On the meaning of the notion of conflict and its study in social psychology

This study is an attempt, based on historical materialism (the science of the history of social formations), to critically analyze the notion of conflict as social psychology has defined it and as social psychology has developed it with models of non-zero sum games imported from game theory. Whether it concerns the postulate of conflict resolution (which governs this domain of social psychology), or the ideological foundations of the notion of conflict, the structure of a game of the ‘PDG’ type and the imaginary trap it orms, or even the staging which the psycho-sociologist produces in utilizing this model, it is shown that this whole proceeding is an ideological construction which functions principally as an obstacle to true scientific knowledge of the field it covers — which can be defined as constituted by the relationships between the subjective and the political — and secondly as the raw material for a theory of ideology, which is understood as having the double function of recognition and misappreciation. Both tasks demand intensive theoretical study as part of the development of storical materialism and, from that point of view, this work should be considered only as a preliminary study.     

The invention of uncertainty in American psychology: intellectual conflict and rhetorical resolution, 1890-1930

A sharp and personal polemical style characterized psychology as a new human science in American universities at the turn of the 20th century. When the experimental pursuit of truth about the mind produced quarreling rather than clarity, psychologists experienced a crisis of confidence. One solution was rhetorical: the use of a disclaimer that all current knowledge was rudimentary and a call for further research to end contention. The wording established a public tone of modesty and fostered collegiality. Scientific disagreements and underlying personal tensions remained, but conventional phrases promising future resolution of disputes contributed to a language of good manners and thereby facilitated debate. Nonetheless, the verbal formula of deferred hopes also made uncertainty seem normative. Confessions of tentativeness helped lay a historical foundation for routine investigation in psychology, but emphasis on incompleteness as an explanation of discord also made experimentation seem perpetual and truth elusive.     

Structural conflict and object relations conflict.

A hierarchical model of the mind is required for a more integrated understanding of psychic conflict. At a higher developmental level, the hierarchical model includes the tripartite model, and at a lower level it includes an object-relations model. Psychic conflicts may be classified into object relations conflicts and structural conflicts. The object-relations class of psychic conflict covers the phase of psychic development prior to id-ego-superego differentiation. The earlier psychoanalytic writings tended to ascribe all kinds of symptoms, conflicts, and disorders to structural conflicts. Logical and empirical evidence against the universality of structural conflicts in various disorders and symptoms, even psychoneurotic symptoms, has been summarized and discussed.     

冲突管理研究中的冲突定义

近年来许多学者致力于冲突管理的研究,在已有的研究成果中,对冲突的定义不尽相同。本文对先前研究中学者们对冲突所下的定义做以总结。在阅读了大量文献资料的基础上,本文按照不同意见、负面情感、恶意妨碍三个方面对冲突的定义进行分类,共总结出关于冲突的七种定义。对于每种定义,本文都阐述了冲突的产生及其对组织的影响。     

The elusive link between conflict and conflict adaptation

A core tenet of the original conflict-monitoring model is that regulation is triggered automatically when conflict is present and that the same regulation mechanism explains both trial-to-trial adaptation effects as well as effects of block-wise conflict manipulations. We present here results from two experiments using the Stroop task that show (a) that adaptation effects in the absence of response repetitions may occur only at the beginning of testing and that (b) robust block-wise effects can be found even in the absence of trial-by-trial effects. Furthermore, we show that the failure to eliminate target-to-distractor repetitions can produce artificial trial-to-trial adaptation effects. Based on the evidence of a weak link between conflict and conflict adaptation, we argue that a wider range of possible reasons for conflict adaptation effects needs to be taken into consideration.     

Exploring relations between task conflict and informational conflict in the Stroop task

In this study, we tested the proposal that the Stroop task involves two conflicts—task conflict and informational conflict. Task conflict was defined as the latency difference between color words and non-letter neutrals, and manipulated by varying the proportion of color words versus non-letter neutrals. Informational conflict was defined as the latency difference between incongruent and congruent trials and manipulated by varying the congruent-to-incongruent trial ratio. We replicated previous findings showing that increasing the ratio of incongruent-to-congruent trials reduces the latency difference between the incongruent and congruent condition (i.e., informational conflict), as does increasing the proportion of color words (i.e., task conflict). A significant under-additive interaction between the two proportion manipulations (congruent vs. incongruent and color words vs. neutrals) indicated that the effects of task conflict and informational conflict were not additive. By assessing task conflict as the contrast between color words and neutrals, we found that task conflict existed in all of our experimental conditions. Under specific conditions, when task conflict dominated behavior by explaining most of the variability between congruency conditions, we also found negative facilitation, thus demonstrating that this effect is a special case of task conflict.     

The relationship between scientific psychology and common-sense psychology

This paper explores the relationship between common-sense psychology (CSP) and scientific psychology (SP) — which we could call the mind-mind problem. CSP has come under much attack recently, most of which is thought to be unjust or misguided. This paper's first section examines the many differences between the aims, interests, explananda, explanantia, methodology, conceptual frameworks, and relationships to the neurosciences, that divide CSP and SP. Each of the two is valid within its own territory, and there is no competition between them — primarily because CSP is not, and has no interest in being, a scientific theory. In the second section some implications are drawn. First, neither CSP nor SP has the mind-body problem in its familiar form. Second, CSP, for excellent reasons, is not equipped to handle irrational or non-rational behaviour; there are some grounds for believing that this can and should be the task of SP. Third, philosophical psychology, or armchair theories of action, perception, etc., are doomed to failure. And, fourth, the realm of the psychological is so heterogeneous that no single model for either CSP or SP is likely to succeed.     

Stimulus conflict predicts conflict adaptation in a numerical flanker task

Conflict monitoring theory states that response conflict triggers conflict adaptation, resulting in reduced congruency effects after response-incongruent trials (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Verbruggen, Notebaert, Liefooghe, and Vandierendonck (2006) observed conflict adaptation after stimulus-incongruent trials without any response conflict. In this study, we further explore the hypothesis that stimulus conflict is an important trigger for conflict adaptation. We propose a measure for stimulus conflict that adequately explains the data of Verbruggen et al. and new data from a numerical flanker task. We conclude that stimulus conflict and response conflict have dissociable effects on behavior Whereas response conflict is a good predictor of response times, stimulus conflict is a better predictor of the adaptation effect.