the semantic “satiation” observed here was a decrement in the activation level of semantic representations induced by presemantic acoustic adaptation.     

Children construct novel word meaning ad-hoc based on known words: Computational model of shape and material biases

Taking the stance that two well-known word learning biases (shape and material bias) are formed through learning (learned bias account, LBA), we illustrated a concrete computational mechanism with “ad-hoc meaning substitution (AMS)” hypothesis, and verified it by two computer simulations. AMS represents that when given a novel word and a corresponding instance, children create novel word meaning by using the known word meaning and the instance as an ad-hoc template. The AMS function enables fast mapping and vocabulary spurt. To describe the AMS process computationally, we introduced “word distributional prototype (WDP),” which is the explicit representation of word meaning with an inductive learning function. Simulation 1 revealed that when a network with WDP and AMS was given a biased vocabulary reflecting young children, it demonstrated shape, material, and overgeneralized shape biases. This result suggested that a triad of word meaning induction, ad-hoc meaning substitution, and early biased vocabulary is essential for the emergence of biases. Simulation 2 introduced the notion of maturity that denoted a degree of learning convergence for each word meaning, and then the network showed neither shape nor material bias during an early small vocabulary. This result indicated that the period at which each bias emerges is decided by maturity. Though AMS consists of simpler and valider mechanisms than those proposed in previous studies, it could reproduce behavior of shape and material biases and explain their emergence process clearly. These results suggest that phenomena concerning shape and material biases are explicable with a simple ad-hoc learning instead of meta-learning among LBA or innate language-specific ones.     

Wittgenstein on the Experience of Meaning and the Meaning of Music

On the basis of some ideas of Wittgenstein’s, an argument is presented to the effect that the ability to feel or to experience meaning conditions the ability to mean, and is thus essential to our notion of meaning. The experience of meaning, as manifested in the “fine shades” of use and behaviour, is central to Wittgenstein’s late conception of meaning. In explicating the basic elements involved here, I first try to clarify the notion of feeling and its relationship to meaning, emphasising its central role in music as explanatory of its use in language. The feeling of words, in this sense, is an objective feature of their meaning and use, and should be distinguished from feelings as psychological processes or experiences that may accompany the use of words. I then explain its philosophical significance by arguing that word‐feeling, and the “experience of meaning,” are basically instances of Wittgenstein’s general conception of aspect and aspect‐perception, which are important elements in his later conception of meaning and of thought. The nature of this experience is explicated in terms of grasping internal relations and relevant comparisons, which is manifested in a “mastery of a technique,” or “feeling at home” in a certain practice. In this sense, I argue, the ability to experience the meaning of a word is essential to the very intentionality of our thought and language. The ability to experience meaning is also a precondition for using words in a “secondary sense,” which is of great significance in itself. I conclude by pointing to the application of these notions of understanding, feeling and experience, as well as their explication in terms of comparisons, internal relations and mastery of technique, to music, where they are so apt and natural.     

Ce que soigner veut dire. Le peintre,le patient et le bon samaritain

The hyper-medicalization of our societies and our absolute confidence in curative medicine have made us gradually lose the deep meaning of the words of ailments. Many are now calling on the public authorities to promote a “policy of Care”. The use of anglicisms is certainly “trendy” but opposing “cure” and “care” does not make sense. We invite our readers to try to recover the meaning and the value of the verb to treat and the word care(s), plural and yet so singular. To carry out this quest, we will focus our attention on a few works of art which will perhaps allow us, in three stages, to (re)discover the deep meaning of the care relationship.     

Predicting raters’ transparency judgments of English and Chinese morphological constituents using latent semantic analysis

The morphological constituents of English compounds (e.g., “butter” and “fly” for “butterfly”) and two-character Chinese compounds may differ in meaning from the whole word. Subjective differences and ambiguity of transparency make judgments difficult, and a computational alternative based on a general model might be a way to average across subjective differences. In the present study, we propose two approaches based on latent semantic analysis (Landauer & Dumais in Psychological Review 104:211–240, 1997): Model 1 compares the semantic similarity between a compound word and each of its constituents, and Model 2 derives the dominant meaning of a constituent from a clustering analysis of morphological family members (e.g., “butterfingers” or “buttermilk” for “butter”). The proposed models successfully predicted participants’ transparency ratings, and we recommend that experimenters use Model 1 for English compounds and Model 2 for Chinese compounds, on the basis of differences in raters’ morphological processing in the different writing systems. The dominance of lexical meaning, semantic transparency, and the average similarity between all pairs within a morphological family are provided, and practical applications for future studies are discussed.     

The identification of metaphor

A number of philosophers, linguists and psychologists have made the dual claim that metaphor is cognitively significant and that metaphorical utterances have a meaning not reducible to literal paraphrase. Such a position requires support from an account of metaphorical meaning that can render metaphors cognitively meaningful without the reduction to literal statement. It therefore requires a theory of meaning that can integrate metaphor within its sematics, yet specify why it is not reducible to literal paraphrase. I introduce the idea of a “second-order meaning”, of which metaphor is but one instance, that is a function on literal-conventional, i.e., first-order meaning, and outline a linguistic framework designed to provide a representation of linguistic meaning for both. This framework is designed to represent linguistic units ranging from a single word to an entire text since I argue that the by-now familiar position that the sentence is the appropriate unit for metaphor has mislead us into asking the wrong questions about metaphorical meaning. With this apparatus, we can specify the conditions under which an utterance may transcend the constraints on first-order meaning (transgressions not always apparent on the sentential level), without thereby being “meaningless”. Conversely, we can specify the conditions that may render apparently odd utterances first-order meaningful rather than metaphorical. In this way we see how metaphorical language differs both from deviant language and from specialized language such as technical language, fanciful and fantastical language (in fairy tales, science fiction, etc.).     

The Science of Philosophy

If philosophy consists of conceptual analysis, is it thereby debarred from being a science? This article argues that it is not and that philosophy so conceived is a science. The argument takes the form of careful attention to the meaning of “science,” “experiment,” “empirical,” and related words. Philosophy is a formal science. This does not mean it is not part of the humanities. The role of observation in other kinds of science is investigated. There is more methodological homogeneity in the various sciences, including philosophy, than has been recognized, despite some clear differences. Seeing this helps restore philosophy to its rightful place in the academic firmament.     

Differential cerebral involvement in the cognitive functioning of bilinguals

The cognitive processing strategies of two groups of French-English bilinguals were studied by means of an auditory Stroop test designed to evaluate cerebral hemispheric involvement. An “early bilingual” group were bilingual before the age of 5, and a “late bilingual” group were bilingual after the age of 10. Stimuli were words uttered in pitches that were related to word meanings either congruently (as in the word “high” uttered in a high pitch) or incongruently (the word “haute” uttered in a low pitch). In one condition, subjects were to differentiate low from high pitches, disregarding meaning, while in a second condition, they were to disregard pitch and respond to word meanings. Measures of field independence were also taken. Results of data analyses suggest that male early bilinguals—the most field independent subgroup—process meaning efficiently in both cerebral hemispheres, but process pitch better in the right hemisphere. However, male late bilinguals and female bilinguals, both early and late, process meaning more rapidly in the right cerebral hemisphere and pitch equally rapidly in both hemispheres. The findings are interpreted as reflecting hemisphere-based strategy and sex differences in information-processing by the two bilingual groups.     

Thinking through thinking: Deleuze and “the dogmatic image of thought”

In my philosophical thinking, I have followed many of those influenced by Heidegger and Nietzsche (particularly Derrida, Lacan and Deleuze) who argue that philosophy has been colonised from its inception by a specific understanding of what thinking entails. Deleuze articulates this form of colonisation in terms of the eight postulates of “the dogmatic image of thought”. This article responds to the disconcerting realisation, elicited by three encounters, that despite my “philosophising about” a disruptive thinking in the name of complexity, my practice of thinking remains deeply habituated by “the dogmatic image of thought” and I have yet to begin thinking as “habitual disturbance” and an “adventure of learning”. To show why an effort to think through thinking remains important for philosophy in South Africa, I tie this reflection to specific provocations (a conference theme entitled “Philosophy in/as Translation”; a pointed remark that “there is no African word for ‘identity’”). However, the topic of the provocations should not mislead readers to expect scholarship about general relationships between philosophy, translation and decolonisation, although these terms are entangled. Instead, I focus on “thinking”. I discuss a personal response to the remark regarding the untranslatability of “identity” through the lens of Deleuze’s critique of “the dogmatic image of thought”, and reminded by the conference theme that this response is situated in the South African academic context where issues of decolonisation form the underlying fabric of intellectual work. From out of this entanglement I consider what philosophy’s internal decolonisation might entail.

“Thus, to ‘philosophize’ about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that is shattered” (Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”).     

The Convergent Conceptions of Being in Mainstream Analytic and Postmodern Continental Philosophy

This article argues that there is ultimately a very close convergence between prominent conceptions of being in mainstream Anglo‐American philosophy and mainstream postmodern Continental philosophy. One characteristic idea in Anglo‐American or analytic philosophy is that we establish what is meaningful and so what we can say about what is, by making evident the limits of sense or what simply cannot be meant. A characteristic idea in Continental philosophy of being is that being emerges through contrast and interplay with what it is not, with what has no being at all and so is beyond sense. The two traditions consequently conceive being in significantly related ways. As a result, what the Continental tradition gets at with “the meaning of being as such and in general,” and how it gets at it, has much in common with what the Anglo‐American tradition gets at, and how it gets at it, by establishing “what can be meaningfully said.”     

Is Philosophy All About the Meaning of Life?

This article defends a conception of philosophy popular outside the discipline but unpopular within it: that philosophy is unified by a concern with the meaning of life. First, it argues against exceptionalist theses according to which philosophy is unique among academic disciplines in not being united by a distinctive subject matter. It then presents a positive account, showing that the issue of the meaning of life is uniquely able to reveal unity between the practical and theoretical concerns of philosophy, while meeting a range of desiderata for a typical specification of subject matter. After showing how recent analytic work on “the meaning of life” has conflated the traditional question with issues of social meaningfulness, it offers an explanation of why the traditional question has become marginalised in philosophy. The reasons are not good, however, so it concludes that philosophy should embrace its popular image.     

What Am I? Virtual Machines and the Mind/Body Problem

When your word processor or email program is running on your computer, this creates a “virtual machine” that manipulates windows, files, text, etc. What is this virtual machine, and what are the virtual objects it manipulates? Many standard arguments in the philosophy of mind have exact analogues for virtual machines and virtual objects, but we do not want to draw the wild metaphysical conclusions that have sometimes tempted philosophers in the philosophy of mind. A computer file is not made of epiphenomenal ectoplasm. I argue instead that virtual objects are “supervenient objects.” The stereotypical example of supervenient objects is the statue and the lump of clay. To this end I propose a theory of supervenient objects. Then I turn to persons and mental states. I argue that my mental states are virtual states of a cognitive virtual machine implemented on my body, and a person is a supervenient object supervening on this cognitive virtual machine.     

Thinking About a Word—Love,for Example

What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word.     

Understanding Satisfaction: An Analysis of the Meaning Potential of the Word “Satisfaction” in Everyday Norwegian Language

Satisfaction with life is often considered to be a component of or a synonym for subjective well-being. However, the meaning of “satisfaction” is rarely discussed in the scientific literature. The purpose of this study was to examine the meaning potential of the Norwegian term for satisfaction (tilfredshet). A conceptual analysis was conducted based on the qualitative responses of 276 Norwegian adults to the question “What is satisfaction for you?” Based on principles of thematic analysis, text data units were examined to develop a framework of recurrent themes and superordinate categories. The analysis demonstrated that the word “satisfaction” in everyday Norwegian language does not unequivocally point toward a unitary, clear-cut affective or evaluative phenomenon. Instead, its meaning potential was found to include material, physiological and interpersonal conditions, activities, internal psychological states, and circumstances and contexts of well-being, connected by temporal and causal assumptions. In addition to hedonic understandings, eudaimonic and processual conceptualizations of satisfaction were identified. Findings support a conceptual co-existence of satisfaction as satisficing (conditions evaluated as good enough) and as more optimal fulfilment (conditions evaluated as good). Further qualitative studies of conceptual understanding across cultural contexts and languages are recommended.     

Short‐term and working memory: Past,progress, and prospects

Abstract

The role of current personal experience in understanding of word meaning was investigated in a patient, WM, who suffers from semantic dementia. The study was prompted by the observation that WM, despite being severely impaired on formal tests of word comprehension and naming, retained a range of vocabulary pertaining to her daily life. If autobiographical experience has a general facilitatory effect, then this should affect which concepts are retained and which lost, but not influence the quality of that conceptual knowledge. Conversely, if personal autobiography has a direct role in investing concepts with meaning, then WM's understanding of nominal terms that she uses spontaneously in conversation ought not to be normal, but should be constrained by the autobiographical context in which she uses those terms. WM could define nouns and noun phrases drawn from her conversational vocabulary, but her definitions had a markedly autobiographical quality. Moreover, WM was extremely impaired in her ability to define new noun phrases, constructed by combining words from her conversational vocabulary (e.g. “dog licence”, constructed from “driving licence” and “dog” “oil field” constructed from “oil” and “field”). It was concluded that WM does not have normal conceptual understanding of nouns and noun phrases that she uses appropriately in conversation. Her understanding is narrow and autobiographically constrained. The findings, which suggest an interactive relationship between autobiographical and semantic memory, have implications for understanding of the progressive breakdown of semantic knowledge.     

Sentence perception units and levels of syntactic structure

Subjects listened to recorded sentences which were followed by probe words. They performed a next-word naming task—uttering the word that followed the probe word in the original sentence as quickly as possible. Other things being equal, naming latencies are longer when the juncture between the probe word and the response word in the original sentence sequence terminates a “functionally complete” unit than when this position corresponds to the boundary of a “functionally incomplete” unit. These results are not predicted by existent “syntactic” theories of sentence perception units, and these theories are to that extent shown to be inadequate. A “functional” program for the study of sentence perception is suggested.     

Psychoanalysis: The Sacred and the Profane

Colleagues from a variety of perspectives have written about the propensity to enshrine psychoanalytic theory. The meaning of the word “enshrine” is to cherish as sacred an idea or philosophy and protect it from change. In other words, the way we view psychoanalysis, our theories of mind and technique, become holy writ and we have divided the world of theory into the sacred and the profane. This is the kiss of death for theory, which must constantly evolve and change, but comforting for the analyst who believes he is on the side of the right, the sacred. In this paper I will discuss how our propensity to enshrine theory has had a debilitating effect on the development of psychoanalysis and, in particular, as a treatment for the most vulnerable people who seek our help. I also address the idea that movement away from enshrined positions allows us to construct different versions of reality. In this context, the notion of “action at a distance” is presented along with the attendant idea of psychoanalytic entanglement.     

The Impact of Stimuli Color in Lexical Decision and Semantic Word Categorization Tasks

In two experiments, we examined the impact of color on cognitive performance by asking participants to categorize stimuli presented in three different colors: red, green, and gray (baseline). Participants were either asked to categorize the meaning of words as related to the concepts of “go” or “stop” (Experiment 1) or to indicate if a neutral verbal stimulus was a word or not (lexical decision task, Experiment 2). Overall, we observed performance facilitation in response to go stimuli presented in green (vs. red or gray) and performance inhibition in response to go stimuli presented in red. The opposite pattern was observed for stop‐related stimuli. Importantly, results also indicated that color might also be used to categorize neutral stimuli. Overall, these findings provide support to the green‐go and red‐stop color associations and test the potential functional autonomy acquired by these colors and the boundary conditions to their effects on stimuli categorization.     

Pictures in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy

The word “picture” occurs pervasively in Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Not only does Wittgenstein often use literal pictures or the notion of mental pictures in his investigations, but he also frequently uses “picture” to speak about a way of conceiving of a matter (e.g. “A picture held us captive” at Philosophical Investigations§115). I argue that “picture” used in this conceptual sense is not a shorthand for an assumption or a set of propositions but is rather an expression of conceptual bedrock on the model of an organising myth. This reading builds primarily on work by Gordon Baker and Stanley Cavell.