On Conservative Extensions in Logics with Infinitary Predicates

If the language is extended by new individual variables, in classical first order logic, then the deduction system obtained is a conservative extension of the original one. This fails to be true for the logics with infinitary predicates. But it is shown that restricting the commutativity of quantifiers and the equality axioms in the extended system and supposing the merry-go-round property in the original system, the foregoing extension is already conservative. It is shown that these restrictions are crucial for an extension to be conservative. The origin of the results is algebraic logic. Presented by Daniele Mundici Supported by grant OTKA T43242.     

Rough Sets and 3-Valued Logics

In the paper we explore the idea of describing Pawlak’s rough sets using three-valued logic, whereby the value t corresponds to the positive region of a set, the value f — to the negative region, and the undefined value u — to the border of the set. Due to the properties of the above regions in rough set theory, the semantics of the logic is described using a non-deterministic matrix (Nmatrix). With the strong semantics, where only the value t is treated as designated, the above logic is a “common denominator” for Kleene and Łukasiewicz 3-valued logics, which represent its two different “determinizations”. In turn, the weak semantics—where both t and u are treated as designated—represents such a “common denominator” for two major 3-valued paraconsistent logics. We give sound and complete, cut-free sequent calculi for both versions of the logic generated by the rough set Nmatrix. Then we derive from these calculi sequent calculi with the same properties for the various “determinizations” of those two versions of the logic (including Łukasiewicz 3-valued logic). Finally, we show how to embed the four above-mentioned determinizations in extensions of the basic rough set logics obtained by adding to those logics a special two-valued “definedness” or “crispness” operator.     

Sequent Calculi for Some Strict Implication Logics

We introduce various sequent systems for propositional logicshaving strict implication, and prove the completeness theoremsand the finite model properties of these systems.The cut-eliminationtheorems or the (modified) subformula properties are provedsemantically.     

Uniform Interpolation and Propositional Quantifiers in Modal Logics

We investigate uniform interpolants in propositional modal logics from the proof-theoretical point of view. Our approach is adopted from Pitts’ proof of uniform interpolationin intuitionistic propositional logic [15]. The method is based on a simulation of certain quantifiers ranging over propositional variables and uses a terminating sequent calculus for which structural rules are admissible. We shall present such a proof of the uniform interpolation theorem for normal modal logics K and T. It provides an explicit algorithm constructing the interpolants. Presented by Heinrich Wansing     

Infinitary Belief Revision

This paper extends the AGM theory of belief revision to accommodate infinitary belief change. We generalize both axiomatization and modeling of the AGM theory. We show that most properties of the AGM belief change operations are preserved by the generalized operations whereas the infinitary belief change operations have their special properties. We prove that the extended axiomatic system for the generalized belief change operators with a Limit Postulate properly specifies infinite belief change. This framework provides a basis for first-order belief revision and the theory of revising a belief state by a belief state.     

A Map of Common Knowledge Logics

In order to capture the concept of common knowledge, various extensions of multi-modal epistemic logics, such as fixed-point ones and infinitary ones, have been proposed. Although we have now a good list of such proposed extensions, the relationships among them are still unclear. The purpose of this paper is to draw a map showing the relationships among them. In the propositional case, these extensions turn out to be all Kripke complete and can be comparable in a meaningful manner. F. Wolter showed that the predicate extension of the Halpern-Moses fixed-point type common knowledge logic is Kripke incomplete. However, if we go further to an infinitary extension, Kripke completeness would be recovered. Thus there is some gap in the predicate case. In drawing the map, we focus on what is happening around the gap in the predicate case. The map enables us to better understand the common knowledge logics as a whole.     

Socratic Proofs

Journal of Philosophical Logic - Our aim is to express in exact terms the old idea of solving problems by pure questioning. We consider the problem of derivability: “Is A derivable from...     

Logic Games are Complete for Game Logics

Game logics describe general games through powers of players for forcing outcomes. In particular, they encode an algebra of sequential game operations such as choice, dual and composition. Logic games are special games for specific purposes such as proof or semantical evaluation for first-order or modal languages. We show that the general algebra of game operations coincides with that over just logical evaluation games, whence the latter are quite general after all. The main tool in proving this is a representation of arbitrary games as modal or first-order evaluation games. We probe how far our analysis extends to product operations on games. We also discuss some more general consequences of this new perspective for standard logic.     

Type Logics and Pregroups

We discuss the logic of pregroups, introduced by Lambek [34], and its connections with other type logics and formal grammars. The paper contains some new ideas and results: the cut-elimination theorem and a normalization theorem for an extended system of this logic, its P-TIME decidability, its interpretation in L1, and a general construction of (preordered) bilinear algebras and pregroups whose universe is an arbitrary monoid. Special Issue Categorial Grammars and Pregroups Edited by Wojciech Buszkowski and Anne Preller     

First Order Common Knowledge Logics

In this paper we investigate first order common knowledge logics; i.e., modal epistemic logics based on first order logic with common knowledge operators. It is shown that even rather weak fragments of first order common knowledge logics are not recursively axiomatizable. This applies, for example, to fragments which allow to reason about names only; that is to say, fragments the first order part of which is based on constant symbols and the equality symbol only. Then formal properties of "quantifying into" epistemic contexts are investigated. The results are illustrated by means of epistemic representations of Nash Equilibria for finite games with mixed strategies.     

Glivenko Type Theorems for Intuitionistic Modal Logics

In this article we deal with Glivenko type theorems for intuitionistic modal logics over Prior's MIPC. We examine the problems which appear in proving Glivenko type theorems when passing from the intuitionistic propositional logic Intto MIPC. As a result we obtain two different versions of Glivenko's theorem for logics over MIPC. Since MIPCcan be thought of as a one-variable fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic Q-Int, one of the versions of Glivenko's theorem for logics over MIPCis closely related to that for intermediate predicate logics obtained by Umezawa [27] and Gabbay [15]. Another one is rather surprising.     

A Calculus of Substitutions for DPL

We consider substitutions in order sensitive situations, having in the back of our minds the case of dynamic predicate logic (DPL) with a stack semantics. We start from the semantic intuition that substitutions are move instructions on stacks: the syntactic operation [y/x] is matched by the instruction to move the value of the y-stack to the x-stack. We can describe these actions in the positive fragment of DPLE. Hence this fragment counts as a logic for DPL-substitutions. We give a calculus for the fragment and prove soundness and completeness.     

Commodious Axiomatization of Quantifiers in Multiple-Valued Logic

We provide tools for a concise axiomatization of a broad class of quantifiers in many-valued logic, so-called distribution quantifiers. Although sound and complete axiomatizations for such quantifiers exist, their size renders them virtually useless for practical purposes. We show that for quantifiers based on finite distributive lattices compact axiomatizations can be obtained schematically. This is achieved by providing a link between skolemized signed formulas and filters/ideals in Boolean set lattices. Then lattice theoretic tools such as Birkhoff's representation theorem for finite distributive lattices are used to derive tableau-style axiomatizations of distribution quantifiers.     

Proof Systems for Reasoning about Computation Errors

In the paper we examine the use of non-classical truth values for dealing with computation errors in program specification and validation. In that context, 3-valued McCarthy logic is suitable for handling lazy sequential computation, while 3-valued Kleene logic can be used for reasoning about parallel computation. If we want to be able to deal with both strategies without distinguishing between them, we combine Kleene and McCarthy logics into a logic based on a non-deterministic, 3-valued matrix, incorporating both options as a non-deterministic choice. If the two strategies are to be distinguished, Kleene and McCarthy logics are combined into a logic based on a 4-valued deterministic matrix featuring two kinds of computation errors which correspond to the two computation strategies described above. For the resulting logics, we provide sound and complete calculi of ordinary, two-valued sequents. Presented by Yaroslav Shramko and Heinrich Wansing     

A Sound and Complete Tableau Calculus for Reasoning about only Knowing and Knowing at Most

We define a tableau calculus for the logic of only knowing and knowing at most ON, which is an extension of Levesque's logic of only knowing O. The method is based on the possible-world semantics of the logic ON, and can be considered as an extension of known tableau calculi for modal logic K45. From the technical viewpoint, the main features of such an extension are the explicit representation of "unreachable" worlds in the tableau, and an additional branch closure condition implementing the property that each world must be either reachable or unreachable. The calculus allows for establishing the computational complexity of reasoning about only knowing and knowing at most. Moreover, we prove that the method matches the worst-case complexity lower bound of the satisfiability problem for both ON and O. With respect to [22], in which the tableau calculus was originally presented, in this paper we both provide a formal proof of soundness and completeness of the calculus, and prove the complexity results for the logic ON.