The Term “Self-Directed Learning”—Back to Knowles,or Another Way to Forge Ahead?

The term self-directed learning has since its seminal definition in 1975 by Malcolm S. Knowles acquired a range of meanings, which has led to communication difficulties about this subject. Examination of self-directed learning from a biblical ontological–anthropological perspective reveals that, although the notion of self-directed learning as a mechanistic or deterministic process should be questioned, Knowles and colleagues were correct in ameliorating the “process part” of the definition of self-directed learning by emphasizing the freedom and agency of the learner as steward of creation. Researchers wishing to deviate from the approach by Knowles and colleagues are compelled to explain what the term designates in their particular project.     

Psychology and Culture: Back to the Future?

Psychology has a poor record in addressing cultural phenomena. One response is to turn to ancient concepts from local traditions and to use these as alternative analytic categories to explain behavior. However, there are problems with such an approach. These concepts will be read from the vantage point of the present and interpreted differently so as to propose different diagnoses (and solutions) for contemporary social problems. As an alternative, rather than using ancient resources as analytic categories in the explanation of behavior, we could instead examine how they are used as categories of practice as people actively make sense of their social context and themselves. Attending to such contemporary ‘lay’ usage (and the contestation it entails) allows for a more dynamic conception of cultural processes than is typical in psychology. More generally, I believe that it is possible to use our psychological constructs so that we can see the distinctive particularities of the phenomena before us in new and interesting ways, and in ways that respect their cultural specificity. This claim is illustrated through reference to recent work using the concept of social identity to illuminate aspects of Hindu pilgrimage.     

No Route to Material Origin Essentialism?

In the last 30 years repeated attempts have been made to develop a proof-sketch Kripke gave for essentialism about material origins into a cogent argument. I argue that there are general reasons that all such attempts have failed, and so we should likewise expect future attempts to fail.     

Was Kant a nonconceptualist?

I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment.

Did Kant Respect Persons?

The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, “[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only”. When we realize that “humanity” means rational nature and “person” means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Society for Personality Assessment — Which Way to Go?

As a result of a mandate by the membership, the Society for Personality Assessment has emerged as an old association with a new name. The decision on this issue was made by the membership at the same time that the question of its future affiliation was voted upon. Approximately two-thirds of the membership expressed the desire to have our group affiliate in some manner with the American Psychological Association. However, the exact manner was not specified in the referendum. At the last meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Society for Personality Assessment, there was a division of opinion as to whether joining as a division or as a section of an already existing division was the better move. The two most articulate exponents, Drs. Little and Farberow, were asked to prepare the position paper below in order to give the membership some information about the issues involved. On a subsequent occasion the members will be asked to take a formal position on this issue. If anyone, after reading the material below, wishes to comment further, I would be happy to publish his views in subsequent issues of the Journal.

Walter G. Klopfer Executive Editor     

Back to the Consideration of Future Consequences Scale: Time to Reconsider?

Abstract

The Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) Scale is a measure of the extent to which individuals consider and are influenced by the distant outcomes of current behavior. In this study, the authors conducted factor analysis to investigate the factor structure of the 12-item CFC Scale. The authors found evidence for a multiple factor solution including one completely present-oriented factor consisting of all 7 present-oriented items, and one or two future-oriented factors consisting of the remaining future-oriented items. Further evidence indicated that the present-oriented factor and the 12-item CFC Scale perform similarly in terms of internal consistency and convergent validity. The structure and content of the future-oriented factor(s) is unclear. From the findings, the authors raise questions regarding the construct validity of the CFC Scale, the interpretation of its results, and the usefulness of the CFC scale in its current form in applied research.     

Normalizing Unemployment: A New Way to Cope with Unemployment?

Although the literature suggests that the massive unemployment statistics of the last decade have resulted in changes in the way people view unemployment, no study to date has precisely identified this phenomenon and its effects on individuals. This study brings to light the connection between these new perceptions of and experiences with unemployment and health. Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, we developed and validated the Unemployment Normalization Questionnaire and correlated it with health. Thus, 938 unemployed people from two economic contexts (France and Luxembourg) completed both the Unemployment Normalization Questionnaire and the General Health Questionnaire. This study confirmed the existence of the psychological concept of unemployment normalization among actual job seekers and its relation to perceived well-being.     

Kant’s Solution to the Euthyphro Dilemma

Are our actions morally good because we approve of them or are they good independently of our approval? Are we projecting moral values onto the world or do we detect values that are already there? For many these questions don’t state a real alternative but a secular variant of the Euthyphro dilemma: If our actions are good because we approve of them moral goodness appears to be arbitrary. If they are good independently of our approval, it is unclear how we come to know their moral quality and how moral knowledge can be motivating. None of these options seems attractive; the source of moral goodness unclear. Despite the growing literature on Kant’s moral epistemology and moral epistemology the question remains open what Kant’s answer to this apparent dilemma is. The Kantian view I attempt to lay out in this paper is supposed to dissolve the secular version of the Euthyphro dilemma. In responding to this dilemma we need to get clear about the source or the origin of our moral knowledge: Voluntary approval or mind-independent moral facts? Projectivism or detectivism? Construction or given? I believe that all these ways of articulating the problem turn out, on closer inspection, to be false alternatives.     

Back to The Phenomena (of Sport) – or Back to The Phenomenologists? Towards a Phenomenology of (Sports) Phenomenology

Is phenomenology a method or a philosophy (of ‘ontological’ character)? This question is discussed here with a recent philosophical collection of articles about the phenomenology of sport at hand. However, one finds very few concrete phenomena in this volume, but much abstract talk about the authoritative philosophers of ontology and existentialism. This gives the ‘phenomenological school’ a somewhat sectarian character, which is not typical in recent contributions of phenomenology. This review essay broadens out from the current volume under consideration towards a history of phenomenology and a differential phenomenology of phenomenology. It is not clear how much value the volume itself, however, has for the understanding of sport as well as for the understanding of phenomenology. Nevertheless, it documents how phenomenological scholastics approach sport, which may serve as a warning at a time when positivist reductionism seems to have also become mainstream in human and social sciences.     

The Earth Garden: Going Back or Going Forward to Nature?

Against the background of a short meditation on the contrasting ways in which landscape has been represented and idealized in Eastern and Western painting traditions,the article will try to show,using some striking examples,that the development of landscape painting in the last two centuries reflects the changing relationship of humanity and nature,leading in both the East and in the West to either the expression of a nostalgic longing for nature to be back as it once was,or to a gloomy expression of the vanishing of nature amidst the modern,technological world.Connecting to both the concept of "harmony," which is a key concept in Eastern aesthetics,and to some recent reflections in Western philosophy on the relationship of nature and technology,a post-nostalgic conception of nature and natural beauty is defended,in which nature and technology are no longer seen as opposing categories,but rather as poles that are intertwined in an ever-lasting process of co-evolution.It is argued that we should not so much strive to go "back to nature," but rather to go "forward to nature" and establish a new harmony between human and non-human nature and technology.The article ends with some reflections on the role artists and aestheticians may play in this transformation.     

No Story,No Analysis?

The construction of narrative is closely linked to identity formation, or the establishment of a sense of self, with its attendant notions of history and continuity and lineal development. Story-making within analysis is seen as being at the heart of symbolic process and of psychic change. The story serves as a form of transitional object combining factual with imaginal, internal and external realities, and reflects our desire to internalize one another. With regard to clinical work, this paper explores the following ideas specifically: the apparent absence of narrative in the analysis of some patients; the use of story as a defence in the service of a false self; how we differentiate 'true' and 'false' stories; and, lastly, the therapeutic value of reconstruction as a form of story making.     

Why? Versus Why Not?: Potentialities of Aging in Shaw's Back to Methuselah

Bernard Shaw's critique of society's sacred cows, as well as his participation in the social, cultural and political marketplace in which he lived, resemble the new historical/cultural materialism of contemporary theory. In Back to Methuselah, Shaw examines the notions of aging and illuminates the degree to which our chronological standards of old age are sociological not biological constructs. This tour de force on aging both dramatizes age as a function of societal and/or individual choice, not as a biological given, and juxtaposes opinions toward aging in such a way that flexible attitudes toward the subject emerge.     

Husserl’s Way to Authentic Being

In a journal entry from 1906, Husserl complains of lacking “internal stability” and of his desire to “achieve” it. My claim in this paper is that the “phenomenological method,” which he made public in his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phänomenologie was, and is, a means to achieve the inner harmony that Husserl longed for. I do not provide an analysis of why Husserl might have felt the way he did; my aim is to show what internal stability might be and how one might achieve it. I conclude that the phenomenological method is the means, the “how,” to internal stability, which I characterize as “clarity” and “harmony” regarding our beliefs and, and ultimately, our authentic comportment.     

‘A Way Out’ and A Way In: Reply to Commentary

I express my appreciation for Michal Rieck's thoughtful and fully felt reading of my paper. I underline her points that the regression that an unobtrusive yet fully engaged analyst can allow, is not solely a phenomenon in work with more disturbed patients, and that the essence of this position is to be without separateness. I outline a process of the “flow of enactive engagement,” which fosters a narrative unfolding of the field of the treatment. I suggest that the flow of enactive engagement is a contemporary mutual form of enacted free association and that Rieck is correct in saying that from my perspective psychoanalytic cure need not involve the analyst's interpretation. The mutual enactment itself can be the interpretation.