Belief bias in the perception of sample size adequacy

In two experiments participants were instructed to set aside their own, complete knowledge of a statistical population parameter and to take the perspective of an agent whose knowledge was limited to a random sample. Participants rated the appropriateness of the agent's conclusion about the adequacy of the sample size (which, objectively, was more than adequate). They also rated the agent's intelligence. Whereas previous work suggests that unbelievable statistical conclusions impact reasoning by provoking critical thought which enhances the detection of research flaws, the present studies presented participants an unflawed scenario designed to assess effects of believability on bias. The results included the finding that participants’ complete knowledge did indeed bias their perceptions not only of the adequacy of the sample size, but also of the rationality of the agent drawing the conclusion from the sample. The findings were interpreted in the context of research on belief bias, social attribution, and Theory of Mind.     

Power of the desired self: Influence of induced perceptions of the self on reasoning

This research shows that the motivation to posses a desired characteristic (or to avoid an undesired one) results in self-perceptions that guide people’s use of base rate in the Lawyer–Engineer problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). In four studies, participants induced to believe (or recall, Exp. 2) that a rational cognitive style is success-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style failure-conducive) subsequently viewed themselves as more rational and relied more on base rate in their probability estimates than those induced to believe that a rational cognitive style is failure-conducive (or an intuitive cognitive style success-conducive). These findings show that the desired self had an influence on reasoning in the self-unrelated lawyer–engineer task, since the use of base rates was mediated by changes in participants’ perceptions of their own rationality. These findings therefore show that the desired self, through the working self-concept that it entails, constitutes another factor influencing people’s use of distinct modes of reasoning.     

Grammaticality,Acceptability, and Probability: A Probabilistic View of Linguistic Knowledge

The question of whether humans represent grammatical knowledge as a binary condition on membership in a set of well‐formed sentences, or as a probabilistic property has been the subject of debate among linguists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists for many decades. Acceptability judgments present a serious problem for both classical binary and probabilistic theories of grammaticality. These judgements are gradient in nature, and so cannot be directly accommodated in a binary formal grammar. However, it is also not possible to simply reduce acceptability to probability. The acceptability of a sentence is not the same as the likelihood of its occurrence, which is, in part, determined by factors like sentence length and lexical frequency. In this paper, we present the results of a set of large‐scale experiments using crowd‐sourced acceptability judgments that demonstrate gradience to be a pervasive feature in acceptability judgments. We then show how one can predict acceptability judgments on the basis of probability by augmenting probabilistic language models with an acceptability measure. This is a function that normalizes probability values to eliminate the confounding factors of length and lexical frequency. We describe a sequence of modeling experiments with unsupervised language models drawn from state‐of‐the‐art machine learning methods in natural language processing. Several of these models achieve very encouraging levels of accuracy in the acceptability prediction task, as measured by the correlation between the acceptability measure scores and mean human acceptability values. We consider the relevance of these results to the debate on the nature of grammatical competence, and we argue that they support the view that linguistic knowledge can be intrinsically probabilistic.     

对认知逻辑一个新发展的若干省思

当代有关于外在世界的激进怀疑论者常利用知识封闭性原则去论证他们的立场。为了反驳这样的怀疑论,有些学者主张我们应该重新检视知识的标准,以便发现这些怀疑论论证中的问题,特别是知识封闭性原则是否成立的问题。在这些学者中,有两类极为受到重视:一类是主张知识的成立与否只涉及"相关的"可能性是否已被排除的相关选择理论学者,如D.Lewis、F.Dretske、和M.Heller,另一类则是主张知识的成立与否与某些虚拟条件是否为真有关的虚拟论者,如R.Nozick、E.Sosa、和K.De Rose。不幸的是,对于这两类理论的讨论往往流于直觉并因而缺乏逻辑的严谨性。为了弥补这个缺点,W.Holliday最近利用了两种新的形式化语意论去重新模塑上述两类理论,并严格证明了每种理论在知识封闭性问题上的逻辑结果。他的形式化工作和证明带来了极为严格而又丰硕的成果,本论文的主旨便在对Holliday这一个认知逻辑的新发展方向作出若干哲学与逻辑上的省思。     

Quantifying disablers in reasoning with universal and existential rules

People accept conclusions of valid conditional inferences (e.g., if p then q, p therefore q) less, the more disablers (circumstances that prevent q to happen although p is true) exist. We investigated whether rules that through their phrasing exclude disablers evoke higher acceptance ratings than rules that do not exclude disablers. In three experiments we re-phrased content-rich conditionals from the literature as either universal or existential rules and embedded these rules in Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens inferences. In Experiments 2 and 3, we also used abstract rules. The acceptance of conclusions increased when the rule was phrased with “all” instead of “some” and the number of disablers had a higher impact on existential rules than on universal rules. Further, the effect of quantifier was more pronounced for abstract rules and when tested within subjects. We discuss the relevance of phrasing, quantifiers and knowledge on reasoning.     

Complex learning: the role of knowledge, intelligence, motivation and learning strategies

This work presents the main theories and models formulated with the purpose of offering a global overview on the acquisition of knowledge and skills involved in the initial development of expert competence. Setting from this background, we developed an empirical work whose main purpose is to define those factors in a complex learning situation such as chapter-sized in a knowledge-rich domain. The results obtained in a sample of Master students reveal that the several variables intervening, such as the qualitative organization of knowledge, intellectual ability, motivation, the deliberate use of strategies, and a rich learning environment, contribute in an independent way to provide an explanation for the acquired knowledge.     

Conflict detection,dual processes,and logical intuitions: Some clarifications

Recent studies on conflict detection during thinking suggest that reasoners are sensitive to possible conflict between their heuristic judgement and elementary logical or probabilistic principles. I have argued that this conflict sensitivity calls for the postulation of logical intuitions and has implications for the way we conceive the interaction between System-1 and System-2 in dual process theories. In this paper I clarify potential misconceptions about this work, discuss the link with other approaches, and sketch directions for further research.     

What are theories for? Concept use throughout the continuum of dinosaur expertise

Although it is now well established that object concepts are situated within broader systems of theoretical knowledge, it is less clear how theories influence the use of object concepts at various points throughout the continuum of expertise. Two studies were conducted to investigate the impact of specific theories (concerning dinosaurs) and overarching framework theories (of biology) on children's and adults' performance on categorization tasks involving familiar and less familiar concepts. Although expertise increased the quantity of deep feature knowledge possessed by children and increased their understanding of biologically adaptive relations among features, few aspects of children's performance generalized beyond highly familiar dinosaurs. Children's specific theories related to dinosaurs were empirically constrained and relatively dissociated from other types of biological knowledge. The interaction of specific concept knowledge with broader framework theories of biology throughout the continuum of expertise is considered.     

Useful lies: The twisted rationality of denial

He who increases knowledge increases sorrow.

Ecclesiastes 1:18

The truth will set you free.

John 8:32

Denial, or the habit of treating a real problem as if it were a nonissue, has both rational and irrational features. The interplay between these is best captured by a utilitarian-rationalist framework stretched to its limits. When in denial, people follow what they feel to be in their best interest by minimizing the psychosocial cost of acknowledging their problems. At its core, denial is thus based on a self-interested rationale of pain avoidance and harm minimization. Depending on the characteristics of the issue at hand, some of the effects are deeply ironic. I demonstrate this by starting from the simplest and most beneficial form of denial, before moving on to cases that are more complex and harmful. I also show how people can be liberated from denial when the practice has become counterproductive. Most of the mystery surrounding denial disappears when we accept that it is premised on a twisted kind of rationality.     

An evolutionary system for neural logic networks using genetic programming and indirect encoding

Nowadays, intelligent connectionist systems such as artificial neural networks have been proved very powerful in a wide area of applications. Consequently, the ability to interpret their structure was always a desirable feature for experts. In this field, the neural logic networks (NLN) by their definition are able to represent complex human logic and provide knowledge discovery. However, under contemporary methodologies, the training of these networks may often result in non-comprehensible or poorly designed structures. In this work, we propose an evolutionary system that uses current advances in genetic programming that overcome these drawbacks and produces neural logic networks that can be arbitrarily connected and are easily interpretable into expert rules. To accomplish this task, we guide the genetic programming process using a context-free grammar and we encode indirectly the neural logic networks into the genetic programming individuals. We test the proposed system in two problems of medical diagnosis. Our results are examined both in terms of the solution interpretability that can lead in knowledge discovery, and in terms of the achieved accuracy. We draw conclusions about the effectiveness of the system and we propose further research directions.     

WHAT LIARS CAN TELL US ABOUT THE KNOWLEDGE NORM OF PRACTICAL REASONING

If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010 ) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge‐lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian framework to show that in each of Sorensen's examples, knowledge‐lies alter people's behavior by affecting their beliefs. Second, I show that while we can imagine lies that target knowledge without targeting beliefs, they cannot alter people's behavior. In other words, knowledge‐lies actually work (i.e., manipulate behavior) by targeting beliefs or they do not work at all.     

Scriptural Reasoning as a “Classic”: The Aesthetics of Interreligious Politics

Seeking to find a new way of meeting between Abrahamic traditions, Scriptural Reasoning has established a unique dynamic. This unique dynamic centres on meetings that are based on friendship rather than consensus, wisdom rather than propositional knowledge or binary thinking. Such virtues are not without problems. This article considers one problem: how the results of Scriptural Reasoning, and the insights gleaned from the meetings, can be passed on to the Abrahamic communities and the wider public. Addressing this problematic, the article focuses on the aesthetics of Scriptural Reasoning and its performance. Whereas one method of extending its influence is to widen the practice into the civic sphere and draw more people into the meetings, this article proposes another approach that suggests that the meetings of scholars or “representatives” around their texts constitute a “classic”, which, through vicarious performance can affect the wider public. Further than this, the article outlines a kind of aesthetic politics of religions. Building upon the idea of aesthetic representation proposed in the political sphere by Frank Ankersmit, it is argued that interfaith movements such as Scriptural Reasoning might be presented as a form of political representation.     

Exploring coaches' experiences and perceptions of a virtual parasport coach mentorship program

Partnering with a provincial coaching association in Canada, we explored the experiences and perceptions of 15 mentor and 29 mentee coaches who participated in a formal virtual parasport coach mentorship program. Data were gathered via focus groups and individual interviews and analyzed using a reflexive thematic analysis. Mentor coaches built a virtual relationship through mutual trust and respect and were perceived by their mentees as supportive, motivating, and knowledgeable. Mentee coaches valued conversations with their mentors surrounding disability-specific knowledge that enhanced their coaching efficacy. Coaches highlighted the need for a greater sense of community within parasport and recommended keeping a virtual component of the program to foster accessibility and learning. Findings provide insight into effective mentorship in parasport for researchers, practitioners, and organizations overseeing this important initiative. Our results will contribute to higher quality experiences for Canadian parasport coaches and athletes and work to progress the growth of parasport worldwide.     

The origins of probabilistic inference in human infants

Reasoning under uncertainty is the bread and butter of everyday life. Many areas of psychology, from cognitive, developmental, social, to clinical, are interested in how individuals make inferences and decisions with incomplete information. The ability to reason under uncertainty necessarily involves probability computations, be they exact calculations or estimations. What are the developmental origins of probabilistic reasoning? Recent work has begun to examine whether infants and toddlers can compute probabilities; however, previous experiments have confounded quantity and probability—in most cases young human learners could have relied on simple comparisons of absolute quantities, as opposed to proportions, to succeed in these tasks. We present four experiments providing evidence that infants younger than 12 months show sensitivity to probabilities based on proportions. Furthermore, infants use this sensitivity to make predictions and fulfill their own desires, providing the first demonstration that even preverbal learners use probabilistic information to navigate the world. These results provide strong evidence for a rich quantitative and statistical reasoning system in infants.     

Do reasoning limitations undermine discourse?

Why does discourse so often seem shallow, with people arguing past one another more than with one another? Might contributing causes be individual and logical rather than only dialogical? We consider here whether there exist errors in reasoning that could be particularly damaging in their effects on argumentive discourse. In particular, we examine implications for discourse of two such errors – explanation as a replacement for evidence and neglecting the likelihood of multiple causes contributing to an outcome. In Studies 1 and 2, we show these errors to be prevalent in a cross section of adults, as well as samples of community college students and young adolescents, with minimal age-related improvement. They also occur, although less frequently, among a sample of highly educated adults, and in Study 3, we examine their role in the discourse of college-educated adults. We point finally to evidence that these individual reasoning errors are potentially addressable through education.     

Circular reasoning

Good informal arguments offer justification for their conclusions. They go wrong if the justifications double back, rendering the arguments circular. Circularity, however, is not necessarily a single property of an argument, but may depend on (a) whether the argument repeats an earlier claim, (b) whether the repetition occurs within the same line of justification, and (c) whether the claim is properly grounded in agreed‐upon information. The experiments reported here examine whether people take these factors into account in their judgments of whether arguments are circular and whether they are reasonable. The results suggest that direct judgments of circularity depend heavily on repetition and structural role of claims, but only minimally on grounding. Judgments of reasonableness take repetition and grounding into account, but are relatively insensitive to structural role.     

Judging Knowledge in the Digital Age: The Role of External‐Memory Organization

Two studies examined relations between features of external‐memory repositories (personal computers) and confidence in knowing. Participants judged their confidence in knowledge related to their work or studies and then answered questions about the way they store and use information. Participants who maintained more organized repositories were more confident in their knowledge. Furthermore, moderation analyses showed that the participants who navigated through their files by manually clicking through folders to find documents, but not those who use an automated search feature, felt more knowledge confident if they maintained a well‐organized electronic repository. These results provide evidence for relation between assessments of internally ‘stored’ knowledge and the degree of organization of their externally stored ‘knowledge.’ Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A multitrait–multimethod study of assessment instruments for complex problem solving

Recently published studies on Complex Problem Solving (CPS) suggest that assessments of CPS using multiple complex systems are only moderately related to tests of classical cognitive abilities. Further, CPS assessments show incremental validity beyond tests of other cognitive abilities when predicting relevant outcomes. However, these empirical accounts have relied on single CPS assessment instruments. We do not know whether these findings will generalize to the construct level across different CPS assessment instruments. To answer this question, we tested a sample of N = 339 German university students who completed three CPS assessment instruments based on multiple complex systems (MicroDYN, the Genetics Lab, and MicroFIN) and the matrices subtest of the Intelligence Structure Test as measure of reasoning. Students further reported their school grades. Analyses including latent multitrait–multimethod models provided support for the conceptualization of CPS as a complex cognitive ability. Results indicated that different CPS assessment instruments showed sufficient convergent validity (with a consistency mostly between .50 and .60). In addition, we found evidence for the divergent validity of CPS from reasoning (reasoning predicted two CPS facets, knowledge and control, β_KNOW = .49 and β_CON = .53, respectively). In the prediction of academic achievement, CPS explained variance in natural science grades after we controlled for reasoning (β_CPS = .22), whereas social science grades were not predicted. Our findings suggest that the validity of CPS generalizes across different measurement instruments.