The Competent Judge Problem

We face an epistemic problem in competently judging some types of experience. The problem arises when an experience either defies our efforts to assess its quality, such as a traumatic event, or compromises our abilities to assess quality in general, such as starvation. In the latter type of case, the competent judge problem is actually a paradox since the experience undermines our competence to judge at the same time that it gives us competence to judge it against other experiences. The problem is pressing because it arises for experiences at the more extreme ends of the spectrum, which are precisely the experiences we most want to judge competently. It also has implications for how we approach some practical ethical problems, such as solitary confinement. The paper explores a range of cases and explains why efforts to escape the competent judge problem may prove fruitless. 1     

Meaning and learning: Response to Moerk

In response to Moerk (1986, Developmental Review, 6, 365–385) the following points are discussed: (a) Semantic and conceptual development must be conceived in terms of systems that undergo developmental change, (b) Objects are viewed as embedded in events and as being conceptualized first within a syntagmatic and later a paradigmatic system, (c) While the nature of the input to the child is important, its effects cannot be considered independently of the state of the child's conceptual and linguistic system. (d) The neurological considerations discussed by Moerk are not relevant to the particular developmental issues discussed in my book.     

What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social Sciences?

This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations. Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems, consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed.     

What is global supervenience?

The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience.     

Working Together,We Get the Job Done: Responses to Susan Bodnar and Philip Cushman

In his response, Samuels argues that the issues under discussion are more of a work in progress than Bodnar claims and that therapists are more accurately perceived of as construction workers than the philosophers and theorists that Cushman wants them to be. More detail is given on working with political material in the session. Economics is presented as a field for exploration in therapy. Certain philosophers are cited for their relevance to clinical work. Theory as bricolage is suggested. Further material on the role of the arts in connection with progressive therapy practice is introduced. Questions of language are discussed.     

Love,money and madness: Money in the economic philosophies of Adam Smith and Jean-Jacques Rousseau

In this paper, the economic philosophies of Adam Smith (1723–1790) and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) are discussed, with special reference to their respective views on money. It is argued that self-love plays an important role in their philosophies of money. For Smith, self-love is the foundation of economic activity and a means to quantify exchange relations. Rousseau, in turn, rejects money because of the possibility that it may give rise to destructive and narcissistic forms of self-love—which he calls amour-propre. It seems that Smith's and Rousseau's views of money are in opposition to each other; however, both argue that their view of money becomes unsustainable, if not qualified, by the embedded tension present in self-love. For Smith, self-love must remain in tension with sympathy for the economy to function, as discussed in his Theory of Moral Sentiments. Rousseau concedes that in society both amour-propre and amour de soi (passionate, sacrificial love) are necessary. This tension introduces a moment of madness that may have important implications when contemporary philosophies of economics engage issues such as economic inequality and poverty.     

Eating disorders and obesity

The majority of patients with eating disorders are female. Most of those seeking treatment for weight loss are also women. Our culture views slenderness as beautiful, creating pressure to be thin. For some, however, the pursuit of thinness may be a way to avoid difficult developmental tasks, increase self-acceptance or get approval from others. Whatever its purpose, seeking slimness can lead to health problems as a result of starvation, binging and purging, or rapid cycles of weight loss and gain. Starvation and the binge-purge cycle themselves also create psychological problems. In this article, the etiology, maintenance and treatment of anorexia nervosa and bulimia are discussed from a cognitive-behavioral perspective. Attention is given to the interplay of physical, psychological and behavioral aspects of these disorders. Although obesity is a physical condition, not an emotional disorder, many women are distressed over their size due to the influence of cultural demands for thinness. The psychotherapist working with weight control may face the dilemma of whether to help a woman accept herself at her size or lose weight. Some guidelines for making a decision are discussed. Cognitions impeding weight loss are identified, and advances in cognitive-behavioral weight loss treatment are discussed.Jill Bresler is a psychologist in private practice and is on staff at the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, New York City     

Wittgenstein,Quasi-fideism,and Scepticism

In the discussion of certainties, or ‘hinges’, in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty some of the examples that Wittgenstein uses are religious ones. He remarks on how a child might be raised so that they ‘swallow down’ belief in God (§107) and in discussing the role of persuasion in disagreements he asks us to think of the case of missionaries converting natives (§612). In the past decade Duncan Pritchard has made a case for an account of the rationality of religious belief inspired by On Certainty which he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. Pritchard argues that religious beliefs are just like ordinary non-religious beliefs in presupposing fundamental arational commitments. However, Modesto Gómez-Alonso has recently argued that there are significant differences between the kinds of ‘hinges’ discussed in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and religious beliefs such that we should expect an account of rationality in religion to be quite different to the account of rational practices and their foundations that we find in Wittgenstein’s work. Fundamental religious commitments are, as Wittgenstein said, in the foreground of the religious believer’s life whereas hinge commitments are said to be in the background. People are passionately committed to their religious beliefs but it is not at all clear that people are passionately committed to hinges such as that ‘I have two hands’. I argue here that although there are differences between religious beliefs and many of the hinge-commitments discussed in On Certainty religious beliefs are nonetheless hinge-like. Gómez-Alonso’s criticisms of Pritchard mischaracterise his views and something like Pritchard’s quasi-fideism is the correct account of the rationality of religious belief.

     

Population and Third World Assistance –A Comment on Hardin's Lifeboat Ethics

Many philosophers have defended the view that well-off people or nations have an obligation to assist people who suffer from famine in less developed areas of the world. However, in contrast to this outlook, some theorists have claimed that it is ethically wrong to provide this kind of assistance. In this article the non-assistance view is discussed. It is argued that even if a neo-Malthusian population theory is correct and if we accept a maximizing policy which allows the relevant weighing of evils, there may still be an obligation to assist the victims of starvation in poor countries.     

Marginal distributions for the estimation of proportions inm groups

A Bayesian Model II approach to the estimation of proportions inm groups (discussed by Novick, Lewis, and Jackson) is extended to obtain posterior marginal distributions for the proportions. It is anticipated that these will be useful in applications (such as Individually Prescribed Instruction) where decisions are to be made separately for each proportion, rather than jointly for the set of proportions. In addition, the approach is extended to allow greater use of prior information than previously and the specification of this prior information is discussed.We are grateful to a reviewer for suggestions that made possible a more concise and complete presentation of our work.     

Beltrami's model and the independence of the parallel postulate

In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell's Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his philosophy due to his distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). However, I show that while the paradox as Russell formulates it is ill-formed with Frege's extant logical system, if Frege's system is expanded to contain the commitments of his philosophy of language, an analogue of this paradox is formulable. This and other concerns in Fregean intensional logic are discussed, and it is discovered that Frege's logical system, even without its naive class theory embodied in its infamous Basic Law V, leads to inconsistencies when the theory of sense and reference is axiomatized therin. therein.     

The Consistency of Multiple-Pronunciation Effects in Reading: The Case of Japanese Logographs

Naming latencies were measured for single- and multiple-reading (pronunciation) kanji words with two frequency levels in Experiment 1. Results showed that multiple-reading kanji are named much slower than are single-reading controls, the effect of multiple reading being greater than that of frequency. There was found to be measurable competition between two readings of a multiple-reading kanji. In Experiment 2, it was demonstrated that there are multiple-reading kanji which are named as fast as single-reading kanji, thereby showing that no significant competition is induced in them. In light of the theoretical perspective in this study, the conflicting results reported by previous studies are discussed.     

Self-attention and self-report: The "veridicality" hypothesis

Wicker (1969) summarized the state of the art in the area of attitude/behavior consistency by suggesting that attitude measures are often only slightly related to overt behaviors. Since that time literally hundreds of studies have been conducted dealing with the question of how the predictive validity of self-assessment can be improved—above the 30 figure that Wicker suggested represents the typical upper limit of correlations between self-reported attitudes and behavior. This article deals with perhaps one of the simplest factors that does appear to be related to accurate self-assessment: internal focus of attention. Research in the area of self-awareness theory is discussed, leading to the conclusion that assessments of various aspects of the self, including attitudes, cognitions, and affective and somatic states, usually are more accurate when they are made by a respondent whose attention is self-directed. By the same token, overt behavior also tends to be more consistent with previously expressed attitudes when it occurs under conditions conducive to self-focus. In discussing this research, it is suggested that self-awareness promotes accuracy in two ways: (a) It focuses the respondent's attention more carefully on those aspects of the self made relevant by the instrument and (b) it increases the person's motivation to report accurately on those self-dimensions. It is also suggested, however, that this latter factor can sometimes work against consistency. In this regard, a variety of situations are discussed in which motives that may conflict with the desire to report accurately, such as ego-protectiveness, are also enhanced by self-focused attention. Finally, a number of empirical questions are presented as guidelines for future research.     

The Metaphysics of Mental Files

There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the ‘same MOP’ relation. For mental files, these transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOPs.     

Process Overlap Theory: A Unified Account of the General Factor of Intelligence

The most replicated result in the field of intelligence is the positive manifold, which refers to an all-positive pattern of correlations among diverse cognitive tests. The positive manifold is typically described by a general factor, or g. In turn, g is often identified as general intelligence, yet this explanation is contradicted by a number of results. Here we offer a new account of g: process overlap theory. According to the theory, cognitive tests tap domain-general executive processes, identified primarily in research on working memory, as well as more domain-specific processes. Executive processes are tapped in an overlapping manner across cognitive tests such that they are required more often than domain-specific ones. The theory provides an account of a number of findings on human intelligence. As well, it is formalized as a multidimensional item response model and as a structural model, and the neural mechanisms underlying the proposed overlapping processes are discussed.     

From philosophy to criticism of myth: Cassirer’s concept of myth

This article discusses the question whether or not Cassirer’s philosophical critique of technological use of myth in The Myth of the State implies a revision of his earlier conception and theory of myth as provided by The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms. In the first part, Cassirer’s early theory of myth is compared with other approaches of his time. It is claimed that Cassirer’s early approach to myth has to be understood in terms of a transcendental philosophical approach. In consequence, myth is conceived as a form of cultural consciousness which is constituted by specific symbolic processes. In the second part, the theoretical assumptions underlying Cassirer’s criticism of myth are discussed and compared with his earlier theory. It is argued that there is a strong conceptual and theoretical continuity between Cassirer’s early views on myth as a symbolic form and his later critique of technological use of myth.     

A Conversation between Theory,Methods, and Data

The 10 year anniversary of the COGITO Study provides an opportunity to revisit the ideas behind the Cattell data box. Three dimensions of the persons × variables × time data box are discussed in the context of three categories of researchers each wanting to answer their own categorically different question. The example of the well-known speed-accuracy tradeoff is used to illustrate why these are three different categories of statistical question. The 200 persons by 100 variables by 100 occasions of measurement COGITO data cube presents a challenge to integrate theories and methods across the dimensions of the data box. A conceptual model is presented for the speed-accuracy tradeoff example that could account for cross-sectional between persons effects, short-term dynamics, and long-term learning effects. Thus, two fundamental differences between the time axis and the other two axes of the data box include ordering and time scaling. In addition, nonstationarity in human systems is a pervasive problem along the time dimension of the data box. To illustrate, the difference in nonstationarity between dancing and conversation is discussed in the context of the interaction between theory, methods, and data. An information theoretic argument is presented that the theory-methods-data interaction is better understood when viewed as a conversation than as a dance. Entropy changes in the development of a theory-methods-data conversation provide one metric for evaluating scientific progress.     

Battle Christologies as a risky act of resistance à la Jesus: A South African perspective

This study depicts African “battle Christologies” as a risky act of resistance à la Jesus, that is, concomitant of Jesus’ own life in terms of their modus operandi. Their christic features are discussed in contradistinction to the mainstream Western christological tradition. Only by probing the dynamics of power and difference inherent in the cultural appropriations of Jesus can their specific performative consequences be accurately captured. In light of the study, some methodological considerations are being offered with regard to the way in which prophetic theology should be done in post‐apartheid South Africa and the Global South in general.     

Deduction theorems for RM and its extensions

In this paper logics defined by finite Sugihara matrices, as well as RM itself, are discussed both in their matrix (semantical) and in syntactical version. For each such a logic a deduction theorem is proved, and a few applications are given.     

Health of Organisms and Health of Persons: An Embedded Instrumentalist Approach

In a time when we as a society are in the process of deciding what our basic rights to health care are, it is critically important for us to have a full and complete understanding of what constitutes health. We argue for an analysis of health according to which certain states are healthy not in themselves but because they allow an individual to reach actual goals. Recognizing that the goals of an individual considered from the point of view of biology and the goals of the same individual considered as an agent in the world might be different, we introduce a distinction between the health of an individual qua organism and the health of an individual qua person. We then argue that this distinction characterizes the evaluations made by patients and healthcare providers better than the widely discussed distinction between disease and illness.