Reiki as surrender: evidence of an external authority

In this article I explore the concept of surrender and its significance for Reiki practitioners. Reiki is a hands-on healing method with roots in spiritual practice. The term ‘surrender’ has been emphasised, not always explicitly, by Reiki practitioners in Britain. I posit that surrender within the Reiki context is indicative of an external authority and source of significance. This contributes to previous literature regarding internal self-authority or non-formative social authority and shows that an external authority provides a third form of influence for practitioners. I explicate the idea of surrender and demonstrate that the object of that surrender, understood as reiki energy, has agency and that the power of this agency is operationalised through authority. In effect, surrender illuminates a consideration of reiki as an agential external authority which is legitimised through practice and training, allowing for new forms of a transformed identity and a sense of freedom and autonomy from hegemonic discourses.     

良心和启蒙:真善判断权问题

There were two prevailing sentiments in Europe after the Reformation: One opposing papal authority and one advocating individual freedom. This paper analyzes these two sentiments and finds that the concept of conscience is crucial in understanding them. The issue of conscience is about judging truth and good, and in initiating the Reformation, Martin Luther heavily appealed to his conscience while countering Catholic attacks. With the wide dispersal of the Reformation, Luther’s notion of conscience was well received among his supporters throughout Europe. Descartes later transformed Luther’s conscience into an epistemological being (the cogito), and argued that its existence was the only valid thing that survived his thorough skepticism — and as such is the foundation of human knowledge. Rousseau continued this line of thinking, which we call subjectivism, and re-employed the term conscience as a replacement for cogito, holding that conscience is the final authority in judging good and bad; that, as the starting point of human existence, it cannot be withheld from any human being; and that it therefore constitutes an inalienable human right. This paper argues that the Enlightenment was a subjectivist movement propelled by this conscience-cogito-conscience conceptualization, and that it sought to enlighten this inalienable conscience. __________ Translated from Qiushi xuekan 求是学刊 (Seeking Truth), 2008, (1): 47–54     

The Virtue of Freedom in Capitalism

ABSTRACT This paper argues that the sort of liberty associated with a capitalist economic system is of particular value because it ensures moral self-responsibility. Two conceptions of freedom are considered but only one is invoked. It is contended that one, namely, positive freedom, is actually a kind of ability or power. One's positive freedom may be lost as a result of events not initiated by other human beings. Negative freedom, by contrast, is a distinctively normative notion. It is a social condition that members of a community ought to maintain out of respect for human dignity, that is, each person's responsibility to choose to live rightly.
It is argued that since 'ought' implies 'can', persons can only be morally responsible for what they can choose to do. If they lack negative freedom, then in addition to natural limitations, they will also be limited by the voluntary conduct of others. Yet this limitation could be prevented by the choices of others, including governments, to secure for all persons their negative freedom. Because of the universality of the requirement that each person be left free, such negative freedom is the quintessential public good.
Finally, the concrete expression of negative freedom is the right to private property— one's sphere of moral authority. This makes the capitalist economic system an essential aspect of the society that secures negative freedom.     

Conceptualising ‘Authority’

Abstract

This paper attempts a conceptualisation of authority intended to be useful across all areas where the concept is relevant. It begins by setting off authority against power, on the one hand, and respect, on the other, and then spells out S₁’s authority as consisting in S₂’s voluntary action performed in the belief that S₁ would approve of it. While this definition should hold for authority generally, a distinction is made between three different kinds of authority according to what grounds them: personal, acquired and bestowed authority. Authority thus defined is then used as an example to argue that there is a kind of property that is response-dependent (R-D), but, consisting in all and only a response, is ontologically different from both secondary qualities and value judgments. While secondary qualities are interactive in that they depend on both the object and the perceiver and on what they are like, genuinely R-D qualities depend ontologically and metaphysically only on the responder. And while value judgments require a concept, R-D qualities require an action as a response. It is hoped that this metaphysical underpinning might be helpful in the discussion of authority in other areas of philosophy and beyond.     

Emancipation from what? The concept of freedom in classical Ch'an Buddhism

This essay attempts to articulate an understanding of the goal of ‘freedom’ in classical Ch'an Buddhism by setting concerns for ‘liberation’ in relation to the kinds of authority and regulated structure characteristic of Sung dynasty Ch'an monasteries. It begins with the thesis that early Western interpreters of Zen have tended to emphasise the dimensions of Zen freedom that accord with modem Western versions of freedom presupposing tension between freedom and authority as well as between individual autonomy and the demands of a communal setting. These dichotomies, assumed by modem Western interpreters, appear to have been absent from this medieval Chinese context, thus suggesting that their concepts of freedom and liberation must have differed significantly from our own. The essay examines classical Ch'an rhetoric and practices in an effort to reconceive what ‘freedom’ might have meant in this context and concludes with a proposal for this reconception.     

Freedom in responsibility: on the relevance of "sin" as a hermeneutic guiding principle in bioethical decision making.

This essay deals with questions of responsibility concerning technology, in particular, gene technology and the special problem of research on embryos. I raise issues concerning the extent of humans' authority to act and the limits of human freedom. In what way is that freedom given, and what kind of responsibility results from it? By discussing various concepts of human freedom in the tradition of European philosophy, as juxtaposed to the Protestant understanding of freedom, this essay discusses the restricting limits, and the obligation to take responsibility. It will turn out that the question concerning freedom cannot be answered without understanding what being human involves. From a Christian perspective, this implies that the foundational relationship between human freedom and sin will be central to an assessment of the human ability to take responsibility. By obliterating the limits of human freedom, sin jeopardizes the very essence of that freedom. The project of taking into account the sinful state of the human condition thus aims at developing a realistic picture of the authority of humans in action, even in view of the human tasks of promoting science and research.     

Freedom and poverty in the Kantian state

The coercive authority of the Kantian state is rationally grounded in the ideal of equal external freedom, which is realized when each individual can choose and act without being constrained by another's will. This ideal does not seem like it can justify state‐mandated economic redistribution. For if one is externally free just as long as one can choose and act without being constrained by another, then only direct slavery, serfdom, or other systems of overt control seem to threaten external freedom. Yet Kant endows the freedom‐based state with considerable powers of economic redistribution. I argue that recent commentary has misunderstood both Kant's account of why poverty is a form of freedom‐threatening dependence and the extent of the Kantian state's powers for remedying poverty. Criticizing Arthur Ripstein and the Kantianism of the “Toronto‐School,” I argue that the most salient notion of dependence at issue within the Kantian framework is not the direct control of the choice‐making capacities of another but asymmetrical influence in a power relationship. For Kant, poverty is fundamentally a problem of structural disempowerment.     

Critical consciousness: current status and future directions

In this chapter, the authors consider Paulo Freire's construct of critical consciousness (CC) and why it deserves more attention in research and discourse on youth political and civic development. His approach to education and similar ideas by other scholars of liberation aims to foster a critical analysis of society--and one's status within it--using egalitarian, empowering, and interactive methods. The aim is social change as well as learning, which makes these ideas especially relevant to the structural injustice faced by marginalized youth. From their review of these ideas, the authors derive three core CC components: critical reflection, political efficacy, and critical action. They highlight promising research related to these constructs and innovative applied work including youth action-research methodology. Their conclusion offers ideas for closing some of the critical gaps in CC theory and research.     

Ferenczi’s Ethics for Our Time: The Possibility of Being Alongside

Ferenczi’s practice and therapeutic ethics as exemplified in the Clinical Diary reveal a profound sensitivity to the questions of authority and freedom. This paper will engage with the ways in which these questions have been taken up elsewhere and have become central to post-war extensions of the psychoanalytic field, such as group analysis. A particular comparison will be made with group analytic notions of leadership and horizontal ways of relating, that is, how to be alongside one another. It will be suggested that the translatability of Ferenczi for our time reveals the adaptability of psychoanalysis to different and changing socio-political contexts.     

Organisms and the form of freedom in Kant's third Critique

In the second half of the third Critique, Kant develops a new form of judgment peculiar to organisms: teleological judgment. In the Appendix to this text, Kant argues that we must regard the final, unconditioned end of creation as human freedom, due to reason's demand that we regard nature as a system of ends. In this paper, I offer a novel interpretation of this argument, according to which judgments of freedom within nature are possible as instances of teleological judgment. Just as individual organisms are to be regarded as governed by supersensible teleological laws, so too is nature as a whole to be regarded as given laws from a supersensible ground. This supersensible ground in the case of nature as a whole is freedom. Freedom and teleological judgments are to be regarded as unifiable with mechanism in the supersensible, and we are to subordinate mechanical explanations to teleological judgments as well as to freedom. This interpretation makes sense both of Kant's claim that he overcomes the “incalculable gulf” between nature and freedom in the third Critique, and also of the location of this argument, as following after and relying on the results of the Dialectic of Teleological Judgment.     

WILLIAM AMES'S CALVINIST AMBIGUITY OVER FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE

Reformed Christianity's qualified embrace of freedom of conscience is perhaps best represented by William Ames (1576–1633). This essay explores Ames's interpretation of conscience, his understanding of its relationship to natural law, Scripture, and civil authority, and his vacillation on the subject of conscientious freedom. By rooting his interpretation of conscience in natural law, Ames provided a foundation for conscience as an authority whose convictions are binding and worthy of some civil respect and freedom. At the same time, his Puritan worldview ultimately required the deference of conscience to the superior manifestations of divine law in Scripture and civil institutions. As a result, Ames provided raw ingredients for a theological doctrine of freedom of conscience despite his unwillingness to commend the idea himself consistently. In this way, Ames symbolizes an ambiguity on freedom of conscience characteristic of the broader Reformed tradition.     

Hare Krishna and Sanatan Dharm in Britain: The Campaign for Bhaktivedanta Manor

Bhaktivedanta Manor, the main centre for ISKCON (the ‘Hare Krishna movement') in Britain, has been under threat of closure for over ten years. The centre—which is a place of pilgrimage for many thousands of Indian Hindus in Britain—is considered by its local authority to be used inappropriately, since it does not have the required planning permission to be a place of public worship. In their view, Bhaktivedanta Manor should be used only as a theological college. ISKCON have challenged this position, and through a series of legal and political battles have tried to prevent the local authority from taking enforcement action. The campaign against closure by ISKCON demonstrates the large support this ‘new’ religion has among the Hindu population of Britain, and indeed has played an important part in developing the relationship between Hindus and the Hare Krishna movement. But the campaign also demonstrates a key point about the role of religious freedom within British law, as the series of legal challenges by ISKCON have highlighted how the right to religious worship is subject to other factors, such as planning regulations.     

Political itineraries and anarchic cosmopolitanism in the thought of Hannah Arendt

In this paper, I argue that Arendt's understanding of freedom should be examined independently of the search for good political institutions because it is related to freedom of movement and has a transnational meaning. Although she does not say it explicitly, Arendt establishes a correlation between political identities and territorial moves: She analyzes regimes in relation to their treatment of lands and borders, that is, specific geographic movements. I call this correlation a political itinerary. My aim is to show genealogically that her elaboration on the regimes of ancient, modern, and ‘dark’ times is supported by such a correlation. I read Arendt in light of the current clash between an amorphous global political identity (and ‘new’ international order) and the renewal of nationalisms. I show that, for Arendt, the world is divided by necessary frontiers – territorial borders and identity frames – and that the political consists precisely of the effort to transgress them. Arendt never proposed a restoration of authority but, on the contrary, a worldwide anarchic (that is, based on no predetermined rule) politics of de‐localization and re‐localization; in her terms, a politics of free movement of founded identities, a cosmopolitanism, which, nevertheless, would have nothing to do with global sovereignty.     

Aesthetic freedom and democratic ethical life: A Hegelian account of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics

This paper presents a novel Hegelian view of the relationship between aesthetics and democratic politics. My account avoids the drawbacks associated with approaches, such as Rancière's, that reconceive all of the political in aesthetic terms or, like Rockhill's, reduce the aesthetic to art. Instead, I maintain that the aesthetic is best understood as a distinct recognition relationship of individual freedom. My argument proceeds by highlighting shortcomings of Honneth's account of democratic Sittlichkeit and then addressing these impasses by integrating aesthetic freedom into the picture. The first two steps of my argument concern the fact that the form of life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of free life, yet his account of democratic Sittlichkeit gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom. The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of freedom incorporated into Honneth's account fail to turn given social roles into the subject matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom. The second problem of freedom concerns conformism. In a final step, I complete my argument that Honneth's account is unsatisfactory and incomplete by showing that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and thus ought to form part of our accounts of democratic ethical life.     

Thoughts on the inner conflict within Islamic culture: Their existential anxieties and ours

Abstract

This paper focuses on how Islamic terrorism is primarily part of a larger internal conflict within Islamic culture. Western, liberal (largely Christian) democracies evolved over centuries of their own bloody philosophical and political struggles between religious authority and what came to be defined as a modern, civil society built on individual freedom of belief, secular authority, and law. Now, Western liberal modernity represents a deep existential threat to traditional Islamic societies around gender, family relations, and individual beliefs. A ferocious internal struggle exists between those Muslims who believe Islam can absorb those tensions – creating its own version of an open, tolerant, cultural modernity – versus political Islamists, jihadists, for whom the annihilation anxiety elicited by the threatened social change is directed both internally and in violent rage at the West.     

Self‐Consciousness,Normativity and Abysmal Freedom

This article critically examines Christine Korsgaard's claim in her Tanner Lectures to find in self‐consciousness itself the norms that would answer our need for practical reasons, insofar as that need is constituted through our capacity for reflection. It shows that the way in which Korsgaard sees “the need for a reason” as arising out of self‐consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want as the ultimate source of our reasons an authority of which we cannot coherently demand legitimation in turn; on the other, our freedom demands that nothing count for us as a reason except insofar as it is in turn endorsed in reflection. Relying on resources drawn from the tradition of reflection, this paper argues that Korsgaard's attempt to resolve this tension is unsuccessful and appeals, in response to this failure, to faith in the authority of our reasons in the absence of foundational justification of them.     

Jehovah's Witnesses in Germany: Prisoners during the Communist Era ∗

Abstract

Commentators on religious freedom disagree on the rationale for its protection. This question of why we protect religious freedom is important because it influences the manner and scope of the protection of religious freedom by the state. The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem argues, in line with some fideistic approaches to the study of religion, that the value of ‘faith’– of belief without reason to believe – justifies the protection of religious freedom. This paper offers a critique of Macklem's account. It argues that this account is inconsistent with a correct view of the nature of reasons, that it overestimates the circumstances in which faith is valuable, that it fails adequately to consider the connections between faith and false beliefs, and that its conclusions imply a much weaker protection of religious freedom than is common in liberal states. This paper also indicates aspects of faith that are valuable, beyond those discussed by Macklem. It is hoped that it will contribute to the debate on the value of faith as well as the broader debate on the justification of religious freedom.     

Analogies between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s Ethical Perspectives

Al-Māturīdī and Duns Scotus share an ethical paradigm that represents the middle ground between divine command and natural law theories in ethics. While al-Māturīdī’s theory can generally be located between Ash?arite divine command and Mu?tazilite natural law theories in Islamic ethics, Scotus’s theory can be placed between William of Ockham’s divine command and Thomas Aquinas’s natural law theories in Christian ethics. Although the starting point of their ethical perspectives is fundamentally based on criticism of natural law theory, neither theologian can be labelled as a typical divine command theorist. This moderate theory may therefore be described as the theory of soft divine command. The main purpose of this article is to draw attention to some similarities between al-Māturīdī’s and Duns Scotus’s ethical perspectives: First, both theologians highlight the composite picture of human nature in terms of morality. In other words, they posit that humans have two opposite tendencies: ‘affection for justice’ and ‘affection for advantage’. Second, although both theologians grant reason an ontological authority in determining what is good and bad, this authority is not limitless. Finally, both theologians argue that, unless one takes account of God’s freedom and wisdom, the moral order in the world cannot be fully comprehended.