共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 0 毫秒
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Jeremy P. Nahum 《Psychoanalytic Dialogues》2017,27(5):621-629
The current discussion offers an alternative to the dissociative self-state model of enactment and dissociation, emphasizing implicit memory processes in bodily comportment and style of relating with others. By embedding the occurrence of enactments within the ongoing flow of nonlinear dyadic process, the focus shifts to the subtle back-and-forth between patient and analyst that leads to the emergence of new relational (i.e., procedural) skills within a therapeutic relationship that is self-organizing at more inclusive levels. Enactment is thus seen as an emergent property of the dyad. 相似文献
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Peter Langland‐Hassan 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2014,95(3):397-420
Pretense is a topic of keen interest to philosophers and psychologists. But what is it, really, to pretend? What features qualify an act as pretense? Surprisingly little has been said on this foundational question. Here I defend an account of what it is to pretend, distinguishing pretense from a variety of related but distinct phenomena, such as (mere) copying and practicing. I show how we can distinguish pretense from sincerity by sole appeal to a person's beliefs, desires, and intentions – and without circular recourse to an ‘intention to pretend’ or to a sui generis mental state of ‘imagining.’ 相似文献
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Ian Parker 《Social and Personality Psychology Compass》2007,1(1):1-15
Critical psychology alerts us to the limitations of mainstream research in the discipline, and it promises to put 'social' issues on the agenda in the whole of psychology. A starting point of the stance of critical psychological research is that the claims that psychologists make about human beings often seem to vanish almost as quickly as they are discovered. People, a group or culture do not behave or think like the model would predict, and, more importantly, we find that our awareness, our reflection on a process described by a psychologist changes that process. It is in the nature of human nature to change, to change as different linguistic resources, social practices, and representations of the self become available, and for human nature to change itself as people reflect on who they are and who they may become. That means that any attempt to fix us in place must fail. But it will only fail in such a way that something productive emerges from it if we do something different, and one place to do something different is in psychology. We need to step back and look at the images of the self, mind and behaviour that psychologists have produced, the types of practices they engage in, and the power those practices, those 'technologies of the self' have to set limits on change. When we appreciate this, we can start to look at what psychologists might do instead as part of a genuinely critical approach. 相似文献
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刘虹 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2005,26(23):1-3
弄清医学哲学是什么和不是什么,是医学哲学学科建设的基本问题.医学哲学理论构架的逻辑起点是生命健康,基本结构是医学哲学的本体论、认识论、方法论、价值论和发展观以及一系列医学范畴."哲学理论+医学实例"不是医学哲学.医学哲学具备超验的思维方式、反思的学术精神、创新的学术风格、开放的学术视野,而临床经验总结、紧跟时局的宣传、时髦热闹的效果,从者众多的场面不是医学哲学. 相似文献
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Scot Campbell 《Ratio》2001,14(3):193-202
The standard version of the psychological criterion or theory of personal identity takes it that psychological connectedness is not necessary for personal identity, or for what matters in survival. That is, a future person can be you, and/or have what matters in survival for you, even though there is no psychological connectedness between you and that future person. David Lewis, however, holds that psychological connectedness is necessary to both identity and what matters (which he takes to coincide). This entails, Lewis acknowledges, that if a human body were to live longer than connectedness lasts, then that body would 'embody' or 'constitute' a different person later on than it did to begin with. Moreover, Lewis accepts, a body may embody more than one person at any one time. Lewis claims that this can be reconciled to some degree with common sense if we count by person stages rather than by persons. I show, though, that Lewis' view cannot be salvaged in this way, and, moreover, that it leads to further absurdities. I conclude that as an account of identity and of what matters in survival, it is highly implausible, and most unsatisfactory. 相似文献
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论医学哲学是什么和不是什么 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
刘虹 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2005,(15)
弄清医学哲学是什么和不是什么,是医学哲学学科建设的基本问题。医学哲学理论构架的逻辑起点是生命健康,基本结构是医学哲学的本体论、认识论、方法论、价值论和发展观以及一系列医学范畴。“哲学理论 医学实例”不是医学哲学。医学哲学具备超验的思维方式、反思的学术精神、创新的学术风格、开放的学术视野,而临床经验总结、紧跟时局的宣传、时髦热闹的效果,从者众多的场面不是医学哲学。 相似文献
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What I intend to do in the following pages is to focus on what might be termed the most important turn in the very dimension of ideality throughout the history of Western culture: the introduction of the notion of ideal drawn from Plato’s notion of idea, and especially its singular contemporary destiny. In the first part of the article, I am going to analyze Kant’s introduction of the notion of ideal and Hegel’s reading of it, and I am going to argue that the former affirms a dualistic relationship which the latter negates. In the second part of the article, I am going to reason on the actual effects of both the affirmation and the negation of the dualism between the ideal and the real, especially focusing on the forms of totalitarianism and anarchism which characterized the twentieth-century history of Western culture. This will lead me to argue that we should try to avoid both the bad uses of the ideal (namely, the idealization of the real and the debasement of the real through the ideal) and the death of the ideal (namely, forms of epistemological and ethical anarchism) in order to work on a notion of ideal which could be an exceedingly promising tool for us to change and improve the real. This change and improvement can be achieved through the affirmation of the dualistic relationship between the ideal and the real, and more specifically through what I will call an evolutionary notion of ideal versus a revolutionary notion of ideal. 相似文献
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