Stankevič and Hegel’s arrival in Russia

When Russia’s “Westernizers,” Nikolai Stankevi?, Vissarion Belinskij, and Mikhail Bakunin first encountered Hegel’s ideas in the 1830s, they gravitated toward a conservative interpretation, centering on the proposition that the “rational is real.” This article studies the preconditions for that interpretation, demonstrating that it was grounded in the writings of the late Hegel and of the circle of adepts who popularized his ideas and writings immediately after his death. These adepts later came to be known as Center and Right Hegelians. They influenced the early reception of Hegel in France as well as in Russia. Stankevi?, the first of the Westernizers to subject Hegel to systematic study, learned about Hegel through these mediators.     

Relations between church and state in Russia today ∗

Abstract

According to its constitution the Russian Federation is a secular state in which all religious associations are equal before the law. The constitution also guarantees freedom of religious choice and practice. Federal legislation, as well as the legislation of the republics, should be in accordance with these clearly formulated principles. Many provisions in the federal law on religion of 1997, however, are in conflict with them. Moreover, in practice the statement in the preamble to that law regarding the historical role of Orthodoxy and that of other ‘traditional religions’ is arbitrarily interpreted to justify a privileged position for Orthodoxy and to some extent for Islam, Judaism and Buddhism. The ‘secularity’ of a state does not entail the marginalisation of religion. A secular state should take account of the historical role and importance of each religion. The Russian state may legitimately award Orthodoxy a position of primus inter pares and privileges of honour in comparison with other religions on the basis of proportionality. These should not, however, take the form of legal advantages. Orthodoxy can perfectly well play the role of ‘official’ religion, but it should not be a ‘state’ religion. It would be advisable to establish a system of bilateral agreements between each religious association and the state and to create a fiscal system that allowed citizens who declare that they belong to a given religious faith to devote part of their taxes to the financial support of that faith.     

Conflict or harmony? Clinical research and the medical press in Russia

The author relates conditions for conducting clinical trials in Russia, current experiences of ethics committees, areas where conflicts of interest can occur regarding publishing the results of clinical trials in medical journals and the state of medical journalism in Russia today. An earlier version of this paper was presented at an International Conference on “Conflict of Interest and its Significance in Science and Medicine” held in Warsaw, Poland on 5–6 April, 2002. The author is a science editor of Meditsynskaya Gazeta.     

The dynamics of Orthodox and Muslim religiosity in Russia, 1989–2012

In this article I focus on the changing religious consciousness and behaviour of Orthodox Christians in Russia over the period from 1989 to 2012, comparing these where appropriate with the situation among Muslims. In the first part of the article I identify three periods in the development of attitudes to religion between 1989 and 2011: from 1989 to the mid-1990s; from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s; and from the mid-2000s to 2011. In the second part I survey attitudes to religion among the Russian population from 2011 from a range of perspectives. In the third part I look in more detail at the religious practice of Russians from 2011, using the concept of votserkovlennost’ (‘enchurchedness’) as developed by the sociologist Valentina Chesnokova. My data are derived from public opinion surveys, particularly surveys conducted in 2006, 2011 and 2012.     

‘Minimal Religion’ and Mikhail Epstein’s Interpretation of Religion in Late-Soviet and Post-Soviet Russia

This is an examination of two essays on minimal religion by Mikhail Epstein (1982 and 1999), assessing the usefulness of the term ‘minimal religion’ for the analysis of religion in contemporary Russia. An adapted version of a paper delivered at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University of London, on 8 December, 2003. Note regarding Mikhail Epstein’s use of the words ‘religion’, ‘religiosity’ and ‘spirituality’: Epstein uses the word ‘religion’ to signify ‘mainstream’, church-based manifestations of religion and also the institutional, hierarchical structures related to those. Although in English usage the word ‘religiosity’ has negative connotations – signifying either a superficially felt religious sentiment or a somehow false and insincere expression of religious feeling, intended for outward show – Epstein appears to use the term entirely neutrally. For him it simply serves as a synonym for the word ‘spirituality’. In the two essays examined in the present article the word ‘spirituality’ signifies the whole inner spiritual life and aspirations of the individual and her/his reflection on an ethical way of living, whether the person concerned is a committed, church-going believer, or someone engaged in a personal spiritual or philosophical quest for meaning, or else someone who has experienced what Epstein refers to as ‘the wilderness’ of the Soviet years and has learnt of a spiritual dimension to life through that formative experience.     

Becoming Eastern Orthodox in diaspora: materializing Orthodox Russia and Holy Rus’

In this article, I draw on interviews and participant observation data from a two-year-long ethnographic study in a Russian Orthodox parish in the United States. I argue that both the Russian Orthodox immigrants and the Protestant converts to Orthodoxy attending this parish may be usefully thought of as diasporic groups. Seeking to construct their particular Orthodox identity, both groups deal with their own physical and symbolic displacements, and attempt to find their place of belonging. I demonstrate how in the process, through reliance on religious narratives, prayer, and Russian Orthodox icons, parishioners construct two overlapping, yet distinctive places of their origin: Holy Rus’ and Orthodox Russia. Finally, attending to how some Orthodox Christians were able to position themselves in two groups simultaneously, I suggest that we think of religious practitioners as able to inhabit two diasporas at once.     

Parenting Style and Children’s Life Satisfaction and Depressive Symptoms: Preliminary Findings from Romania,France, and Russia

This study evaluated how culture relates to parenting and children’s life satisfaction and depressive symptoms, and whether there are cultural differences in how maternal parenting style relates to children’s adjustment among three cultural contexts: Romanian, Russian, and French. The sample included 325 children, aged 9–11 years, from Romania (n = 123), Russia (n = 112), and France (n = 90). Children completed questionnaires regarding their perceptions of maternal parenting style, and their life satisfaction and depressive symptoms. French children reported lower levels of authoritative parenting style and higher levels of authoritarian parenting style compared to their Romanian and Russian peers. Further, French children reported higher levels of depressive symptoms than both their Romanian and Russian peers, while Russian children had higher life satisfaction than their Romanian and French peers. The strengths of the associations between parenting style and both children’s life satisfaction and depressive symptoms, however, did not differ based on children’s cultural context. Our findings suggest the importance of cultural context in relation to parenting styles and children’s life satisfaction and depressive symptoms. Further, our study shows that the relations between parenting and children’s adjustment are similar across the cultural contexts included in this study.     

Tradition,morality and community: elaborating Orthodox identity in Putin’s Russia

This paper draws upon a number of official, semi-official and other public texts related to the current views of the Russian Church on social and political issues. Overall, in spite of a variety of opinions and nuances, a certain mainstream becomes apparent, as expressed through this body of texts. The most discussed topics include moral values related to the human body (such as abortion, euthanasia, reproductive technologies and sexuality) and issues such as blasphemy, juvenile courts and new technologies of personal registration for Russian citizens. ‘Traditional morality’ has become the signature discourse of the Russian Orthodox Church which is attempting to construct ‘tradition’ by drawing upon a partly imagined ethos of imperial Russia and the late Soviet Union. Traditional family values are central to the church’s rhetoric. The authors of these texts see a presumed decay of traditional values as the main danger that must be opposed. They usually trace the source of this danger directly to the contemporary West. By contrast, they see Russia as a protective shield against these global influences. Either consciously or involuntarily, they translate their religious language of traditional morality into a political rhetoric of solidarity and patriotism. Such ideological rhetoric has direct political implications and analogies in the agenda of Putin’s regime. This Russian appeal to ‘traditional values’, both religious and political, has recently acquired an extraordinary international relevance.     

The Social Dynamics of Russia’s Desecularisation: a Comparative and Theoretical Perspective1

This article approaches Russia’s desecularisation from a comparative and theoretical perspective. For this purpose, it applies to the Russian case a conceptual framework designed for comparative studies of the world’s many counter-secularisations, and as a result it offers a theoretical model to explain the social dynamics of Russia’s desecularisation. The model reveals a chain of causal links extending from initial conditions for desecularisation at the end of the Soviet era to the formation of the current desecularising regime and to its likely collapse leading to a new phase of desecularisation. The model attributes the contradictory and inconsistent outcomes of Russia’s religious resurgence to its prevailing pattern of desecularisation from above. It shows why desecularisation from above rather than from below prevailed, and why its strategies included the formation of ethno-religious church–state hybrid monopolies, religious protectionism, ethnicisation of faith and cultivation of nationalistic, undemocratic and intolerant ideologies. The model also explains why and how the current desecularising regime has slowed down religious growth and mobilisation from below. Furthermore, since the current desecularising regime exists in a symbiosis with the political and ideological regime of Putin’s Russia, the former shares the vulnerabilities of the latter. Building on rational choice theory, the article predicts that Russia’s present desecularising regime will become unsustainable and ultimately collapse. Its fall will be followed by a much more competitive and unpredictable desecularisation from below, which has so far been largely suppressed. In conclusion I outline a research agenda derived from this theoretical model.     

What Influences Subjective Well-Being in Russia?

The relationship between subjective well-being and domain satisfactions is studied in this paper. In the past, different models have been specified. The most commonly used model is the bottom-up model where domain satisfactions affect subjective well-being. The more recent top-down model suggests a reversed relationship. Finally, there is the suggestion that the correlations between these variables can be spurious due to the effect of personality characteristics. Empirical research has shown that different models fit different domains. All three possibilities are evaluated for three domains on the basis of data from the Russet panel. The relationships found are quite different from those found in other studies, thus we conclude that the models may not only vary by domain, but also by country. This result is in line with the idea of a hierarchy of values suggested in older literature.     

The Crimes and Punishments of the ‘Enemies of the Church’ and the Nature of Russia’s Desecularising Regime1

Following a longstanding sociological tradition, this paper looks at reactions to nonconformity in order to understand the nature of social norms. In particular, it explores the patterns and scope of intolerance towards the perceived ‘enemies of the Church’ in order to understand social norms emerging in post-atheist Russia. Utilising the ‘social drama’ approach, the paper offers a comparative case study of increasingly repressive reactions by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) and state to two art exhibitions at the Sakharov Museum and anti-clerical publications by a blogger in Karelia, along with an in-depth analysis of the recent (2012) Pussy Riot action at Christ the Saviour Cathedral in Moscow and the resulting trial and punishment of three of the band’s members, as well as of a variety of events that have followed this initial action. We then utilise national and cross-national representative survey data to suggest that these repressive reactions were congruent with an intolerant public sentiment towards opponents of the ROC. Ultimately, we draw on Durkheim’s dialectic of norm and deviance, work on disciplinary modalities of power by Foucault and Agamben, desecularisation analysis and social identity theory to argue that the severe punishment of the perceived ‘enemies of the Church’ and the popular support for it reflect the crystallisation of a new normative system brought about by the desecularising regime in Russia, a regime which is characterised by a symbiosis of the ROC and the state.     

The perestroika of the family? Gender and occupational differences in family values in modern day Russia

The recent dramatic changes in the political and economic structures of Eastern Europe have focused interest on the position of women in Russia, where a greater openness in discussing inequalities has been accompanied by a more regressive harkening back to traditional gender roles. The study reported in this paper examines gender and occupational differences in general attitude toward the family, disclosure to family members, and child-rearing values. Three hundred sixty-eight students, 179 manual workers, and 160 entrepreneurs completed a structured measure of family orientation and replied to open-ended questions on family taboos and child-rearing practices, while a subsample (N = 475) completed a family disclosure inventory. Multivariate analyses of variance analyses revealed women to be more family oriented than men, while gender and occupation interacted in producing family disclosure rates. HILOGLINEAR analyses found that the topics suitable for family discussion, as well as the child-rearing values promoted by our respondents, were also best predicted by considering the interaction between both gender and occupation. The implications of these findings for the future shape of Russian family relations is discussed.     

T. G. Masaryk’s The Spirit of Russia: between Positivism,Axiology and Orientalism

The article discusses Masaryk’s work The Spirit of Russia. In terms of methodology, The Spirit of Russia is based in Positivism, in a faith in progress and a forward-looking orientation of European development. At the same time, however, it also displays certain axiological positions that condemn conservative, monarchist or religious ideas present in Russian thought. Masaryk is critical of Russian spirituality and traditional elements of Orthodox devotion. The Orthodox faith in his view represents an antipode to progress, being non-European in character. Russia itself is presented as split internally into a progressive, European tendency, and a stagnant traditionalist segment. Masaryk’s view of Russia bears some traits of Orientalism, in particular the notion of the superiority of the European West over traditionalist Russia and the negative aspects of its traditional cultural and religious forms. He also anticipates the notion of internal colonialism within Russia itself.

     

The Contemporary Study of Religion,Society and Politics in Russia: A Scholar’s Reflections1

Over the past decade, religious issues in France have come to the fore in the public debate. The 1905 law on the separation of church and state structures the concept of ‘laïcité’ as a configuration for the treatment of religions in France. This political and media debate has highlighted the representative institutions of mainstream religions in France, including the Orthodox Church. Obliged to take a position, both collectively with other religious actors and individually, Orthodoxy in France seems to be only marginally affected by this controversy. However, through press releases, memos, articles in the national press and online resources, the Orthodox Church has appropriated the issue of ‘laïcité à la française’. Behind these different messages lie the issues of the place of Orthodoxy in the French religious landscape and the (suspected) resistance of Orthodoxy against secularising forces in the minority context of the diaspora in Western Europe. Orthodoxy in France constitutes a key element of identity for the national Orthodox communities of the diaspora. Laïcité shapes and to a large extent justifies the anticanonical compromise of the ecclesiological treatment of the Orthodox communities in the diaspora, which are grouped by ethnicity. In this context, I assess how the legal and societal contexts of laïcité influence the main configurations of Orthodoxy in France, in terms of relations with the public authorities, relations with other religions and confessions, and the inter-Orthodox situation.     

Hegel at the GAKhN: between idealism and Marxism—on the aesthetic debates in Russia in the 1920s

This contribution analyses the importance of the State Academy of the Study of Arts (GAKhN) in the appropriation of Hegel's aesthetics in Russia. In immediate connection to this discussion at the GAKhN is Gustav ?pet’s conception of the ontology of art. This concept represents an attempt of a non-metaphysical interpretation of Hegel’s aesthetics. There, art is interpreted as an autonomous mode of the cultural existence as “aesthetic reality.” In this interpretation of art ?pet refers to two of Hegel's theses in which (1) art is determined as “appearance” which stands as a "quasi-reality" and (2) the aesthetic object gets its ontological status because of “recognition” by humans. These theses help ?pet to develop an alternative to Marxist aesthetics.     

Attempts to revive the council for religious affairs in Russia∗

The Russian Orthodox Church: Triumphalism and Defensiveness, by Jane Ellis. London: Macmillan Press, in association with St Antony's College, Oxford, 1996. 203 pp.

Christian Thinking and the End of Communism in Russia, by William van den Bercken. Utrecht‐Leiden: Interuniversity Institute for Missiological and Ecumenical Research (IIMO Research Publication 34), 1993. 154 pp.     

Bringing culture to the nation: Hebraism, Yiddishism, and the dilemmas of Jewish cultural formation in Russia and Ukraine, 1917–1919

Focusing on the pivotal 1917–1919 conjuncture in Russia and Ukraine, this paper analyzes the efforts of the divided Jewish nationalist intelligentsia to disseminate new forms of Jewish culture to a mass audience, the reception of these efforts in the former Tsarist empire’s variegated Jewish population, and the intelligentsia’s parallel exploration of other forms of cultural formation less dependent on popular support. Comparing the cultural programs of Hebraism and Yiddishism, it demonstrates important parallels in their cultural visions and highlights their shared belief in the possibility of implanting a secularist, aestheticist intelligentsia culture in the whole of “the nation.” The paper reconstructs both substantial forms of popular openness to this culture and its sociocultural weaknesses. Finally, it examines experiments made by the intelligentsia with alternative routes to cultural transformation: suppression of popular culture, non-market cultural arrangements, cultural revolution through education, and the uses of the state. The paper seeks a fuller understanding both of the roots of interwar cultural programs in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and of the Jewish nationalist intelligentsia’s underlying conception of “culture,” its own authority, and the evolving relationship between these conceptions and the realities of East European Jewish social, cultural, and political life from the 1890s onward.     

Selling in an asymmetric retail world: perspectives from India,Russia, and the US on buyer–seller information differential,perceived adaptive selling,and purchase intention

The current research aimed to contribute to our understanding of (a) how adaptive selling is perceived by retail consumers in different types of economies when they have differing levels of buyer–seller information differential and (b) how this phenomenon influences their purchase intention. The focal countries were the US (a developed economy) and India and Russia (both developing economies). These three were selected owing to their disparate economic and cultural contexts. This investigation used a relatively new construct: perceived adaptive selling (PAS). PAS refers to the degree to which the buyer perceives that the salesperson is adapting. The study examined whether the impact of PAS was a function of a country’s level of development and whether such perceptions were influenced by the level of buyer–seller information differential in the retail transaction. The findings suggested that buyers in Russia and India PAS and were influenced by it differently from their US counterparts. This work provided a general framework for understanding tactical implementation of the salesperson’s PAS behavior.     

The World War against the spirit of Immanuel Kant: philosophical Germanophobia in Russia in 1914–1915 and the birth of cultural racism

During the First World War the radical nationalist sentiments were widespread in different European countries involved in military activities, including the Russian Empire. In Russia this rise united the features of Russian ethnonationalism and imperial enthusiasm. The Russian philosopher Vladimir Ern (1882–1917) in his article “From Kant to Krupp” (1914) attempted “to ground” the hostility between Russia and its allies, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other hand. This attempt turned Ern’s article into one of the earliest manifestoes of cultural racism in Russia, maybe the very first one. Discussing this article in the context of other works by Ern of 1910–1917, one can see that Ern applied Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical method for the political interpretation of “the problem of technology” causing the aggressive approach to the human’s environment. Nevertheless, Ern’s cultural racism and aggressive rhetoric blocked further development and even reception of his methodological innovations. The psychological compensatory pragmatic of his rhetoric seems to resemble the analogical function of rigid opposition between “Russia” and “West” in speeches of contemporary Russia’s official ideologues.