Epistemological principles for developmental psychology in Frege and Piaget

My main aim is to identify and discuss parallels between the epistemologies of Gottlob Frege and Jean Piaget. Although their work has attracted massive attention individually, parallels in their work have gone unnoticed. My discussion is in four parts and covers psychologism and epistemology; five epistemological criteria in Frege's rational epistemology under an AEIOU mnemonic, namely autonomy, entailment, intersubjectivity, objectivity and universality; the elaboration of these same criteria in Piaget's developmental epistemology; their implications for developmental psychology and epistemology. One main conclusion is that the same criteria fit both Frege's and Piaget's epistemology. A second conclusion is that Piaget's developmental epistemology can be regarded as an elaboration of Frege's rational epistemology in each of these five respects on both methodological and substantive grounds. Both conclusions are compatible with non-psychologism, which was accepted by both Frege and Piaget.     

Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism

Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods. This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology.     

FEMINIST THEORY, FEMINIST PSYCHOLOGY

A selection of recent (post-1980) works on feminist theory and method, this bibliography includes literature from psychology and other social sciences, feminist studies, and philosophy of science. The first of its four sections concerns epistemology and metatheory. The second lists works that offer reformulations or critical analyses of key concepts in gender studies; many of these are grounded in social constructionist and feminist standpoint epistemologies. The third section cites writings that illustrate the potential of new epistemological stances or exemplify new ways of working. The last section lists related bibliographies. (232 entries.)     

Researching the Family Theories of Schizophrenia: An Exercise in Epistemological Confusion

Some, but not all, of the family theories of schizophrenia entail a shift from the Aristotelian/Cartesian/Newtonian epistemology of individual psychology to a systemic epistemology of pattern. Perhaps the most significant (and underappreciated) aspect of this epistemological shift pertains to etiology: The family theories of schizophrenia espoused by Bateson et al. and by Wynne and Singer do not claim that parents or families cause schizophrenia. The persistent failure of researchers to appreciate this has led to many fruitless studies that have sought to discover a causal link between the thought disorder and communication deviance of parents and the schizophrenia of their offspring. This paper reviews from an epistemological viewpoint the empirical literature that has attempted to assess the validity of the family theories of schizophrenia. Particular attention is given to restating and extending the epistemology of pattern within which schizophrenia occurs. The conventional psychiatric approaches to schizophrenia are shown to play an active role within the schizophrenic pattern.     

个体认识论的研究现状与展望

个体认识论是个体对知识性质和认识过程的信念,这些信念深刻地影响知识获得和知识建构过程。学生的认识信念是理解学生学习过程的关键成分之一。关于个体认识论研究有个体认识论的发展研究、个体认识的信念系统研究和个体认识的元认知过程研究等三种主要研究取向,这些研究取向既面临着新的问题又各具挑战性的展望     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck

The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call "veritic" epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call "reflective" epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal.     

个人认识论理论概述

个人认识论是个体对知识和知识获得所持有的信念,它对个体的认知过程及行为有重要的调节作用。该文在对文献资料进行梳理的基础上,系统介绍了个人认识论研究中相关理论,其中包括个人认识论的各发展模型,多维度的认识论信念系统模型以及认识论“理论”的观点和认识论资源的观点。最后,该文指出个人认识论的未来研究应该运用多种多样的研究方法提出更整合的理论,并解决有关个人认识论领域一般性和领域特殊性的争议问题     

An empirically feasible approach to the epistemology of arithmetic

Recent years have seen an explosion of empirical data concerning arithmetical cognition. In this paper that data is taken to be philosophically important and an outline for an empirically feasible epistemological theory of arithmetic is presented. The epistemological theory is based on the empirically well-supported hypothesis that our arithmetical ability is built on a protoarithmetical ability to categorize observations in terms of quantities that we have already as infants and share with many nonhuman animals. It is argued here that arithmetical knowledge developed in such a way cannot be totally conceptual in the sense relevant to the philosophy of arithmetic, but neither can arithmetic understood to be empirical. Rather, we need to develop a contextual a priori notion of arithmetical knowledge that preserves the special mathematical characteristics without ignoring the roots of arithmetical cognition. Such a contextual a priori theory is shown not to require any ontologically problematic assumptions, in addition to fitting well within a standard framework of general epistemology.     

Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment Dedicated to Günther Patzig on his 85th birthday

This essay aims to sharpen debates on the pros and cons of historical epistemology, which is now understood as a novel approach to the study of knowledge, by comparing it with the history of epistemology as traditionally pursued by philosophers. The many versions of both approaches are not always easily discernable. Yet, a reasoned comparison of certain versions can and should be made. In the first section of this article, I argue that the most interesting difference involves neither the subject matter nor goal, but the methods used by the two approaches. In the second section, I ask which of the two approaches or methods is more promising given that both historical epistemologists and historians of epistemology claim to contribute to epistemology simpliciter. Using traditional problems concerning the epistemic role of perception, I argue that the historical epistemologies of Wartofsky and Daston and Galison fail to show that studying practices of perception is philosophically significant. Standard methods from the history of epistemology are more promising, as I show by means of reconstructing arguments in a debate about the relation between perception and judgment in psychological research on the famous moon illusion.     

From Logos to Pathos in Social Psychology and Academic Argumentation: Reconciling Postmodernism and Positivism in a Sociology of Persuasion

This paper argues that one can empirically test, via positivist methods, the post-modern attack on positivist epistemologies: Postmodern perspectives hold Knowledge and Truth to be intersubjective, consensus-driven social constructions. But traditional scientific approaches to knowledge, exemplified here by the cognitive social psychology of persuasion, seem oblivious to this and continue to detach the study of attitudes, beliefs, and emotions from that of knowledge, facts, and reason. Abandoning these artificial distinctions in both epistemology and method would enable this social psychology, reconstituted as a Sociology of Persuasion, to contribute greatly to illuminating the processes of Truth and Knowledge construction in social interaction. Moreover, this would facilitate academic engagement in civic discourse.     

Historizing Epistemology in Psychology

The conflict between the psychometric methodological framework and the particularities of human experiences reported in psychotherapeutic context led Michael Schwarz to raise the question whether psychology is based on a methodological error. I take this conflict as a heuristic tool for the reconstruction of the early history of psychology, which bears witness to similar epistemological conflicts, though the dominant historiography of psychology has largely forgotten alternative conceptions and their valuable insights into complexities of psychic phenomena. In order to work against the historical amnesia in psychology I suggest to look at cultural-historical contexts which decisively shaped epistemological choices in psychology. Instead of keeping epistemology and history of psychology separate, which nurtures individualism and naturalism in psychology, I argue for historizing epistemology and for historical psychology. From such a historically reflected perspective psychology in contemporary world can be approached more critically.     

Moving beyond the enduring dominance of positivism in psychological research: Implications for psychology in Australia

Almost since its inception, the dominant narrative of modern psychology has embraced positivism through its insistence that psychological science is objective, generalisable, and value free (or neutral). Consequently, quantitative research and, in particular, experimental designs, are privileged over other forms of enquiry, and other epistemologies, methodologies, and methods remain marginalised within the discipline. We argue that the enduring hegemony of positivism needs to be opposed to enable psychology to genuinely understand the antecedents of, and provide meaningful sustainable solutions for, complex human issues without being constrained by a narrow focus on method. We discuss the ways in which psychology in Australia can move towards embracing a constructionist epistemology that provides the framework for methodological pluralism. We provide a number of suggestions for change across the interrelated areas of accreditation, curriculum, the Australian Psychological Society, and research.     

皮亚杰理论近期的若干发展──差别观点的贡献

皮亚杰认知发展理论的一个新趋势是从智力发展的认识论过渡到智力发展的心理学,差别心理学的近期实验研究为这一过渡提供了方法。后皮亚杰学派理论对差别心理的强调在教育学和临床心理学中有着重要意义。     

Reflective Equilibrium as an Ameliorative Framework for Feminist Epistemology

As Helen Longino's overview of Hypatia's engagement with feminist epistemology suggests, the last twenty‐five years’ contributions to this field reveal a strong focus on the topic of knowledge. In her short outline, Longino questions this narrow focus on knowledge in epistemological inquiry. The main purpose of this article is to provide a framework for systematically taking up the questions raised by Longino, one that prevents us from running the risk of becoming unreflectively involved in sexist, racist, or otherwise problematic inquiry. I argue that a specific form of the method of Reflective Equilibrium, as it is widely discussed in moral epistemology, logic, and theories of rationality, enables us to cope with the problems of traditional epistemology, which feminist theorizers such as Sally Haslanger have pointed to. With the account of Reflective Equilibrium I am offering—drawing in many respects on the model provided by Catherine Z. Elgin—we have an ameliorative method that allows us to rethink epistemological values, goals, and standards in a systematic way, and that largely avoids implicit and explicit biases in epistemology.     

OUTSOURCED COGNITION

Recent developments in technologically enabled social cognition call for a rethinking of many aspects of human cognition. According to the hypothesis of extended cognition, we must revise our psychological categories by eliminating allegedly superficial distinctions between internal cognition and external processes. As an alternative to this proposal, I outline a hypothesis of outsourced cognition which seeks to respect distinctions that are operative in both folk psychology and the social and cognitive sciences. According to this hypothesis, the cognitive states and processes of the individual are substantially and explanatorily distinct from the relevant external states and processes. In consequence, the individual remains a cognitive unit that is both central and indispensable in the explanations of cognitive science. As a case study, I consider the epistemology of testimony. I will argue that important epistemological categories may be preserved by adopting the hypothesis of outsourced cognition over the hypothesis of extended cognition. Moreover, I will argue that the outsourced cognition hypothesis deepens the problems that beset an extended epistemology of testimony.     

Aristotle's ontogenesis: a theory of individuation which integrates the classical and developmental perspectives

The effects of the classical/developmental split in analytical psychology are described. No underlying issues explaining the nature of the split have been clearly enunciated. The schools can, however, be distinguished by their differing epistemologies. These are the hermeneutic and transcendental branches of phenomenology. The use of these epistemologies leads their proponents to either an immanent or transcendent concept of the divine, respectively. The theoretical break between Freud and Jung can, in part, be attributed to their espousal of determinism and teleology, respectively. This conflict has been continued in analytical psychology with the developmentalists most often advocating determinism, and the classicists usually championing teleology. The dissimilar causal theories lead to different concepts of the nature of individuation. Aristotle's fourfold theory of causality, of which determinism and teleology are two categories, can be seen to be an ontogenic theory rather than a classification of causal influences. Applying his theory to the process of individuation provides an ontogenesis that more accurately describes the process itself, and unifies the developmental and classical theories. Intimations of this formulation in Jung's work are described. More explicit conceptions of this idea in the work of two contemporary analytical psychologists and that of Wilfred Bion are also presented.